Book Review: Why I Rejected Christianity

It's not everyday that I get to befriend a fellow apostate and freethinker who left the Christian faith but also one who has a sharp theolgoical mind such as John W. Loftus. A divinity school graduate with three masters degrees, a former student of William Lane Craig, and an academic star in his school days, Loftus has a formidable resume. That's why I was eager to purchase and read Loftus' book Why I Rejected Christianity. This book is one of the best introductory texts on the philosophical problems with Christianity.

As a way of introducing himself, Loftus begins with the story of how he got involved with and came to reject Christianity. Like myself, he adopted his faith because it was the only thing he really knew and had no exposures to anything that would challenge his faith. I was sorry to hear of the trials he went through with the Restorationist movement (which, ironically, is what denomination my mother grew up in- so I have some familiarity with the mind-frame), his experience with Linda, and his experience with Jeff. All I can say is that I am pleased that he got out of all of that. I am particularly pleased that John has found new happiness with Gwen. For someone constantly wrestles with grave doubts on whether he will ever meet the love of his life or not, it sort of sparked new hope in me. I just hope my newfound hope lasts.

I have to say that I agree with many of Loftus' philosophical arguments. His argument called the Outsider Test , based on the presumption of agnosticism, I very much agree, is the best way of approaching all supernaturalist claims of revealed religion. His chapter on prayer is particularly excellent! Though brief, he states the chief problems with prayer, especially petitionary prayer. I loved his chapter on "Historical Evidence and Christianity"- that was superb! These were some of the best chapters of the entire book! I would like to focus on other chapters, while good throughout, or having some good points, could've been argued better. There is a chapter "On the lessons of Galileo, Science, and Religion". I wasn't sure what Loftus was getting at until I read that science was divorcing itself from the religious community and that methodological naturalism was probably the best way to conduct science. I agree but I also think that there is something that is overlooked by many Christians and nonChristians. The point was driven home to me after reading an essay of considerable length by Robert M Price and Reginald Finley on biblical cosmology. Many Christians point out that Galileo's approach to science and religion is best. The problem is that Galileo started the whole conflict between science and religion in my opinion. Loftus correctly notes what the Hebrew universe is like on pgs. 104-5, but as far as I can see, Galileo refuted the biblical cosmology by verifying the cosmology of Copernicus. When Scriptural references to primitive-sounding cosmology are pointed out in the Bible, Christians will say "Well, that's because the Bible is using a language of "appearance". Thus when the Psalmist says that the sun rises, or when the pillars of the earth are spoken of by Isaiah, or there is spoken of water above the firmament, modern fundamentalists, often with a straight face, will say that the Bible is speaking of a language of "appearance", describing events of the natural world using a language of how things "appear" to someone stationed on earth. But then, again, one can use this kind of rationalization to "explain" away obvious geo-centric, flat-earth cosmological references in just about any literature in antiquity. To argue that it's langauge of "appearance" is gross special pleading. You can make any ancient text scientifically inerrant by invoking such nonsense. The problem, I see, is that this nonsense about "appearances" started with Galileo.

Martin Luther, whom I regard as a antiscience, antireason, antiintellectual rube, condemned Copernicus for espousing a view that was contrary to Scripture. Yet it was Martin Luther who understood the Bible better than Copernicus and Galileo did! Luther may be an antiscientific ignoramous in every sense of the word imaginable, but Luther was biblically justified! It was Galileo, in my opinion, started the whole war with Christianity. Copernicus and Galileo were Christians who started the whole enterprise of "compromise" of the Bible with science that creationist organizations like Answers in Genesis are so fond of whining about! The geologists who gave us the geological system of earth's history and an ancient earth, older than James Ussher would've thought concievable, were Christians who went about trying to compromise Genesis with long periods of time. All of this is borne out of attempts to reconcile the Bible with science. Even Kenneth Miller, a respectable cell biologist believes that God wasn't being literal with Genesis as he explains in Finding Darwin's God. God used evolution but couldn't accurately communicate these truths about evolution, DNA, and the Big Bang. Right, and my life is just some mad scientist's experiments and my brain is in a vat somewhere with electrodes in it only making me think I was typing this review and making me think that Loftus and others would read it for comments.

