Feedback on Two Arguments Requested
Spencer Lo is looking to get some feedback on the following two arguments, and was wondering if I would post them so people can comment. Yes I will:
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [Let's suppose]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities). [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead
Argument 2
1. Whenever we encounter a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon has a supernatural cause.
2. The phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead is a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories. [Let's assume for argument's sake that Jesus was raised from the dead.]
3. Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead has a supernatural cause.
114 comments:
Re 1: Okay, now what? I agree that the "magic" defence works but then trying to argue that Jesus was definitely magical/supernatural/supernormal sounds an awful lot like special pleading which is a fallacy.
I also don't think many people say that Jesus didn't rise from the dead because people don't rise from the dead. This sounds like a strawman to me.
Argument 2: Fair enough. Just note that written accounts of people rising from the dead are not difficult to explain scientifically.
There's no special pleading in argument 1. A fuller statement of premise (3) would be: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal powers or capabilities), who may or may not have been human, who may or may not have been a supernatural entity.
@rl - establishing that Jesus was supernormal is the part I think requires special pleading. Adding it to your premises only helps in the trivial case that your syllogism is internally consistent.
wouldn't you have to first prove that there was a Jesus and that he was raised from the dead before you make the leap as to whether or not he was superhuman or not
"@rl - establishing that Jesus was supernormal is the part I think requires special pleading. "
I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus really had the abilities and powers attributed to him: ability to walk on water, teleportation, heal the sick without physical contact, rise from the dead, turn water into wine, etc. So, why would it be special pleading to classify Jesus as a supernormal being?
"Adding it to your premises only helps in the trivial case that your syllogism is internally consistent."
There's nothing trivial about the conclusion -- if it's true, then the apologist will be unable to argue, soundly, for the supernatural explanation given the physical events.
Jason wrote: "wouldn't you have to first prove that there was a Jesus and that he was raised from the dead before you make the leap as to whether or not he was superhuman or not"
No. I can assume those things for the sake of argument.
@rl - re-read what I wrote in my first comment. I agreed that the syllogism works, I just disagreed that the premises could be supported.
There's nothing trivial about the conclusion -- if it's true, then the apologist will be unable to argue, soundly, for the supernatural explanation given the physical events.
You're confusing what I said about the first argument with what I said about the second.
"@rl - re-read what I wrote in my first comment. I agreed that the syllogism works, I just disagreed that the premises could be supported."
I don't have to support the premises; I can assume them for the sake of argument to make my point. Why is this special pleading?
Argument 1:
The first two premises seem sound, but I would like to address the third premise. This premise is the clincher: If this falls, the entire argument falls.
What does it mean to be a supernormal being? I would presume part of the answer would involve somehow breaking known laws of physics and biology. By that, I mean this now-dead and not-yet-realive being would have consciousness without material form and would be able to reanimate his three-day-old rotting carcass back to pristine condition.
The burden of proof is on the one making the claims that the dead-not-yet-realive Jesus did that. We have trillions of data points (generations of people on the globe) at attest that this has not been done.
Argument 2:
We have adequately studied the phenomenon of people rising from the dead to the same extent that we have studied the effects of anti-depressant medications on the reproductive habits of unicorns. Sadly, we have a sample size of zero.
@rl
I don't have to support the premises; I can assume them for the sake of argument to make my point. Why is this special pleading?
Since you're clearly not reading what I wrote, I said your syllogism works but your premises can't be supported without fallacies. Get it?
BJ wrote:
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What does it mean to be a supernormal being? I would presume part of the answer would involve somehow breaking known laws of physics and biology.
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I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus really had the abilities and powers attributed to him: i.e. ability to walk on water, teleportation, heal the sick without physical contact, rise from the dead, turn water into wine, etc. If he had these abilities, it would be perfectly appropriate to classify Jesus as a supernormal being.
A fuller statement of premise (3) would be: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal powers or capabilities), who may or may not have been human, who may or may not have been a supernatural entity.
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The burden of proof is on the one making the claims that the dead-not-yet-realive Jesus did that.
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There's no burden here, since I'm simply assuming a claim Christians accept to make my point.
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Argument 2:
We have adequately studied the phenomenon of people rising from the dead to the same extent that we have studied the effects of anti-depressant medications on the reproductive habits of unicorns. Sadly, we have a sample size of zero.
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I don't think addresses my argument. We certainly haven't studied the phenomena (assuming there is one) of people rising from the dead, and so it would be premature to conclude it is the result of supernatural causation.
Tyro wrote:
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Since you're clearly not reading what I wrote, I said your syllogism works but your premises can't be supported without fallacies. Get it?
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You charged my first argument with the special pleading fallacy, and so, no, I do not get this.
Again, I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus really had the abilities and powers attributed to him: i.e. ability to walk on water, teleportation, heal the sick without physical contact, rise from the dead, turn water into wine, etc. So why would it be special pleading to classify Jesus as a supernormal being? Can you explain how I'm guilty of this fallacy/
And you do have to support your premises. If premises are false, the argument falls. Otherwise, I could simply assert anything I wanted provided I used a sound syllogism.
P1: My three-hole punch guesses the stock market inerrantly.
P2: My three-hole punch just told me that I could make $3,000,000 by investing everything I have into a new line of kitchen faucets.
P3: I invested everything I have into a new line of kitchen faucets.
C: I make $3,000,000.
BJ wrote:
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And you do have to support your premises. If premises are false, the argument falls. Otherwise, I could simply assert anything I wanted provided I used a sound syllogism.
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Again, I'm assuming a claim that apologists *already* accept - so I wouldn't need to argue it with them - in order to make my point. It's easier to say: "Okay, suppose what you say is true. That still doesn't follow."
This method of assuming an opponent's assumptions, then showing that he is still unable to make his case is used ALL the time, and there's absolutely nothing wrong with it.
@rl
Again, I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that Jesus really had the abilities and powers attributed to him: i.e. ability to walk on water, teleportation, heal the sick without physical contact, rise from the dead, turn water into wine, etc. So why would it be special pleading to classify Jesus as a supernormal being? Can you explain how I'm guilty of this fallacy/
For the fourth and final time, your little syllogism works in the purely hypothetical world where Jesus is magical. Defending this unsupported assumption in the real world would require steps which would probably require special pleading.
Tyro wrote:
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For the fourth and final time, your little syllogism works in the purely hypothetical world where Jesus is magical. Defending this unsupported assumption in the real world would require steps which would probably require special pleading.
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Again, there's no special pleading in my argument. I'm simply accepting - for the sake of argument - a crucial claim apologists believe, then seeing what follows from that.
So radical logic you are saying that Jesus was magical and therefore was not raised from the dead by God the Father?
Chuck wrote:
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So radical logic you are saying that Jesus was magical and therefore was not raised from the dead by God the Father?
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Not at all. My arguments do not even suggest this.
This debate is like listening to blind people discussing the Mona Lisa.
I think the larger problem for the theist is trying to explain how any natural manifestation (whether it is supernormal or not) has a supernatural cause. I don't think they can do that with any present manifestation, much less a supposed historical one.
I don't know how useful this will be, but here goes:
Argument #1 relies on two key assumptions: that the Jesus as described in the NT actually existed and that he was a supernormal person. However, Argument #1 does not offer any support for either assumption, but instead requires that these be taken for granted for the argument to hold true. Isn't that an a priori fallacy?
Argument #2 talks about "the phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead," but outside the Bible and church doctrines, no independent confirmation of said phenomenon exists. It is entirely reasonable, in my mind, to dispel this argument simply on the basis that there's no reason to believe that the underlying event actually happened.
MrMarkAZ wrote:
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Argument #1 relies on two key assumptions: that the Jesus as described in the NT actually existed and that he was a supernormal person. However, Argument #1 does not offer any support for either assumption, but instead requires that these be taken for granted for the argument to hold true. Isn't that an a priori fallacy?
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No. I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, assumptions that Christians accept - again, for the sake of argument.
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It is entirely reasonable, in my mind, to dispel this argument simply on the basis that there's no reason to believe that the underlying event actually happened.
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The same point applies.
RL,
I am no logician so I doubt my judgment of your arguments is worth much but, they seem to have internal logic to me. That said, I'm curious as to your use of this argument. That's why I jumped to the conclusion you were postulating the resurrection was not consistent with the theological assumption Christ was raised by the Father but rather it was born from his "supernatural" status.
What is the utility of the two arguments you've formed?
Chuck wrote:
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What is the utility of the two arguments you've formed?
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They show, if successful, that the apologist cannot demonstrate their main contention: God raised Jesus from the dead.
RL,
That is what I thought you were getting at. Thanks. Interesting tactic.
"A implies B" is sound if A is always false. That is predicate logic. Jesus did not rise from the dead. So your argument works. But you cannot conclude anything. I want to note that predicate logic was invented before Christ by the Greeks.
Argument 1 would only work if a 'supernormal being' remains a supernormal being after death. You're granting that Jesus died, after all. If Jesus died, then a supernormal being died. Now, in ordinary language, when a supernormal being dies, we no longer have a supernormal being. If you drive a stake through Dracula's heart, he's no longer a supernormal being. If you expose Superman to Green Kryptonite for a sufficient period of time, he'll die, and will no longer be a supernormal being. In short, it's *far* from obvious that a supernormal being remains a supernormal being after *death*; indeed, we have every reason to suppose that there's no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal being. But if this is the case, then (4) doesn't follow from (3).
Argument 2, it seems to me, doesn't get past (1). All we have to do is come up with a counterexample to the claim that a supernatural conclusion is *always* ("Whenever we encounter...)" to be judged premature in the absence of *adequate* *scientific* study.
Suppose American Atheists decide to hold meetings across the nation on the same night. Imagine that they all decide to say, at the same time of the night (and suppose they get their time zones worked out correctly), "God, if you exist, give us a sign!" Now, immediately after this request, the roof disappears from every building in which the meetings are being held, and that the stars of the night sky spell out, in every written language used on the earth today, "I, the god of all creation, am!" Now suppose that the atheists at each of these meetings, being rational folks, go immediately to their television sets and discover that this phenomenon has been observed around the world. Would they be *justified* in concluding, at that moment (i.e. before any adequate scientific investigation) that the cause of this event was supernatural? Note, the key word here is justified: a conclusion can be both justified and false. However, to provide a counterexample to (1), justification is all I need.
Now, this example is of course extreme and silly (and extremely silly). However, once we concede that my extremely silly counterexample refutes (1), the rest of the argument obviously fails.
Eric wrote:
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we have every reason to suppose that there's no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal being. But if this is the case, then (4) doesn't follow from (3).
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There is reason to suppose a difference between Jesus' physiology and normal human physiology. Hence, there is reason to suppose a difference between the physiological make-up of Jesus' corpse and the corpse of a normal human being, and thus no reason to suppose there is "no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal [human] being."
Regarding argument 2, you wrote:
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Would they be *justified* in concluding, at that moment (i.e. before any adequate scientific investigation) that the cause of this event was supernatural? Note, the key word here is justified: a conclusion can be both justified and false.
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Notice what my premise says: "it would be *premature* to conclude that the phenomenon has a supernatural cause." This is the case even if one might be "justified" in some sense in believing that the event was the result of supernatural causes.
"There is reason to suppose a difference between Jesus' physiology and normal human physiology. Hence, there is reason to suppose a difference between the physiological make-up of Jesus' corpse and the corpse of a normal human being, and thus no reason to suppose there is "no difference between a *dead*(1) supernormal being and a *dead*(2) normal [human] being."
I disagree. We have a problem with at least two equivocations here.
First, no rules of logical inference will take you from, "S was a supernormal *being*(1) while alive" to "S was a dead supernormal *being*(2)." Why not? S's corpse is no longer a 'being' in the same sense S was while alive. Death is the cessation of life, and it was the characteristics of the living entity S that informed our use of the term 'being'(1) when S was alive.
