The Moral Argument Revisited: Further Thoughts on Bill Craig's Presentation
In this article, I will revisit some thoughts I made last week about Dr. William Lane Craig's morality argument for the existence of God. The critique has been adjusted to answer the top two or three objections presented in the post, and also adds some additional thoughts I've had over the past week.
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin