An Implausible Parallel Argument to the Moral Argument for God

In a question to William Lane Craig, a person named Manol from Albania noticed a parallel argument to the Moral Argument for the Existence of God. Here’s Dr. Craig’s Moral argument:

1) If God does not exist then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values do exist.
3) Therefore God exists.

Speaking to Dr. Craig Manol writes:

Your argument in support of premise 2 is that in the same way the outer world is objective, in the same way moral values are objective. Our perception of objective moral values is on a par with our perception of the outer world with the five senses.

But if this parallelism between moral values and the outer world is true, then it means that the argument may be turned into something like this:

1) If God does not exist, then an objective outer world does not exist.
2) An objective outer world does exist.
3) Therefore God exists.

If this second argument is used and it is proven not convincing, why should be the moral argument, which is a parallel argument, be convincing? Or, if you think this second argument is not convincing, why is it so?

Dr. Craig responded by saying:

On this basis you construct a parallel argument, which, if dubious, ought to make us think that the moral argument is also dubious. Now the parallel argument you construct is actually a sort of cosmological argument for God’s existence. In fact, I think it is a sound argument! It is obviously valid, and both the premises seem to me to be true. For the objective outer world obviously exists, and if God did not exist, then no world at all would exist, including an objective outer world! It’s not that if God did not exist, then the outer world would be merely a subjective illusion; rather it’s that there wouldn’t be anything at all!

The first premise of your parallel argument threatens to beg the question and is not apt to appear more plausible than its negation to someone who is not already a theist. By contrast, as you know, the first premise of the moral argument is one that many atheists themselves believe and argue for. Thus, although the premises of your two arguments are parallel, the support for the premises is quite different.

What Craig said is that these two arguments are parallel but that the one for the existence of an outer world threatens to beg the question and that skeptics just wouldn't be apt to think it’s plausible.

As a skeptic I think there is more room for discussion here. Doesn’t the first premise in the moral argument "threaten" to beg the question in the same way? And can’t we reverse things and say that since the argument for the outer world isn’t plausible then neither is the moral argument?

I think so. Any thoughts?