Now, this equivocation in the term 'being' follows from an equivocation with your use of the term 'death.' You're using it one way for a normal being, and another way for a supernormal being. Let's grant that a supernormal corpse isn't a normal corpse. *It's still a corpse*. You're trying to smuggle 'but, since S was supernormal, S wasn't really dead' into your use of the term 'dead' when you refer to a supernormal corpse. From SEP: "Death for you and me is constituted by the *irreversible* discontinuation of the vital processes by which we are sustained." Merriam-Webster's Online: "A *permanent* cessation of all vital functions: the end of life." Wiki: "Death is the *permanent* termination of the biological functions that define a living organism." All of these definitions include the element of irreversibility or permanence, an element decidedly lacking from your use of the term with respect to a supernormal being.
"Notice what my premise says: "it would be *premature* to conclude that the phenomenon has a supernatural cause." This is the case even if one might be "justified" in some sense in believing that the event was the result of supernatural causes."
This doesn't make any sense. If I'm justified in concluding that P, then by definition my conclusion isn't premature.
Eric wrote:
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First, no rules of logical inference will take you from, "S was a supernormal *being*(1) while alive" to "S was a dead supernormal *being*(2)."
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I never claimed that a dead Jesus was a being -- in the sense of a living entity. What I said was: There is reason to suppose a difference between Jesus' *physiology* and normal human physiology, and thus there very well could be a difference - one that makes a difference - between the corpse of Jesus' body and the corpse of a normal human being. Hence your claim that "there's no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal being" has no basis.
You wrote:
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From SEP: "Death for you and me is constituted by the *irreversible* discontinuation of the vital processes by which we are sustained." Merriam-Webster's Online: "A *permanent* cessation of all vital functions: the end of life." Wiki: "Death is the *permanent* termination of the biological functions that define a living organism." All of these definitions include the element of irreversibility or permanence, an element decidedly lacking from your use of the term with respect to a supernormal being.
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If you adopt this definition of death, that it entails "the irreversible discontinuation of vital processes," then you cannot claim that Jesus rose from the dead *at all* - naturally or supernaturally. You cannot consistently claim:
(a). Jesus was dead if and only if he was no longer able to be restored to life.
and,
(b). Jesus was dead and he was later restored to life.
So your definition of "death" here is unacceptable, even from the Christian pov.
You wrote:
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This doesn't make any sense. If I'm justified in concluding that P, then by definition my conclusion isn't premature.
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Not at all. Consider a detective who has a very plausible theory about how a crime occurred, but he can't prove it yet. It's plausible to say he could be justified in believing his theory even though it would be premature for him to *conclude* that it is true. One can say: "there's good reason to believe the hypothesis is true, but at this point, it's premature to make any concluding remarks."
"I never claimed that a dead Jesus was a being --"
7:46 PM, June 04, 2009: "Hence, there is reason to suppose a difference between the physiological make-up of Jesus' corpse and the corpse of a normal human being, and thus no reason to suppose there is "no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal [human] being."
That is what I was referring to.
"I never claimed that a dead Jesus was a being -- in the sense of a living entity."
Of course not. If you had, I wouldn't have charged you with equivocating with your use, although you were quoting me (see above), of the term 'being.'
"There is reason to suppose a difference between Jesus' *physiology* and normal human physiology, and thus there very well could be a difference - one that makes a difference - between the corpse of Jesus' body and the corpse of a normal human being. Hence your claim that "there's no difference between a dead supernormal being and a dead normal being" has no basis."
No, you're missing the point. If I say that a supernormal being is alive, I'm using the term 'alive' in the same sense I would be if I were to say, 'Joe is alive.' It's the same with the term 'dead.' Take a superior athlete. His corpse will differ physiologically from that of a normal person, but it will still be a corpse. The point is that a supernormal being and a normal being are 'dead' in the same fundamental way. If they were dead in fundamentally different ways, we couldn't use the same concept -- death -- when referring to each one.
"You cannot consistently claim:
(a). Jesus was dead if and only if he was no longer able to be restored to life.
and,
(b). Jesus was dead and he was later restored to life."
You would have to work on (a) to get that claim right (given the definitions of death I provided):
(a') Jesus was dead iff he was no longer to be *naturally* restored to life.
Death is clearly permanent in these definitions only in the *natural, biological sense* ("vital processes by which we are sustained"; "cessation of all vital functions"; "termination of the biological functions that define a living organism.").
Now, there's no contradiction between (a') and (b).
"Consider a detective who has a very plausible theory about how a crime occurred, but he can't prove it yet. It's plausible to say he could be justified in believing his theory even though it would be premature for him to *conclude* that it is true."
P is by no means justified if P is merely plausible. To say that P is justified is (roughly) to say that you've satisfied the evaluative norms with respect to what you ought to believe to be the case. Justified beliefs may indeed be false, but they can't be premature.
Eric wrote:
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Of course not. If you had, I wouldn't have charged you with equivocating with your use,
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I don't see how I'm guilty of any equivocation.
you wrote:
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The point is that a supernormal being and a normal being are 'dead' in the same fundamental way. If they were dead in fundamentally different ways, we couldn't use the same concept -- death -- when referring to each one.
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Both the Jesus-corpse and the normal-corpse are dead, but because they have (radically) different physiological properties, they're not the same kind of corpse. Your original point was that because they're both "corpses," conclusion (4) of arg1 doesn't follow. However, your point here doesn't follow: you're overlooking the fact that the corpses could have significant differences (i.e. physiological differences) that make a difference.
Moreover, it could *also* be the case that some other supernormal being, similar to Jesus, raised Jesus from the dead. My argument can be modified to cover this case.
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't raise other beings naturally from the dead. [Let's suppose]
3. Supernormal beings do not fall within the scope or category of non-supernormal human beings.
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that some other supernormal being could not have been risen Jesus naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't raise other beings naturally from the dead.
You wrote:
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You would have to work on (a) to get that claim right (given the definitions of death I provided):
(a') Jesus was dead iff he was no longer to be *naturally* restored to life.
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Your qualification is nowhere found in the definitions you quoted. Why should I accept *this* definition, which clearly begs the question against me? Given the definitions you referenced, why should I adopt (a') as opposed to (a)?
you wrote:
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P is by no means justified if P is merely plausible. To say that P is justified is (roughly) to say that you've satisfied the evaluative norms with respect to what you ought to believe to be the case. Justified beliefs may indeed be false, but they can't be premature.
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There are degrees of justification -- justified in believing is not the same (or strong) as justified in *concluding*. I can consistently grant the former in your case while denying the latter.
Both arguments look sound in their logical form. The first premise in the second argument is solid, and the second premise ought to be eagerly accepted by Christians. So the second argument should do just fine.
The first premise of the first argument is problematic, and you may have trouble getting intelligent Christians to accept it. The trouble is that the category 'data suggesting that all zs can't y' includes the pesky subcategory 'data suggesting both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y'. But it wouldn't be fallacious to make the inference on the basis of data in this subcategory. Unfortunately, it is possible to interpret the data you go on to apply the argument to as being of this kind, as follows:
The scientific data we have suggests that no human being could rise naturally from the dead. Though this implies that no non-supernormal human being could rise naturally from the dead, it also suggests that no supernormal human being could rise naturally from the dead by suggesting that there are naturally no human beings who are supernormal in a way that allows them to rise naturally from the dead (supernormal humans of various kinds have been observed not to rise from the dead).
Argument 1 is rather unhelpful, I think. To see why, consider the following (equally unhelpful) variation:
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-rising-from-the-dead human beings can't rise from the dead.
3. Jesus was a rising-from-the-dead human being. [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-rising-from-the-dead human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
The first disputes a variety of argument that no atheist I know of makes. As has already been noted, it seems to be an attack on a strawman.
As to argument 2, its not always premature to favor (subject to further investigation) a supernatural hypothesis. If, for example, every christian on the planet suddenly disappeared, it would be reasonable to favor a certain well-known supernatural explanation. Others would be possible but, on its face, that would seem the most plausible.
sfwc wrote:
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The first premise of the first argument is problematic, and you may have trouble getting intelligent Christians to accept it. The trouble is that the category 'data suggesting that all zs can't y' includes the pesky subcategory 'data suggesting both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y'. But it wouldn't be fallacious to make the inference on the basis of data in this subcategory. Unfortunately, it is possible to interpret the data you go on to apply the argument to as being of this kind, as follows:
The scientific data we have suggests that no human being could rise naturally from the dead. Though this implies that no non-supernormal human being could rise naturally from the dead, it also suggests that no supernormal human being could rise naturally from the dead by suggesting that there are naturally no human beings who are supernormal in a way that allows them to rise naturally from the dead
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I don't see how this follows. Suppose it were true that all non-supernormal human beings are natural entities. Why should this fact imply that supernormal beings are NOT natural entities?
You wrote:
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(supernormal humans of various kinds have been observed not to rise from the dead).
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By "supernormal beings" I mean beings with supernormal capabilities -- e.g. ability to walk on water, heal the sick without physical contact, teleport, etc. What supernormal beings, in this sense, have we observed not to have risen from the dead?
Eric Sotnak wrote:
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Argument 1 is rather unhelpful, I think. To see why, consider the following (equally unhelpful) variation:
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-rising-from-the-dead human beings can't rise from the dead.
3. Jesus was a rising-from-the-dead human being. [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-rising-from-the-dead human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
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I don't have a problem with this argument -- the conclusion is true if the premises are granted. Consider the claim: Mike, a body-builder who works out 15 hours a day, can't bench press 500 lb. If this conclusion is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs, then it is surely fallacious. There's no reason to think we can be confident in our conclusion about Mike when clear differences exist between him and the others.
To use a more extreme (and compelling) example, suppose one claims that Josh, a professional concert pianist (say, 30 years experience), probably can't play through Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto, and this is thought to follow from the claim that every piano student who has studied piano for less than 5 days can't play through the piece. There should be no doubt that this inference is absurdly fallacious.
The point is that the inference to "Jesus could not have risen naturally" is similarly fallacious.
David B wrote:
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The first disputes a variety of argument that no atheist I know of makes. As has already been noted, it seems to be an attack on a strawman.
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No, how is my argument a strawman?
You wrote:
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As to argument 2, its not always premature to favor (subject to further investigation) a supernatural hypothesis. If, for example, every christian on the planet suddenly disappeared, it would be reasonable to favor a certain well-known supernatural explanation. Others would be possible but, on its face, that would seem the most plausible.
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Two things.
1. I don't think this is a compelling example of an instance in which the supernatural explanation should be "favored."
2. Even if we should "favor" the supernatural explanation, it doesn't follow that we can *conclude* it's the right one.
radical_logic wrote:
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I don't see how this follows. Suppose it were true that all non-supernormal human beings are natural entities. Why should this fact imply that supernormal beings are NOT natural entities?
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Of course, this fact would not imply that supernormal beings aren't natural. But that wasn't what I was arguing.
radical_logic wrote:
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By "supernormal beings" I mean beings with supernormal capabilities -- e.g. ability to walk on water, heal the sick without physical contact, teleport, etc. What supernormal beings, in this sense, have we observed not to have risen from the dead?
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None at all. But you did not make it clear that this was your intended sense. I had taken it in a different sense - namely 'notably better than the average (mode) in some field.'
In any case, given your first comment, I guess that I've failed to successfully communicate what I wanted to say, so I'll have another go. I'm attacking the first premise: 'It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.' You give a couple of examples of the application of this principle (body building, piano playing), and on the basis of these examples I accept that 'It is sometimes fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of etc.' What I disagree with is 'It is always fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of etc.' - I have inserted the word 'always' to make the distinction clear. Consider a modification of your second example:
Suppose that I claim that Josh, a professional concert pianist, probably can't play through Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds. I base this claim both on observations of particular pianists (some professional) and on a study of the mechanics of piano playing.
A putative user of your first premise might reason as follows 'The data sfwc has suggests that every piano student who has studied for less than 5 days is unable to play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds. But Josh is not such a student; he's been playing the piano all his life. So it would be fallacious to infer that Josh can't perform this feat.'
The problem is that my data also suggests that nobody at all can play so quickly. So it is perfectly sensible to infer my conclusion. Nor would it be helpful for the putative premise-user to refer to some feature which makes Josh unique. Let us suppose, for example, that Josh is the inventor of crinkle-sliced bread. The newly modified (and still flawed) argument looks like this:
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-inventors of crinkle-sliced bread can't play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
3. Josh is the inventor of crinkle-sliced bread.
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Josh cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
The problem is that my data not only suggests things about crinkle-sliced bread inventors (CSBIs) but also about non-CSBIs (for example, Josh).
