One question that I have for religious believers is how they would distinguish between the following:Believers can say "I know that I know that I know all they want to," but their knowing can be accounted for by (2) since such a possible god is a trickster. Likewise, any claim of a true religious experience according to Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology cannot overcome scenario (2).
(1) An all-powerful deity created and guides the universe ultimately towards a good purpose;
and
(2) An all-powerful deity created and guides the universe ultimately towards an evil purpose, but have chosen to maliciously presented himself as benevolent to play a trick on created beings.
I mean, since believers are big on creating conceptual space to make their positions logically POSSIBLE, then it is also possible that God is a Cosmic Trickster who takes pleasure in fooling them.
How could one refuse (2)? Only based upon one's religious beliefs that (1) must be true. The problem is that one's beliefs that (1) must be true could be part of the cosmic joke in scenario (2), and thus there is no real way to differentiate between (1) and (2) for a religious believer.
Link.
And so my friends there can be no reason given scenario (2) to think that it won't be skeptics like ME who will be rewarded in heaven rather than believers like YOU! As far as we know believers like YOU will end up in hell.
Christians, better switch sides now while you can. Hurry before you die. It could be today.
Pascal's Wager anyone?
To read a follow-up post click here.
246 comments:
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One, it means that “having faith” is nothing special at all, because ALL our beliefs require it. So, what is the big deal about it for believers if it happens all the time? The big deal is that religious faith is supposed to be about highly unlikely and implausible beliefs, which is why it requires so much effort and is so impressive to believers.
Actually, I think there is a potential for equivocation here because we do not have the same definition going on and I have explicitely distinguished religious faith from this that we have been talking about which I call epistemic faith (not in this discussion, but I have anticipated this matter and have discussed it else where). Epistemic faith is only about how we approach beliefs. Religious faith is actually more of a personal category than an epistemic category with moral dimensions and beyond in how we live our life. James noted that people were treating faith as a mere epistemic concern and argued against that from the end of the first chapter of James to the end of the second chapter noting that even demons believe in God. According to the best recent research, When Paul spoke of faith vs. works, he was not speaking of mere belief vs. effort and merit, but rather it was covenant identity entered into by faith vs. obtaining that covenant identity by following the specific laws of Moses. And when Jesus said that whoever believes in me will have everlasting life, history informs us how we are to understand what that statement means. Flavius Josephus said to Jewish soldiers "believe in me" and he wasn't just asking them to have positive feelings in him, but he was telling them to trust AND follow him.
The difficulty and challenge to faith is not always and not for everyone to believe something that is difficult to believe. After all, so many of the claims that scripture makes were not so difficult for people at that time to believe as they are for people of today with modernistic assumptions (not that there weren't intellectual challenges or that we can mistakenly believe that people back then were credulous and gullible just because they found supernatural claims more believable). The challenge of faith is emotional as well. To give into temptation of all sorts or resist it is not an epistemic matter and resisting it is in scripture is synonymous with faithfulness. To obey God is also called faithful though it goes well beyond a matter of simply believing religious claims.
In short, religious faith is not exactly the same as epistemic faith and to treat it as such is to do damage to and ignore it's actual usage in scripture.
post 3 of 3
Fourth, I wonder what your comments are about the fallacy of equivocation in the argument that believers make when they say that evolution by natural selection is “just a theory”, and thus lacks any evidentiary justification meriting their acceptance. Do you even consider this line of reasoning an example of that fallacy?
I am not confidant that an equivocation is involved in this line of reasoning. I think it is wrong for a different reason. I don't think that those who object to evolution do so because they switch the definition of a theory in the middle of their reasoning. I think they just are mistaken on the definition of theory as applied to evolution as something that is tentative and not well established. I reject this argument for another reason though as well. I don't believe evolution is a theory but is a scientific paradigm or maxi-theory. Paradigms are much more flexible than theories and they are in fact theories of theories. They do more than organize data, they organize theories and hypotheses. They are also permitted unquestioned assumptions. Actually, more specifically, it is legitimate to hold them without questioning their assumptions though those assumptions may come under scrutiny, but that they are not always under scrutiny is not a problem (at least not a scientific problem). The main thing is that paradigms are always able to organize the data and theories of data coherently, which sometimes they do eventually fail to do. This is the description of what happened in physics from Newtonian physics to qm and relativity. Of course those also present an interesting ongoing dilemma as qm and relativity excellently interpret much data and yet they are inconsistent with each other (and there is no clear solution, not even string theory).
As for John Loftus, he has taught a critical thinking class, but of course that doesn't put him beyond misunderstanding fallacies as philosophers like John accuse each other of fallacies all the time. He may or may not oblige us though as I don't know that he has much patience for me. But I suspect that he would not make this criticism and that you'd respect his opinion more than mine thus I suggest it. But unless there is a better explanation of equivocation, I have no doubt that i am not committing this fallacy as specifically accused.
Rob:
I am glad that you are, at least, starting to present an explicit argument. Most of my previous comments were based upon what I thought your argument was. Now, I have some direct material to work with.
First, you say that you have given reasons for your faith in a benevolent God over other possible supernatural scenarios.
The only reasons that you have provided had to do with things like whether the supernatural scenario supports morality, is aesthetically pleasing, is parsimonious, and so on. As I said earlier, none of these has anything to with what is true, except parsimony, and have everything to do with which beliefs make us feel good or act good. Like I pointed out, there is no good reason for the truth to make us feel good or act good. The truth of a matter may be terribly depressing. For example, it might make me feel better and act better to believe that I am a firefighter, but that does not mean that I am one.
Second, my infinite supernatural scenario argument does not fail simply because you can present ANY arguments. That is not the point of it at all. The point is that no-one can present any GOOD arguments to justify one supernatural scenario over another, except by using information from within their preferred supernatural scenario, which would be circular logic. You would have to show features of the empirical world that imply that your supernatural scenario is superior to others. Good luck with that.
Third, “religious sceptics” can mock “faith” as an “irrational response” if that “faith” involves beliefs in entities that are philosophically problematic, falsified by the facts of the empirical world, and demand absolute certainty and belief in them on pain of eternal punishment, which negates their status as “faith” at all, i.e. since they are now considered “absolutely true”.
Again, you are confusing faith1 and faith2 and committing the fallacy of equivocation. Just because two beliefs cannot be considered absolutely certain does not put them on an equal footing that implies that one cannot reject one without the other. There are DEGREES of justification for such beliefs, and one can justifiably reject a belief based upon faith1 while adhering to a belief based upon faith2. Therefore, just saying “faith” is a poor response to my sceptical argument above, unless you clearly specify whether you mean faith1 or faith2.
Rob:
Sorry, I missed your last two comments.
First, you argue that I may be guilty of committing the fallacy of equivocation in my point that if “faith” is simply defined as “having firm belief in a proposition for which there is no absolute proof or certainty”, then religious faith becomes mundane, because we all have “faith” in many beliefs without any cognitive or emotional effort whatsoever. You say that one must make a distinction between “epistemic faith” and “religious faith”.
Now, I find this ironic, because I actually agree with you that there IS a difference between religious faith and the alleged faith involved in believing in the external world, for example. However, if I have committed the fallacy of equivocation in this matter, then you MUST have also committed it in your point that if one accepts “faith” in the external world, then one has no grounds for rejecting “faith” in God. I have been saying that these are totally different kinds of faiths that must be kept distinct, and probably refer to totally different phenomena, despite superficial similarities. You appear to agree with me, and so I am unsure why you deny that your argument falls by the hand of this fallacy.
Second, you and others may have other reasons to reject the theory of evolution by natural selection, but surely, you must see that those who argue that it is “just a theory” have committed the fallacy of equivocation. They confuse a mere hypothesis (theory1) with a hypothesis that is supported by a wealth of empirical data and contains internal consistency (theory2). One can easily reject a theory1, but one cannot easily reject a theory2. The “just a theory” argument trades upon confusing these two types of “theory”. You do see this, right?
And furthermore, forget about the fallacy of equivocation, and just think about this.
It is simply FALSE that if one believes one proposition to be true that is impossible to be known for certain, then one must accept all propositions that are impossible to be known for certain.
I think the counterexamples are just obvious.
Therefore, just because one believes in the external world, in the past, and in other people, as well as the findings of science, then it does not follow that one must accept belief in God.
The Presumption of Atheism: A Project
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QNt1xAqQGM8
This first series of videos deals with the Presumption of Atheism or the "lack of belief" definition that many Atheists propose of themselves today.
We examine it to see if Atheists are need of justification for their skepticism and whether that justification is reasonable.
I think this video and its question seemed to fit well with the discussion.
My reply is:
I don't believe God exists for the reason that it is a man made cultural artifact reflected from a specific historical, geographical and ethnic viewpoint.
Did I complete the assignment?
His reply:
Well, I don't agree with you (obviously), but yes...you completed the assignment ;)
dguller, I'm well aware that you have criticized what I have identified as existential import (which you oversimplify to something that it is not consistently). I found your criticism empty and unconvincing. But I won't discuss it further provided some things are addressed. The equivocation accusation was one of them and I'm glad you are abandoning it even though you don't explicitely say whether you still feel that way. I'll address your comment on evolution briefly but I really don't want to discuss it further.
You say that the creationists are equivocating between hypothesis and theory. The fact is it may be the case that they are confusing the definition of a hypothesis with the definition of a theory but they are only equivocating if they switch from one definition to the other in the middle of their reasoning. Being wrong about a definition (or even using the wrong definition in a context of what is otherwise a reasonable usage of the term elsewhere) and equivocating are two different things. The fact is, you can as I have with epistemic faith mention up front what it is that you mean when you use a term even if that may or may not be a normal usage of the term, but Creationists are trying to take something that they believe to be a scietifically understood matter (that evolution is a theory and theories are tentative) and draw the conclusion from that that evolution is therefore tentative. The problem is that they are mistaken about that usage of the term theory, but it is not equivocation.
BTW, you mentioned that I may have reason to reject evolution by natural selection. I never said what i think about evolution. I only explained why I agree that the creationist argument of "just a theory" is a bad one and I explained that it is not equivocation. I did type the words "but i reject it for other reasons". The object of that claim wasn't evolution, it was the "just a theory" criticism of evolution. I don't reject it because it's a matter of equivocation. I reject it because I recognize that describing evolution as a theory is not a comment on how tentative or how well established it is.
Secondly, you say that I haven't defeated your argument, but your argument in and of itself wasn't the target of my most recent comments to the effect. Remember, your argument was posted by John Loftus and John Loftus said that on the basis of this argument, we can only come to agnosticism and that the argument stands alone. These two claims are effectively dead. As I explicitly said, my points do not get us all the way there in terms of dismantling your arguments, but I have demonstrated both propositions to be wrong that your argument stands alone and that the only possible conclusion is agnosticism. I think after 200 posts, an argument that needs so much defense does not stand alone. Secondly, as for my part, if your argument depends upon your criticism of my reasons for #1 and against #2 (the ones that I won't take up again until we establish what I'm speaking of here) then clearly, it does not stand alone. It needs help. Whether your help was good or not, in light of my criticism it still needed that help and it thus does not stand alone.
if we can agree to that much (or maybe most of it) then perhaps we can move on.
Next, you misunderstood my comments on religious faith. We (at least you and me) have never discussed what I just defined as religious faith until recently. Belief in God that has been discussed here is not religious faith as defined in the Bible. It is what I have distinguished as epistemic faith in God.
Rob:
First, I never abandoned my contention that you are committing the fallacy of equivocation in your argument that having “faith” in the existence of the external world precludes criticizing the religious faith of believers. I still believe that this argument is an almost classic case of the fallacy. I’m truly sorry that you cannot see this but that is your problem.
Second, if you cannot see how the creationist “only a theory” argument against the theory of evolution is another example of the fallacy of equivocation, then I’m afraid that you are just hopeless on this matter. Perhaps you can e-mail a university professor of logic who understands informal logical fallacies to explain it to you, because it is simply beyond my powers.
Third, you are right that misinterpreted you with regards to criticizing the theory of evolution. Sorry.
Fourth, you have not provided any GOOD arguments against my infinite supernatural scenario argument. What are your arguments again?
One, that you have trust in your particular supernatural scenario. Wow, great argument. Oh, and this is the argument that led you to make your fallacy of equivalence by asserting that no-one can criticize “trust” as a good reason, because we all “trust” many beliefs that are impossible to prove.
Two, that your supernatural scenario is superior to others on the basis of parsimony, morality, enhancing the dignity of persons, contributing to meaning in human life, and so on. Also very convincing, except that NONE of these qualities necessarily has anything to do with the truth of one’s beliefs, except probably parsimony. After all, the truth may be depressing and immoral. It is a truth that some fathers rape their daughters. I know! Totally uplifting and full of meaning! Also, you never actually demonstrating the truth of this assertion. Are you telling me that there are NO other possible supernatural scenarios in which all of these conditions can be met? I doubt that very much.
That’s all that I can figure. It’s pretty clear that these are all weak arguments, and thus you still have no good reason to believe in your supernatural scenario and reject all others.
Fifth, who cares if my argument “stands alone”? What does that even mean?
Sixth, I will repeat my argument, and instead of nitpicking this comment, why not just answer it?
Here it is (again):
“My argument is that if one assumes that there is a supernatural realm that explains phenomena within the empirical world, then one is forced to admit that there are an infinite number of possible supernatural scenarios out there. If one believes in only one of those possible supernatural scenarios, then one must be able to justify that choice independent of information contained within the supernatural scenario itself. That means that one must only use information that exists within the empirical world to justify one’s supernatural choice.
“My belief is that no-one will be able to do so, because any justification of one’s supernatural choice ultimately utilizes information present only within one’s chosen supernatural scenario, and thus commits the fallacy of circular reasoning. It follows that since there is no rational justification for choosing one supernatural scenario over another, then it is largely arbitrary and ultimately based upon one’s personal preference. However, it still follows that it is impossible to know which supernatural scenario is true, because there are millions of people who hold different scenarios, and thus personal preference cannot ground one’s belief in one’s specific supernatural scenario.
“Therefore, at best, one must stop talking about the supernatural realm by virtue of being agnostic about it.”
You have a few options here.
One, you can show how my argument either contains false premises or makes mistake in the logical inference. Two, you can prove me wrong by providing a rational justification for your specific supernatural scenario using ONLY information already present within the empirical world. Three, you can show using personal preference to justify your religious beliefs ONLY applies to those who agree with you, and fails to be valid in those who have other religious beliefs.
So far, you have done none of this.
I look forward to your next attempt.
Perhaps you can e-mail a university professor of logic who understands informal logical fallacies to explain it to you, because it is simply beyond my powers.
