Truth? What do You Think?
A skeptical Blogger insists he's on to something important so I decided to link to what he wrote. It's long. I have my doubts. It seems he wants to develop a rational step by step approach to reasoning with a believer. In my experience this has not worked. Believers switch topics once we corner them. In some ways that's legitimate to do because they have Bayesian background beliefs that are not presently on the table but form the background for why they think the present one on the table is more probable than not. In my experience it takes a slam dunk cumulative case dealing with all of the background beliefs that one can write about in a single readable book that refers to other tomes defending each claim.
21 comments:
I find the opposite is true. In discussing the isses with atheists the subject always comes arround to the problem of suffering or hell even though these things have been delt with. A holy God just traumatizes some people.
There is no correct method on how to deconvert someone. People are different.
But you also wrote that, since believers don't arrive at their beliefs through reason (but rather culture), most can't be reasoned out of those beliefs.
i do not "switch topics" that i am aware of. i am addressing each of loftus' arguments from wiba on my blog and not shying away from any topics.
From the essay:
"That no claim of qualitative superiority can therefore be sustained for any of our knowledge statements."
If this point is applied to the "knowledge statements" that the rest of the essay relies upon, it refutes itself. If it doesn't apply to the "knowledge statements" that the rest of the essay relies upon, it's inconsistent. Either way, it doesn't even get off the ground.
This was a bit strange: "Counterintuitively, my argument will be found to be in direct opposition to our now dominant intellectual backdrop of post-structuralism/knowledge-relativism."
Where exactly is "post-structuralism/knowledge-relativism" dominant? Certainly not in science, philosophy, history, biblical criticism/religious studies or theology -- the primary areas of inquiry this blog deals with.
Ray,
I'll agree that there's no master method, and we need to keep a flexible approach. The 3 step process that I outline* will work best on theists who consider themselves to have a pretty strong commitment to reason. Nothing will work on those who are willing to invoke Tertullian's escape ("I believe it because it is absurd". But then, as this escape obviously works a little better for Flying Sphagetti Monsterism than for Christianity, they will presumably switch when we point this out to them.
*Suggested in 'Truth?', but spelled out explicitly in a single page document ('Crystal Blue Persuasion') that can be accessed at the blog through 'view my complete profile'.
Martin,
As suggested to Ray, our best bet is to try for those who would already claim some commitment to reason. What I believe that we can now do - through Karl Popper's position, if we are finally willing to extend it all the way out to its logical boundry - is to offer the theists a clear choice between reason and their theism. We can completely remove the veil of intellectual respectability that has still been providing some cover for their positions.
trae,
Please provide the link to your blog so that I can check it out. And if you have any theistic position that you'd like to propagate then let me offer to join you in it, as soon as you will provide me with a coherent basis upon which I can embrace it. Simple as that. Not a 'rational' basis, but merely one that can be understood to be functional. (To select your position without simultaneously selecting an effectively infinite number of other and logically exclusive ones). Should be easy, no?
Eric,
I didn't say 'no claim of superiority'. I said 'no claim of qualitative superiority'. I believe, through all of the erguments set out at length in 'Truth?', that a claim of qualitative superiority is exactly what we are advancing, if we are advancing anything that is coherent, through use of our 'truth' concept.
As to p-s/k-r. It has been, since about the 1950s, the water that we are all swimming in. It permits the theist's confident assertion "Well, you can't prove that my God doesn't exist". And you hear it everywhere in phrases like "Yes, but .... could be true" and "OK, but that's only your opinion". It was even celebrated in a recent silly movie. Something like 'What the *#!%# do we Know'.
Matthew Flannagan debated Raymond Bradley (who has debated WLC previously) at the University of Auckland last week and the only person in that debate switching topics to get off the moot was the atheist - listen to the debate audio yourself!
"I didn't say 'no claim of superiority'. I said 'no claim of qualitative superiority'."
Can you provide me with two propositions, one of which some people (though not you) claim to be qualitatively superior (wrt knowledge) to the other, and another set of two propositions, one of which you would claim is superior (wrt knowledge), though not qualitatively superior, to the other? I think such examples will help flesh out the distinction you're trying to make between qualitative superiority and superiority.
"As to p-s/k-r. It has been, since about the 1950s, the water that we are all swimming in. It permits the theist's confident assertion "Well, you can't prove that my God doesn't exist". And you hear it everywhere in phrases like "Yes, but .... could be true" and "OK, but that's only your opinion""
I don't think those examples support your claim about the influence of p-s/k-r at all. Let's look at the first one.