I also mentioned that a Christian apologist could claim that the situation in which you wish to apply the premise is one in which it fails. For although our data on rising from the dead applies to non-supernormal humans, it also applies to supernormal humans by suggesting that there is no natural way that a human who is supernormal in such a way that they can rise from the dead could come to exist. A consequence of this is 'No supernormal human could naturally rise from the dead'. Any event involving a human (supernormal or otherwise) rising from the dead would, our current data suggests, be unnatural.
sfwc wrote:
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Suppose that I claim that Josh, a professional concert pianist, probably can't play through Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds. I base this claim both on observations of particular pianists (some professional) and on a study of the mechanics of piano playing.
A putative user of your first premise might reason as follows 'The data sfwc has suggests that every piano student who has studied for less than 5 days is unable to play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds. But Josh is not such a student; he's been playing the piano all his life. So it would be fallacious to infer that Josh can't perform this feat.'
The problem is that my data also suggests that nobody at all can play so quickly. So it is perfectly sensible to infer my conclusion.
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It may be perfectly sensible to infer this conclusion, but not on the basis of data suggesting that beginning piano students can't play through Rach 3 in three seconds. The conclusion follows from the *other* data you mentioned -- "observations of particular pianists (some professional) and on a study of the mechanics of piano playing."
You wrote:
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1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-inventors of crinkle-sliced bread can't play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
3. Josh is the inventor of crinkle-sliced bread.
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Josh cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
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The conclusion is false even if we grant the premises. Notice what it *doesn't* say: it is fallacious to infer that Josh cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds on the basis of data suggesting that all non-CSBIs can't play through Rach 3 in under three seconds. *This conclusion* follows just fine.
You wrote:
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I also mentioned that a Christian apologist could claim that the situation in which you wish to apply the premise is one in which it fails. For although our data on rising from the dead applies to non-supernormal humans, it also applies to supernormal humans by suggesting that there is no natural way that a human who is supernormal in such a way that they can rise from the dead could come to exist.
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I don't see how this follows. Why should data about non-supernormal human beings suggest that there is no natural way for "a human who is supernormal," and who can rise from the dead, could come to exist?
To avoid confusion, here is a fuller statement of premise (3): Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, a natural entity or supernatural entity.
Radical logic wrote:
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It may be perfectly sensible to infer this conclusion, but not on the basis of data suggesting that beginning piano students can't play through Rach 3 in three seconds. The conclusion follows from the *other* data you mentioned -- "observations of particular pianists (some professional) and on a study of the mechanics of piano playing."
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I did not refer to two collections of data, but only one. It is this data - 'observations of particular pianists (some professional) and a study of the mechanics of piano playing.' - which is used by the putative premise-user in his argument. After all, as claimed, this data does suggest that 'every piano student who has studied for less than 5 days is unable to play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds,' even if it only does so by suggesting something somewhat stronger.
Radical logic wrote:
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The conclusion is false even if we grant the premises. Notice what it *doesn't* say: it is fallacious to infer that Josh cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds on the basis of data suggesting that all non-CSBIs can't play through Rach 3 in under three seconds. *This conclusion* follows just fine.
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I'm afraid it doesn't; since the data referred to does in fact suggest that all non-CSBIs can't play Rach 3 in 3s. Once more the data suggests this by virtue of suggesting something stronger.
Similar remarks apply to the remainder of what you said; the data I refer to is not 'about non-supernormal beings' – it is about human beings. But this doesn't stop it from suggesting things about non-supernormal beings if those beings happen to be human.
We might attempt to fix up the argument by putting a qualification into the first premise: 'It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting only that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z,' but I can see a potential problem with this. Most sets of data are not particularly limited in the scope of the things they suggest. Though we might have gathered the data to help us examine one question, it may well suggest answers to unrelated questions. So this first premise will not apply to many useful data-sets. This will cause a problem when we introduce a matching modification into the second premise: 'There is data suggesting only that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead,' for an intelligent Christian opponent can easily dispute this, claiming that our data is not so limited in the scope of things it suggests. It suggests the broader claim 'human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.'
sfwc wrote:
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I did not refer to two collections of data, but only one. It is this data - 'observations of particular pianists (some professional) and a study of the mechanics of piano playing.' - which is used by the putative premise-user in his argument.
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And I don't dispute that one can sensibly infer that Josh can't play through Rach 3 on the basis of *this* data. What I dispute is: one can sensibly infer that John can't play through Rach 3 *from the fact that* beginning piano students (for less than 5 days) can't play through Rach 3 in three seconds.
You wrote:
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I'm afraid it doesn't; since the data referred to does in fact suggest that all non-CSBIs can't play Rach 3 in 3s.
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And if Josh is a CSBI, then it would be fallacious to infer from data about non-CSBIs that he cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
What's the problem?
radical_logic wrote:
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And I don't dispute that one can sensibly infer that Josh can't play through Rach 3 on the basis of *this* data. What I dispute is: one can sensibly infer that John can't play through Rach 3 *from the fact that* beginning piano students (for less than 5 days) can't play through Rach 3 in three seconds.
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In your original argument, the putative inference in question is not from any particular fact, but instead from a collection of data. In the case in question, the premise is taken to refer to inferences not from the fact that beginning piano students can't play through Rach 3 in three seconds, but from the data which suggests that fact (among others).
radical_logic wrote:
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And if Josh is a CSBI, then it would be fallacious to infer from data about non-CSBIs that he cannot play Rachmaninoff's third piano concerto in under 3 seconds.
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The data is not about non-CSBIs, but it is data from which particular facts about non-CSBIs may be deduced. That is, it is the kind of data referred to in your argument.
We could try to modify the argument like this:
1.It is fallacious to infer that x can't y from a fact of the form 'all zs can't y', when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. It is a fact that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [Let's suppose]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities). [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead from the fact that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
But the Christian apologist now has an easy escape route; he can accuse you misrepresenting him, and point out that he has never tried to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead from the fact that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. Instead, he relies on the fact that all human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
sfwc wrote:
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But the Christian apologist now has an easy escape route; he can accuse you misrepresenting him, and point out that he has never tried to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead from the fact that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. Instead, he relies on the fact that all human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
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No, this is not an appropriate escape route. First, the apologist cannot plausibly claim that all human beings (supernormal or otherwise) can't rise naturally from the dead. If he claims this, does his make this claim on the basis of any observations of supernormal human beings not being able to rise naturally from the dead? Is so, I'd like to see this data. If not, then he's restricted to the previous data I mentioned: non-supernormal human beings.
Second, Jesus may not even have been a human being. Remember my revised third premise: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. Hence, even if it were true that all human beings (supernormal or otherwise) can't rise naturally, since we don't know if Jesus falls into this category, it would be fallacious to make inferences on the assumption that he does fall into this category.
Look, I'm not a Christian apologist and I don't want to get sucked into trying to defend Christianity. I do, however, believe that the claim 'all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us. This is despite our lack of study of supernormal humans. Suppose that we discover a new inhabited island, in the middle of the pacific (named Smith Isle after its discoverer). I would expect the claim 'all Smithites can't naturally rise from the dead' to be true, and I would not be fazed by rhetoric like 'do you make this claim on the basis of any observations of Smithite human beings not being able to rise naturally from the dead? Is so, I'd like to see this data.' The magic of physical induction is that we can sensibly make inferences about a class from observations of only some elements of that class.
Now, even if you don't accept this, you should be aware that, if you are hoping this modified argument will be useful in a debate setting (I get that impression), you will have to wait for an apologist to make an inference with the premise 'all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead.' They're much more likely to be using the premise 'all human beings can't rise naturally from the dead', so if you were to use this argument you would be misrepresenting them and they may well call you out on it. You may have some arguments to bring to bear against this latter premise (and good luck with that) but the modified form of your first argument won't be helpful here. I've already pointed out why I think the original form of that argument is also problematic.
Further, I got the impression that in this context you were hoping to smuggle in premise 3 under cover of the opponent's worldview. But if you modify it so as to cast doubt on the humanity of Jesus (a central tenet of Christianity) then you will have much more trouble in doing so. You could try challenging your opponent to prove that Jesus really was human, but (since all they really have to do is convince the audience) I don't think they would raise too much of a sweat doing so and they might even get a cheap laugh out of it: 'What? Is my friend here suggesting (in the spirit of scepticism) that he was some kind of passing alien? Stopping off for a quick fag and a crucifixion, perhaps?'
sfwc wrote:
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I do, however, believe that the claim 'all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us.
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This is patently false; we have absolutely no data on supernormal being, such as their physiology, chemical-make up, and their natural capabilities. Thus we simply don't know what they can or cannot do, or to what extent they share our limitations.
you wrote:
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Further, I got the impression that in this context you were hoping to smuggle in premise 3 under cover of the opponent's worldview. But if you modify it so as to cast doubt on the humanity of Jesus (a central tenet of Christianity) then you will have much more trouble in doing so. You could try challenging your opponent to prove that Jesus really was human, but (since all they really have to do is convince the audience) I don't think they would raise too much of a sweat doing so and they might even get a cheap laugh out of it: 'What? Is my friend here suggesting (in the spirit of scepticism) that he was some kind of passing alien? Stopping off for a quick fag and a crucifixion, perhaps?'
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Premise (3) as I've written it should be acceptable to the apologist.
As for Jesus not being human, remember the claim: he was born of a virgin. This means he has no human DNA from his father's side, and thus there's some reason to doubt his biological humanity.
Argument #1 - no, let's not suppose.
Argument #2 - no, let's not assume.
Corky wrote:
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Argument #1 - no, let's not suppose.
Argument #2 - no, let's not assume.
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Try understanding the arguments.
sfwc wrote:
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I do, however, believe that the claim 'all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us.
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radical_logic responded:
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This is patently false; we have absolutely no data on supernormal being, such as their physiology, chemical-make up, and their natural capabilities. Thus we simply don't know what they can or cannot do, or to what extent they share our limitations.
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This lack of data doesn't affect the inference, any more than our lack of data on horses with wings hinders us from inferring 'all horses can't naturally fly' from our current data about horses. To put it another way, our data suggests 'all humans have neither a suitable physiological and chemical make-up nor suitable natural capabilities to allow them to naturally rise from the dead'. As I said, physical induction allows such inferences.
radical_logic wrote:
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Premise (3) as I've written it should be acceptable to the apologist.
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I agree: The premise as you wrote it is 'Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity '. However, you then went on to argue as follows: 'Hence, even if it were true that all human beings (supernormal or otherwise) can't rise naturally, since we don't know if Jesus falls into this category, it would be fallacious to make inferences on the assumption that he does fall into this category.' This introduces a new, stronger idea to the premise, namely 'we don't know if Jesus was a human being'. I was referring to this when I said 'if you modify it so as to cast doubt on the humanity of Jesus.' Without this extra idea, the snippet of argument I quoted breaks down. But if you try to fit this new idea into the premise, you will have much more trouble getting it past Christians.
radical_logic:
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As for Jesus not being human, remember the claim: he was born of a virgin. This means he has no human DNA from his father's side, and thus there's some reason to doubt his biological humanity.
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This argument is not going to convince evangelical Christians. Since they believe the virgin birth was miraculous, they have no reason to suppose that the process involved was anything like meiosis followed by fertilisation.
We've been arguing this back and forth for a while, and quite a few possible modifications to your argument have been discussed. To avoid confusion, it would be helpful to fix a particular 'version 2' of the argument under discussion. Would you be happy to write out a new version of the argument; one which best avoids the criticisms I have been making?
sfwc wrote:
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This lack of data doesn't affect the inference, any more than our lack of data on horses with wings hinders us from inferring 'all horses can't naturally fly' from our current data about horses. To put it another way, our data suggests 'all humans have neither a suitable physiological and chemical make-up nor suitable natural capabilities to allow them to naturally rise from the dead'. As I said, physical induction allows such inferences.