You're making the accusation. You email the professor who actually has taught a class on critical thinking at the college level and runs this blog. Be sure to inlcude my actual explanation as to why it isn't a relevent equivocation and for simplicities sake, i think the evolution skeptic claim is an excellent example.
What more can I do than to take the actual description of the fallacy, the actual example given and demonstrate that my thinking doesn't fit the pattern?
And I explained to you exactly where you err and you've done nothing about it. You don't know how definitions work. Why should I repeat myself? I value my time. Let's not engage in a fruitless discussion. Why don't you address that issue of definition? that is where it has been taken. I noted that cause does not equal definition.
Why also don't you address the issue of equivocation itself as it has been discussed. is it or is it not an inconsistent use of a definition of a word within an argument? But you seem to think that it is just using a wrong definition. In the creationist example, I don't see why a creationist thinks that well established is ever part of the definition of theory. Even if they recognize this, I don't see where that definition is even relevent in the context of their argument.
Furthermore, I've shown you what my argument might look like if I actually did equivocate as it looks nothing like what I posted.
Look, if this feeds your assessment of what I say, I am really not going to discuss every other issue under the sun that is related to this (even though I would love to answer many of the questions that were posed) until this obstacle is clear. I know we could continue further, but I just don't see the point in making dozens of posts on all the related issue if we cannot resolve one or two essential ones.
I’m truly sorry that you cannot see this but that is your problem.
That really depends on whether you want to successfully communicate your criticism or not.
Fifth, who cares if my argument “stands alone”? What does that even mean?
So if you disagree with John Loftus on this GREAT! (He did say it in the title). If it's not that big of a deal to you, excellent. Course, I would think that if the argument stood alone, then it wouldn't matter whether I was right or not on the matter of existential import. But it is of consequence. Now lets just fix this equivocation thing.
Rob:
First, this is ridiculous. Fine, I’ll e-mail John. You forget that this was YOUR idea to begin with, but whatever.
Second, you are seriously trying to get blood from a stone, if you want to get into the minutiae of what the definition of “definition” and of “equivocation” is, then you really have lost this argument. It is painfully obvious to probably everyone except you that your argument -- if one has “faith” in the existence of the external world, then one cannot rationally criticize someone who has “faith” in God, simply on the matter of “faith” alone -- needs “faith” to remain exactly the same.
What you do is simply DEFINE “faith” as being “conviction without absolute proof”, and think that this eliminates the fallacy. And you are right, this does eliminate the fallacy, but it also KILLS your argument. Why? Because your conditional statement becomes totally false for the simple reason that one CAN argue that the two types of faith may share the quality of “conviction without absolute proof”, but they DIFFER in regards the DEGREE of logical consistency and empirical evidence. Those differences are what matter, and your argument requires them to have the SAME degree of logical consistency and empirical evidence.
Let me give you an example, to try to make this clear.
(1) A nobody cannot be seen.
(2) John is a nobody.
(3) Therefore, John cannot be seen.
Imagine someone makes this argument. When it is pointed out that they have obviously committed a fallacy of equivocation, they simply say that they are DEFINING “nobody” to mean “someone who matters very little”. Yes, they have technically saved the argument from the fallacy of equivocation, but the argument is no longer valid, because (1) is OBVIOUSLY false, i.e. “someone who matters very little cannot be seen”.
This is EXACTLY what you are doing. The major premise of your argument -- if one has “faith” in the existence of the external world, then one cannot rationally criticize someone who has “faith” in God, simply on the matter of “faith” alone -- is FALSE if “faith” simply means “conviction without absolute proof”. Why? Because just because they share “conviction without absolute proof”, they differ in the AMOUNT of proof and evidence that sustains them.
That is the same reason why “faith” in God is different from “faith” in invisible unicorns. The former has SOME evidentiary support whereas the latter has NONE. Similarly, “faith” in the existence of the external world differs from “faith” in God, because the former has TONNES of evidence in support of it whereas the latter only has SOME.
Your tactic of focusing upon the superficial similarities DOES avoid the fallacy of equivocation, but it renders your argument UNSOUND. Is that really a better strategy?
Third, what does “stand alone” mean? Does it mean that the argument is so obvious that the only response is utter acceptance by others without any questions or criticisms? Does it mean that it is valid independent of empirical evidence? I mean, what are you TALKING about when you bring up the red herring of “stand alone”?
post 1 of 2
So having slept on it, I believe I can see how evolution skeptics may be equivocating. But it still isn't clear to me that they are. Again, is it switching the definition mid reasoning or is simply being wrong. But anyhow, this is the best on the creationist exampe for the interpretation of equivocation:
Evolutionists admit evolution is a theory
Theories are tentative
Thus evolution is tentative.
Why might this be an equivocation? It's only because in relying on the evolutionists assessment, they also have to take into account what it is that evolutionists mean by calling it a theory. They rely on their calling it a theory, but not fully what they mean by that. I'm not convinced though that this is equivocation because the meaning is not within the argument of the reasoner but rather, it is in a disagreement on the definition between the parties that also disagree elsewhere. It could be that the concept of equivocation is more flexible than the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy implies (I've been using that since our blog host has reffered to that for his authority).
Do we have the same issue with my reasoning? Absolutely not. I am not depending on what YOU, dguller, means by faith. I told you up front what I mean by faith and what I always mean by faith (until we are in a different context, the context of reading scripture which I explained was not relevant, not the context of my argument which is the only relevant consideration. If the context of reading scripture had to be then every use of every word with more than one definition is a matter of equivocation since context makes a difference in meaning). So if the creationists are indeed equivocating, it isn't relevant.
Second, you are seriously trying to get blood from a stone, if you want to get into the minutiae of what the definition of “definition” and of “equivocation” is, then you really have lost this argument.
You seriously have lost this argument if you think that it's acceptable to label something a fallacy, give half an effort to defend that claim and then think that challenges ought not be made.
What you do is simply DEFINE “faith” as being “conviction without absolute proof”, and think that this eliminates the fallacy. And you are right,
YES IT CERTAINLY DOES ELIMINATE THE FALLACY!!! Why don't you latch on to that right there and we can move foward?
post 2 of 2
but it also KILLS your argument. Why? Because your conditional statement becomes totally false for the simple reason that one CAN argue that the two types of faith may share the quality of “conviction without absolute proof”, but they DIFFER in regards the DEGREE of logical consistency and empirical evidence.
I don't even know what conditional statement you are talking about.
And it doesn't ruin my argument since I have always admitted that the degree of faith IS different. My argument doesn't depend on the degree of faith required, my defition of faith is independent of the degree of faith. If you want to stick to the idea that degree of something also is a matter of it's definition, then you'd render most technical and mathematical pursuits illogical. You'd say the definition of an inch in the measurement of 5 inches and 12 inches are different. Why, the degree of length they measure is different. Do you really want to make that commitment?
But even if the quality was different, you still don't have a difference in definition. Look at the word flower. Do you really think that the definition of flower changes just because it is used to label a rose vs. labelling a tulip?
Imagine someone makes this argument. When it is pointed out that they have obviously committed a fallacy of equivocation, they simply say that they are DEFINING “nobody” to mean “someone who matters very little”. Yes, they have technically saved the argument from the fallacy of equivocation, but the argument is no longer valid, because (1) is OBVIOUSLY false, i.e. “someone who matters very little cannot be seen”.
Right, the argument is wrong for different reasons. That sounds great. that sounds marvelous. if you want to criticize my arguments along similar lines and drop the equivocation charge, that sounds a heck of a lot more fruitful to me.