"Well, you can't prove that my God doesn't exist". This response doesn't suppose p-s/k-r at all; in fact, the opposite is true. To respond, in defense of X, that you cannot prove not-X is to implicitly approve of the notion that a successful proof of not-X would be sufficient. But a successful proof of not-X isn't even possible (or even relevant) given p-s/k-r.
This essay doesn't seem to be much of a threat to theism. In fact its a wholesale capitulation to what Van Til and Bahnsen were saying all along. If the best hope of the atheist to oppose theism is the rejection of truth and the redefinition of reason to something that opens it up to the charge of solipsism, what is left for the theist to take seriously?
It is difficult to see how Popper "thus effectively rescued science from Hume’s epistemological meltdown". The explanatory power of science is still contingent on the law of induction, which is still not justified by Popper's "inversion". This is what happens with every attempt to answer Hume. It implicitly assumes the law of induction.
Eric:
Can you provide me with two propositions, one of which some people (though not you) claim to be qualitatively superior (wrt knowledge) to the other, and another set of two propositions, one of which you would claim is superior (wrt knowledge), though not qualitatively superior, to the other? I think such examples will help flesh out the distinction you're trying to make between qualitative superiority and superiority.
Keith:
OK. First set: (A)“The God of Christianity exists”.
(B)“The God of Islam exists”.
Second set: (A)“Water boils, at sea level, at 100 degrees C.
(B)“Descartes published his ‘Discourse on the Method…..’ in 1637”.
Keith's previous:
"As to p-s/k-r. It has been, since about the 1950s, the water that we are all swimming in. It permits the theist's confident assertion "Well, you can't prove that my God doesn't exist". And you hear it everywhere in phrases like "Yes, but .... could be true" and "OK, but that's only your opinion""
Eric:
I don't think those examples support your claim about the influence of p-s/k-r at all. Let's look at the first one.
"Well, you can't prove that my God doesn't exist". This response doesn't suppose p-s/k-r at all; in fact, the opposite is true.
Keith:
I would say that the opposite is demonstrable, and then demonstrate it, but putting that to the side: P-s/k-r makes it safe for the theist to derail the debate into proof’s cul-de-sac. He knows that, post Hume, we can’t finally and conclusively prove anything. He knows that he can say, to the most magnificent edifice of on demand repeatable physical observations that you can possibly assemble, and which precisely controverts every point of his belief system that he is willing to state clearly enough to expose it to that possibility – “OK, and fine. But your whole edifice can be seen to be based on as clear a step beyond reason as the faith that supports my God belief. You can see that you need that leap to claim, from ten million consecutive observations of B following A, that from your next observation of A you will shortly see B. And if such a leap is permissible for you then how can it not be for me?”
Eric:
To respond, in defense of X, that you cannot prove not-X is to implicitly approve of the notion that a successful proof of not-X would be sufficient. But a successful proof of not-X isn't even possible (or even relevant) given p-s/k-r.
Keith:
Exactly. With p-s/k-r as zeitgeist the theist has absolute confidence in our inability to win the debate through proof (of contra-X, the unlikelihood of X, or anything else). He can happily offer us that phantom, ‘implicitly approve of the notion that a successful proof of not-X would be sufficient’, then stand back and watch us exhaust ourselves in trying to grapple with it. My essay is a proposal for our side to opt out of that game.
@Keith:
Please still be following this... I'd love to hear more of your thoughts. I loved the article and am sold on the concept for the most part, save questions alluded to by Neal but not yet answered...
For starters:
- How does such a proposal verify it's own superiority to other proposals? This seems to be one of the primary critiques of empiricism and such... how do you use empiricism to verify empiricism? Do you allow for some kind of first principles or other system from which to begin?
- How does such a proposal hold up against (as Neal said) solipism and your other varieties of evil demon problems?
- In what sense can one's beliefs be said to be "justified"? For example, you said that our only mode of gaining knowledge is via cognition and sensory input.
--- If I think something am I justified in believing it true?
--- If I think I received a revelation or "experienced god," can it be true for me?
--- What is my justification for believing that I exist or that the world is real? Simply that contra-evidence does not exist?
If you'd like to continue this via email, I'd be happy to do that. I really enjoyed the article and think it's fantastic. I could simply be naive, but it struck me quite profoundly. It's officially bookmarked as "truthAwesome" in my bar for quick access.
