Miracles are currently unknowable
Traditionally, miracles are defined or understood as naturally impossible events, which are events inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (e.g. science 800,000 + years from now). This raises an intriguing question: can we currently know if some event is probably naturally impossible? If so, then perhaps we have good grounds for believing that certain events (assuming they occurred) are probably miracles; but if not, then either the definition of "miracle" must be significantly loosened so as to be consistent with what's naturally possible (though this option has its difficulties), or we currently have no good grounds for believing that certain events are probably miracles. Consider:
1. We cannot properly infer from the fact that, if event e were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science (henceforth C), then e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (henceforth F). [premise]
2. If we cannot properly infer F from C, then we cannot properly infer F (because there's no other basis from which F can be inferred). [premise]
3. If we cannot properly infer F, then we cannot justifiably claim that e, if C, is probably naturally impossible (henceforth N). [premise]
4. Therefore, if e occurs, and C, we cannot justifiably claim N.
Long (convoluted) version:
1. We cannot properly infer from the fact that, if event e were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, then e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (e.g. science 800,000 + years from now). [premise]
2. If we cannot properly infer that event e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science from the fact that e is inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, then we cannot properly infer that e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (because there's no other basis from which the claim can be inferred). [premise]
3. If we cannot properly infer that e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science, then we cannot justifiably claim that e -- if it were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science -- is probably naturally impossible. [premise]
4. Therefore, if e occurs, and it is inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, we cannot justifiably claim that e is probably naturally impossible.
1. We cannot properly infer from the fact that, if event e were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science (henceforth C), then e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (henceforth F). [premise]
2. If we cannot properly infer F from C, then we cannot properly infer F (because there's no other basis from which F can be inferred). [premise]
3. If we cannot properly infer F, then we cannot justifiably claim that e, if C, is probably naturally impossible (henceforth N). [premise]
4. Therefore, if e occurs, and C, we cannot justifiably claim N.
Long (convoluted) version:
1. We cannot properly infer from the fact that, if event e were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, then e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (e.g. science 800,000 + years from now). [premise]
2. If we cannot properly infer that event e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science from the fact that e is inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, then we cannot properly infer that e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science (because there's no other basis from which the claim can be inferred). [premise]
3. If we cannot properly infer that e will probably be inconsistent with the physical laws understood by any possible future state of science, then we cannot justifiably claim that e -- if it were inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science -- is probably naturally impossible. [premise]
4. Therefore, if e occurs, and it is inconsistent with the physical laws understood by current science, we cannot justifiably claim that e is probably naturally impossible.