A Brief Essay on the God of the Gaps Fallacy
Why do so many Christians use God of the Gaps arguments even though they intuitively understand that sort of argument is fallacious? In this short essay, I take a shot at answering my question.
God of the gaps arguments are often used by religious believers to assert their god exists. Such arguments, in my experience, have often had the following form.
1. Human knowledge does not include X.
2. It is impossible for X to be caused or explained under naturalism.
3. Therefore, God did it.
The believer's burden of proof for premise 1 is to show that the relevant scientific literature does not include X. The believer must show an exhaustive survey of the relevant scientific literature to support their first premise. Any failure to show a dearth of knowledge dooms the argument.
In order to validly make premise 2, the believer must have omniscient knowledge of all natural phenomena to rule out any possibility of natural causation. This neither the believer nor any other person can do, for human beings are not omniscient. Conceptually, the Uniformity of Nature is secure. No instance of a supernatural explanation supplanting a natural cause has ever been observed. The converse, however, has been witnessed many times. The history of science is the history of sweeping away superstitions, of showing alleged supernatural explanations to be not even wrong. The context of supernaturalism is not the context of reality. Fantasies of gods, demons, angels, spirits, magic, fairies, incorporeal beings and such can neither be right nor wrong, for they are not part of or even related to reality. (Additionally, it is amusing to note that by making premise 2, believers blaspheme their idea of God by predicating they are omniscient. Comparing their minds to God or asserting they are God constitutes blasphemy.)
Even if the first two premises were sound, the conclusion would not follow. Under a supernatural worldview, there are an infinite number of invisible magic beings or other causes that could be responsible for a given phenomenon. Most religionists actively seek to gloss over this uncomfortable fact of their worldview. Their feeble protestations notwithstanding, the preeminent standing granted to the primacy of consciousness and mere alleged possibility renders any "god of the gaps" conclusion Non Sequitur.
Despite the obvious irrationality of this type of argument, religious believers continue to predicate their assertions at least in part thereupon. Why? If what they believe is so believable, then why do they believe by faith what is propped up by obvious and ostensively fallacious arguments? Blank out. Could it be that what the religious believer claims is not actually believable?
What does it mean for something to be believable? The primary definition of believable is "to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing so".
What does it mean to say that something is the truth? The first three definitions of truth are:
1. the true or actual state of a matter:
2. conformity with fact or reality; verity: .
3. a verified or indisputable fact, proposition, principle, or the like:
For something to be believable human beings must be able to have confidence or reliability that the given proposition is the actual state of the matter that is in conformity with the fact of reality in the sense of a verified and indisputable objective event. What must the religious believer do in order to be confident that what she believes is actually believable – actually in conformity with the fact of reality? The believer, if she is to be honest with herself, must accurately compare her faith propositions with actual reality and accept only those propositions comparing favorably. But if the believer does not need absolute proof of being right in so doing, then she need not be concerned that any proposition she believes "true" be only probably in conformity with the fact of reality. By accepting as absolutely true propositions that only probably compare favorably with the fact of reality, is the believer not disrobing the primacy of existence of meaning? In so doing the believer is finding a back door to a primacy of consciousness fantasy and thereby reversing the proper epistemological subject-object order of her own consciousness.
With a subject of thought-object of thought reversal in hand, it then becomes child's play to hold god of the gaps arguments as valid and sound reasons to believe. By ascribing a probability of truth to god of the gaps arguments, the believer inculcates a sense of correctness for her propositions and justifies ignoring any lack in comparing correctly with reality. This vivifies her subject of thought-object of thought epistemic reversal. Self-purposed feedback loops tend to reinforce themselves on each run. A hysteresis effect ameliorates such feedback, yet as the loop progresses, the facts of reality dim. For that reason, it is vitally important for human beings to ground their cognition to the metaphysically actual and accept only that which is demonstratively in conformity with fact or reality. Thus lack of knowledge should lead us to be skeptical of the claims of god believers.
God of the gaps arguments are often used by religious believers to assert their god exists. Such arguments, in my experience, have often had the following form.
1. Human knowledge does not include X.
2. It is impossible for X to be caused or explained under naturalism.
3. Therefore, God did it.
The believer's burden of proof for premise 1 is to show that the relevant scientific literature does not include X. The believer must show an exhaustive survey of the relevant scientific literature to support their first premise. Any failure to show a dearth of knowledge dooms the argument.