I am glad that Loftus tackled the question of God's existence in a chapter, critiquing some of the well-known arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, and the ontological argument. Although I see deep problems with all of these arguments, I will, for the sake of space constraints, limit myself to the cosmological argument, particularly the Kalam cosmological argument. I was particulary delighted by the critique offered by one Blogger who argued what applies in our universe may not apply in a "yniverse", a universe bigger than ours which contains ours, yet the same laws and rules do not apply there as they do here (pg. 76). That's a good point! I think the chief problems with the 'kalam' cosmological argument, that I didn't see addressed in the book (Loftus is more than welcome to use these observations in a future edition if he pleases), are 1.) the argument self-destructs on inductive grounds, and 2.) the argument is necessarily scientifically incomplete and therefore, one cannot logically argue the conclusion from the premises. The argument assumes that a.) that which begins to exist must have a cause. Fine and good...until you consider that, inductively speaking, everything which is caused to come into existence, does so being assembled from preexisting materials! A house began to exist at one point and its existence was caused, but it just didn't pop into existence ex nihilo! No, it was assembled from preexisting materials; lumber, metal, glass, wiring, concrete, bricks, etc. If we apply this to the universe, it leads us to a conclusion that is bound to give William Lane Craig a hernia: the universe began to exist because it was constructed out of preexisting materials. Another problem: not everything began to exist at once! The earth, life, and us humans are some of the last things that evolved in this cosmos. Stars are constantly coming into existance. Red giants, existing for millions of years, explode as supernovas; they have been around for a long time. Not everything began to exist simultaneously. Furthermore, we can break things down quite a bit. A house can be broken down into smaller parts. And some of these smaller parts into even smaller parts. Did these parts began to exist simultaneously? No. Do they comprise our physical "universe"? Yes.

We can break things down physically until we get to the point where we can break them down no further. Scientists believe that this point of irreducibility is where we break down all matter into elementary particles. So the argument should be that elementary particles began to exist at one point: the rest of the cosmos evolved out of these elementary particles as they combined into more complex systems; protons, atoms, molecules, elements, compounds, gasses, metals, etc. None of these necessarily originated simultaneously, yet they all comprise our existing universe. Rather than argue that the universe came into existence, Kalamers (as I like to call them) such as Bill Craig, need to argue that elementary particles began to exist. Many cosmologists will argue that elements are generated by thermonuclear fusion in stars. Atoms, elements, etc, and that these materials get pushed out when the stars explode as supernovas-they need no supernatural cause for their existence, especially protons, neutrons, and atoms. But wait, a number of quantum physicists believe that elementary particles pop into and out of existence with no apparent cause! Oooh, that's got to throw a huge monkey wrench into the whole argument! Why believe that God had anything to do with the origin of such particles, many eons ago, when many scientists believe they originate on the subatomic level acausally, even as we speak? The second problem is that the argument is necessarily incomplete. The problem? The problem is that we haven't synthesized Einsteins' theories of relativity and quantum mechanics into a quantum theory of gravitation. We will never know, for sure, how the universe originated and whether it had a cause for its existence unless we have this much needed and badly desired quantum theory of gravitation. Craig argues that the universe began to exist at the moment there was a singularity in the Big Bang and that God caused the universe's origin with the singularity. Um, okay, but many quantum physicists believe that the singularities result from imperfections of our theories and that they are mathematically incomplete. A mathematically complete may well yield quantum gravity theories lacking singularities.

In fact, some physicists, like Lee Smolin, argue that singularities do not exist in nature and that time didn't begin with the Big Bang but extends eternally into the past. He makes a brilliant argument for this in his book Life of the Cosmos. Smolin argues that our universe originated in a black hole from another universe. Black holes, you see (yes, those mystical things that are the stuff of science fiction and fantasy) can give birth to baby universes! Smolin also argues that the fine-tuning of the universe is no accident; the fine-tuning of the universe is one that makes it possible to have many black holes and that the more black holes there are, the better are the chances that black holes can produce more baby universes like ours. I personally agree with Smolin's theory here. Smolin believes that this is what a quantum theory of gravity will show, or what it may well show! I personally don't buy that singularities exist! So much for the cosmological argument! (Even if Smolin's theory proves flawed; there are other cosmologies that eliminate singularities and allow time to extend indefinitely into the past as well as explaining the apparent fine-tuning of the cosmos!) Loftus can use an argument like these to really blow the Kalam cosmological argument to smithreens!

I particularly enjoyed Loftus' chapter on the Incarnation. I thought his arguments were very good! There is only a bit of tidying up as far as this argument goes and I wish to explore it in a future blog on Loftus' website "Debunking Christianity" of which I am a proud member! Loftus's argument against Jesus being born in Bethelhem is good, but there are some problems I believe Loftus may not have considered that would've made his case better. I agree with Sander's criticism of the problems inherent in Luke and the census! But a bigger problem is that Matthew and Luke contradict each other as well! Luke has Joseph take the Holy Family from Bethelhem to Jerusalem for up to 40 days and from there straight into Nazarenth. Matthew has the Holy Family in Bethelhem for up to two years, and then after the wise men leave, Joseph is warned to take the Family to Egypt until Herod dies. The Family is on its way to return to Bethelhem when Jospeh is warned again not to go to Galilee, so Joseph settles in Nazarenth (for the first time!). Thus there is a big, disasterous contradiction in the two stories! This is not only argued cogently by Ed Sanders but also by Richard Carrier in an essay designed to show that Luke made an error in claiming the census during the reign of Quirinius!