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No, the data does not allow such inferences, since we have no understanding of the physiology of supernormal beings. If we have no reason to suppose that the physiology of Jesus is relevantly comparable to the physiology of non-supernormal human beings (and there's no reason to suppose this, given his abilities), we cannot make inferences based on the assumption that there are no relevant comparable differences in Jesus' physiology.
you wrote:
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This argument is not going to convince evangelical Christians. Since they believe the virgin birth was miraculous, they have no reason to suppose that the process involved was anything like meiosis followed by fertilisation.
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They cannot presuppose, prior to arguing for the miracle, that the virgin birth was miraculous, or they beg the question. The point is: even on their understanding, Jesus had no *human* biological father. Thus it's entirely within reason to doubt the full biological humanity of Jesus.
you wrote:
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We've been arguing this back and forth for a while, and quite a few possible modifications to your argument have been discussed. To avoid confusion, it would be helpful to fix a particular 'version 2' of the argument under discussion. Would you be happy to write out a new version of the argument; one which best avoids the criticisms I have been making?
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I'm not convinced much modifications are necessary, but I have been thinking about an argument along these lines:
1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, it is plausible these capability differences can be explained to be result of differences in the physiology of X and O.
2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have.
3. Therefore, it is plausible these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained to be the result of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings.
If this argument is sound, then there's enough reason to suspect "natural" differences between Jesus and non-supernormal beings, and therefore enough reason to suppose we cannot trust inferences based on data about the capabilities of non-supernormal human beings.
radical_logic wrote:
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No, the data does not allow such inferences, since we have no understanding of the physiology of supernormal beings. If we have no reason to suppose that the physiology of Jesus is relevantly comparable to the physiology of non-supernormal human beings (and there's no reason to suppose this, given his abilities), we cannot make inferences based on the assumption that there are no relevant comparable differences in Jesus' physiology.
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My inference is not based on the assumption that that there are no relevant comparable differences in Jesus' physiology. That is one of the things that it is reasonable to infer from the data available to us.
sfwc wrote:
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This argument is not going to convince evangelical Christians. Since they believe the virgin birth was miraculous, they have no reason to suppose that the process involved was anything like meiosis followed by fertilisation.
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radical_logic responded:
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They cannot presuppose, prior to arguing for the miracle, that the virgin birth was miraculous, or they beg the question. The point is: even on their understanding, Jesus had no *human* biological father. Thus it's entirely within reason to doubt the full biological humanity of Jesus.
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It may be entirely within reason, but that is not the point at issue. It is extremely unlikely that evangelical Christians will be persuaded to doubt that Jesus was human on the basis that he was born of a virgin, since their understanding of that virgin birth implies that he is human. This understanding is not something the evangelical Christian is attempting to prove in this context. Instead, it forms a part of their worldview which will block your strategy of introducing the third premise under cover of that worldview if you phrase that premise so as to cast doubt on the humanity of Jesus.
radical_logic wrote:
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I have been thinking about an argument along these lines:
1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, it is plausible these capability differences can be explained to be result of differences in the physiology of X and O.
2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have.
3. Therefore, it is plausible these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained to be the result of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings.
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This argument is rather reminiscent of the second of your original arguments. However, this new argument is needlessly specific ('biological entity', 'differences in physiology') and therefore primed to degenerate into quibbling over technicalities. Accordingly, I'd advise you to stick with the stronger form you gave in the second of your two original arguments.
What I requested in my last post was not a new argument (though I'm gratified that you provided one for me), but a sharpening of the older argument we had been discussing. I think that this would be helpful since, in the course of our discussion, a few different modifications to your argument have been suggested. Since I would respond to these various modifications in different ways, and I do not wish to repeatedly respond to them all simultaneously, I would be grateful if you would provide the modification that you reckon will stand firm against my criticisms.
sfwc:
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My inference is not based on the assumption that that there are no relevant comparable differences in Jesus' physiology. That is one of the things that it is reasonable to infer from the data available to us.
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Right, and so the apologist cannot non-fallaciously infer the claim that Jesus can't rise naturally on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal beings can't rise naturally. There are many differences which may or may not be relevant to Jesus' ability to rise naturally -- we just can't say. We certainly can't say, with confidence, that there are no relevant differences which would enable Jesus to rise naturally but not non-supernormal human beings, and until we can say this, the inference remains fallacious.
you wrote:
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It may be entirely within reason, but that is not the point at issue. It is extremely unlikely that evangelical Christians will be persuaded to doubt that Jesus was human on the basis that he was born of a virgin, since their understanding of that virgin birth implies that he is human. This understanding is not something the evangelical Christian is attempting to prove in this context. Instead, it forms a part of their worldview which will block your strategy of introducing the third premise under cover of that worldview if you phrase that premise so as to cast doubt on the humanity of Jesus.
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The point at issue is premise (3), which says: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity.
The fact that Jesus may not have been human, or fully human, is, again, *another* difference between him and all non-supernormal human beings, and thus another reason why the inference is suspect. And when I say "within reason," I do not insist that Jesus was *not* fully human -- he very well could have been. But because there is enough reason to doubt this *objectively*, just simply looking at the data, that the apologist cannot plausibly challenge this *very real possibility*. Hence he has no non-question begging grounds for assuming that Jesus was a human "just like" everyone else.
you wrote:
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Since I would respond to these various modifications in different ways, and I do not wish to repeatedly respond to them all simultaneously, I would be grateful if you would provide the modification that you reckon will stand firm against my criticisms.
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Your criticism of my first argument can be reduced to: we *can* non-fallaciously infer that Jesus didn't rise naturally on the basis of data bout all non-supernormal human beings. Is this right? If so, I simply don't buy this objection.
However, here is a fuller version of my new argument:
1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, it is plausible these capability differences can be explained in terms of differences in the physiology of X and O.
2. If it is plausible these capability differences, between X and O, can be explained in terms of differences in physiology, then it is plausible there are natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between X and O.
3. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is plausible these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained in terms of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 3, 1)
5. Therefore, it is plausible there are natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 4, 2)
sfwc:
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My inference is not based on the assumption that that there are no relevant comparable differences in Jesus' physiology. That is one of the things that it is reasonable to infer from the data available to us.
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radical_logic responded:
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Right, and so the apologist cannot non-fallaciously infer the claim that Jesus can't rise naturally on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal beings can't rise naturally.
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This does not follow from what I said.
radical_logic wrote:
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The point at issue is premise (3), which says: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity.
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I have never disputed the truth of this premise, in any of the given forms, and despite the fact that I don't believe it is true. This is because I am interested in how evangelical Christians will respond to your argument.
I have also never disputed that evangelical Christians will be happy to accept premise (3) in the form you give here.
Hence, neither of these things is the point at issue. What I have disputed is that evangelical Christians will accept the expanded version of premise (3) necessary for the argument 'Hence, even if it were true that all human beings (supernormal or otherwise) can't rise naturally, since we don't know if Jesus falls into this category, it would be fallacious to make inferences on the assumption that he does fall into this category.' This argument wouldn't work unless premise (3) were phrased in such a way as to cast doubt on Jesus' humanity, or an additional premise were introduced with a similar purpose.
radical_logic wrote:
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Your criticism of my first argument can be reduced to: we *can* non-fallaciously infer that Jesus didn't rise naturally on the basis of data bout all non-supernormal human beings. Is this right?
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No, this is wrong. I hope you will not consider it discourteous that I do not reiterate my criticism here: I have explained it already in a few earlier comments.
radical_logic wrote:
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However, here is a fuller version of my new argument:
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It is kind of you to provide this expanded version. Unfortunately, the expanded version is no different to the original with regard to the problem I raised in my last comment (over-specificity). I suggest that you stick with the stronger form of this line of attack which is found in the second of the two arguments you originally gave.
In any case, what I have requested a couple of times is not a new argument but a sharpening of your original argument which deals adequately with the criticisms I have raised. Would you be happy to provide such a sharpening?
sfwc wrote:
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This does not follow from what I said.
No, this is wrong. I hope you will not consider it discourteous that I do not reiterate my criticism here: I have explained it already in a few earlier comments.
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Then why don't you explain why it's wrong? I don't believe I've interpreted your criticism incorrectly.
Previously you said: "I do, however, believe that the claim 'all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us."
This is no different than what I wrote regarding your criticism: "we *can* non-fallaciously infer that Jesus didn't rise naturally on the basis of data bout all non-supernormal human beings."
If you believe the evidence "suggests" that all humans (supernormal or not) can't rise naturally, then you ARE saying we *can* non-fallaciously make the inference.
radical_logic wrote:
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Then why don't you explain why it's wrong? I don't believe I've interpreted your criticism incorrectly.
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You did interpret my criticism incorrectly. Since all you presented was your (incorrect) interpretation, all I could think of doing to explain why you were wrong was to re-explain my criticism. But since I had already explained it a couple of times I didn't think this would be either necessary or helpful.
radical_logic wrote:
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Previously you said: "I do, however, believe that the claim 'all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us."
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Yes, this is something I wrote, and it accurately represents one of my beliefs. However, it is only one of the things I wrote. It does not accurately represent my criticism – it represents a side issue related to my criticism. That criticism is presented in each of my first and second comments above.
sfwc wrote:
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You did interpret my criticism incorrectly. Since all you presented was your (incorrect) interpretation, all I could think of doing to explain why you were wrong was to re-explain my criticism. But since I had already explained it a couple of times I didn't think this would be either necessary or helpful.
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No, I did interpret (at least one of) your criticism correctly. As you admitted, you hold the view that "all humans can't naturally rise from the dead' is suggested by the evidence we have available to us," and if this statement were true, my conclusion would be false. Hence this is one way to criticize my argument.
Moreover, your criticism can be accurately stated another way: "we *can* non-fallaciously infer that Jesus didn't rise naturally on the basis of data bout all non-supernormal human beings."
So, either the above is not of one your criticisms, or it is. Since you wrote the above in response to my argument, it must be, or it can reasonably interpreted to be.
You might have written other criticisms, but this is the only one that makes sense to me. Feel free to explain why your other criticisms remain unanswered.
Radical Logic, let's take a different approach. Your arguments are meant to work together, but I would argue that they cannot in fact do so because (1) a corollary of the first premise of argument 2 is inconsistent with an assumption you make in argument 1, and (2) this inconsistency brings out an error in your application premise 1 of argument 1.
First I'll set out my argument for (1).
Argument 1 assumes that a supernormal person, i.e. a person with supernormal capabilities, performs supernormal acts naturally. This is so because if a supernormal person's supernormal acts aren't done naturally, but supernaturally, then you have no reason to suppose that a supernormal person is any more likely to rise from the dead naturally than a normal person. However, you have no reason to suppose that supernormal acts are natural. Why not?
Look at premise 1 of argument 2. You claim that when we encounter scientifically unexplained phenomena which we haven't adequately studied scientifically and which appear to contradict our current scientific theories -- such as the supernormal acts of Jesus -- it's premature to conclude that they have a supernatural cause. However, note that it would also be premature to conclude that a scientifically unexplained phenomenon that appears to contradict our current scientific theories, and which we haven't adequately studied scientifically, has a natural cause. (N.B. I'm not referring to the methodological assumption of naturalism that any scientific investigation begins with, but the metaphysical *conclusion*, prior to any adequate scientific investigation, that unexplained phenomena that appear to contradict our current scientific theories have natural causes.)
However, if we can't assume, prior to investigation, that supernormal acts have natural causes, then we have no grounds for concluding that supernormal beings are any different physiologically from normal beings (since it's not at all clear that there's any necessary or sufficient relationship between physiology and supernatural acts).
But if we can't justify this conclusion (this is where I support (2)), then we have no reason to conclude that the corpse of Jesus differed physiologically from the corpse of a normal person, and thus no reason to conclude that premise 1 of argument 1, which assumes a difference between Xs and Zs, can be applied to the corpse of Jesus and the corpse of a normal person (since we have no reason, until you deal with the supernatural/natural issue, to conclude that we're dealing with Xs and Zs as opposed to just Xs or just Zs).
radical_logic wrote (a few comments back):
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Your criticism of my first argument can be reduced to: we *can* non-fallaciously infer that Jesus didn't rise naturally on the basis of data bout all non-supernormal human beings.