In order to validly make premise 2, the believer must have omniscient knowledge of all natural phenomena to rule out any possibility of natural causation. This neither the believer nor any other person can do, for human beings are not omniscient. Conceptually, the Uniformity of Nature is secure. No instance of a supernatural explanation supplanting a natural cause has ever been observed. The converse, however, has been witnessed many times. The history of science is the history of sweeping away superstitions, of showing alleged supernatural explanations to be not even wrong. The context of supernaturalism is not the context of reality. Fantasies of gods, demons, angels, spirits, magic, fairies, incorporeal beings and such can neither be right nor wrong, for they are not part of or even related to reality. (Additionally, it is amusing to note that by making premise 2, believers blaspheme their idea of God by predicating they are omniscient. Comparing their minds to God or asserting they are God constitutes blasphemy.)
Even if the first two premises were sound, the conclusion would not follow. Under a supernatural worldview, there are an infinite number of invisible magic beings or other causes that could be responsible for a given phenomenon. Most religionists actively seek to gloss over this uncomfortable fact of their worldview. Their feeble protestations notwithstanding, the preeminent standing granted to the primacy of consciousness and mere alleged possibility renders any "god of the gaps" conclusion Non Sequitur.
Despite the obvious irrationality of this type of argument, religious believers continue to predicate their assertions at least in part thereupon. Why? If what they believe is so believable, then why do they believe by faith what is propped up by obvious and ostensively fallacious arguments? Blank out. Could it be that what the religious believer claims is not actually believable?
What does it mean for something to be believable? The primary definition of believable is "to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing so".
What does it mean to say that something is the truth? The first three definitions of truth are:
1. the true or actual state of a matter:
2. conformity with fact or reality; verity: .
3. a verified or indisputable fact, proposition, principle, or the like:
For something to be believable human beings must be able to have confidence or reliability that the given proposition is the actual state of the matter that is in conformity with the fact of reality in the sense of a verified and indisputable objective event. What must the religious believer do in order to be confident that what she believes is actually believable – actually in conformity with the fact of reality? The believer, if she is to be honest with herself, must accurately compare her faith propositions with actual reality and accept only those propositions comparing favorably. But if the believer does not need absolute proof of being right in so doing, then she need not be concerned that any proposition she believes "true" be only probably in conformity with the fact of reality. By accepting as absolutely true propositions that only probably compare favorably with the fact of reality, is the believer not disrobing the primacy of existence of meaning? In so doing the believer is finding a back door to a primacy of consciousness fantasy and thereby reversing the proper epistemological subject-object order of her own consciousness.
With a subject of thought-object of thought reversal in hand, it then becomes child's play to hold god of the gaps arguments as valid and sound reasons to believe. By ascribing a probability of truth to god of the gaps arguments, the believer inculcates a sense of correctness for her propositions and justifies ignoring any lack in comparing correctly with reality. This vivifies her subject of thought-object of thought epistemic reversal. Self-purposed feedback loops tend to reinforce themselves on each run. A hysteresis effect ameliorates such feedback, yet as the loop progresses, the facts of reality dim. For that reason, it is vitally important for human beings to ground their cognition to the metaphysically actual and accept only that which is demonstratively in conformity with fact or reality. Thus lack of knowledge should lead us to be skeptical of the claims of god believers.
5 comments:
I made reference to several concepts from Objectivism in the above essay. The primacy of existence vs the primacy of consciousness is cardinal to enthymemes presupposed by many philosophies. Is reality objective? Or is it the case that consciousness of some sort rules existence? If the former, then existence has metaphysical primacy. If the later, then "the primacy of consciousness means the primacy of the subject in the subject-object relationship." [1] The one who is conscious is the subject of thought, and the things she is conscious of are the objects of thought. The subject of thought cannot change, amend, modify, manipulate, create or destroy the objects of thought. This is true of all forms of consciousness. Those who assert the contrary commit the fallacy of epistemological subject-object reversal. Dawson Bethrick specializes in discussions of this issue. (See footnote [1].)