I'm quite interested in epistemologies at present and the subject of justification, starting points, infinite regress, evil demon problems, and the like continue to occur between myself and a theist blogger. He subscribes to moderate foundationalism which, in a debate, allowed him to claim that he "experienced god" and thus "god exists" was a properly basic belief. Our debate narrowed down to me suggesting that "god" was not an irreducible experience (i.e. it probably was a good feeling, tingling, feeling loved/cared about, etc.) and him claiming that it absolutely was irreducible to the point of saying that to explain it to me would be like explaining pain to someone who has never felt it.
The debate fizzled out at that point because he thinks it's irreducible and I think it's almost certainly not... where to from there?
Just a tangible example of how I'd like to understand how your proposal holds up to the above as my debate opponent holds that any belief system that does not allow for justified first principles or prima facie justified beliefs cannot escape evil demon problems and self-verification tests and so on.
See THIS for an example.
"First set: (A)“The God of Christianity exists”.
(B)“The God of Islam exists”.
Second set: (A)“Water boils, at sea level, at 100 degrees C.
(B)“Descartes published his ‘Discourse on the Method…..’ in 1637”."
Keith, why is (A) of the second set superior to (B) of the second set, and why is it not qualitatively superior to (B)? In other words, can you provide an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions of 'superiority' on the one hand, and of 'qualitative superiority' on the other? (Preferrably, in a form like this: A proposition P1 is superior to another proposition P2 just in case [here proceed to lay out the conditions], and, A proposition P1 is qualitatively superior to a proposition P2 just in case [here proceed to lay out the conditions].) If you've studied analytic philosophy, you should understand what I'm looking for. But in case you haven't, here's an example (from 'God and Other Minds'):
P is an essential property of X if and oly if [i.e. just in case] X has P and there is a being Y identical with X and a property P' identical P such that Y has P' necessarily.
An analysis like that would really help clarify what you're getting at.
Neal: This essay doesn't seem to be much of a threat to theism. In fact its a wholesale capitulation to what Van Til and Bahnsen were saying all along. If the best hope of the atheist to oppose theism is the rejection of truth and the redefinition of reason to something that opens it up to the charge of solipsism, what is left for the theist to take seriously?
Keith: I provide my definition of ‘reason’, which I claim to be consistent with my use of the term in ‘Truth?’, as point #6 of the essay. If you consider it to be a redefinition then perhaps you will give me your understanding of the primary or main definition? On the potential threat to theism, did you read the essay (in particular, the last 4 or 5 pages)? It may be complete goobledegook, and if so then some smart theist (Plantinga?) will demonstrate this. Or perhaps you will, and save me that embarrassment. But if it is not complete goobledegook then, again in reference to its summary pages, it would seem to be as unthreatening to theism as fire is to ice.
Neal: It is difficult to see how Popper "thus effectively rescued science from Hume’s epistemological meltdown". The explanatory power of science is still contingent on the law of induction, which is still not justified by Popper's "inversion".
Keith: If we want to claim that science ‘is still contingent on the law of induction’ then we are observably in real trouble. As explained to Eric, Induction can be seen to require the same kind of clear leap beyond reason as the theist’s ‘faith’. If we have got to have ours then we can’t in fairness forbid theirs, so we might as well pack up our tents and leave the battlefield.
Neal: This is what happens with every attempt to answer Hume. It implicitly assumes the law of induction.
Keith: This seems very curious, but clear. I think, and state explicitly in my essay, that Karl Popper did answer Hume. So perhaps you will tell me in what sense Popper’s answer ‘implicitly assumes the law of induction’. As an aside: I suspect we can agree that this would disqualify Popper’s answer.
Great posts from Hendy and Eric, but I am going to have to answer them tomorrow. For quick interim answers:
Hendy,
Take another look at Point #6. Reason can't justify itself as a path to 'truth'. But it can justify itself. And that is enough if our requirement is only for clear selection of some proposals over others.
Eric,
Your question: "Why is 'A' of the second set...." goes right to the heart of the matter, and I am looking forward to answering it.
Real answers tomorrow, so don't respond to these.
Best regards to both,
Keith
For Hendy.
H: For starters:
- How does such a proposal verify it's own superiority to other proposals? This seems to be one of the primary critiques of empiricism and such... how do you use empiricism to verify empiricism? Do you allow for some kind of first principles or other system from which to begin?
K: The simplest rehash of Hume’s problem statement and Popper’s answer is that we empiricists don’t verify. That our whole quest for verification (final proof in the real world in the clear sense in which we can achieve it in our internal worlds, like mathematics) has been an enormous red herring. I know that you are being bombarded with book recommendations, but to add one more very slim volume to your pile: Bryan Magee’s ‘Philosophy and the Real World’. It’s just over 100 pages, very well written, and the best available quick launch to understanding of the main points of Karl Popper’s philosophy.