Your tactic of focusing upon the superficial similarities DOES avoid the fallacy of equivocation, but it renders your argument UNSOUND. Is that really a better strategy?
Your perception that my argument is unsound is a heck of a lot better stances towards a more fruitful dialogue than the equivocation. Have we decided to move on yet from equivocation. It seems we are close.
Third, what does “stand alone” mean? Does it mean that the argument is so obvious that the only response is utter acceptance by others without any questions or criticisms? Does it mean that it is valid independent of empirical evidence? I mean, what are you TALKING about when you bring up the red herring of “stand alone”?
Isn't it more important what John means by this claim? He's the one who's made it. It's his title for your argument. If you don't like it, we can move on from it.
If we can agree and move past equivocation and this claim of John's that the argument stands alone, then perhaps we can consider my three claims at the bottom of the first 200 comments on the first page (assuming blogger puts the same amount of comments on your web pages as it does mine).
I'll tell you what, you can agree to all three claims without conceeding that the argument has failed. You don't have to disagree with number 2 on the grounds that you don't think there is any rational response along the lines of faith. You can agree that yes, faith is an alternative to agnosticism in the face of the lack of absolute provability even though you'd make a step further and say "but there are no reasons to support that faith, thus only agnosticism is left." Can we agree here?
Rob:
Before I even begin to respond, could you please do the following:
First, provide me with an explicit argument for your contention that since atheists believe in truths that they cannot demonstrate to be absolutely true, that therefore they have no grounds to criticize religious beliefs upon the basis that they are taken on a matter of faith.
Second, respond to my infinite supernatural scenario argument, as described below:
“My argument is that if one assumes that there is a supernatural realm that explains phenomena within the empirical world, then one is forced to admit that there are an infinite number of possible supernatural scenarios out there. If one believes in only one of those possible supernatural scenarios, then one must be able to justify that choice independent of information contained within the supernatural scenario itself. That means that one must only use information that exists within the empirical world to justify one’s supernatural choice.
“My belief is that no-one will be able to do so, because any justification of one’s supernatural choice ultimately utilizes information present only within one’s chosen supernatural scenario, and thus commits the fallacy of circular reasoning. It follows that since there is no rational justification for choosing one supernatural scenario over another, then it is largely arbitrary and ultimately based upon one’s personal preference. However, it still follows that it is impossible to know which supernatural scenario is true, because there are millions of people who hold different scenarios, and thus personal preference cannot ground one’s belief in one’s specific supernatural scenario.
“Therefore, at best, one must stop talking about the supernatural realm by virtue of being agnostic about it.”
You have a few options here.
One, you can show how my argument either contains false premises or makes mistake in the logical inference. Two, you can prove me wrong by providing a rational justification for your specific supernatural scenario using ONLY information already present within the empirical world. Three, you can show using personal preference to justify your religious beliefs ONLY applies to those who agree with you, and fails to be valid in those who have other religious beliefs.
Thanks.
Rob:
First, regarding this idiotic “stand alone” issue. I think what John meant was that simply by virtue of my argument alone, one must be a religious agnostic. He did NOT mean that there are no counter arguments that might be made, that it is psychologically compelling, or whatever you think he meant. He just means that unless someone can show a flaw in my reasoning, that the conclusion of religious agnosticism follows. That’s all.
Second, let’s look at your three claims.
“1)The dilemma of this topic only demonstrates a reason why our belief in a benevolent God cannot be absolutely proven (as a malignant deceptive God can explain any evidence that we concieve).”
That is the weaker claim, because ANY belief, with the exception of mathematics and logic, cannot be absolutely proven, and thus this argument would not be adding anything significant at all.
The stronger claim is that it is IMPOSSIBLE to demonstrate that one’s supernatural scenario is superior to another one, because one must utilize information WITHIN your supernatural scenario to justify it, thus engaging in circular reasoning.
My contention is that the ONLY way to justify – Not prove! What a red herring! – one’s supernatural scenario is to ground it in philosophical consistency and empirical evidence. In other words, one would have to show (1) that on philosophical grounds, one’s position contains more logical consistency than the others, and (2) that on empirical grounds, one’s supernatural scenario accounts for natural phenomena better than the others.
“2)There isn't just one possibly reasonable response to a scenario that demonstrates a lack of absolute proof, agnosticism, there is also another, faith.”
It depends upon what you mean by “reasonable response”. What DO you mean by “reasonable”? Do you mean, reasonable1, a response that, given one’s psychology, culture, and life circumstances that anyone would have made such a response? That’s certainly one sense of “reasonable”. Or, do you mean the stronger claim, i.e. reasonable2, a response that is the result of actively engaging with the evidence and assessing it for logical consistency, empirical validation, and only assenting to it if it meets the standards of evidentiary justification, and rejecting it if it does not since it is likely a product of bias, distortion and/or wishful thinking?
I would say that faith is a reasonable1 response, but not a reasonable2 response. On the other hand, I would say that agnosticism is both reasonable1 AND reasonable2. Sure, someone can be happy with being reasonable1, but I would say that it is better to be reasonable2. Do you disagree?
“3)Religious skeptics (who are not also anti-realists on many accounts) cannot cannot consistently call faith an irrational response in principle because they have faith as well.”
This is the sticking point where I believe you are equivocating. Please provide an explicit argument, including premises, for this position. Perhaps I am attacking a straw man. Present a real man for me to examine. :)
Rob,
You might want to avail yourself of the "switch referecne" form of equivocation. You are describing it but fail to see how it fits with the agreed upon fallacy of equivocation. It seems like you are looking for an exception to the fallacy of equivocation by explaining one of its derivative forms (switch-reference) as an exception to it. This seems circular and self-defeating.
examaning the switch reference, I don't see any consideration that changes anything. I have written the most here on the nature of equivocation and have gone to great lengths to show that I don't do it. apart from dealing with what I actually said, I can't recognize that the accusation of equivocation holds.
dguller as to his second to last set of posts to have admitted there is a way to understand what I said that avoids equivocation. He is absolutely right. He says this leads to another problem. I am fine with that and am happy to deal with that other problem (without looking, I think I may have dealt with that but right now), I am focused on his last set of posts including (hopefully) one last claim of equivocation.
Rob,
Nothing you have described has satisfied me that you are not equivocating using the switch reference. Just because you define faith in both realms the way you do does not mean that is the agreed upon use of that term relative to the realm we are discussing. Faith has a specific definition when considering theological claims and an all-together different meaning when considering scientific claims. Your appeal to your own perception is nothing more than begging the question. Deal with the way the term is used in practice, not the way you would like it to be used. Additionally, ignorance of the meaning of a term (as stated in your rationalization for the creationists use of theory) does not insulate someone from equivocation. You are ignorant of the way faith is considered in scientific realms and your ignorance leads you to practice equivocation to determine its meaning as a means of satisfying your conclusions.
Rob:
One more thing.
>> My argument doesn't depend on the degree of faith required, my defition of faith is independent of the degree of faith.
Your argument absolutely depends upon the degree of faith required, because if you insist that degree does not matter, then you have proven my point. You are clearly latching onto the notion that faith must be a rational response to my argument, because it is all you really have. It is pretty clear that the only real way of picking out one supernatural scenario over another is by virtue of one’s faith in that particular scenario. Obviously, this is unpersuasive, and so you must support faith as being reasonable.