Loftus has a chapter on the devil and concludes by saying that "The bottom line is that if Satan was the brightest creature in all of creation, and he knew of God's immediate presence and omnipotent power like no one else, then to rebel against God makes him dumber than a box of rocks!" Perhaps so! A bigger problem, however, that would make the chapter even better, is to point out how paradoxal the concept of Satan is! Think about it: according to the Bible, we sin because we are tempted to rebel against God. It's impossible for God to be tempted, sure, but it seems that we cannot be tempted to sin apart from Satan tempting us to sin. Alrighty, but who tempted Satan then? What? Satan doesn't need a tempter? Then, how did the concept of sin, of rebellion, of going against the will of God, enter into Satan's mind? Why would Satan want to? I recall being told on a number of occasions that it was pure and sheer pride that Satan wound up the way he did. Oh? But where did the pride come from? Well, God put Satan in charge of some awesome responsibilities, it went to his head, he wanted to be God, and thus it happened. If that's the case then, it was God who was responsible for Satan to get the idea of sinning. It was God who was responsible for putting Satan into a position, knowing that the devil would become prideful. However the devil wound up the way that he did, it was God who put the devil into the position, however directly or indirectly so. Any rebellion or sin, or what-have-you, is ultimately God's fault; he was the one who either directly put it into Satan's mind or it was he who put Satan into a position where the concept of sin, pride, rebellion, etc, would be planted and sprout forth!

I read with great interest Loftus's chapter on the resurrection, and its the last one that I wish to review before closing this review. First I agree with criticisms that the resurrection are not based on eyewitness accounts in the gospels. I agree that they are also impossibly inconsistent and contradict each other. I think that Loftus' objections and incredulty of the account of doubting Thomas are reasonable (pg. 210) but I do think that Loftus may be missing the larger picture. The account of doubting Thomas was written as an apologetic against various heretics, especially some Gnostics who had docetic views of Jesus. Docetic heretics believed that Jesus never really had a body of flesh, he only appeared to have one! This is why Jesus eats fish in the presence of his disciples in Luke. These accounts were written as apologetics against heresies of Gnostics, especially docetic ones. This also explains the fact that in Luke's account, all Eleven disciples (except Judas Iscariot) were present on the first Easter Eve. In John's account, only ten are present! Notice the contradiction? Loftus is right to criticize the presence of doubt (which, in these apologies, it was usually a foil against which the miraculously risen Jesus performs the deed that convinces them that he's no ghost and that he can really eat and drink like the rest of them!) This seems to be the verdict of many critical New Testament scholars ranging from Robert Price, to Gerd Ludemann, to Charles Talbert!

Loftus does good to notice that Christian scholars engage in double-talk regarding the discrepancies. They will try to rationalize them away by trying to make contradictions evidence of their reliability. No collusion among the authors? You mean the authors were writing independently of each other and had no clue as to what the authors other authors were writing? Yeah, sure. I guess then that Josephus was wrong when he argued that the greatest evidence of veracity was when two or more historians agree on the same event that they are narrating. Josephus charged the Greek historians of his time to be in error because they would contradict each other when narrating the same event! Silly Josephus. Poor bastard didn't realize that the Greek historians were right; it just goes to prove that they didn't collude with each other when writing about the same narrative. Sure. That said, I move to the problems I have with the chapter on the resurrection though. First, of all, even though I am an advocate of the theory that the earliest Christians started out with a spiritual resurrection, I believe that Loftus is in error when he states that "...Paul didn't think of resurrection in terms of a physical body" (pg. 216). Actually, Paul would've thought of it as a physical body. I believe that Robert Gundry has demonstrated this point thoroughly in his book Soma in Biblical Theology. I don't believe that the ancients would've thought of the spiritual as "nonphysical". That is a later conception. In fact, I am convinced that people in antiquity wouldn't have concieved of anything as "nonphysical" and certainly would've have thought to equate anything spiritual as being "nonphysical". Rather, the most important thing about the spiritual resurrection, was that the spiritual body, being necessarily physical, was something lacking in flesh! It was lacking in flesh for the same reason that the sun, moon, and stars are lacking in flesh! They are all made of the same substance! This is why flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God in Paul's mind. Natural bodies consist of flesh and it is flesh that is perishable. Spiritual bodies must be made of incorruptible substance to survive in the realm of the heavenly bodies and must be lacking of corruptible, perishable substances such as flesh! Notice in 1st Corinthians 15, with its distinction between the natural and physical, how the contrast is between things containing flesh and those which lack flesh! So the spiritual resurrection must not be thought of as "physical vs. nonphysical" but, rather, "flesh vs. nonflesh".