H: - How does such a proposal hold up against (as Neal said) solipism and your other varieties of evil demon problems?
K: I think that Popper’s position - and so by extension mine, which I believe to be merely a more radical version - is about as far from solipsism as it’s possible to travel. We strongly affirm the existence of an external world. But we just can’t see – from the most basic empirical and analytical positions that we can achieve – how we can meaningfully ‘prove’ any of our statements about it. [Look again, in the essay, at the second endnote to Point #9].
H: - In what sense can one's beliefs be said to be "justified"? For example, you said that our only mode of gaining knowledge is via cognition and sensory input.
K: I’d reverse the terms (input first, and then cognition based on it), but yes. I’m open to any other proposals, but analytically I can’t conceive of their possibility.
--continued below--
H: --- If I think something am I justified in believing it true?
--- If I think I received a revelation or "experienced god," can it be true for me?
K: I think that you’re confusing yourself mightily with that little word ‘true’. But taking you to mean by it the thing that most of its users appear to mean, and analytically must mean in order to render their usage non-redundant, let’s look at the consequence of a ‘yes’ to your second question. You can take the revelation of your ‘experienced god’ as the actual state of reality for you. And a Muslim can – on precisely the same grounds –take the revelation of his experienced god as the actual state of reality for him. In due course your respective priests, through interpretation of your respective holy books, will tell each of you that through the will of your god a particular piece of ground is yours by right. You know the rest of the story. We’ve played it out millions of times, and at all scale levels, throughout our species’ history. If it’s finally OK with you, or if you’re fully resigned to its being the best that we can possibly do, then yes; you can take your revelation or experienced god as ‘true’ for you. I think that you understand, from your initial enthusiasm, that ‘Truth?’ is about our ability to do better than this.
H: --- What is my justification for believing that I exist or that the world is real? Simply that contra-evidence does not exist?
-some cut to meet length restriction-
The debate fizzled out at that point because he thinks it's irreducible and I think it's almost certainly not... where to from there?
K: Go back to the poppersinversion blog, click on ‘view my complete profile’, and then on ‘Crystal Blue Persuasion’. We can’t prove theists wrong. We can’t force them to abandon their irrational belief systems. But we can place them in the position of standing with us on a snowfield and having to tell us that it is black. They can dodge and prevaricate and obfuscate without limit, but – unless they can finally propose something that is understandably more powerful than on-demand-repeatable-physical-observation as our criteria for selection, not of ‘truth’ but of knowledge - the snowfield will remain.
H: Just a tangible example of how I'd like to understand how your proposal holds up to the above as my debate opponent holds that any belief system that does not allow for justified first principles or prima facie justified beliefs cannot escape evil demon problems and self-verification tests and so on.
See THIS for an example.
K: I went there, and was convinced by Justin to buy Professor Craig’s book. But I then discovered that even to do so on my Kindle would cost $ 150. This seems like a very high price for a window onto the agonized thrashings of a dying belief system. ‘Truth?’ and its subsidiary essays are available to all, and for free. I wouldn’t require as much from Prof. Craig, but when he’s prepared to enlighten me for something closer to a standard book price – say $ 25. – then I’ll accept his invitation.
Hendy, we are indeed running foul of DC's lenght restriction, so let's continue this by email. My e-address at the end of 'Truth?' is still current.
For Eric. Probably a ‘two parter’.
(John, I apologize, and will try to keep them shorter after this).
"First set: (A)“The God of Christianity exists”.
(B)“The God of Islam exists”.
Second set: (A)“Water boils, at sea level, at 100 degrees C.
(B)“Descartes published his ‘Discourse on the Method…..’ in 1637”."
Keith, why is (A) of the second set superior to (B) of the second set, and why is it not qualitatively superior to (B)? In other words, can you provide an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions of 'superiority' on the one hand, and of 'qualitative superiority' on the other? (Preferrably, in a form like this: A proposition P1 is superior to another proposition P2 just in case [here proceed to lay out the conditions], and, A proposition P1 is qualitatively superior to a proposition P2 just in case [here proceed to lay out the conditions].) If you've studied analytic philosophy, you should understand what I'm looking for. But in case you haven't, here's an example (from 'God and Other Minds'):
K: Eric, I’ll try first in your requested format:
1. A proposition P1 is superior to another proposition P2 just in case the extent of coherence between P1 and our on demand repeatable physical observations can be seen to be greater for P1 than for P2.