My hero, Ayn Rand, wrote a cool essay called “The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made.” There she clearly defined the bifurcation interjacent opposing world views.
"The basic metaphysical issue that lies at the root of any system of philosophy [is] the primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness.
The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness—the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness).
The source of this reversal is the inability or unwillingness fully to grasp the difference between one’s inner state and the outer world, i.e., between the perceiver and the perceived (thus blending consciousness and existence into one indeterminate package-deal). This crucial distinction is not given to man automatically; it has to be learned. It is implicit in any awareness, but it has to be grasped conceptually and held as an absolute."
There is much more to be said on this issue, and it is appropriate for this blog. The case for Objectivism is a case against all forms of god belief.
[1] Dawson Bethrick, Incinerating Presuppositionalism blog, http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/
[2] Ayn Rand, “The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made,” in
Philosophy: Who Needs It, 24.
"2, the believer must have omniscient knowledge of all natural phenomena to rule out any possibility of natural causation. This neither the believer nor any other person can do, for human beings are not omniscient."
In that statement INSERT:
"Atheist" for "believer",
"Supernatural" for "natural", and
"God" for "natural causation"...
This is the problem with the atheist argument in general, gaps or no gaps.
What say ye?
In that statement INSERT:
"Atheist" for "believer",
"Supernatural" for "natural", and
"God" for "natural causation"...
This is the problem with the atheist argument in general, gaps or no gaps.
You failed to account for an important difference between the theistic and materialistic arguments.
We know nature exists. We can see it, experience it and reproduce it in a reliable fashion. As such we do not create some new realm of contra-nature as part of the process.
You do.
We can use an pie analogy illustrate this difference.
Materialists think there is one pie to which we do not have all the pieces yet. We know this pie exists because we can see the slices we do have.
However, theists claim there is not one pie, but actually two separate pies: one that is natural and another that is supernatural.
Theists point to the missing slices in the first pie and claim it justifies adding an entirely new pie into the equation. They go on to say some pieces missing in the first pie are actually in the second, even thought they lack exhaustive knowledge of the contents of first pie, which we do know exists.
This is like claiming knowledge that characters do not exist in a novel without actually having read the entire book from cover to cover.
Theists have no reliable way of demonstrating the second pie actually exists at all. However, this doesn't stop them from making specific claims about the second pie's contents. In fact, they say slices in the second pie intentionally hide it's existence from us but wants us to believe it exists anyway.
How do they know this? They say one of the slices in the second pie, which cannot be reliably seen or identified, revealed this information to them in some special channel of communication, which also cannot be replicated or clearly identified as actually coming from the second pie.
Materialists do not deny that we do not have all of slices. However they do not think the addition of an entirely new pie is justified because there simply isn't sufficient evidence to suggest a second pie actually exists, let alone contains specific slices.
Personally, I don't really think the existence of gaps are the reason why theists believe God exists. The gaps serve as justifications for their beliefs, which they hold for other, non-concrete reasons.
Robert,
I Just finished listening to the audio book version of Atlas Shrugged, by Any Rand. Thanks for the article, links and references!
Scott wrote:
-"Materialists think there is one pie to which we do not have all the pieces yet. We know this pie exists because we can see the slices we do have.
However, theists claim there is not one pie, but actually two separate pies: one that is natural and another that is supernatural."
Mike Earl in one of his audio presentations makes a similar analogy, but uses the example of a jigsaw puzzle. He says something like this;
'We naturalists admit that we only have some of the puzzle pieces, but theists assert that they have the box that the puzzle came in, including a picture on the front of the box which shows what the puzzle is supposed to look like when completed. Theists claim that the puzzle makes a picture of a dog, however we naturalists, using the pieces we already have, conclude that it is actually a picture of a cow.
As we continue to aquire new puzzle pieces, it becomes increasingly obvious that what we have is a picture of a cow, but the theist stubbornly clings to his dog, as if the puzzle pieces which we have already assembled demonstrating that it's a cow, mean nothing.'
I suspect that even if or when we naturalists have finally assembled all of the puzzle pieces, and can unmistakebly demonstrate that what we have is a picture of a cow rather than a dog, then some desperate theists will still continue to assert that what we actually have is a picture of a dog, which by a remarkable co-incidence just happens to look exactly like a cow.
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