Loftus follows this discussion with a greater discussion about Paul's vision in Acts. However, in Galatians, Paul seems to recount his Damascus experience and uses a word for "reveal" that is used chiefly of visions. Putting two and two together, we can see, then, that in 1st Corinthians 15:8, then, that his Damascus experience was a vision and since, as Loftus points out correctly, that the Greek word is ophthe, this necessarily means that since Paul is using the same word to describe the Christophany he experienced, that he is using to describe the other appearances, it necessarily follows, that they, too, must have been visions! Next is the section on the empty tomb. Loftus has what I consider to be an bad argument from silence, quoting Uta Ranke-Heinemann. I don't exactly agree that the empty tomb is a legend just because Paul fails to mention it. If Paul didn't know about any empty tomb, I can only agree because it's a symbolic creation of later gospel writers as Richard Carrier argues for in his essay "The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb". Loftus also uses the arguments of Peter Kirby in his essay "The Case Against the Empty Tomb", especially in regards to a lack of tomb veneration (both essays appear in the anthology The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave). However, I believe that Kirby's case against the empty tomb has been invalidated completely by the research of Byron McCane. He has written a book called Roll Back the Stone. McCane argues, persuasively, that the burial of Jesus by Joseph of Arimethea would've been dishonorable. The difference between an honorable burial and an dishonorable one was that honorable burials involved burial in a family tomb and ritual mourning. In the gospels, Jesus is not buried in a family tomb nor is there ritual mourning; Jesus was given a dishonorable burial. This is why there was no tomb veneration; the empty tomb would've been regarded as a place of shame for some time, not because, as Kirby maintains that "the earliest Christians did not know the location of the tomb of Jesus, neither of an empty tomb nor of an occupied tomb." There would've been no tomb veneration regardless of whether the tomb was occupied or empty.

This means that there are two possibilities: the tomb story is a symbolic fiction as argued for by Richard Carrier or that it is a core historical fact, argued for by McCane. I do agree with Stephen Davis that the empty tomb is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the resurrection of Jesus" but for reasons he doesn't consider (Loftus quotes Davis here, pg. 221). I believe that if there was an empty tomb, Jesus was simply reburied elsewhere, giving rise to visions that he was alive. I agree with Davis and Flew for the reasons stated and I am glad that Loftus quoted them. I do believe, however, that Loftus could've made his case much stronger. Cultural anthropologists know how such visions occur. Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh, in their excellent Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels point out that the "appearances" of Jesus to his followers, as narrated in the gospel resurrection stories, are examples of visionary experiences involving altered-states-of-conciousness. These kind of ASC visions were so common in antiquity that they were considered to be normal, thus the case can be made that the resurrection "appearance" visions were just as common as any other visions were, whether to individual people or to groups of people at a time, and were therefore caused by the same psychodynamic forces that caused just about every other visionary experience involving ASC.

To summarize, I believe that John Loftus has written a good introductory book on the philosphical problems with Christianity. I would best recommend his book for those who are new to the philosophical problems of Christianity and may be wrestling with doubts. Loftus was more than just another Christian, just another face one saw in Church. This book, written by a former apologist, is a good introduction to the problems of Christianity from a philosophical viewpoint. I would recommend his book as food for thought and for those who are wrestling with problems to see that there are others who go through the same struggle, have the same doubts, and leave for the same reasons. I tip my hat to John! He had some very good reasons for rejecting Christianity and I share many of those same reasons myself!

Visionary Basis of Christianity

I believe for the most part that Christianity had its origins in a series of visions. These visions, I believe, were naturally-caused and are in no need of supernatural/divine causation. Many Christians will object by saying that while individuals may have hallucinations or visions, it cannot happen to a group or collection of people at the same time. This, I believe, is wrong. What I wish to show in this post is 1.) that visions have occured in antiquity, 2.) that they occur to groups of people at a time, and 3.) they were so common in antiquity that they were considered actually to be normal.