Here’s the problem. If you are really saying that the faith that you require to support your supernatural scenario over others is just “conviction without absolute proof”, then you have no way of reasonably ruling out other supernatural scenarios, which people can hold with “conviction without proof”. You land straight into the dilemma of lacking any genuine standard to differentiate between the different supernatural scenarios. This is because faith in invisible unicorns, under your definition, becomes equal to faith in God and faith in the external world. It is all the same! As such, you lack any way of differentiating between them.
However, once you INCLUDE differences of DEGREE between the different possible faiths, then you kill your argument. How? Your argument essentially is that because atheists accept having trust in our senses, despite being unable to absolutely trust them, then they lack the grounds to criticize believers in trusting God, despite being unable to absolutely prove in his existence. However, if you include differences in the degree of justification, then this argument is clearly false, because one can believe in our senses, because the evidence is 99% in their favour, and yet reject belief in God, because the evidence falls far short of that of our senses.
Two conclusions:
One, if you do NOT include different degrees of justification of different types of faith, then you have no way of differentiating between different supernatural scenarios (e.g. God versus invisible unicorns versus invisible fairies, etc.) if you want to use faith at all.
Two, if you DO include different degrees of justification of different types of faith, then your argument is unsound, because the major premise is false. One CAN reject religious faith despite having faith in our senses, for example, because our senses have FAR MORE justification to back them up than faith in God.
Choose which horn you want to impale yourself upon.
>> If you want to stick to the idea that degree of something also is a matter of it's definition, then you'd render most technical and mathematical pursuits illogical. You'd say the definition of an inch in the measurement of 5 inches and 12 inches are different. Why, the degree of length they measure is different. Do you really want to make that commitment?
That is a silly counterexample. The difference between 5 inches and 12 inches uses a single concept of “inch” that has ONE MEANING to it. That is different from “reasonable”, “justified”, “faith”, and “trust”. They are capable of multiple meanings, and thus open to equivocation.
Chuck,
Nothing you have described has satisfied me that you are not equivocating using the switch reference.
Then explain. Don't assert. Take what I've said and show it to be lacking. If you are just registering your opinion that I've failed here, well, fine provided you don't expect me to agree or for me to think you understand that I've failed.
Just because you define faith in both realms the way you do does not mean that is the agreed upon use of that term relative to the realm we are discussing.
There is no need to agree here. It is perfectly normal in philosophical discourse and has been modelled in philosophical publications that one can articulate his own definition of a term. If i am equivocating, then it is because i am not consistent with the definition, not because someone else doesn't want to recognize my definition. At the same time, there is a matter of taking a word, even if one provides a definition, it is nevertheless an (implicitely) loaded definition (it implies more than what the person is defining it. There is also arguing via pure definition. But none of those necessarily entail equivocation.
Faith has a specific definition when considering theological claims and an all-together different meaning when considering scientific claims.
If you are right, it has nothing to do with me. I have defined, I have been consistent. that is all that is necessary to avoiding equivocation.
Deal with the way the term is used in practice, not the way you would like it to be used.
This is poor linguistic theory. Usage determines definition and the context of usage may very well be as small as published paper, a book or even a comment in a blog topic. But my usage is close to more conventional usage and since I did not invent this usage, (John has posted on the issue before in response to other people who have used faith in this way). It is normal for the context of this debate.
Additionally, ignorance of the meaning of a term (as stated in your rationalization for the creationists use of theory) does not insulate someone from equivocation.
It surely doesn't. But consistent usage of the term certainly does.
And I don't rationalize that argument chuck. I have criticized it on solid grounds, not the poor grounds of a fallacy that isn't there. Course I later explained that I may be wrong about how flexible the meaning of equivocation is and I used the creationist example. The creationist did not define "theory" as applied to evolution and yet they want to use that term in how it is applied to evolution as a criticism. Since they did not define the term which they capitilize on, they have a weakness. that might be an equivocation, but it's not what I am doing. I am the one who introduced this argument and I have been very very specific in how I use the term "faith" and I have been consistent with it.
Rob:
I think that what Chuck and I are trying to tell you is that you are free to define the terms that you are using however you like. However, if the term that you are defining ALSO have a well-known meaning that differs from your definition, then whatever you prove using your new definition of the term CANNOT be taken to imply to the broader meaning. So, even if your argument proves that faith (i.e. conviction without absolute proof) is reasonable, it does NOT follow that FAITH (i.e. religious faith) is reasonable, because “religious faith” is far MORE than just “conviction without absolute proof”.
That would be like arguing as follows:
(1) Humans intrinsically strive towards transcendence in their lives.
(2) God is transcendent reality.
(3) Therefore, humans intrinsically strive towards God.
That is a valid, if unsound, argument. However, it does NOT follow from this argument that
(4) Humans intrinsically strive towards a benevolent, all-powerful deity whose holy book is the Bible.
The problem is that many people would agree that (4) follows from (1)-(3), because the REAL definition of “God” is NOT just “a transcendent reality”, but something more than that, i.e. a personal deity that possess a number of qualities. In fact, when most people think of “God”, it is of the broader concept and not the limited one in (2).
Similarly, when you define “faith” in your specific and narrow way, then the reach of your conclusions is extremely limited, and they do not touch the bigger sense of faith. However, it is easy to lose sight of this, and commit a fallacy of equivocation in which if your limited version of faith is valid, then the broader version of faith is valid, too. This is not reasonable at all, and as long as you keep your aims limited, then I have no problem.
Rob,
You are dealing with a homonym that has an agreed upon meaning in the realms you consider.
Your definition of faith as it pertains to either realm is invalid to their meaning (as used in either).
If you want to argue what you argue then one must live by the rules of your mind, rather than empirical definitions related to real-world observations.
post 1 of 5 reposted for editing,
dguller,
First, provide me with an explicit argument for your contention that since atheists believe in truths that they cannot demonstrate to be absolutely true, that therefore they have no grounds to criticize religious beliefs upon the basis that they are taken on a matter of faith.
By definition, my definition, believing something that cannot be absolutely proven is taking something on a matter of faith. I can only think that you're taking a step that I don't take to accuse me of equivocation. You are assuming that I am saying that the rational behind both the faith claims of atheists who are not radical skeptics and the faith claims in God are for all the same reasons and/or types of reasons. I absolutely am not saying that. I 100 percent recognize that there are differences (as well as some important similarities). Secondly, you insist that we take our beliefs on FAITH ALONE which has been explicitely contradicted by myself. Let's have no more of these mistaken insistences about what I am claiming. I'm here, I tell you what I mean, you have to accept what I mean is what I mean. That is the only way to have a fruitful dialogue.
First, regarding this idiotic “stand alone” issue. I think what John meant was that simply by virtue of my argument alone, one must be a religious agnostic.
I showed that this isn't clearly the case at all from number 2. Just because my number two requires more investigation does not change this.
He did NOT mean that there are no counter arguments that might be made, that it is psychologically compelling, or whatever you think he meant.
I don't see a difference.
Second, respond to my infinite supernatural scenario argument, as described below:
No, I'll stick to the original argument. If you want to abandon it as a lost cause in favor of this one, that is fine by me. All I will say about this is that I can only compare a few feasible scenarios at a time. As for other claims in that argument, we don't need a whole new set of scenarios to discuss them. We don't need to discuss an infinite number of scenarios to discuss a dubious empiricism as you have suggested. As far as I can tell, the context of the argument of the topic is a fine place to discuss that.
