--Norman Geisler, a Christian apologist, is on record as saying:
--I. Howard Marshal. According to Christian intellectual Marshall in his book, I Believe in the Historical Jesus (Eerdmans, 1977) “many historians—the great majority in fact—would say that miracles fall outside their orbit as historians. For to accept the miraculous as a possibility in history is to admit an irrational element which cannot be included under the ordinary laws of history. The result is that the historian believes himself justified in writing a ‘history’ of Jesus in which the miraculous and supernatural do not appear in historical statements. The ‘historical’ Jesus is an ordinary man. To some historians he is that and no more. To others, however, the possibility is open that he was more than an ordinary man—but this possibility lies beyond the reach of historical study as such.” (p. 59).
--William Lane Craig is on record as saying:
--J.L. Mackie argued against the belief in miracles. Let me quote from him since it's so good:
Plantinga asks the following question: "why should we think it is particularly improbable that a law of nature be interfered with?" He continues, "I have no reason to suppose that the world is not regularly interfered with. Why couldn't interferences with nature be the rule rather than the exception?" But to people who disagree with Plantinga, that's not a very bright question at all. How often has anyone ever seen a real miracle? Science has progressed on the assumption that miracles don't occur in the laboratory. Plantinga debates with modern science here. Now to those of us who question the believability of miracles, that just seems superficial to us. It really really is superficial to us.
From Geisler to Marshall to Craig to Plantinga to Mackie and myself. Perspective matters. That's the legacy of Bayes Theorem. It reminds us that we're all dealing with contexts, perspectives, priors, and background information. As human beings we can't easily avoid the cognitive biases that produce in us the desire, the need, and the motivation to confirm what we believe rather than seek the truth, to assume (without justification) we're all raised to believe the truth, to squelch the inquisitive itch to launch out into new intellectual territory.
Why? Because it's all about "seeing." I simply see things differently, and I will argue that I see things better. But I can no more decisively refute Craig and Plantinga, than they could decisively refute me. It's not about refuting, though. It's not even about scholarship. It's about seeing things differently. I have offered reasons why I see things differently. To help us all I've written a rescue type of help book, The Outsider Test For Faith: How to Know Which Religion Is True. Just go and read it. While you're at it read some of the other books of mine that interest you. I see things differently, and I think what I have concluded is truth, and have backed it up.
I try to help Christians see things from my side of the fence. I've been there as an apologist, and from my side of the fence now, it's not justifiable. Seeing things differently means dealing with one's contexts, perspectives, priors, and background information, the things Bayes Theorem has provoked us all to consider when debating and discussing important issues to us all.
The mere fact of the resurrection cannot be used to establish the truth that there is a God. For the resurrection cannot even be a miracle unless there already is a God. . . . The real problem for the Christian apologist is to find some way apart from the mere facts themselves to establish the justifiability of interpreting the facts in a theistic way. . . . No fact, event, or series thereof within an overall framework which derives all of its meaning from the framework can be determinative of the framework which bestows that meaning on it. For no fact or set of facts can of and by themselves, apart from any meaning or interpretation given to them, establish which of the alternative viewpoints should be taken on the fact(s). [Norman Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker House, 1976), see pp. 94–98.]Geilser's perspective stands in stark contrast to other ways of knowing whether Jesus arose from the dead. Geisler was endorsing Classical apologetics. Evidentialist apologetics by contrast, rejects it (with some nuances).
--I. Howard Marshal. According to Christian intellectual Marshall in his book, I Believe in the Historical Jesus (Eerdmans, 1977) “many historians—the great majority in fact—would say that miracles fall outside their orbit as historians. For to accept the miraculous as a possibility in history is to admit an irrational element which cannot be included under the ordinary laws of history. The result is that the historian believes himself justified in writing a ‘history’ of Jesus in which the miraculous and supernatural do not appear in historical statements. The ‘historical’ Jesus is an ordinary man. To some historians he is that and no more. To others, however, the possibility is open that he was more than an ordinary man—but this possibility lies beyond the reach of historical study as such.” (p. 59).
--William Lane Craig is on record as saying:
"J.L. Mackie's critique of miracles is particularly shockingly superficial."Craig said this in his paper, The Resurrection of Theism, Endnote # 19. Craig was commenting on the late J.L. Mackie's book, The Miracle of Theism. Craig was prompted to say this while reading Alvin Plantinga’s critique of it titled, Is Theism Really a Miracle?, in Faith and Philosophy, [April 1986].