To accomplish these three goals, I wish to provide the social-scientific basis for such visions. Then, I wish to give a few examples of what I consider to be these kinds of visions in history. Let me start with the social-scientific basis of the visions that I have in mind.In pages 327-329 of their excellent Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels, Bruce Malina and Richard Rohrbaugh engage in a discussion on "Altered-States-of-Conciousness". I reproduce their section below:"Anthropologists studying cross-cultural psychology define altered states of conciousness as conditions in which sensations, perceptions, cognition, and emotions are altered. Such states are characterized by changes in sensing, perceiving, thinking, and feeling. When a person is in such a state, the experience modifies the relatoin of the individual to the self, body, sense of identity, and the enviroment of time, space, or other people. One scholar has identified twenty such states of conciousness: dreaming, hynogogic (drowsiness before sleep), hypnopompic (semiconsciousness preceding waking), hyperalert, lethargic, rapture, hysteric, fragmentation, regressive, meditative, trance, reverie, daydreaming, internal scanning, stupor, coma, sotred memory, expanded consciousness, and 'normal'. In trace or in any other altered state of conciousness, a visionary encounters, indeed enters, another level of aspect of reality registered physiologically in the brain in the same way 'normal' experiences are. Culturally 'normal' of consensual reality is that aspect of dimension of reality of which a person is most commonly aware most of the time."Alternate reality describes that dimension of reality in which the deity and spirits reside, in which human beings from culturally 'normal' reality can sometimes visit in ecstatic trance by taking a journey (variously called "sky journey" or "soul loss" and the like), and to which people go when they die (Those who do not believe any of these things would call this nonconsensual reality.) During the centuries before and after the Gospels were written, countless persons reported a range of visions and appearances involving celestial entities. There is no reason not to take the experiences of these persons seriously, at their word. Their experiences have to be interpreted within the framework of their own culture's consensus reality (rather than ours)."The authors go onto list five main incidents of these kinds of visions and appearances; the baptism of Jesus, the testing of Jesus, the miracle of walking on the sea, the Transfiguration, and the Resurrection appearances. Their comments on the resurrection appearances are especially pertinent. They say:"The appearances of Jesus raised by God are visions of Jesus in alternate reality, where he, as God's chosen holy one, continues to live. The appearances of a holy man are altered-states-of-conciousness experiences and therefore are quite real. The interpretation that the disciples gave to these experiences was that God had raised Jesus from the dead. Mainstream U.S. culture frowns upon and even denies the human capacity for visions, trances, and experiencs of alternate realities. We are very cruious about nonrational dimensions of human existence, but tend to label all such occurences as irrational. John Pilch cites the work of Erika Bourguignon, who compiled a sample of 488 societies in all parts of the world, at various levels of technological complexity, and found that ninety percent of these societies evidence 'altered states of conciousness' Her conclusion: "Societies which do not utilize these states are historical exceptions which need to be explained, rather than the vast majority of societies that do not use these states" (cited by Pilch 1993). Thus it would be quite anachronistic and ethnocentric to take our post-Enlightenment, post-industrial revolution, technologically obsessed society as the normative for judging anyone other than ourselves. For most of the world, even today, a report of altered states of awareness would be considered quite normal."Cross-cultural comparison suggests that the Gospel authors describe experiences of altered states of awareness. This may be difficult for us to believe because we have been enculturated to be selectively inattentive to such states of awareness except in dreamsand under the influence of controlled substances."I have highlighted in bold what I consider to be important points relative to my arguments. First of all, note that Malina and Rohrbaugh consider the postmortem appearances of Jesus to be "visions". Note also, that they point out that visions of a holy man are in altered-states-of-awareness. Next, note that during the time before and after the Gospels were written that these visions and appearancs were widely reported in history and that they involved altered-states-of-consciousness. Finally note that the U.S. appears to be the exception, not the norm, and that these kinds of ASC type of visions are normative and considered usual in honor-shame soceities. This provides, I believe, the social-scientific basis for visions. Now as for specific examples of these kinds of visions in history involving ASC.

My first example is from Gershom Scholem's remarks on "the messianic revival of Sabbatai Sevi": The people of Smyrna saw miracles and heard prophecies, providing the best possible illustration of Renan's remark about the infectious character of visions. It is enough for one member of a group sharing the same beliefs to claim to have seen or heard a supernatural manifestation, and the others too will see and hear it. Hardly had the report arrived from Aleppo that Elijah had appeared in the Old Synagogue there, and Elijah walked the streets of Smyrna. Dozens, even hundreds, had seen him.... A letter written in Constantinople notes apparitions of Elijah "whom many have seen." In fact, visions of Sevi were very common after his death to his followers from what I understand (Price, Beyond Born Again, "Guarding an Empty Tomb"). These visions of Sevi can be understood as having occured in altered-states-of-consciousness, just like what Malina and Rohrbaugh have argued. Robin Lane Fox, in his work Pagans and Christians also seems to provide an example of a ASC- group vision:"Every visitor to the Black Sea knew the special island of Achilles, and in his report on the area, a visiting governor, Arrian, informed the Emperor Hadrian how 'some said' Achilles appeared to them in broad daylight on the prow or mast of their ships, 'as did Castor and Pollux'. Maximus, indeed knew a man after Homer's own heart. Near the same island, visitors had 'often' seen a young, fair-haired hero dancing in armour and had heard him singing a paean." (Fox pg. 144).According to Fox, Arrian informed Emperor Hadrian of reports that Achilles had appeared to groups of visitors to that special island of Achilles. In fact, according to this report, visitors "had often seen" what they took to be Achilles. In fact, Fox stresses that Miletus was alive with glimpses of the gods which had been granted to all sorts of people (pg. 143). Granted, Achilles and Sevi were probably not in the least considered holy men, but that's not my point here; rather my point is that these kinds of group visions involving altered-states-of-consciousness were common in antiquity. In fact, one can argue that legends arose from these kinds of visions. Even if some stories of these kinds of visions are pure legends, one can reasonably argue that the legends might reflect actual visionary experiences of these kinds.