That is the weaker claim, because ANY belief, with the exception of mathematics and logic, cannot be absolutely proven,
On the side, you actually are wrong about that. Math can shown to be self coherent. Logic can be shown to be self coherent. Nothing outside of these two fields absolutely demonstrates their veracity. You can't even appeal to science (or any empirical data) since it is logic and math by which scientific claims are evaluated, not the other way around. It has not even been demonstrated that all of mathematics is logically coherent as Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead attempted to do so and ran into a paradox. The veracity of math and logic is not embraced because they are absolutely provable but because they are self evident and/or properly basic (if there is a difference).
Their is only one piece of knowledge that is beyond any kind of conscious disproof, that is that thinking is taking place (which is even less ambitious than Descartes "I think therefore I am").
But back to your claim, that virtually all claims have this feature doesn't make it weak. it makes the claim undeniably strong. If there is a weakness, it's probably that you are reading more into than I intend or need. It's only a small part of my reasoning.
post 2 of 5
The stronger claim is that it is IMPOSSIBLE to demonstrate that one’s supernatural scenario is superior to another one, because one must utilize information WITHIN your supernatural scenario to justify it, thus engaging in circular reasoning.
Okay. That doesn't contradict my first point. it would contradict other points that I've made, but there is no reason on the basis of this claim of yours that anyone should object to my first point. So why shouldn't we agree on my first point?
It depends upon what you mean by “reasonable response”.
I didn't just call the options reasonable responses. They are possibly reasonable responses which can be explored. This does two things. It highlights in opposition to John's claim that agnosticism isn't the only clear option for us in light of your argument. There is also the possibility of faith. Number 2 it points out that we have an alternative trajectory of investigation. We can indeed probe why faith is reasonable here and we don't have to conclude agnosticism immeadiately. As for what you ask afterwords, you aren't treating that very claim as modest as it really is. It could indeed be the case that faith is a rational response. I didn't say that this IS reasonable but that we do have an option other than agnosticism to investigate that is POSSIBLY reasonable. you can critisize my reasons in the investigation that comes AFTER this claim if you want, but nevertheless at a preliminary stage, this demonstrates that it is premature to declare as John Loftus does that agnosticism is the only response. In assessing this, if you don't like my reasons that I offered, as far as this point is concerned, great, but it is a closed mind to suggest that we have already arrived at agnosticism before exploring the other option.
This is the sticking point where I believe you are equivocating. Please provide an explicit argument, including premises, for this position.
1) Religious skeptics criticize views on grounds that they cannot be absolutely proven.
2)But most religious skeptics also hold views that cannot be absolutely proven.
3)Thus skeptics are not consistent in this criticism.
Was it not your approach that we should not hold views that cannot be absolutely proven? That's fine, as i said, You can agree to my three points without agreeing that your argument has been completely dismantled. These are preliminary considerations that are useful to atheists who actually do believe that we shouldn't believe in anything that cannot be scientifically proven or proven absolutely. These are useful observations in light of your argument. More must be said, but these observations are still of use.
And where in lies the equivocation? I am not inconsistent here in noting that both religious views and religious religious skeptics both hold beliefs that absolutely proven. I don't stand on this and say "there you see, I have demonstrated that faith claims about God are equal in every way to faith claims about external reality or science". I don't have to, it doesn't help me, I know it's not true. But there are some equivalences that are worth exploring and there are matters that aren't equivalent that are also worth exploring.
Your argument absolutely depends upon the degree of faith required, because if you insist that degree does not matter, then you have proven my point.
Alright, I don't like the way I've worded that. What I should've said is that my argument doesn't depend on the degree being the same. After all, there is no objective measure of what degree of faith is allowable for good epistemology. Math and logic take the least amount of faith (granted the amount of faith is not objectively quantifiable) belief in an external world takes, more, science takes more than that and so on.
post 3 of 5
You are clearly latching onto the notion that faith must be a rational response to my argument, because it is all you really have.
This is not a revelation. This is what I've been explicitely stating from the beginning.
It is pretty clear that the only real way of picking out one supernatural scenario over another is by virtue of one’s faith in that particular scenario.
I don't agree that faith is all there is. I've already explained that, you disagreed, I am very unconvinced by your objections, but I'm not returning to it until I hear you abandon the whole equivocation claim. The reasons for my faith and your objection is legitimate business, but i strongly and confidently believe that the whole equivocation claim is indefensible junk. Get rid of the junk, then we can deal with the real business.
If you are really saying that the faith that you require to support your supernatural scenario over others is just “conviction without absolute proof”,
it isn't JUST that. i don't know how you can say that it is JUST that considering I gave reasons otherwise. That you don't agree with those reasons doesn't mean that i am not offering them in support of my faith, that I am JUST offering faith. The only context in which I say that faith is enough is that it is enough to show that agnosticism isn't, as John explicitely claimed, the only response to the argument of the topic.
However, if you include differences in the degree of justification, then this argument is clearly false, because one can believe in our senses, because the evidence is 99% in their favour, and yet reject belief in God, because the evidence falls far short of that of our senses.
There is no objective equation that will support that figure of 99%. There is no evidence from our senses that an external world exists over against a claim that there is only a mind that is vividly perceiving a consistent external world that is nevertheless imaginary and false.
One, if you do NOT include different degrees of justification of different types of faith,
I absolutely do include it but not in the definition of faith. the degree of faith comes cognitively after the definition of faith.
One CAN reject religious faith despite having faith in our senses, for example, because our senses have FAR MORE justification to back them up than faith in God.
Of course they can. I may have made a claim that looked like this towards the beginning of the discussion, but I was arguing against an absolute anti-faith position. You cannot fault truth claims because faith is part of knowing them if you also hold to other truth claims where faith is relevent. However, you can criticisize the reasons behind the faith. You did that. it was legitimate. Recant the equivocation claim and I'd happily take it up again.
That is a silly counterexample. The difference between 5 inches and 12 inches uses a single concept of “inch” that has ONE MEANING to it.
It's an excellent counterexample because it demonstrates precisely that degree does not necessarily figure into definition. I don't know that it ever does. And inch doesn't have one meaning, not that that is even relevant.
post 4 of 5
I think that what Chuck and I are trying to tell you is that you are free to define the terms that you are using however you like. However, if the term that you are defining ALSO have a well-known meaning that differs from your definition, then whatever you prove using your new definition of the term CANNOT be taken to imply to the broader meaning.
It's not clear to me at all that what the broader meaning is. When atheists use the term, they often mean belief without evidence (irrelevent, not the same as, but consistent with my definition usually called blind faith). Then there is rational faith which is closer to what I speak of. Then there is faith as used in scripture which as I have very well explained (without challenge) is something that goes well beyond our consideration in epistemology.
And the idea that your definition of faith in science is a broader meaning is woefully uninformed to the fact that most people don't even concieve the two as being coherent. And in fact, it is your definition. No one defines faith in science as the belief that science is trustworthy because of it's constent reliability even though it cannot be absolutely proven. Again (to your silence) this mixes the reasons for faith with the definition of faith. This is your own ad hoc definition imposed upon my thinking just to make the case that I equivocate.
So, even if your argument proves that faith (i.e. conviction without absolute proof) is reasonable, it does NOT follow that FAITH (i.e. religious faith) is reasonable,
No it doesn't follow. It does follow against the thrust of the argument that faith in religious claims/belief in God may very well be reasonable (and hence, it isn't clear, as John Loftus suggested that agnosticism is our only response to the topic argument). I did not leave it there. I gave reasons why it is reasonable (and once we can get off this claim of equivocation, I'll return to it). If I wrote something that faith is all that is necessary, then I corrected that in my last post of the first page.