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This suggests that your summary encapsulates my criticism, or at the very least includes my main point. Instead, it is a mangled version of something I said to address a side issue.
radical_logic wrote:
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No, I did interpret (at least one of) your criticism correctly.
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I don't accept even this. You introduced the idea that the data I refer to is *about* non-supernormal beings. All I was using was that the data suggests something about non-supernormal beings. But this is not the same as *being about* non-supernormal beings; that phrasing implies that the data is only useful for answering questions involving non-supernormal beings. Even if you were on the money here, interpreting one thing I said correctly is not at all the same thing as interpreting my criticism correctly.
radical_logic wrote:
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You might have written other criticisms, but this is the only one that makes sense to me. Feel free to explain why your other criticisms remain unanswered.
----------
I already did this, when you tried to answer my main point. I explained at the time what the problems with your answers were. Go back and have a look at what I wrote. If there are any specific clarifications you would like, I'll try to provide them.
Eric wrote:
-------
Your arguments are meant to work together
--------
Two independent arguments are better than one, so in a sense, I agree my two arguments are meant to work together. But they are also independent: hence they must be addressed independently.
You wrote:
--------
Argument 1 assumes that a supernormal person, i.e. a person with supernormal capabilities, performs supernormal acts naturally.
---------
This is just plain wrong; Argument 1 does not make this assumption. Perhaps to clarify, I'll restate premise (3) as follows: Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity.
Nothing about this premise (or my argument in general) makes the assumption you stated.
Moreover, it is important to understand that Argument 1 does *not* argue for the claim : it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally. Conclusion (4) is perfectly consistent with the view that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally, since it is only asserting the fallaciousness of inferring this claim from "the fact that..." See the difference?
You wrote:
-----------
However, note that it would also be premature to conclude that a scientifically unexplained phenomenon that appears to contradict our current scientific theories, and which we haven't adequately studied scientifically, has a natural cause.
------------
Perhaps. In any case, Argument 2 is consistent with - but does not entail - the claim that it would be premature to conclude that the unexplained phenomenon has a natural cause.
Eric wrote:
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However, if we can't assume, prior to investigation, that supernormal acts have natural causes, then we have no grounds for concluding that supernormal beings are any different physiologically from normal beings (since it's not at all clear that there's any necessary or sufficient relationship between physiology and supernatural acts).
But if we can't justify this conclusion (this is where I support (2)), then we have no reason to conclude that the corpse of Jesus differed physiologically from the corpse of a normal person, and thus no reason to conclude that premise 1 of argument 1,
--------------
A few things.
A. Notice your slide from "it would be premature to *conclude* prior to investigation" to "it would be premature to *assume* prior to investigation." It may be perfectly reasonable to *assume* that the unexplained phenomenon has natural causes even if it would not be reasonable to *conclude* this.
In any case, my argument consistent with the claim that it would not be reasonable to *assume* the phenomenon has natural causes. (This is only a minor point.)
B. I don't need to *conclude* that the physiology of supernormal beings are in fact different than the physiology of non-supernormal human beings. All I need is enough reason to suspect a difference which may make a difference, and this I have.
Here's *one* reason, which I think I already stated: Jesus had no biological human father. A person without human DNA from one's father's side is CERTAINLY good grounds for thinking there might very well be significant physiological differences between him and someone with human DNA from her father's side.
Here's another one, expressed in a form of an argument:
1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, it is plausible these capability differences, at least in part, can be explained in terms of differences in the physiology of X and O.
2. If it is plausible these capability differences, between X and O, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in physiology, then it is plausible there could be natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between X and O.
3. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is plausible these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 3, 1)
5. Therefore, it is plausible there could be natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 4, 2)
sfwc wrote:
--------
I already did this, when you tried to answer my main point. I explained at the time what the problems with your answers were. Go back and have a look at what I wrote. If there are any specific clarifications you would like, I'll try to provide them.
-----------
I've read what you wrote several times, and other than the criticism I recently addressed, I don't find your comments to be very understandable. I've also been addressing your posts in detail throughout these exchanges, so it's not like I haven't been trying to understand your criticisms. Perhaps the fault doesn't in fact lie with me, though maybe it does.
You might want to consider reposting your criticisms, one at a time, and perhaps with modifications for clarity, because I don't think much will be served in me scrolling up (again) and re-reading comments I didn't understand the third time around.
For Eric:
Here is my argument again, but more explicitly laid out.
1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, it is plausible to assume these capability differences can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in the physiology of X and O.
2. If it is plausible to assume these capability differences, between X and O, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in physiology, then it is plausible to assume there could be some natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between X and O.
3. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [Let's suppose]
4. There are no very good reasons to suppose it is not plausible to assume the capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in terms of physiology.
5. Therefore, it is plausible to assume these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 4, 3, and 1)
6. Therefore, it is plausible to assume there could be some natural reasons or explanations for the capability differences between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings. (from 5, 2).
"1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, it is plausible these capability differences, at least in part, can be explained in terms of differences in the physiology of X and O."
Only if it's plausible, on a case by case basis, to conclude that physiological properties are capable of explaining some capability.
However, what if the possible relationship between physiological properties and capabilities are more like (1) "I can't see how property X could even possibly cause or explain capability Y, e.g. I can't see how the number 4 with its properties could possibly mow the lawn" than (2) "I can't see how property X in fact causes or explains capability Y, e.g. I don't in fact know how a the parts of a transmission with their properties work to shift gears"?
It seems to me that the relationship between physiology and these specific capabilities: walking on water, multiplying loaves and fish, changing water to wine, raising the dead, healing the sick, casting out devils, etc. is better exemplified by (1), i.e. I can't even see how it's possible that physiological properties could explain these supernormal capabilities, than (2), i.e. where I can see how it's possible but not how it works.
Eric,
See my modified version of the argument.
Btw, do you agree with the criticisms I made to your previous post?
Argument 1: Is there any conclusive evidence that z exists? No, therefore it is simply absurd to conjecture what an imagined z could or could not do. Z’s only limitations are those of the human imagination.
Argument 2. Is there any conclusive evidence that the said phenomenon occurred? No, therefore it is simply absurd to conjecture what the cause of said phenomenon was.
I doubt this will help Spencer, but I really don’t know how else to answer the imagination and the absurd.
M. tully said:
----------
Argument 1: Is there any conclusive evidence that z exists? No, therefore it is simply absurd to conjecture what an imagined z could or could not do. Z’s only limitations are those of the human imagination.
Argument 2. Is there any conclusive evidence that the said phenomenon occurred? No, therefore it is simply absurd to conjecture what the cause of said phenomenon was.
I doubt this will help Spencer, but I really don’t know how else to answer the imagination and the absurd.
--------------
Try understanding the arguments
I think I have to break this post up in two parts. I'm getting a message that indicates that it's too long.
Part 1
"Eric,
See my modified version of the argument."
I don't see how your modified premise 1 withstands my last challenge (i.e. that there may be a category error in supposing that physiological properties could even possibly account for the specific supernormal capabilities we're speaking about. In other words, that there's almost -- not quite, but almost -- as much difficulty in conceiving how it could even be possible that any collection of physiological properties could enable one to do all of the following: cast out devils, walk on water heal the sick, raise the dead, turn water into wine, multiply food, resurrect oneself etc.; as there is in conceiving how the number three could mow the lawn. As I said, it's not as obvious or as difficult as that, but it's almost as obvious and difficult as that).
"Btw, do you agree with the criticisms I made to your previous post?"
First, here's what I agree with. I take your point about having to deal with the arguments independently as well as in conjunction with one another (depending on you you deploy them, of course).
I also agree with this:
"I don't need to *conclude* that the physiology of supernormal beings are in fact different than the physiology of non-supernormal human beings. All I need is enough reason to suspect a difference which may make a difference, and this I have."
I agree too with the notion that if Jesus didn't have a father, you have reason to suspect that his physiology differs from that of a normal person. However, I would add that this gives you no reason to expect that such a difference would, or even could, lead to supernormal capabilities. You didn't explicitly say that it would, but you did adduce this as evidence for a difference in physiological properties, and it is your argument from different physiological properties that you claim supports the notion that Jesus' supernormal properties might have a natural origin. Hence, it's hard to see why you would mention the father issue in the context of the physiological issue if you didn't think it supports your supporting argument about the possible natural origins of supernormal capabilities.
(Part two will deal with more disagreements.)
Part 2
I also disagree with the notion that the mere presence of supernormal capabilities gives you grounds for suspecting differences in physiology -- *unless* you suppose a sufficient connection (not a necessary connection, but a sufficient one) between certain physiological properties and certain supernormal capabilities. However, it's hard to see why such a connection would be sufficient *unless* you're supposing that such supernormal capabilities are caused naturally. In other words, if such capabilities are caused supernaturally, we clearly have no reason whatsoever to suppose that they result from physiological properties. It's only if they're caused naturally that we have any reason to suppose such differences. Hence my claim that your first argument *and your various defenses of it* rest on the assumption that supernormal capabilities are naturally caused and explained.
I think that even if you can support the notion that your argument doesn't make this assumption, that you still must deal with the issue that I raised at the beginning of this post. Therefore, it seems to me that since the last point I raised could be determined either way without affecting the first point I raised, that the issue we need to address is the first one.
That said, I think there's one overall point on which we agree. I certainly don't think that the proposition, 'Jesus was resurrected' logically entails the proposition, 'god raised Jesus from the dead' (disregarding definitional concerns about the term 'resurrection' among Jews in the 1st century for the moment). However, I do think that it's the 'best explanation' (i.e. the best abductive conclusion) of the resurrection (assuming it happened).
By the way, thanks for the intelligent, insult-free discussion! One doesn't get much of that between/among theists and atheists (agnostics, etc) on the web (see Pharyngula as a prime example. The discussion can be intelligent at times, viz. from certain posters, but it's *never* insult free, viz. from everyone else there. I know that there are theistic analogs of Pharyngula too, of course).
radical_logic wrote:
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I've read what you wrote several times, and other than the criticism I recently addressed, I don't find your comments to be very understandable. I've also been addressing your posts in detail throughout these exchanges, so it's not like I haven't been trying to understand your criticisms. Perhaps the fault doesn't in fact lie with me, though maybe it does.
----------
That's fine. We don't have to allocate blame here, and since the fact of the matter is that I wrote my criticism in such a way that you didn't understand it after multiple attempts, I'll have a go at explaining it again.
When we put together a collection of data, we often have a question in mind; something we would like to answer, if we can, with the data. But the data may suggest other things than an answer to the question we have in mind. Indeed, a given collection of data will normally suggest more than one statement. For example, our data about the Pope suggests each of the following two statements:
1. The pope is Catholic.
2. The pope is Christian.
Or consider our data about Esperanto. This data suggests each of the following two statements:
1. All dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
2. Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperanto.
These examples look rather innocent, but bear with me and you will see why this phenomenon has an impact on your argument. Suppose, for example, that (for suitable values of x, y and z) there is a collection of data which suggests each of the following two statements:
1. All zs can't y.
2. x can't y.
In such a case, each of the following statements is true:
1. The data suggests that all zs can't y.
2. The data suggests that x can't y.
We can modify the second of these a little:
2'. It is not fallacious to infer that x can't y from the data.
But now suppose that we have an example in which the following statement is also true:
3. x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
We're not leaving the realm of possibility here. Each of 1, 2' and 3 holds in the second example above. But now look what we have:
1. The data suggests that all zs can't y.
2'. It is not fallacious to infer that x can't y from the data.
3. x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
These three statements taken together contradict the first premise of your argument.
Eric wrote:
------------
I don't see how your modified premise 1 withstands my last challenge
-------------
Your disagreement isn't with premise (1), which says: If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then *barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise,* it is plausible to assume these capability differences can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in the physiology of X and O.
This premise is eminently plausible, for when we notice capability differences between two biological entities, we *always* assume those differences can be explained, at least in part, in terms of physiological differences. Induction is on the side of premise (1).
Your disagreement, instead, is with premise (4), which says: There are no very good reasons to suppose it is not plausible to assume the capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in terms of physiology.