This, I consider to be the naturalistic basis upon which Christianity was founded on.

Matthew

Bird Brain!

"13. Gavest thou the goodly wings unto the peacocks? or wings and feathers unto the ostrich? 14. Which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in dust, 15. And forgetteth that the foot may crush them, or that the wild beast may break them. 16. She is hardened against her young ones, as though they were not her's: her labour is in vain without fear; 17. Because God hath deprived her of wisdom, neither hath he imparted to her understanding." (Job 39:13-17)

The truly amazing thing about this passage is not that God created a merciless ecosystem where certain animals are incapable of caring for their young, but the fact that the ancient writers, like most unobservant theists today, honestly did not give the matter a second thought! Characteristically, God-believers have always tended not to notice when heinously sadistic characteristics of the "nature" that God created are pointed out to them. Apparently they have willfully blinded themselves to the implications of God saying he knowingly created an inept creature who is naturally an unfit mother! Why on earth would your god do that, theists?

Population control? Maybe, but if that is so, it is not only wasteful and unnecessary (God could just lessen the amount of eggs laid), but not part of what this text says at all. It says she crushes them because she is stupid! She can't help it. She is profoundly stupid. She just doesn't know any better! God intentionally created what would be the inspiration behind the reference, "bird brain." God gave those much needed IQ points that were supposed to go to the bird to us, so we could speak eloquent flatteries to God and remind him of how great he is. I'm sure, if the bird was smart enough to contemplate her short-changed situation, she'd pray for wisdom.

It is a known fact that if a manatee mother has two or more calves, she will often leave all but one behind because she is incapable of counting past the number one. Like his mother, that lost manatee calf may not be very smart, but I'm certain it experiences the same sense of horror and distress when it is deserted as one of our own children would getting lost in a mall or being sent to an orphanage.

Apologists are content to dilly-dally with what they consider to be new and improved versions of various philosophical arguments and biblical textual evidences that "prove" the God of the Bible's existence. What they should do instead is take a step backwards and deal with simple but inexcusable problem passages like this one!

(JH)

A Response to Jason

Here's John W. Loftus, once again responding to Jason Engwer's post here.

Jason argued: On the subject of the alleged gullibility of ancient people, Loftus lists some ancient practices he disapproves of, such as the behavior of the prophets of Baal and astrology…

In other words, Loftus compares what he considers some of the worst elements of the ancient world to what he considers some of the best elements of the modern world. He doesn't mention the positive elements of the ancient world or the negative elements of the modern world. As I've said repeatedly in previous responses to Loftus, the large majority of the people in the world today are supernaturalists. I can produce a list of modern beliefs that Loftus would disapprove of that would be longer than his list of ancient beliefs he disapproves of in his latest article. Many modern people believe in God or gods, astrology, ghosts, psychics, etc. And while our technology is more advanced than ancient technology, people in the forty-first century surely will have more advanced technology than we have.

I believe no one who truly looks at the evidence can come away thinking that ours is as superstitious of an age as the ancient people were, especially with the rise of science, newspaper reporters, and the rise of an historical consciousness. We are comparing the masses of people in the ancient world, like Jonah, the Ephesians, the people of Lystra, those on the island of Malta with your average educated American.

Even among God’s people we see divination through the Casting of Lots. In the OT the lot was cast to discover God’s will for the allocation of territory (Jos. 18–19, etc.), the choice of the goat to be sacrificed on the Day of Atonement (Lev. 16), the detection of a guilty person (Josh. 7:14; Jonah. 1:7), the allocation of Temple duties (1 Chr. 24:5), the discovery of a lucky day by Haman (Esther 3:7). The Urim and the Thummim are lots used to make important decisions where the answer was either yes or no (1 Sam. 14:41; 28:6; Exod. 28:29; Deut. 33:8; Lev. 8:7; Num. 27:21). In the NT Christ’s clothes were allocated by lot (Mt. 27:35). The last occasion in the Bible on which the lot is used to divine the will of God is in the choice of Matthias (Acts 1:15–26). Can you imagine any judges today casting lots to divide up land or to make any decisions?

