Response to Dr. Blomberg
Dr. Blomberg’s view of altruism is flawed in light of recent primatological research.
I thank Dr. Blomberg for posting his commentary on Debunking Christianity. Here, I would like to respond to his argument for theism based on altruism. In addition to being a trained biblical scholar, I am also formally trained as an anthropologist (B.A., University of Arizona, 1982 + 1 year of graduate work). I have had a longstanding interest in the evolution of morality.
Dr. Blomberg’s post seems uninformed about crucial advances taking place in primatology as well as in neurobiology, which can explain altruistic behavior. I begin with this remark from Dr. Blomberg:
"What about the sheer altruism, utterly unmotivated by self-interest, which leads firefighters to sacrifice their lives by running back into towering infernos? Only the concept of humans made in the image of God can account for that in my estimation."
In one of the responses he adds:
"The most advanced of apes has never disclosed any awareness of systems of morality, which is why we never arrest and imprison them, even if they kill humans."
His example about human beings not imprisoning apes is not only factually incorrect (we do "imprison," kill, or separate apes who hurt human beings), but also overlooks that the human beings he describes may not be informed about recent primatological research. Otherwise, these are the problems with Dr. Blomberg’s argument:
1. It relies on a God-of-the-Gaps argument.
Dr. Blomberg suggests that since we don’t have a naturalistic explanation for altruism, then this should be relegated to the actions of God. Historically, such arguments have been overturned repeatedly. We can name literally hundreds of phenomena once thought to be supernatural, but which were subsequently overturned by completely naturalistic explanations. Everything from lightning to earthquakes were once thought to have supernatural origins before we discovered naturalistic explanations.
The reverse has never been the case to my knowledge. That is to say, I don’t know of any case where a naturalistic explanation has been replaced by an indisputably supernaturalistic one. The replacement of natural explanations by indisputably supernatural explanations has batted a zero in history. Given such a track record, therefore, it is reasonable to posit that altruism is no less naturalistic than any other phenomenon observed.
2. We do have observations of animals who act to save other individuals even when it imperils their lives.
One recent dramatic case was in Santiago, Chile, where a dog rushed into traffic and dragged to safety another dog lying on the road. See video here: Dog saves Dog in Traffic
Can Dr. Blomberg explain why a dog would do such a thing?
3. Recent and very rigorous primatological research shows that greater apes do have a sense of what we might call “morality.”
Crucial here is the research of Frans de Waal, Professor of Primate Behavior in the Department of Psychology at Emory University. Frans de Waal has brought a methodological and experimental rigor to primate behavioral research that provides good controls. Overall, de Waal’s research shows a continuity between higher ape “moral” behavior and that of human beings (as opposed to previous theorists who think human moral behavior is completely unique and/or an innovation).
In some cases (e.g., food sharing behavior), his data sets have involved upwards of 7,000 interactions (see de Waal. “Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations Among Chimpanzees.” Journal of Human Evolution 18 [1989]:433-459).
In addition, to his important books (Good Natured: The Origin of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals [1996] and Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved [2006]), I would suggest his following technical articles:
S. F. Brosnan and F. B. M. de Waal. Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay.
Nature 425 (2003):297-299.
F. B. M. de Waal and A. van Roosmalen. Reconciliation and Consolation
among Chimpanzees. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology
5 (1979):55-66.
Let me just briefly summarize the results of some of these experiments. In the article in Nature, Dr. de Waal devised elegant experiments showing that capuchin monkeys do have a sense of fairness. For example, capuchin monkeys might reject a food reward of less value if they observe other monkeys receiving food of higher value for performing the same task.
Just as compelling are the earlier experiments showing that Rhesus monkeys refuse to pull a chain that delivered food to themselves if pulling the chain shocked other monkeys. Some monkeys were willing to starve if getting food for themselves meant hurting other monkeys. See: J. Masserman. M. S. Wechkin and W. Terris. Altruistic Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys. American Journal of Psychiatry 121 [1964]: 584-585.
How would Dr. Blomberg explain that behavior?
In his research on consolation, de Waal found that chimpanzees who observe a fight between two other chimpanzees will offer consolation behavior at much higher rates to the recipient of the aggression than to the aggressor. This also involved hundreds of rigorously quantified conflictive interactions, and not just a few anecdotes.
Further research by de Waal shows that chimpanzees do make inferences about the mental and emotional states of other chimpanzees, and then tailor their own behavior accordingly. In other words, we see incipient theories of mind among greater apes. Combined with research about the development of morality in infants, primatology can greatly elucidate what we observe in human beings.
Neurobiology is also helping us to make great strides in explaining the origin of human morality. For example, consider recent experiments elucidating the role of Oxytocin, a neuropeptide, in explaining nurturing and “trust” behavior in animals. See, for example, Duo Jin et al., CD28 is Critical for Social Behaviour by Regulating Oxytocin Secretion. Nature 446, (1 March 2007): 41-45.
In any case, the conjoining of primatology, neurobiology, and human developmental psychology will probably yield much better explanations for “altruism” than the old “God-does-it” theories, which have not a single piece of verifiable scientific evidence to support them. Dr. Blomberg must interact fully with this scientific and anthropological literature before he can convince us that a theistic argument is a better alternative.
If he wishes to respond, I hope Dr. Blomberg can at least address these questions:
1. Are you familiar with the the primatological and neurobiological literature I have cited above? If so, could you tell us where you have cited or critiqued it?
2. How do you explain the motivations of the dog who saved the other dog in traffic?
3. Why do Rhesus monkeys prefer to starve rather than receive food if that means hurting other monkeys?
4. How do you explain that Oxytocin pathway malfunctions will result in a loss of nurturing behavior in some animals?
Otherwise, thanks again for your time and for posting on our website.
