David Hume: “A miracle may be accurately defined as a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”
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Hume’s target was the Christian religion with its miracles. He argued against the probability of human testimony on behalf of miracles focusing on the Christian religion with its miracle claims. The root word “relig” with its endings (-ion –ions -ious –ionist) occurs twenty times in this chapter].
Below are a few paragraphs from the end of Hume's chapter (#97-100) with notes.
Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. [This sums up Hume's conclusion. It entails that even if human testimony could amount to a proof it would be canceled out by an opposite proof from the laws of nature. So John Earman grossly misinterpreted Hume. It is not the case Hume simplistically stated the obvious, that “one should not believe a miracle unless it is greater than 50% probable in light of the evidence.”]
According to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion. [This states Hume’s Maxim. It’s not just miracles he aims at, it’s whole systems of religion].
In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. [We don’t hear of religions until after they become known, after the witnesses and records are lost or forgotten].
I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. [Miracles without corresponding religions might be possible].
But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree, that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years. [This is an example of a miracle without a religion].
I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. [Hume doubts this miracle.]
But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination. [But if a miracle was part of a new system of religion it can be dismissed without the evidence (Hitchens' Razor before Hitchens!)].
Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered. [Even if there’s a God, a miracle isn’t any more probable. Hume argues we still only have human testimony for religious miracles, which is so bad we shouldn’t pay any attention to it. Keep in mind Hume previously disputed the philosophical arguments of the existence of God (such as the design, cosmological, and ontological arguments)].
Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. 'We ought,' says he, 'to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions and in a word of every thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature.' [Prodigious or monstrous births were congenital anomalies often attributed to divine omens, or hoaxes. The most famous of them was the 1726 Mary Toft Rabbit Hoax. She convinced several prominent physicians and royal surgeons she had given birth to a series of seventeen rabbits.] But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion: And no less so, every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable. [Hume compares beliefs about monsters, magic, and alchemy with religious beliefs. If the "wise and learned" doubt the former they should more so doubt the later. Presumably these beliefs are opposed to the evidence of senses (per his book)].
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. [Hume's arguments based on reason, should confound those who wish to defend the Christian religion, exposing it to be based on nothing but Faith].
To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian. [Hume will focus on just the first five books of the Bible, the ones embraced by Jews and Christians ].
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Hume’s target was the Christian religion with its miracles. He argued against the probability of human testimony on behalf of miracles focusing on the Christian religion with its miracle claims. The root word “relig” with its endings (-ion –ions -ious –ionist) occurs twenty times in this chapter].
Below are a few paragraphs from the end of Hume's chapter (#97-100) with notes.
Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. [This sums up Hume's conclusion. It entails that even if human testimony could amount to a proof it would be canceled out by an opposite proof from the laws of nature. So John Earman grossly misinterpreted Hume. It is not the case Hume simplistically stated the obvious, that “one should not believe a miracle unless it is greater than 50% probable in light of the evidence.”]
According to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion. [This states Hume’s Maxim. It’s not just miracles he aims at, it’s whole systems of religion].
In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. [We don’t hear of religions until after they become known, after the witnesses and records are lost or forgotten].
I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. [Miracles without corresponding religions might be possible].
But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree, that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years. [This is an example of a miracle without a religion].
I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. [Hume doubts this miracle.]
But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination. [But if a miracle was part of a new system of religion it can be dismissed without the evidence (Hitchens' Razor before Hitchens!)].
Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered. [Even if there’s a God, a miracle isn’t any more probable. Hume argues we still only have human testimony for religious miracles, which is so bad we shouldn’t pay any attention to it. Keep in mind Hume previously disputed the philosophical arguments of the existence of God (such as the design, cosmological, and ontological arguments)].
Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. 'We ought,' says he, 'to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions and in a word of every thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature.' [Prodigious or monstrous births were congenital anomalies often attributed to divine omens, or hoaxes. The most famous of them was the 1726 Mary Toft Rabbit Hoax. She convinced several prominent physicians and royal surgeons she had given birth to a series of seventeen rabbits.] But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion: And no less so, every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable. [Hume compares beliefs about monsters, magic, and alchemy with religious beliefs. If the "wise and learned" doubt the former they should more so doubt the later. Presumably these beliefs are opposed to the evidence of senses (per his book)].
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. [Hume's arguments based on reason, should confound those who wish to defend the Christian religion, exposing it to be based on nothing but Faith].
To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian. [Hume will focus on just the first five books of the Bible, the ones embraced by Jews and Christians ].
Here then we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established. [He rhetorically asks this question. For him the answer is obvious. Again, Hitchens' Razor before Hitchens!]
What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. [In the same manner Hume disputes prophecy in defense of religion].
So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. [This is ridicule. To believe in miracles requires Faith, which subverts all the principles of understanding].
What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. [In the same manner Hume disputes prophecy in defense of religion].
So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. [This is ridicule. To believe in miracles requires Faith, which subverts all the principles of understanding].
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