Can you supply very good reasons to suppose it is NOT plausible to assume "..."? That is, other than the fact that you can't *conceive* of the kind of physiology Jesus would have to have to account for his abilities, do you have any actual reasons for thinking that, despite the capability differences between Jesus and everyone else, his physiology is no relevantly different from ours?
It's not enough for you to argue that Jesus' physiology is merely *probably* no relevantly different from ours (though I don't think you can even do this); your case must be strong enough to support the falsity of (5). In other words, you must show that it isn't even *plausible* (not just improbable) that "..." Can you do this?
You wrote:
------------
In other words, that there's almost -- not quite, but almost -- as much difficulty in conceiving how it could even be possible
--------------
Your argument against premise (4) is simply that: "I can't conceive of how it's possible..." Your inability to conceive is not good enough to render (5) false. You need to argue:
It is NOT *plausible* to assume these capability differences, between Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings, can be explained, at least in part, in terms of differences in the physiology of Jesus and all non-supernormal human beings.
Again, even if I grant the mere improbability of the capability differences being explained, at least in part, in terms of physiological differences, this is not enough to show the *implausibility* of this claim.
Your argument from inconceivability is an argument from ignorance and failure of imagination, and thus it is not at all convincing.
You wrote:
---------
Hence, it's hard to see why you would mention the father issue in the context of the physiological issue if you didn't think it supports your supporting argument about the possible natural origins of supernormal capabilities.
-----------
Suppose we find out that Jesus had alien-DNA, and thus he was part-human and part-alien. Nothing you wrote renders this possibility implausible (even if it were unlikely). If Jesus had alien DNA (which is plausible), and thus an alien physiology, then your claim that there is no relevant physiological differences which could account for Jesus' capabilities becomes even more suspect.
Eric,
I'm always finding different ways of restating my argument.
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O.
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology.
-----------------------------------------------------
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y; (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to assume there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y; or (c) we know of a good reason to assume there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reasons to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus to rise naturally but not non-supernormal human beings. [premise, supported by C1]
5. We know of a good reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus to rise naturally but not non-supernormal human beings. [premise, supported by the claim that Jesus was not fully human]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
sfwc wrote:
------------
1. The data suggests that all zs can't y.
2'. It is not fallacious to infer that x can't y from the data.
3. x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
These three statements taken together contradict the first premise of your argument.
------------
I'm still not following. Instead of using x, y, and z, let's stick with your examples of dogs and Arnold Schwarzenegger. So we have:
1. Data1 suggests that all dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
2. It is not fallacious to infer that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperanto from Data1.
3. Arnold Schwarzenegger does not fall within the scope or category of a dog.
Is this what you're saying? If so, then I deny (2) -- it would be fallacious to infer that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperato from Data1.
radical_logic wrote:
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I deny (2) -- it would be fallacious to infer that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperato from Data1.
----------
Remember what Data1 is in this case. I specified it in my comment: '[all] our data about Esperanto' (the 'all' was implicit). This data does suggest that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperanto. So (2) holds. It follows that (2') also holds (I think it is (2') rather than (2) that you are denying) - It is not fallacious to infer that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperanto from the data.
Note that the same problem is still present in the second argument you presented in your recent reply to Eric. Each of the following statements is true (for my criticism to apply to the formulation you gave I would only need at least one of them to be true):
(a) We know of relevant differences between Arnold Schwarzenegger and dogs that could enable Arnold Schwarzenegger, but not dogs, to speak fluent Esperanto.
(b) Arnold Schwarzenegger does not fall within the category 'dogs', and we know of no good reason to assume there are no relevant differences between Arnold Schwarzenegger and dogs that could enable Arnold Schwarzenegger, but not dogs, to speak fluent Esperanto
(c) We know of a good reason to assume there might be relevant differences between Arnold Schwarzenegger and dogs that could enable Arnold Schwarzenegger, but not dogs, to speak fluent Esperanto.
sfwc wrote:
-----------
Remember what Data1 is in this case. I specified it in my comment: '[all] our data about Esperanto' (the 'all' was implicit).
-------------
Let's get clear on this.
Data1a = all dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
Data1b = Arnold Schwarzenegger + all dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
Which is the data you're referring to? If it's Data1a, then I maintain what I said earlier: it would be fallacious to infer that Arnold Schwarzenegger can't speak fluent Esperato from the data.
If, however, you mean Data1b, then of course the inference wouldn't be fallacious. But this doesn't parallel my argument.
"Your argument from inconceivability is an argument from ignorance and failure of imagination, and thus it is not at all convincing."
This isn't true at all. I've characterized our disagreement here as a category dispute: category disputes don't in any sense involve 'arguments from ignorance.' In other words, I'm not simply saying, 'I can't see *how* it could be the case that physiological properties enable S to cast out devils, change water into wine, raise the dead, etc.'; rather, I'm saying, 'I don't see how it could *possibly* be the case that physiological properties enable S to cast out devils, change water into wine, raise the dead, etc.' The former proposition may be categorized as an argument from ignorance, but the latter proposition cannot. As I said, it's similar to saying that I can't see how the number three could mow the lawn -- and that's decidedly *not* an argument from ignorance or lack of imagination; it's a question of categories. What you must do is defend the notion that you haven't committed a category error. Merely labelling my position as a 'failure of imagination' begs the question.
radical,
"Try understanding the arguments"
I understand the arguments, they're not written in any complex form.
I was merely giving one empiricist's answer to them. My point being that they are ill-formed questions. x times y equals z. z is 128, what are x and y?
But, thank you for encouraging me to think. I wouldn't have come up with that on my own.
Eric wrote:
----------------
In other words, I'm not simply saying, 'I can't see *how* it could be the case that physiological properties enable S to cast out devils, change water into wine, raise the dead, etc.'; rather, I'm saying, 'I don't see how it could *possibly* be the case that physiological properties enable S to cast out devils, change water into wine, raise the dead, etc.' The former proposition may be categorized as an argument from ignorance, but the latter proposition cannot.
----------
I don't see the difference. In the former, you are saying "I can't see how it could be the case...", whereas in the latter you are saying "I can't see how it could *possibly* be the case..."
To me, the two sounds like:
(1). I can't see how Tim was able to rob the bank.
and,
(2). I can't see how it was *possible* that Tim was able to rob the bank.
The two are not different (perhaps the latter is a little stronger). The fact is: in both of your statements, you start off by noting YOUR inability to *to see* (i.e. conceive). An argument which begins with "I can't conceive/see of how it is possible that..." is an argument from inconceivability.
You wrote:
---------
As I said, it's similar to saying that I can't see how the number three could mow the lawn -- and that's decidedly *not* an argument from ignorance or lack of imagination;
-----------
To say that the number three can mow the law is a category error, but to *argue* that this statement commits a category error because "you can't see how..." (as you just did above) is to argue from inconceivability.
Instead you should say: For A to mow the lawn, A needs to be able to come into physical contact with the mow, and if A is a number -- that is, an abstract object -- then A cannot, by definition, come into physical contact with the mow. Hence the statement that A can mow the lawn commits a category error.
radical_logic wrote:
----------
Let's get clear on this.
Data1a = all dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
Data1b = Arnold Schwarzenegger + all dogs can't speak fluent Esperanto.
----------
These are both statements, which might be suggested by collections of data. But neither is itself a collection of data. The data I referred to (all our data about Esperanto) suggests both the statement you have referred to as Data1a and the statement you have referred to as Data1b.
In any case, suppose that Data1b really is the data I referred to (it is a statement suggested by the data in question, which comes reasonably close). Then, for Data1b, each of (1), (2') and (3) holds, and so the first premise of your argument is false.
radical_logic wrote:
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If, however, you mean Data1b, then of course the inference wouldn't be fallacious. But this doesn't parallel my argument.
----------
My aim was not to parallel your argument, but to show that the first premise of your argument is false. If you think it can be fixed, then present a modified form of your argument which doesn't have this problem, and we can talk about that.
"To me, the two sounds like:
(1). I can't see how Tim was able to rob the bank.
and,
(2). I can't see how it was *possible* that Tim was able to rob the bank.
The two are not different (perhaps the latter is a little stronger)."
The fault here is mine. I assumed you were familiar with possible world semantics. To say that I can't see how it's possible for S to perform action A is to say I can't see how there's a possible world in which S performs A, which is another way of I find the notion impossible. And, of course, to say that I find X impossible is not merely stronger than saying I can't see how X was done. I don't have time right now, but I can present an argument for this later in the day. However, the onus is on you to show that there is a possible world in which S performs A (or, getting back to our dispute, where property P enables supernormal capability C). First, you're the one claiming that it is possible; second, you're the one claiming that it is possible contrary to all the data we possess; and third, you're the one claiming it's possible without having provided an argument for its possibility. Hence, given that (1) you're making the positive claim, (2) your positive claim contravenes everything we know about the issue, and (3) you haven't presented an argument supporting such a claim (the claim being, to clarify, that physiology could, in some possible world, enable one to change water into wine, raise the dead, resurrect oneself, heal the sick, command the weather, etc.), a mere claim of inconceivability on my part, sans any argument I plan to present later today, seems to me to be sufficient to place the onus on you to provide an argument in support of your claim.
sfwc wrote:
-----------
In any case, suppose that Data1b really is the data I referred to (it is a statement suggested by the data in question, which comes reasonably close). Then, for Data1b, each of (1), (2') and (3) holds, and so the first premise of your argument is false.
-------------
If are you referring to Data1b, then my first premise is not false -- it is not an appropriate counter-example, for it doesn't parallel my argument. My argument does not assume the data is: All non-supernormal human beings + supernormal beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
If *this* were the data, then of course the inference would NOT be fallacious. But that's not the data I was referring to.
Eric wrote:
------------
The fault here is mine. I assumed you were familiar with possible world semantics. To say that I can't see how it's possible for S to perform action A is to say I can't see how there's a possible world in which S performs A, which is another way of I find the notion impossible.
----------------
I am familiar with possible-worlds semantics, but I did not realize that by "possible" you had meant "logically possible." Hence, I now take your claim to be: "I can't see how it is logically possible that..."
Well, if this is what you mean, then surely the onus is on you to show the notion to be "logically impossible." Perhaps there's a subtle contradiction here I'm not seeing, but the claim does not appear contradictory to me. What is the contradiction?
Until you can answer this question, you cannot claim I am guilty of a category error.
Continuing to leave aside the distinction between a statement and a collection of data,
radical_logic wrote:
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If are you referring to Data1b, then my first premise is not false -- it is not an appropriate counter-example, for it doesn't parallel my argument.
----------
The truth of a premise does not depend on the argument into which it is incorporated. I have shown that premise (1) of your argument is false by providing data and suitable values for x, y and z with:
1. The data suggests that all zs can't y.
2'. It is not fallacious to infer that x can't y from the data.
3. x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
radical_logic wrote:
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My argument does not assume the data is: All non-supernormal human beings + supernormal beings can't rise naturally from the dead.
----------
No, but because your first premise is universal in form it ought to apply for any collection of data and any sensible values of x, y and z.
The phrase 'parallel my argument' suggests that there is some necessary structure here which you have not made explicit. Perhaps premise (1) holds in certain cases, for example if there are restrictions on the data in question or on its relationship to x, y and z. You may not have mentioned these restrictions because you feel they are clear from the form of the application, and that they should be deduced from this form. But since it is you who is providing the argument, you ought to include these restrictions more explicitly, for example by modifying premise (1), and possibly also modifying the remainder of the argument to match. I don't want to predict this modification – I tried that before, and it caused some confusion. So I'd be much happier if you suggested a suitable modification.
A quibble: thinking about modality in terms of possible worlds isn't limited to logical possibility, but includes e.g. metaphysical possibility, epistemic possibility, etc.
Here's a simple line of thought (which I don't have time to formalize, and which will extend beyond my charge of your committing a category error, but which will include it) that leads to the conclusion that in at least one case (which, it seems to me, is all I need) you're guilty of a category error in supposing the possibility that Jesus' supernormal capability could be explained naturally.
Jesus cast out devils by commanding them to leave.