That is a valid, if unsound, argument. However, it does NOT follow from this argument that
Actually, that DOES seem to be a matter of equivocation on the term "transcendence".
and commit a fallacy of equivocation in which if your limited version of faith is valid, then the broader version of faith is valid, too.
Let me help make this clear. I don't say faith in God is reasonable and justified because faith in science is. Again, I may have poorly articulated my view speaking along a similar line. What I did intend to convey is that faith itself is not necessarily irrational if we are rational to hold faith in other areas. Again again, don't make me say it any more so please, understand this and stop writing as if I didn't explain it manyu times: that faith general can be rational DOESN'T GET US ALL THE WAY TOWARDS ANSWERING YOUR ARGUMENT AGAINST BELIEF IN A BENEVOLENT GOD. It is a step in that direction. Maybe it was an unnecessary step for you as you are fine with acknowledging that belief in an external reality or in science is indeed belief held in faith, in spite of the ability to absolutely prove it. But for some people, it very well needs to be pointed out. I gave reasons why religious faith is reasonable. My complete answer to the topic argument cannot be judged apart from those reasons (and I won't return to them until we get the equivocation business out of the way).
post 5 of 5
Chuck
You are dealing with a homonym that has an agreed upon meaning in the realms you consider.
my usage is close to a couple of agreed upon meanings and it accurately describes how beliefs actually work. Words also serve convenience. Why should I constantly utter the phrase "belief that something is true in spite of absolute provability" when faith is an excellent stand in for the whole phrase. And that you can't find it spelled out in the dictionary is of little consequence and is poor linguistics considering a dictionary is not intended to be absolute nor exhaustive in linguistic range nor does it follow a philosophy that these meanings are to be strictly adhered to.
No one agreed with Jean-Paul Sarte in his usage of the term "bad faith" prior to his using it nor does anyone criticize his view on those grounds. Why would they? There's no reason to. We can critisize it on legitimate grounds rather than mere word games. (and his term is much further removed from the general definition of faith than my term is of episetmic faith).
If you want to argue what you argue then one must live by the rules of your mind,
These aren't the rules of my mind, that usage determines definition and that an individual can instantiate a definition for a specific purpose and context as this is how much scholarship even beyond philosophy works.
Rob,
You don't get it.
You invent a meaning for a word to satisfy your a priori conclusion.
I work in the realm of science. In fact, I am taking a break from studying a tracking study right now that deals with physician perceptions.
If you want to show me that your definition of faith (epistemic or otherwise) is consistent with the way the term is credibly used in the areas you are illustrating then I will agree. Until then what I see is someone who wants to believe his faith is reasonable changing the meaning of words to fit his desire to be correct.
Rob,
Additionally, your definition of faith within the two realms is the false premise on which this rests. You state that consistent faith between science and theism is defined thus, "belief that something is true in spite of absolute provability."
That would not be the definition of faith when dealing with scientific "faith". Implicitly or explicity a faith in science adheres to probability, not provability, with incremental degrees of value correlating to statistical levels of confidence. Faith in science is related to quality of information. Faith in theism is related to trust. The former is discriminatory and the latter is a leap.
Rob:
<< You are assuming that I am saying that the rational behind both the faith claims of atheists who are not radicle skeptics and the faith claims are for the same reasons. I absolutely am not saying that.
I am happy that you acknowledge that the faith claims of atheists who believe in the validity of their senses are different from the faith claims of believers who believe in the existence of God. Since they are different, one can assent to one faith claim and not the other without any contradiction. If that is true, then who cares if atheists assent to some beliefs without absolute proof? They can still reject the faith claims of believers on the basis that there is an extremely low probability of their being true and a high probability that they are byproducts of bias, distorted reasoning and evidence, and/or wishful thinking.
Also, you STILL haven’t provided an argument in support of your contention that atheists cannot criticize believers for justifying their beliefs on the basis of faith, because atheists also believe in some propositions that lack absolute proof. Come on, no more distractions and diversions: WHAT IS YOUR ARGUMENT FOR THIS POSITION?? Or, do you deny the truth of it altogether?
<< I showed that this isn't clearly the case at all from number 2. Just because my number two requires more investigation does not change this.
What “number 2” are you referring to?
<< The veracity of math and logic is not embraced because they are absolutely provable but because they are self evident and/or properly basic (if there is a difference).
Fine. I’ll concede that mathematics and logic are also not absolutely provable. The implication of this is that NONE of our beliefs are absolutely provable, and thus ALL must be taken on your definition of “faith”. So what? How does this POSSIBLY help you to differentiate between one supernatural scenario and another, especially by using “faith”? I mean, if “faith” underlies ALL our beliefs, then how can it help to differentiate between them?
I mean, if our life presupposed the existence of oxygen to breathe, and someone changed their clothes to something else, then you wouldn’t explain that change in clothes on oxygen, right? You would have to appeal to something ELSE entirely, because oxygen would be required whether someone stayed in the same clothes or changed them!
Similarly, if ALL our beliefs presuppose your version of “faith”, then both our justified AND unjustified beliefs would also presuppose “faith”. It follows that “faith” is IRRELEVANT to whether one belief is justified or not, because it is present in BOTH types!
<< there is no reason on the basis of this claim of yours that anyone should object to my first point. So why shouldn't we agree on my first point?
Because you would have to show how it is possible to differentiate your supernatural scenario from other possible supernatural scenarios WITHOUT using anything that you already assume to be true WITHIN your specific scenario. For example, you could not say that God is good, and therefore cannot possibly be bad, because that is an ASSUMPTION from within your specific scenario.
You would have to FIRST demonstrate that God MUST be good, based upon philosophical argumentation and/or empirical evidence from the world, and THEN you could rule out supernatural scenarios that include an evil God. My point is that you CANNOT do so, and the fact that you are STILL not doing so just proves my point. Why not just do so, and then you will have refuted my argument.
<< It could indeed be the case that faith is a rational response. I didn't say that this IS reasonable but that we do have an option other than agnosticism to investigate that is POSSIBLY reasonable.
Wow. So, you are not saying that faith IS a rational response, but that it COULD POSSIBLY be one? What is THAT all about? “Sure, my argument doesn’t REALLY support what I’m proposing, but MAYBE it MIGHT!?” Your whole argument depends upon faith BEING a reasonable response to agnosticism in the case where you are presented with MULTIPLE possible supernatural scenarios without any ability to justify one scenario over another. If you are conceding that you cannot demonstrate this, and that it MIGHT be a good response, then I think the case is closed.
And remember that that was the whole point of my argument. I wrote: “I mean, since believers are big on creating conceptual space to make their positions logically POSSIBLE, then it is also possible that God is a Cosmic Trickster who takes pleasure in fooling them.” And here you are doing exactly what I said believers do. Namely, try to find SOME kind of wiggle room within the realm of possibility and once you think you have done so, declare victory. Why not focus on PROBABILITY instead of POSSIBILITY? If your standard is mere possibility, and not likelihood, then my argument stands, because it is POSSIBLE that God is a Cosmic Trickster, no?
<< 1) Religious skeptics criticize views on grounds that they cannot be absolutely proven.
2)But most religious skeptics also hold views that cannot be absolutely proven.
3)Thus skeptics are not consistent in this criticism.
FINALLY!