2. A proposition P1 is qualitatively superior to a proposition P2 just in case P1 is representative of the actual state of reality, and P2 is not.
‘Truth?’s’ case, at this simple level, is that we can see ourselves to have the ability to resolve Question 1, but not Question 2. Many of ‘Truth?’s’ arguments are to the effect that we can see, through our contextual usage of our terms ‘true’ and ‘truth’, that their implication is precisely that we can resolve the Question 2 issue. In addition it is pointed out that through avoidance of clear (and thereby limiting) reference to any of our specific perceptive or cognitive faculties our ‘true’ and ‘truth’ analytically must either refer to our ability to resolve Question 2, or must be redundant and then - through their generality - inferior to our specific knowledge justification concepts.
But now, let me try in my way. I will go ahead and give you my knowledge selection procedure. [The thing that I would expect to lay out for any theist, and he to reciprocate by laying out for me, so that we could resolve our potential differences at this level before plunging into the specifics of our debate (the submittal of his theistic proposals, or my logically exclusive naturalistic ones, to our agreed KSP).] I think that this will answer both of your questions [How, for me, some proposals can be superior. (The structure is clearly hierarchal). And how none can be qualitatively so. (The structure is linear and unified. It contains no ‘leaps of faith’).]
It was first written a couple of years ago, as a letter response to a good friend, and I’ve left in a couple of those allusions which I think shed some additional light.
1. The top level of the hierarchy is acceptance of all proposals that are both objectively measurable and on-demand repeatable. I include in this blanket acceptance of all of the current proposals of science. I certainly don't know all of these; but (A) I understand the scientific method (how this selects proposals as knowledge) and can see that measurable and on-demand-repeatable observation is its ultimate determinant, and (B) I can see that in general and across the board the proposals themselves work. I drive the cars, talk on the cell phones and fly in the planes whose designs I can see - through the amount of scientific knowledge that I do have - to be based exactly on scientific proposals.
--continued below--
2. Acceptance of all proposals that are grounded in my own direct observations, but which fail on one or both of the critical qualifications for Level 1 (so, are not objectively measurable, and/or are not on-demand repeatable). I’d offer my proposals that are outlined in ‘Spirituality sans Theism’ as good examples of Level 2 acceptance.
3. Acceptance of a lot of proposals (ideological, ethnic, political, historical, etc.) merely on the basis of their having been passed to me before I had enough knowledge at Levels 1 and 2 - and associated development of reason - to have any kind of effective BS shields in place. [This is the kind of stuff that I am now still trying to work back through, and pare, until I can make it entirely consistent with my Levels 1 and 2 knowledge. But that is a slow process, and I know that in the meantime these proposals are powerfully affecting my thinking.] Didn’t we once talk about trying to re-build your car's engine while driving down the road?
4. Acceptance of all proposals that appear to be being offered in good faith and by generally reasonable people who don't stand to gain appreciably from their acceptance. This is the level of honest speech with people who seem to know their subjects, and the reading of apparently authoritative books. This level is a big one, and accounts for most of my knowledge outside of the sciences and direct personal experience. It’s all of my historical knowledge, and my day-to-day knowledge of all of the events that are happening in the places where I'm not.
5. Acceptance of proposals from any source whatsoever (politicians, lawyers, comic books, fortune cookies, etc.) if they are sufficiently consilient with enough that I am already holding as knowledge at any of the higher levels.
This has been my first attempt at clearly delineating the hierarchy, and it has been instructive (difficult!). For one thing, I was expecting more levels. But I don't think that their number is important. What I think important is:
(A) To have such levels; and to be able to honestly trace every proposal that one holds as knowledge to at least one of them. So, in that sense, to be able to own and take responsibility for every proposal of one's knowledge.
(B) That the levels are acknowledged to form a simple linear hierarchy; in which sense some influence from the dominant one - for you and I, on demand repeatable physical observation - should be traceable through a valid reasoning chain to any lower level proposal.
To expand a little on B, this is the whole meaning of calling the structure a hierarchy. No proposal can be accepted at Level 2 if it stands in logical opposition to any Level 1 proposal; or at Level 3 if it stands in logical opposition to any at levels 1 or 2, and so on.
@Keith:
Thanks for the response. I'll definitely email you as I'm thrilled at the article, intrigued, and want to poke around a bit more.
You'll hear from me soon.
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