Paul Helm on "God and Spacelessness"
Here is a summary of Paul Helm’s “God and Spacelessness,” Philosophy 55 (1980):
Helm begins with two authors who made similar claims against the timelessness of God. J. R. Lucas made this claim: “To say that God is outside time, as many theologians do, is to deny, in effect, that God is a person.” He reasons that to be a person is to have a mind, and to have a mind requires that it be in time (i.e., thoughts require a sequence of events, etc.). A.N. Prior claimed that a proposition such as “It is raining now” is not equivalent in meaning to “It is raining on Tuesday,” and that an omniscient God who knew the latter would not necessarily know the former, and would not know it if he were timeless, since he could not be present on the occasion on which it was raining.”
Helm argues against both authors by merely showing that such a claim also entails the denial that God is spaceless, which in turn denies that God is infinite--something these authors want to maintain. Helm writes that “the arguments used to show that God is in time, in effect support the view that God is finite, and so anyone who wishes to maintain that God is infinite, as the traditional theist does, will either have to find other arguments for the view that God is in time, or eschew the idea of God being in time altogether”—-this is the dilemma Helm presents to these authors.
Helm does not try to show that God is in fact timeless, nor is his purpose to show that the logic of these two authors is wrong. He admits that he doesn’t even fully understand what it means to say God is both timeless and spaceless. He’s only claiming that a denial of God’s timelessness is also a denial of God’s spacelessness.
After making his arguments he leaves the reader with three alternative consequences to choose from:
1) The belief in God is even more incoherent than previously thought, in that it requires unintelligibilities such as a timeless and spaceless existence;
2) Recognize that since the belief in God requires an infinite and spaceless God there must be something wrong with the current arguments against the timelessness of God; or,
3) The burden of proof is on these authors to present an argument against God’s timelessness that does not also apply to God’s spacelessness.
That is, one can either, a) Deny (or accept) the unintelligible existence of both a timeless and spaceless God, b) Accept the consequences of a God who is both in time and finite, or, c) Supply other arguments on behalf of a God who is in time which does not also deny God’s spacelessness. Not being able to do (c) presents the dilemma of choosing either (a) or (b).
Helm closes with these words: “Nothing in the argument of this paper requires one of these consequences as against either of the other two to be the correct one.”
Enjoy the discussion.
Helm begins with two authors who made similar claims against the timelessness of God. J. R. Lucas made this claim: “To say that God is outside time, as many theologians do, is to deny, in effect, that God is a person.” He reasons that to be a person is to have a mind, and to have a mind requires that it be in time (i.e., thoughts require a sequence of events, etc.). A.N. Prior claimed that a proposition such as “It is raining now” is not equivalent in meaning to “It is raining on Tuesday,” and that an omniscient God who knew the latter would not necessarily know the former, and would not know it if he were timeless, since he could not be present on the occasion on which it was raining.”
Helm argues against both authors by merely showing that such a claim also entails the denial that God is spaceless, which in turn denies that God is infinite--something these authors want to maintain. Helm writes that “the arguments used to show that God is in time, in effect support the view that God is finite, and so anyone who wishes to maintain that God is infinite, as the traditional theist does, will either have to find other arguments for the view that God is in time, or eschew the idea of God being in time altogether”—-this is the dilemma Helm presents to these authors.
Helm does not try to show that God is in fact timeless, nor is his purpose to show that the logic of these two authors is wrong. He admits that he doesn’t even fully understand what it means to say God is both timeless and spaceless. He’s only claiming that a denial of God’s timelessness is also a denial of God’s spacelessness.
After making his arguments he leaves the reader with three alternative consequences to choose from:
1) The belief in God is even more incoherent than previously thought, in that it requires unintelligibilities such as a timeless and spaceless existence;
2) Recognize that since the belief in God requires an infinite and spaceless God there must be something wrong with the current arguments against the timelessness of God; or,
3) The burden of proof is on these authors to present an argument against God’s timelessness that does not also apply to God’s spacelessness.
That is, one can either, a) Deny (or accept) the unintelligible existence of both a timeless and spaceless God, b) Accept the consequences of a God who is both in time and finite, or, c) Supply other arguments on behalf of a God who is in time which does not also deny God’s spacelessness. Not being able to do (c) presents the dilemma of choosing either (a) or (b).
Helm closes with these words: “Nothing in the argument of this paper requires one of these consequences as against either of the other two to be the correct one.”
Enjoy the discussion.