(1) is wrong, and actually sets up a nice straw man. Religious skeptics criticize religious claims on the basis that they are highly unlikely to be true. Even Richard Dawkins concedes that it is POSSIBLE that there is a God, but concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support that proposition.
My argument says that it is impossible for a believer to justify their specific supernatural scenario over others, because they would have to appeal to features of their specific supernatural scenario, which would be circular, and thus invalid.
It doesn’t help your case to just say, “Yes, it IS possible, and therefore cannot be impossible, which negates the argument!” Don’t just SAY it’s possible, but demonstrate it by showing me how you could justify your supernatural scenario over the others. Go for it!
>> These are preliminary considerations that are useful to atheists who actually do believe that we shouldn't believe in anything that cannot be scientifically proven or proven absolutely.
More straw men. “Scientifically proven” does not mean “metaphysically certain”. It just means that it would be overwhelmingly unlikely if the particular scientific explanation would be false. And science is not the ONLY route to truth, but it IS the best tool we have to differentiate real patterns and phenomena in nature from chance occurrences that appear to have an underlying pattern.
>> And where in lies the equivocation? I am not inconsistent here in noting that both religious views and religious religious skeptics both hold beliefs that absolutely proven.
You are right that there is no equivocation when you have defined the terms in a highly idiosyncratic fashion to serve the purposes of logical consistency. As long as you remain within the strict confines of your definitions, I will no longer criticize your equivalences. But you should know that the scope of your argument narrows considerably, possibly so much that what you say becomes trivial and useless.
>> What I should've said is that my argument doesn't depend on the degree being the same. After all, there is no objective measure of what degree of faith is allowable for good epistemology. Math and logic take the least amount of faith (granted the amount of faith is not objectively quantifiable) belief in an external world takes, more, science takes more than that and so on.
True, there is no “objective measure”. However, there is faith in something that is philosophically consistent, constantly empirically validated, and is absolutely required for our survival and understanding at all, and faith in something that is philosophically inconsistent, rarely (if ever) empirically validated, and is unnecessary for our survival and understanding at all. No mathematical equation needed. If you disagree with the above, I would love to hear why.
>> I don't agree that faith is all there is. I've already explained that, you disagreed, I am very unconvinced by your objections, but I'm not returning to it until I hear you abandon the whole equivocation claim.
As I’ve said a few times now, you do not commit the fallacy of equivocation, if you stay within the narrow confines of your personal definitions of the terms. There. Now answer my objections to your objections.
>> The only context in which I say that faith is enough is that it is enough to show that agnosticism isn't, as John explicitely claimed, the only response to the argument of the topic.
Oh Lord. He was saying that the only epistemically justified response to the argument is agnosticism. There are LOTS of ways that one could respond. One could howl at the moon. One could start dancing in the street. One could go to church. One could throw up.
The specific issue is whether FAITH is an EPISTEMICALLY JUSTIFIED response. Your only argument in support of this position has to dilute the meaning of faith to the point that it basically underlies ALL our beliefs – epistemically justified and not -- and thus does not particularly apply to this issue at all. I mean, you are trying to justify RELIGIOUS FAITH in particular. My contention is that were you to venture outside the narrow circle of “belief without absolute proof” and into RELIGIOUS BELIEF and FAITH, then your argument collapses.
>> There is no evidence from our senses that an external world exists over against a claim that there is only a mind that is vividly perceiving a consistent external world that is nevertheless imaginary and false.
Really? Hang out with psychotic people, and see if there is no real difference between those who believe their senses are veridical and those who disbelieve them consistently. Also, you are forgetting that believing our senses is the DEFAULT position that we are hardwired to assume. It is only afterwards that we learn that not all our sense experience is veridical, but that it according to a background standard of believability. I mean, you could not even make the argument against the senses unless your senses worked sufficiently well to allow you to learn language and logic to begin with. If our senses are false, then you cannot be talking to me right now.
These kinds of radical skeptical arguments eat themselves, as we both agreed, and thus are nothing but “intuition pumps”, as Dennett called them. They give us another way to imagine something we hold to be true. However, they are not ARGUMENTS. They do not hold validity unless what they are intuiting actually makes sense with our other well-established beliefs. Sure, it’s possible that if I jump off a building THIS time, then gravity won’t work, but I would bet 99.9999999999999% on the error of that belief. Again, just because you can sort of imagine something does not make it a genuine possibility, including that I am a solitary mind without a surrounding empirical world. Too much nonsense there to be believable, even though there is a 0.00000000001% chance that it is true.
>> You cannot fault truth claims because faith is part of knowing them if you also hold to other truth claims where faith is relevent. However, you can criticisize the reasons behind the faith. You did that. it was legitimate. Recant the equivocation claim and I'd happily take it up again.
Sure. Just admit that you are not talking about religious faith at all. Actually, you shouldn’t even use the word “faith” at all, because you are taking ONE PART of faith, i.e. its lack of absolute proof, and making it the WHOLE of faith.
That is as valid a move as me saying that “love is bliss” as a basis of some argument while ignoring that love is ALSO pain (e.g. at the separation from one’s beloved). I could go on and on about how love is bliss, but what I am talking about is not LOVE, but something else.
I would argue that that is what you are doing with faith. You are removing all the controversial features of it that actually distinguishes it from ordinary uncertain beliefs, and then saying that faith really is nothing more. It is clearly something entirely different from an ordinary uncertain belief, and just defining those features away for the sake of logical consistency does not change the fact that in the REAL world, those features are still present and require justification.
And yes, I do criticize the reasons behind the faith, because faith in and of itself is not reasonable. Only the REASONS that support it should be part of an argument of this kind. It was YOU who brought faith into it. If you agree to remove faith from the table, since your version actually underlies ALL beliefs, justified and unjustified alike, and just focus on the reasons that would make religious beliefs justified, then I will stop talking about equivocation.
As I’ve said a few times now, you do not commit the fallacy of equivocation,
ah, then I will adress more important matters and then some. But it will have to wait... perhaps a day or two or three. I must be off.
Rob and d,
I am going to watch from the sidelines. I don't agree with the concession on equivocatin (for the reasons I stated) but feel this is a debate between you two.
I've benefitted from observing both sides of the debate.
Best.
Chuck:
I concede that, given Rob's idiosyncratic definition of "faith", he avoids the fallacy of equivocation. However, in so doing, he does a number of things.
First, he commits the "no true scotsman" fallacy.
Second, he defined "faith" in such a way that it becomes both trivial AND useless to defend religious faith.
Anyway, thanks for your input. We'll see how this discussion goes from here on in.
D,
Thanks. I look forward to observing the dialogue between you and Rob.
The main scholarly article on this kind of argument is Stephen Law's The Evil God Challenge, which I summarize here and here.
Luke:
Thanks for the links. Lots of good arguments showing that religious arguments in support of a good God being necessary to explain the evidence of the world are bunk.
I think that my argument is more general than Law's, however. Law is focusing specially upon the moral qualities of different supernatural scenarios. I am focusing generally upon ANY qualities of different supernatural scenarios.
My contention is that it is impossible to identify a single supernatural scenario as the most justified one over and above all others.
dguller, you intrigue me. Email me if you would. Who are you?
Rob, you're interesting to me as well.
You guys are indefatigable!
God, Atheism and Evidence: A Response to Veritas48
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9stJ8h2ilZU
I think this vid help in the discussion.
Yes, no?
Where did Rob go?
I thought he was going to continue to debate this topic.
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