The casting out of devils is one of the capabilities Jesus possessed that would fall properly under the category 'supernormal.'
Devils are, by definition, supernatural beings.
If Jesus cast out devils by natural means, he cast out supernatural beings by natural means. (Here's the category error in this case)
The supernatural is, by definition, that which transcends the natural.
That which transcends the natural cannot be subject to the natural.
Hence, Jesus could not have cast out devils by natural means.
Hence, Jesus possessed at least one supernormal capability that cannot be explained naturally.
If a supernomral capability cannot be explained naturally, then natural correlations are of no use in reasoning about them.
The correlation between one's capabilities and one's physiology is a natural correlation.
Hence, if Jesus' supernormal capability to cast out devils cannot be explained naturally, we have no grounds for supposing that this ability is caused or explained by his physiology.
Hence, in this case, we have no grounds for concluding that Jesus' physiology differed from that of a normal human being.
I would go on to say that if Jesus possessed at least one supernormal capability that was demonstrably not dependent on his physiology, and that cannot be explained naturally, then the notion that his other supernormal capabilities also were not dependent on his physiology is made much more plausible. Indeed, it seems to me that this plausibility overrides your claim that differences in capabilities are plausibly explained by differences in physiology (I mean 'overrides' in the sense that you now need a stronger premise than this if your argument is to succeed).
I wrote that out rather quickly, so I apologize in advance for any errors it might contain. My time is limited today, but I did say that I would provide you with an argument, and so I have.
I will end by adding that it seems to me, for the three reasons I mentioned in my last post ((1) you're making the positive claim that such capabilities can possibly be explained by appeals to physiology, (2) your positive claim contravenes everything we know about the issue, and (3) you haven't presented an argument supporting such a claim (the claim being, to clarify, that physiology could, in some possible world, enable one to change water into wine, raise the dead, resurrect oneself, heal the sick, command the weather, etc.), that you too need to provide an argument.
Eric wrote:
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I will end by adding that it seems to me, for the three reasons I mentioned in my last post ((1) you're making the positive claim that such capabilities can possibly be explained by appeals to physiology, (2) your positive claim contravenes everything we know about the issue, and (3) you haven't presented an argument supporting such a claim (the claim being, to clarify, that physiology could, in some possible world, enable one to change water into wine, raise the dead, resurrect oneself, heal the sick, command the weather, etc.), that you too need to provide an argument.
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No, I don't need to provide this argument. The fact that Jesus was able to do things no one else could do is no reason to assume that differences in physiology cannot explain the capability difference. Recall my argument:
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O.
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1),
The burden lies with you to demonstrate the falsity of P3.
You wrote:
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Jesus cast out devils by commanding them to leave.
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Why do I need to concede that Jesus casted out real entities such as "demons and devils" as opposed to mental illness?
sfwc wrote:
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I have shown that premise (1) of your argument is false by providing data and suitable values for x, y and z with:
1. The data suggests that all zs can't y.
2'. It is not fallacious to infer that x can't y from the data.
3. x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
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I don't think so. Recall Data1ab: all dogs + Arnold can't speak Esperanto. So of course it would not be fallacious to infer, on the basis of this data, that Arnold can't speak Esperanto.
Premise (1) of Argument 1 does NOT say: "it is fallacious to infer that X can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs + x can't y..." This is just obvious.
"No, I don't need to provide this argument. The fact that Jesus was able to do things no one else could do is no reason to assume that differences in physiology cannot explain the capability difference."
That's not exactly how I put it, but that's not important. Look again at P1:
"P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, **barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise**, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O."
We do have very good reasons to suppose otherwise: first, there's not a single example, in all of history, in which we have been able to attribute capabilities of the sort you're considering to physiological properties; second, we haven't the slightest clue how physiological properties could enable one to turn water into wine, etc.; third, you've presented no argument whatsoever to support the notion that it's even possible for physiological properties to enable the sorts of capabilities you're considering (and, since your argument presupposes that it's minimally possible, this is a premise you must defend). Now, if having no examples whatsoever of X, not knowing how X could be caused, and not even knowing if X is possible don't count as 'very good reasons to suppose otherwise,' I don't know what does.
"Why do I need to concede that Jesus casted out real entities such as "demons and devils" as opposed to mental illness?"
Now you're being just plain arbitrary. You want to use the text as long as it suits your purposes, even to the point of agreeing (for the sake of argument) that Jesus walked on water, turned water into wine, resurrected, etc. but don't want to accept that he cast out devils. In other words, in every other case you're willing to interpret the text literally, but in this case you want to smuggle in arbitrarily a modern assumption (i.e. devils don't exist, and when the bible refers to them in the NT it's due to the ignorance of first century people with respect to mental illness) that cannot be supported by an appeal to the sort of reading of the text you've previously been relying upon.
Eric wrote:
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We do have very good reasons to suppose otherwise:
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Let's get something clear: your disagreement is with P3, not P1.
You wrote:
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first, there's not a single example, in all of history, in which we have been able to attribute capabilities of the sort you're considering to physiological properties; second, we haven't the slightest clue how physiological properties could enable one to turn water into wine, etc.; third, you've presented no argument whatsoever to support the notion that it's even possible for physiological properties to enable the sorts of capabilities you're considering (and, since your argument presupposes that it's minimally possible, this is a premise you must defend). Now, if having no examples whatsoever of X, not knowing how X could be caused, and not even knowing if X is possible don't count as 'very good reasons to suppose otherwise,' I don't know what does.
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I'll respond to these three points in turn.
Response to (a): All you're pointing out is the uniqueness of Jesus' abilities. Why should this constitute a "very good" reason for thinking that his capabilities can't be explained in terms of a very unique physiology? I can simply point to the fact that P1 is true: in virtually every case we can think of, whenever we see two biological entities with different physical capabilities, we NEVER assume there are no relevant differences found in their physiology which could potentially explain their different physical capabilities. For instance, when we observe that cats can't breathe underwater, but fish can, we do not assume this is the case despite the absence of relevant differences in their physiology -- just the opposite, in fact. We assume there ARE relevant differences in their physiology, and we make these assumptions even when we are not very familiar with the biological entity we're studying.
However, we can stick to purely human examples to make the same point. When we observe that person A can run a full marathon, while person B can only run a half marathon, do we assume there are NO relevant differences in their physiology which can explain their different capabilities? Of course not. In order to assume that there are NO relevant differences in their physiology, despite their capability differences, we would need very good reasons for thinking this to be so. P1 seems *very well* confirmed by induction.
Moreover, if we assume the virgin birth story, then we good reason to think Jesus was not fully biologically human. Hence it's plausible - on the assumption that Jesus had no biological human father - that Jesus was, at least, part alien.
Response to (b): this is nothing more than an argument from ignorance.
Response to (c): The way my argument is phrased, I'm not committed to the view that it's *actually* physically possible that Jesus' capabilities can in fact be explained in terms of his physiology. All I'm committed to is: it is NOT known to be impossible.
However, if I wanted to argue that those feats are actually physically possible (i.e. they don't violate the laws of natural), I can simply direct you to a quote from Victor Stenger. He says:
"Physics does not forbid a human from growing younger or the dead rising!"
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html
You wrote:
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Now you're being just plain arbitrary.
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Not at all. I conceded the *observed* physical events. Did anyone see devils rush out of people's bodies?
Eric,
Btw, even supposing P3 is refuted and thus my argument fails, that still wouldn't mean premise (4) of Argument 1 is false. For it could be the case that there are relevant *non-physiological* differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings (e.g. advanced technology) which could Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally from the dead.
For convenience, I'll repost my arguments:
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to assume there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y; or (c) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reasons to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus to rise naturally but not non-supernormal human beings. [premise, supported by C1]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus to rise naturally but not non-supernormal human beings. [premise, supported by the claim that Jesus was not fully biologically human]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
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P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O.
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)
radical_logic wrote:
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I don't think so. Recall Data1ab: all dogs + Arnold can't speak Esperanto. So of course it would not be fallacious to infer, on the basis of this data, that Arnold can't speak Esperanto.
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Yes; this is precisely my point (2').
radical_logic wrote:
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Premise (1) of Argument 1 does NOT say: "it is fallacious to infer that X can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs + x can't y..." This is just obvious.
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This gives me an opportunity to explain my criticism in a slightly different way. You have raised here the possibility of a premise (1'):
1'. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
As you point out, this would be no good as a premise for your argument. It is clearly false. The problem is that your premise (1) logically implies this premise (1'). It follows that premise (1) of your argument is also false.
sfwc wrote:
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This gives me an opportunity to explain my criticism in a slightly different way. You have raised here the possibility of a premise (1'):
1'. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
As you point out, this would be no good as a premise for your argument. It is clearly false. The problem is that your premise (1) logically implies this premise (1'). It follows that premise (1) of your argument is also false.
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No, I don't see the problem; premise (1) cannot be reasonably interpreted as (1'). It's a simple matter of interpreting my premise charitably.
For Eric,
Here is a more general way to support premise (4) of Argument 1.
(p1). If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.
(p2). Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
(p3). There are no good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
(p4). Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from (p3), (p2), and (p1))
(p5). If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise
*NATURALLY* from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise *SUPERNATURALLY* from the dead.
(p6). Either (a) or (b). (from p5, p4)
(p7) If there is no good reason to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.
(p8). There is no good reason to suppose that (a) is false.
(p9). Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p8, p7)
"I conceded the *observed* physical events. Did anyone see devils rush out of people's bodies?"
You did no such thing. Not *one* person *observed* the *event* of the resurrection, yet you concede it.
Also, wrt to the devils, we have the cases of the devils speaking through the people they possess, we have them knowing Jesus and things about him, we have the casting out of devils into the Gadarene swine, we have Jesus, whom you're conceding is supernormal, believing that they're devils and treating them as if they're devils, etc.
Note, I'm not arguing that these things in fact happened (no more than you are); rather, I'm arguing that your use of the text is arbitrary.
radical_logic wrote:
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No, I don't see the problem; premise (1) cannot be reasonably interpreted as (1'). It's a simple matter of interpreting my premise charitably.
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I haven't interpreted (1) as being (1'), but as logically implying (1'), which it does. If you intend to use this argument in the context of a debate or argument, then you will not be able to rely on your opponent's charity. If there is even a small chink in the way that your argument is phrased, it may be exploited. In this case, the first premise, as stated, is false, and this is likely to make the argument less useful for convincing your opponents.
Now, it may be that there is another formulation of the argument which, because it is phrased more carefully, does not rely on charitable interpretation. If you reckon that that is the case, then please provide the reformulation (in which the proper interpretation of the first premise is stated explicitly) and we can discuss that.
sfwc wrote:
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You did no such thing. Not *one* person *observed* the *event* of the resurrection, yet you concede it.
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Right, and that's because I'm being overly generous. I don't HAVE to concede that Jesus died and rose from the dead; while in the tomb, he could have been in a near death state, and then after regenerating for 3 days, appeared to people *as if* he came back from the dead.
you wrote:
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Also, wrt to the devils, we have the cases of the devils speaking through the people they possess, we have them knowing Jesus and things about him, we have the casting out of devils into the Gadarene swine, we have Jesus, whom you're conceding is supernormal, believing that they're devils and treating them as if they're devils, etc.
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Was it observed that people were speaking as if they were possessed by devils, and therefore it was concluded that they were possessed by devils, or was it *observed* that people were being possessed by devils?
You wrote:
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Note, I'm not arguing that these things in fact happened (no more than you are); rather, I'm arguing that your use of the text is arbitrary.
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Being arbitrarily generous is not the same thing as being arbitrary.
sfwc wrote:
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I haven't interpreted (1) as being (1'), but as logically implying (1'), which it does.
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False. (1) does not logically imply (1') at all -- the implication only goes through if in (1), I'm assuming that "x can't y" is part of my data, which I'm not. This is obvious. The principle of reasonable interpretation is in order here.
"Being arbitrarily generous is not the same thing as being arbitrary."
OK, that's definitely a conversation stopper for me!
Anyway, thanks for the discussion, and for putting these interesting arguments out there in the first place.
radical_logic wrote:
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(1) does not logically imply (1') at all -- the implication only goes through if in (1), I'm assuming that "x can't y" is part of my data, which I'm not.
