August 06, 2026

Hume's Four Suplemental Arguments Against Miracles Vs Michael Licona

As mentioned in a previous post, David Hume argued that the prior probability of a miracle is infinitely low because it violates established laws of nature. Consequently, the likelihood of human testimony being mistaken will almost always outweigh the probability of the miracle itself, making it irrational to believe.

But what's often neglected is that Hume offered four supplemental arguments that discussed the "likelihood" and "false positive rate" of miracles in Part 2 of Chapter 10 of the Enquiry. This part of Hume's chapter comes after he presented his general disproof of miracles in Part 1. I think Hume didn't revise his chapter after learning about Bayes, because he had already used the structure of Bayes in his chapter! In the first part he presented his philosophical disproof against the abject improbability of human testimony for miracles that must overcome the laws of nature. This burden is made heavier when considering uncorroborated miracle claims for which we cannot interogate the alleged people mentioned in the biblical texts. After that destruction what else did Hume need to say in Part 2? But he had more to say.

Here's an excerpt from my long chapter on miracles in Why I Became an Atheist (2012), titled, Hume's Four Suplemental Arguments Against Miracles. My focus is on Michael Licona's arguments against Hume. I think I could do a better job of this if you combined other chapters I mentioned. If you want to read the whole chapter with endnotes you'll have to get the book. What? You haven't done so yet? ;-)

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