Dreams. Dreams in the ancient world were believed to be communication from God. Dreams were thought to convey messages from God or the gods. (See Genesis 20; 21:32; 24; 31:24; 40-41; Judges 7:13-14). Pharaoh had two dreams and demanded that someone interpret them, and it’s claimed Joseph accurately interpreted them for him (Genesis 41); Solomon had a dream where he asked and received his request for wisdom (I Kings 3:5-15); Matthew records five dreams in connection with the birth and infancy of Jesus, in three of which an angel appeared with God’s message (Mt. 1:20; 2:12–13, 19, 22). Later he records the troubled dream of Pilate’s wife that Jesus is innocent, and this dream was considered by Matthew as at least enough evidence of Jesus’ innocence to mention it (27:19). On occasions there is virtually no distinction between a dream and a vision during the night (Job. 4:12f; Acts 9:10; 10:10, 30; 16:9; 18:9f.). There is a very close connection between dreams and visions and prophecies: “And afterward, I will pour out my Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your old men will dream dreams, your young men will see visions.” (Joel 2:28 & Acts 2:17, cf. Numbers 12:6) [On dreams see A. L. Oppenheim, The Interpretation of Dreams in the Ancient Near East, 1956].

Today’s modern educated people simply don’t accept that view of magic, divination, blessings, curses or dreams. Dreams, for instance, are the combined product of memory and sensation running wild, as the rational part of our brains is unconscious. CAT scans and probes tell us which parts of our brains are “asleep” and which parts are awake when we are sleeping. Dreams open the window of the mind. Dreams give us glimpse of a person’s unconscious self. The Bible contains far too many things that people living in our day and age simply cannot accept any longer. It is simply irrational and superstitious, in the light of brain science, to consider dreams as any communication from God, gods, or the dead.

Sometimes Jesus is called demon possessed simply because he says things that seemed to his hearers just plain crazy: “’Has not Moses given you the law? Yet not one of you keeps the law. Why are you trying to kill me?’ ‘You are demon-possessed,’ the crowd answered. ‘Who is trying to kill you?’” (John 7:20). “At these words the Jews were again divided. Many of them said, “He is demon-possessed and raving mad. Why listen to him?” (John 10:19-20, also John 8:48-51). Even John the Baptist was thought to be demon possessed. (Matt. 11:18). It was easy to claim someone was possessed in those days. Whenever Jesus’ acted contrary to what was expected or his teaching sounded strange or weird, they concluded he was a demon-possessed person, much like someone today might say, “you’re crazy.”

The Gospel of John

One huge piece of evidence that leads most scholars to believe John’s Gospel was written very late is his usage of the phrase, “the Jews.” It occurs about seventy times, in contrast to five occurrences in the other Gospels. In John’s gospel it is a stereotype for Jesus’ opponents. Compare 7:13: “for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him (Jesus)” (See also John 2:18-20; 5:15, 18; 7:1; 9:18, 22; 10:31; 12:9; 18:28; 19:38; 20:19). But they were all Jews! How do Jews fear the Jews? The Gospel writer himself was a Jew, if it was John! Such a usage reveals the complete break between official Judaism and Christianity, which occurred after the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. by the Roman army. It is a very odd use of the phrase, leading some to believe John the Apostle didn’t even write this gospel, because he himself was a Jew. At the minimum it reveals that the author was not so much interested in historical facts, but in elaborating on history, and even creating history. [Someone might object that the phrase “the Jews” merely meant those people who lived in Judea, but several of these occurrences could not be just about people in Judea: John 2;13; 4:22; 5:1; 6:4, 41; 18:20, 33; 19:3,21,19,40].

Conservative scholar James Dunn, in The Evidence for Jesus, tells us the specific problem. It’s “whether we can use John’s Gospel as direct testimony to Jesus’ own teaching.” “This problem was not invented by modern scholarship; it was rather discovered by modern scholarship.” (p. 31). John’s Gospel is “obviously different” from the other three earlier Gospels in terms of style and content. In the other three Synoptic Gospels (so named because they see the same things) Jesus speaks in proverbs, epigrams (cf. Sermon on the Mount for example, Matt. 5-7) and in parables, whereas in John’s Gospel Jesus often speaks in long involved discourses (John 6, 14-17). In the three Synoptic Gospels Jesus speaks often of the “kingdom of God” and hardly anything about himself, but in John’s Gospel he speaks often about himself (“I am the light of the world…the bread of life…the way the life and the truth.”), but he hardly says anything about the kingdom of God.