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I'm afraid that the deduction of (1') from (1) is pure logic, and does not rely on any supposition that you are assuming `x can't y' is part of your data. Here is one way the deduction could be presented:
(i) It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z. [Assumption]
(ii) 'all zs can't y and x can't y' implies 'all zs can't y'. [That's what the word 'and' is all about]
(iii) All data suggesting both that all zs can't y and that x can't y is data suggesting that all zs can't y [From (ii)]
(iv) All data suggesting that all zs can't y is data from which, if x does not fall within the scope or category of z, it is fallacious to infer that x can't y. [Reformulation of (i)]
(v) All data suggesting both that all zs can't y and that x can't y is data from which, if x does not fall within the scope or category of z, it is fallacious to infer that x can't y. [From (iii) and (iv)]
(vi) It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z. [Reformulation of (v)]
Eric wrote:
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OK, that's definitely a conversation stopper for me!
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What's unreasonable about what I said?
sfwc wrote:
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I'm afraid that the deduction of (1') from (1) is pure logic,
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No, it is not.
You wrote:
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(ii) 'all zs can't y and x can't y' implies 'all zs can't y'. [That's what the word 'and' is all about]
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Although "all zs can't y and x can't y" implies "all zs can't y," the reverse is not true: "all zs can't y" does not imply that x can't y."
The fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs (all zs can't y) does not imply that Mike, a body-builder who works out 15 hours a day, can't bench 500 lbs (x can't y).
radical_logic wrote:
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Although "all zs can't y and x can't y" implies "all zs can't y," the reverse is not true: "all zs can't y" does not imply that x can't y."
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That's fine, since what I rely on in the deduction is that 'all zs can't y and x can't y' implies 'all zs can't y', and not the reverse.
sfwc wrote:
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That's fine, since what I rely on in the deduction is that 'all zs can't y and x can't y' implies 'all zs can't y', and not the reverse.
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Your logic is incorrect. Again, I refer you back to my example: The fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs (all zs can't y) does not imply that Mike, a body-builder who works out 15 hours a day, can't bench 500 lbs (x can't y).
This translates to: "It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y...." Nothing about this inference assumes that 'Mike can't bench 500 lbs' is part of the data from which the conclusion is inferred.
Spencer wrote:
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Your logic is incorrect.
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It may be, but I'm afraid I don't see a problem with it yet. Would you care to point out at which step the error occurs?
Spencer wrote:
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Again, I refer you back to my example: The fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs (all zs can't y) does not imply that Mike, a body-builder who works out 15 hours a day, can't bench 500 lbs (x can't y).
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I don't dispute this.
Spencer wrote:
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This translates to: "It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y...." Nothing about this inference assumes that 'Mike can't bench 500 lbs' is part of the data from which the conclusion is inferred.
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You have shown that the claim of premise (1) holds in one particular instance, for specific values of x, y and z and a particular constrained collection of data. But premise (1) is a general claim, so, in order to demonstrate it, it is insufficient to show that it holds in one special case. You must show that it holds in general: For any values of x, y and z and for any data. You cannot do this, because it does not hold in general. As stated, it is false.
sfwc wrote:
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You have shown that the claim of premise (1) holds in one particular instance, for specific values of x, y and z and a particular constrained collection of data. But premise (1) is a general claim, so, in order to demonstrate it, it is insufficient to show that it holds in one special case. You must show that it holds in general: For any values of x, y and z and for any data. You cannot do this, because it does not hold in general. As stated, it is false.
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Recall your previous claim: my (1) "logically implies" your (1'). If this were the case, than my Mike example would fail, for we would have to suppose that 'Mike can't bench 500 lbs' is part of the data from which the conclusion is inferred.
Spencer wrote:
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Recall your previous claim: my (1) "logically implies" your (1'). If this were the case, than my Mike example would fail, for we would have to suppose that 'Mike can't bench 500 lbs' is part of the data from which the conclusion is inferred.
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Your Mike example is not relevant. When I said (1) logically implies (1'), I meant that it is possible to deduce (1') from (1) by a chain of logical reasoning, and not that every collection of data suggesting that all zs can't y is necessarily also data suggesting that x can't y (it is hard to see how my statement could sensibly be construed that way).
Since I have presented a chain of reasoning by which (1') may be deduced from (1), if my claim is false you ought to be able to point out a step in that chain of reasoning which is faulty. Please do so.
You have also still not dealt with the formulation of my criticism in terms of Arnold Schwarzenegger and Esperanto. Do you dispute that any of (1), (2') and (3) hold in that example? Or do you deny that the existence of an example in which (1), (2') and (3) all hold shows that your premise (1) is false?
sfwc wrote:
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Your Mike example is not relevant. When I said (1) logically implies (1'), I meant that it is possible to deduce (1') from (1) by a chain of logical reasoning, and not that every collection of data suggesting that all zs can't y is necessarily also data suggesting that x can't y (it is hard to see how my statement could sensibly be construed that way).
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My Mike example is certainly relevant: if (1) "logically implies" (1'), then if we substitute the variables with examples, they should go all through. But they don't.
You wrote:
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Since I have presented a chain of reasoning by which (1') may be deduced from (1), if my claim is false you ought to be able to point out a step in that chain of reasoning which is faulty. Please do so.
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Either (iii) is false or (v) doesn't follow.
"(iii) All data suggesting both that all zs can't y and that x can't y is data suggesting that all zs can't y [From (ii)]"
If this is read: "the DATA suggesting that all za can't say" is the combination of data1 -- all zs can't y -- + data2 -- x can't y -- then I deny this. This most certainly doesn't follow from (ii)
Spencer wrote:
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My Mike example is certainly relevant: if (1) "logically implies" (1'), then if we substitute the variables with examples, they should go all through. But they don't.
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If I've understood you correctly, you've misunderstood what is going on in at least two ways here. First of all, I claimed that one general statement follows from another general statement; this does not require me to show that the same relation holds between the corresponding particular statements. If you are familiar with quantifier notation, I can use it to express the form of the issue reasonably succinctly (though I'll have to use the symbol @ in place of a universal quantifier, since I'm not sure how to get that symbol in this context). (1) has the form (@t)F(t) and (1') has the form (@t)G(t). Now, I have claimed that (1) entails (1'): That is, that ((@t)F(t)) --> ((@t)G(t)). This is different from, and doesn't imply, the statement (@t)(F(t) --> G(t)), which you appear to be attempting to disprove.
As a matter of fact, the statement of this latter form is also true in this case, and your attempt to invalidate it with an example also fails. Lets see what happens when we plug in the specific data and values for x, y and z you gave in this case. (1) becomes 'If the fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500lbs suggests that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs, and Mike does not fall within the scope or category of such body builders, then it is fallacious to infer from this fact that Mike can't bench 500lbs.' After a little careful unwinding, it is clear that this statement is true. So the corresponding statement for (1') should also be true. That statement is 'If the fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500lbs suggests both that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs and also that Mike can't bench 500lbs, and Mike does not fall within the scope or category of such body builders, then it is fallacious to infer from this fact that Mike can't bench 500lbs,' which is quite a mouthful. However, it is still a true statement, since it is of the form 'If A then B' with B being 'It is fallacious to infer from this fact that Mike can't bench 500lbs', which is true.
Spencer wrote:
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Either (iii) is false or (v) doesn't follow.
"(iii) All data suggesting both that all zs can't y and that x can't y is data suggesting that all zs can't y [From (ii)]"
If this is read: "the DATA suggesting that all za can't say" is the combination of data1 -- all zs can't y -- + data2 -- x can't y -- then I deny this. This most certainly doesn't follow from (ii)
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It seems you are unsure what I meant by (iii), so I'll make it a little clearer. A less ambiguous statement of (iii) is 'For any data which suggests both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, that same data suggests that all zs can't y'. Now I've made this clearer, what is the issue? Is it that (iii) is false, or that (v) doesn't follow?
I must also remind you that you have yet to deal with the Schwarzenegger/Esperanto issue. Is it that (1), (2') or (3) fails in the example I gave? Or is it that the existence of an example for which (1), (2') and (3) all hold doesn't invalidate your premise (1)?
sfwc wrote:
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(1) becomes 'If the fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500lbs suggests that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs, and Mike does not fall within the scope or category of such body builders, then it is fallacious to infer from this fact that Mike can't bench 500lbs.' After a little careful unwinding, it is clear that this statement is true. So the corresponding statement for (1') should also be true. That statement is 'If the fact that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500lbs suggests both that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs and also that Mike can't bench 500lbs, and Mike does not fall within the scope or category of such body builders, then it is fallacious to infer from this fact that Mike can't bench 500lbs,' which is quite a mouthful.
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(1) clearly does not imply (1').
you wrote:
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'For any data which suggests both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, that same data suggests that all zs can't y'.
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This is precisely NOT what my (1) says. You are saying: DATA consists of both "all zs can't y and x can't y," which is a misrepresentation of my (1). You cannot derive this from (ii).
you wrote:
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I must also remind you that you have yet to deal with the Schwarzenegger/Esperanto issue. Is it that (1), (2') or (3) fails in the example I gave? Or is it that the existence of an example for which (1), (2') and (3) all hold doesn't invalidate your premise (1)?
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I already delt with it. In your example, you are assuming that the data consists of both Arnold AND Esperanto. Hence it doesn't apply to my (1).
Spencer wrote:
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(1) clearly does not imply (1').
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Then you ought to be able to point to the flaw in my deduction of (1') from (1). Which step is faulty?
sfwc wrote:
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'For any data which suggests both that all zs can't y and also that x can't y, that same data suggests that all zs can't y'.
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Spencer responded:
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This is precisely NOT what my (1) says. You are saying: DATA consists of both "all zs can't y and x can't y," which is a misrepresentation of my (1).
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This was never intended to be what your (1) says. In the logical derivation I provide, I don't even deduce it from (1) but from the logical principle (ii). Since it is not a representation of (1), it certainly isn't a misrepresentation.
Spencer responded:
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I already delt with [your other formulation of the criticism]. In your example, you are assuming that the data consists of both Arnold AND Esperanto. Hence it doesn't apply to my (1).
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I specified (rather than assumed) what the data is: All our data about Esperanto. In order for this not to falsify your premise (1), at least one of (1), (2') or (3) would have to fail or the combination of these would have to be different to the negation of your premise (1). Which is it?
sfwc wrote:
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This was never intended to be what your (1) says. In the logical derivation I provide, I don't even deduce it from (1) but from the logical principle (ii). Since it is not a representation of (1), it certainly isn't a misrepresentation.
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This *is* a misrepresentation. You are saying: "all Bs who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500" and "Mike who works out 15 hours can't bench 500" implies "all Bs who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500." From this you think it follows that: the Data is both "all Bs who work out less than 2 hours a day..." + "Mike who works out 15 hours a day..." It doesn't.
you wrote:
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I specified (rather than assumed) what the data is: All our data about Esperanto. In order for this not to falsify your premise (1), at least one of (1), (2') or (3) would have to fail or the combination of these would have to be different to the negation of your premise (1). Which is it?
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Once again, you specified a data that is not at all related to premise (1). Your specified data = "all zs can't y + x can't y." That is not the specified data in premise (1).
Spencer wrote:
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From this you think it follows that: the Data is both "all Bs who work out less than 2 hours a day..." + "Mike who works out 15 hours a day..." It doesn't.
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No, I don't think this. Nor do I make use of any such principle in the deduction of (1') from (1). At least, if I do then I haven't noticed having done so. Would you be happy to point out at which step in the deduction this error occurs?
Spencer wrote:
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Once again, you specified a data that is not at all related to premise (1). Your specified data = "all zs can't y + x can't y." That is not the specified data in premise (1).
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There is no 'specified data' in premise (1), which is a general statement. Since it is a general statement, it ought to apply in the case of the data I mentioned (all our data about Esperanto). Do you deny that (1), (2') and (3) hold for this example? Or do you deny that, taken together, these show that premise (1) is not true of this data and so is false?
sfwc,
I take leave of this conversation. I don't think I can explain myself any clearer -- we'll just have to agree to disagree.
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