--J.L. Mackie argued against the belief in miracles. Let me quote from him since it's so good:
“The defender of a miracle...must in effect concede to Hume that the antecedent improbability of this event is as high as it could be, hence that, apart from the testimony, we have the strongest possible grounds for believing that the alleged event did not occur. This event must, by the miracle advocate’s own admission, be contrary to a genuine, not merely supposed, law of nature, and therefore maximally improbable. It is this maximal improbability that the weight of the testimony would have to overcome.” “Where there is some plausible testimony about the occurrence of what would appear to be a miracle, those who accept this as a miracle have the double burden of showing both that the event took place and that it violated the laws of nature. But it will be very hard to sustain this double burden. For whatever tends to show that it would have been a violation of a natural law tends for that very reason to make it most unlikely that is actually happened.”Mackie then distinguishes between two different contexts in which an alleged miracle might be considered as a real one:
First, there is the context of two parties in which “already both have accepted some general theistic doctrines and the point at issue is, whether a miracle has occurred which would enhance the authority of a specific sect or teacher. In this context supernatural intervention, though prima facie (“on the surface”) unlikely on any particular occasion is, generally speaking, on the cards: it is not altogether outside the range of reasonable expectation for these parties.”--John W. Loftus. So I re-read Plantinga's essay critiquing Mackie. As I was doing so, I thought to myself this was superficial too, from my perspective. I'm serious! It's obvious that Plantinga critiques Mackie from a theistic perspective. He even says so. Plantinga refers repeatedly to the phrase "to me," "my evidence," "my experience," or "our evidence." Take for example this sentence: “as a matter of fact it could be that what is in fact a violation of a law of nature (a miracle) not only wasn’t particularly improbable with respect to our evidence (emphasis mine), but was in fact more probable than not with respect to it.” What kind of evidence is he speaking to that is specifically his? He’s debating Mackie from within a viewpoint Mackie doesn’t accept. That is, he totally ignores Mackie’s distinction between the two contexts in which an alleged miracle might be considered as a real one. Mackie’s debate is inside the second context where it’s a “fundamental debate about the truth of theism itself.”
The second context is a very different matter when “the context is that of fundamental debate about the truth of theism itself. Here one party to the debate is initially at least agnostic, and does not yet concede that there is a supernatural power at all. From this point of view the intrinsic improbability of a genuine miracle…is very great, and that one or other of the alternative explanations…will always be much more likely—that is, either that the alleged event is not miraculous, or that it did not occur, or that the testimony is faulty in some way.” Mackie concludes by saying: “This entails that it is pretty well impossible that reported miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism.” (From chapter one).
Plantinga asks the following question: "why should we think it is particularly improbable that a law of nature be interfered with?" He continues, "I have no reason to suppose that the world is not regularly interfered with. Why couldn't interferences with nature be the rule rather than the exception?" But to people who disagree with Plantinga, that's not a very bright question at all. How often has anyone ever seen a real miracle? Science has progressed on the assumption that miracles don't occur in the laboratory. Plantinga debates with modern science here. Now to those of us who question the believability of miracles, that just seems superficial to us. It really really is superficial to us.
From Geisler to Marshall to Craig to Plantinga to Mackie and myself. Perspective matters. That's the legacy of Bayes Theorem. It reminds us that we're all dealing with contexts, perspectives, priors, and background information. As human beings we can't easily avoid the cognitive biases that produce in us the desire, the need, and the motivation to confirm what we believe rather than seek the truth, to assume (without justification) we're all raised to believe the truth, to squelch the inquisitive itch to launch out into new intellectual territory.
Why? Because it's all about "seeing." I simply see things differently, and I will argue that I see things better. But I can no more decisively refute Craig and Plantinga, than they could decisively refute me. It's not about refuting, though. It's not even about scholarship. It's about seeing things differently. I have offered reasons why I see things differently. To help us all I've written a rescue type of help book, The Outsider Test For Faith: How to Know Which Religion Is True. Just go and read it. While you're at it read some of the other books of mine that interest you. I see things differently, and I think what I have concluded is truth, and have backed it up.
I try to help Christians see things from my side of the fence. I've been there as an apologist, and from my side of the fence now, it's not justifiable. Seeing things differently means dealing with one's contexts, perspectives, priors, and background information, the things Bayes Theorem has provoked us all to consider when debating and discussing important issues to us all.
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