The "Hidden" Moral Imperative of Rationality

When utilizing rational thought, it is common to claim that rationality does not entail a moral judgment. A claim that thus-and-so must be blue does not entail a moral approval or disapproval of the fact that thus-and-so is blue, it is merely a statement of fact separate from moral judgments. Non-theists typically find ourselves making this distinction quite often when arguing with theists, pointing out the "is-ought" fallacy when charged with such villainy as loving the fact that survival of the fittest entails the death of the weak, or of wanting people to die for pointless or false reasons as opposed to a true faith. However, rationality does contain a moral judgment that is often left unspoken, and this moral assumption sometimes seems to be a key area of misunderstanding between theist and atheist.

Rationality is based on the moral assumption that a truth is inherently preferable to an untruth. Now for some of us, such a moral assumption may seem so basely shared as to be unworthy of comment. However, I am quickly becoming convinced that this moral value is NOT shared nearly as widely as some might suspect, and perhaps it shouldn't be.

"Atheism can't be true, because then anyone can do what they want as there would be no arbiter of morality."

"If I accept atheism, then when I die I'm dead, end of story. Why would I want to believe that?"

"Atheism leads to Hitler, Pol Pot, and Stalin."

Every time someone, whether theist or non-theist, uses or accepts an Argument from Consequences or Wishful Thinking, they are implicitly affirming that they do NOT consider a truth to be inherently preferable to an untruth. Rather, they find the truth preferable only for its utility in reaching some other goal. In the case where a lie is more useful in reaching that goal, the truth is NOT to be preferred. Now rational thinkers throughout the centuries have succeeding to some extent, I think, in making Wishful Thinking a dirty word, and something that is just not done in respectable company. But, much like racism, there is a large disconnect between making something publicly unacceptable and eradicating it from the general mindset. While many may claim that they are most interested in the truth, the continued success and appeal of Arguments from Consequences such as those listed above is prima facie evidence that some people do NOT value the truth of an idea over its other utilities.

This inherent moral disconnect is not just some unrelated esoteric moral dilemma. Rather, it gets to the heart of why two groups of people often seem to be speaking past one another. Rationalists will go into an argument with the notion that if they can demonstrate that something is untrue (or, at least, unsupported by fact), they can sway their opponent. However, this is not enough for non-rationalists, nor should it be. The failure of a rational argument to sway a non-rationalist is NOT a failure in the cognitive skills of the non-rationalist; rather, it is a moral disconnect between what an idea ought to do. A rationalist thinks an idea ought to approximate a metaphysical reality as closely as possible. I value truth in my ideas over other utility because, by better understanding reality, I can better bring my faculties to bear to shape reality in a fashion that makes my happiness more likely. A non-rationalist thinks that an idea has another utility more important that modeling truth.

Rationalists are not obligated to accept or respect a non-rationalists' moral view of the utility of ideas. However, those here who know me know I am, above all, a pragmatist. I don't come here to practice my typing or because I have a lot of free time to kill; I want to convince people to come around to my way of thinking, find a superior way of thinking that I can adopt, or failing all that, better understand my opponents. So, while I think that rationalists are not obliged to accept non-rationalists' moral view of ideas as valid, I think that we must engage this idea in order to hold mutually productive arguments (similarly, non-rationalists must realize that it is non-productive to point out to a rationalist all of the bad utility that stems from a belief unless you can point out that the belief does not represent reality).

My point in all this is to justify and expand upon something that I have said previously: in our attempts to Debunk Christianity, it is often insufficient to show that Christianity is false (or, at best, unsupported). Rather, we must also show that it is not useful. While some here have addressed, others demonstrate a disdain towards it that I think is unproductive and perhaps unwarranted. By examining why we value truth over other utilities, we might better understand why others might not have the same moral value, and therefore why Arguments from Consequences might sway them more strongly than the most rigorous proofs. I can damn well guarantee you that Evangelical pastors fully understand the power of emotional appeals and Arguments from Consequences, and history has shown that they will not hesitate to use them.

I know some find such arguments beside the point, as do I. As a rationalist, it is often hard for me to sympathize with those who think that their belief should do something other than represent reality as accurately as possible. We often fall into the trap of thinking that our discourse must rise above such "petty" concerns. However, such concerns are only "petty" to those who value truth over all else, and that group of people is far from all-inclusive. We must decide if we are going to be in the business of academic debate or in the business of convincing people, and we must recognize that the two are not wholly overlapping sets. As a pragmatist who believes in moral subjectivity, I can appreciate that my value of the truth is not universal. I can also recognize that there is utility to me in being able to persuade those who place secondary value on truth. Finally, I have recognized that we have already managed to convince a disproportionate number of those who already place primary value on truth in ideas. While it's important to continue to spread appropriate facts to those who remain ignorant of them, it is not enough. If we wish to cease speaking past those who value other utilities in ideas, we must be prepared to either speak towards their values or convince them that their values are wrong.