I thank Dr. Blomberg for posting his commentary on Debunking Christianity. Here, I would like to respond to his argument for theism based on altruism. In addition to being a trained biblical scholar, I am also formally trained as an anthropologist (B.A., University of Arizona, 1982 + 1 year of graduate work). I have had a longstanding interest in the evolution of morality.
Dr. Blomberg’s post seems uninformed about crucial advances taking place in primatology as well as in neurobiology, which can explain altruistic behavior. I begin with this remark from Dr. Blomberg:
"What about the sheer altruism, utterly unmotivated by self-interest, which leads firefighters to sacrifice their lives by running back into towering infernos? Only the concept of humans made in the image of God can account for that in my estimation."
In one of the responses he adds:
"The most advanced of apes has never disclosed any awareness of systems of morality, which is why we never arrest and imprison them, even if they kill humans."
His example about human beings not imprisoning apes is not only factually incorrect (we do "imprison," kill, or separate apes who hurt human beings), but also overlooks that the human beings he describes may not be informed about recent primatological research. Otherwise, these are the problems with Dr. Blomberg’s argument:
1. It relies on a God-of-the-Gaps argument.
Dr. Blomberg suggests that since we don’t have a naturalistic explanation for altruism, then this should be relegated to the actions of God. Historically, such arguments have been overturned repeatedly. We can name literally hundreds of phenomena once thought to be supernatural, but which were subsequently overturned by completely naturalistic explanations. Everything from lightning to earthquakes were once thought to have supernatural origins before we discovered naturalistic explanations.
The reverse has never been the case to my knowledge. That is to say, I don’t know of any case where a naturalistic explanation has been replaced by an indisputably supernaturalistic one. The replacement of natural explanations by indisputably supernatural explanations has batted a zero in history. Given such a track record, therefore, it is reasonable to posit that altruism is no less naturalistic than any other phenomenon observed.
2. We do have observations of animals who act to save other individuals even when it imperils their lives.
One recent dramatic case was in Santiago, Chile, where a dog rushed into traffic and dragged to safety another dog lying on the road. See video here: Dog saves Dog in Traffic
Can Dr. Blomberg explain why a dog would do such a thing?
3. Recent and very rigorous primatological research shows that greater apes do have a sense of what we might call “morality.”
Crucial here is the research of Frans de Waal, Professor of Primate Behavior in the Department of Psychology at Emory University. Frans de Waal has brought a methodological and experimental rigor to primate behavioral research that provides good controls. Overall, de Waal’s research shows a continuity between higher ape “moral” behavior and that of human beings (as opposed to previous theorists who think human moral behavior is completely unique and/or an innovation).
In some cases (e.g., food sharing behavior), his data sets have involved upwards of 7,000 interactions (see de Waal. “Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations Among Chimpanzees.” Journal of Human Evolution 18 [1989]:433-459).
In addition, to his important books (Good Natured: The Origin of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals [1996] and Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved [2006]), I would suggest his following technical articles:
S. F. Brosnan and F. B. M. de Waal. Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay.
Nature 425 (2003):297-299.
F. B. M. de Waal and A. van Roosmalen. Reconciliation and Consolation
among Chimpanzees. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology
5 (1979):55-66.
Let me just briefly summarize the results of some of these experiments. In the article in Nature, Dr. de Waal devised elegant experiments showing that capuchin monkeys do have a sense of fairness. For example, capuchin monkeys might reject a food reward of less value if they observe other monkeys receiving food of higher value for performing the same task.
Just as compelling are the earlier experiments showing that Rhesus monkeys refuse to pull a chain that delivered food to themselves if pulling the chain shocked other monkeys. Some monkeys were willing to starve if getting food for themselves meant hurting other monkeys. See: J. Masserman. M. S. Wechkin and W. Terris. Altruistic Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys. American Journal of Psychiatry 121 [1964]: 584-585.
How would Dr. Blomberg explain that behavior?
In his research on consolation, de Waal found that chimpanzees who observe a fight between two other chimpanzees will offer consolation behavior at much higher rates to the recipient of the aggression than to the aggressor. This also involved hundreds of rigorously quantified conflictive interactions, and not just a few anecdotes.
Further research by de Waal shows that chimpanzees do make inferences about the mental and emotional states of other chimpanzees, and then tailor their own behavior accordingly. In other words, we see incipient theories of mind among greater apes. Combined with research about the development of morality in infants, primatology can greatly elucidate what we observe in human beings.
Neurobiology is also helping us to make great strides in explaining the origin of human morality. For example, consider recent experiments elucidating the role of Oxytocin, a neuropeptide, in explaining nurturing and “trust” behavior in animals. See, for example, Duo Jin et al., CD28 is Critical for Social Behaviour by Regulating Oxytocin Secretion. Nature 446, (1 March 2007): 41-45.
In any case, the conjoining of primatology, neurobiology, and human developmental psychology will probably yield much better explanations for “altruism” than the old “God-does-it” theories, which have not a single piece of verifiable scientific evidence to support them. Dr. Blomberg must interact fully with this scientific and anthropological literature before he can convince us that a theistic argument is a better alternative.
If he wishes to respond, I hope Dr. Blomberg can at least address these questions:
1. Are you familiar with the the primatological and neurobiological literature I have cited above? If so, could you tell us where you have cited or critiqued it?
2. How do you explain the motivations of the dog who saved the other dog in traffic?
3. Why do Rhesus monkeys prefer to starve rather than receive food if that means hurting other monkeys?
4. How do you explain that Oxytocin pathway malfunctions will result in a loss of nurturing behavior in some animals?
Otherwise, thanks again for your time and for posting on our website.