At best, scholars see these differences as indicative of the fact that John’s Gospel is a theological elaboration of history, while still others see them indicating it is wholly theological in nature with not much historical value at all when it comes to what Jesus taught. Case in point is the question of the high view of Christ revealed in John’s Gospel. Even Dunn acknowledges that the number of times Jesus speaks of God as his “Father” or ‘the Father’ in John’s gospel (173 times—Dunn’s count) when compared to all three earlier Synoptic Gospels (a sum total of 43 times, many repeated between them) leads him to say that John’s Jesus is “the truth of Jesus in retrospect rather than as expressed by Jesus at the time…it is expanded teaching of Jesus.” (p. 45). And yet it is mostly because of John’s Jesus that we get a very high Christology. John’s Jesus is quoted as saying: “I and the Father are one,” (John 10:30), and “He who has seen me has seen the Father.” (John14:9). But, based on what we’ve just seen, he never said those things. This is John’s Jesus speaking, not the historical Jesus.

Furthermore, James D.G. Dunn asks a very important question with regard to the “I am” claims of Jesus: “If they were part of the original words of Jesus himself, how could it be that ONLY John has picked them up, and NONE of the others (emphasis his)? Call it scholarly skepticism if you will, but I must confess that I find it almost incredible that such sayings should have been neglected HAD they been known as a feature of Jesus’ teaching (p. 36).

Jude 14: “Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied about these men: “See, the Lord is coming with thousands upon thousands of his holy ones.”

It is just wrong that Enoch, the “seventh from Adam” said this, even though this is quoted from the Book of Enoch. Because it was written in the 2nd century B.C. and couldn’t have come from Enoch himself! About this text, listen to what James Barr said in his book After Fundamentalism (pp. 42-50): "The letter of Jude quotes from the Book of Enoch with all the air of accepting it as a fully authoritative religious book. It is not just a minor allusion, or the borrowing of a few words as a matter of style. It is the fullest and most explicit use of an older sacred text within the letter. It is aligned with a series of references: to the exodus from Egypt (v. 5), to Sodom and Gomorrah (v.7), to an incident involving the body of Moses, an incident not related in the Old Testament (v. 9), to Cain, Balaam and Korah (v. 11), and to ‘predictions of the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (v. 17). It is clearly intended to carry the strongest weight within the argument of the letter.”

“Enoch is regarded as having ‘prophesied’, just as Moses or Elijah or Isaiah had done. As all true prophets were, he must have been inspired. The citation of Enoch had, for the purposes of Jude’s argument, just the same validity and the same effect as the citation of the scriptures which came later to be deemed canonical….He quoted Enoch because it was an authoritative utterance of a prophet of ancient times, accepted as such in the church. To say…Enoch’s book ‘was not scripture’ would have been unintelligible to Jude.”

Jason Engwer vs. The Superstitious Past

Jason Engwer has offered a critique of what I argued in “Jonah, Evidence and the Superstitious Past” I will respond to it here.

Jason: John Loftus has made another attempt to justify his assertions about the alleged gullibility of ancient people. His latest attempt, like the ones before it, fails to prove anything significantly relevant to the issue at hand. I'm writing a response primarily for the benefit of other people. John Loftus has repeatedly demonstrated his unreasonableness, and his latest article gives many more examples. If you read the Debunking Christianity blog in the future, or have discussions with people influenced by it, keep in mind their demonstrated lack of effort in being reasonable. The number of errors they make and the ease with which those errors could have been avoided are significant.

All I can do is to share reasons why I see things differently than Christians do. And I can only do so one story at a time and one argument at a time, since my rejection of Christianity is based upon a cumulative case. To say that I’m unreasonable is merely to say you disagree with the way I see things. To argue that I am unreasonable because you reject the way I see things, is judging the way I see things by the way you see things. I do my best to describe the way I see things. But if you reject my reasons for seeing things the way I do, it's not because I’m unreasonable, for I'm sure that I am reasonable. It may be because you have blinders on. And it may just be that we see things differently. Anyway, let’s see how unreasonable I am…..

Citing people like the Ephesians in Acts 19 doesn't explain the beliefs of somebody like Thomas, Paul, or Luke. That's why no scholar arguing against Jesus' resurrection, for example, will just cite something like the book of Jonah or Acts 19, and refer to ancient people as gullible, without addressing the details surrounding the claims made by the early Christians. You can't sufficiently explain the testimony of somebody like Paul or Luke by arguing that some ancient Ninevites or some ancient Ephesians were gullible. Similarly, we can't dismiss what John Loftus says just because he lives in a world with militant Muslims and people who consult psychics.

Just so we are clear here, I never said that based upon my analysis of the Ephesians and Jonah’s book that the resurrection never happened. I have some other reasons for thinking this. But I'm saying that the people in Biblical days were very superstitious such that I question whether any evidence was needed to convince them of something. I merely used the Ephesians and Jonah’s book as examples of this. I could multiply these examples with Elijah at Mt. Carmel with the prophets of Baal (did these “false” prophets really think they could bring down fire from the sky, such that they spent all day trying?) Paul in Lystra (Acts 14:8-20), Paul in Athens (Acts 17:16), Paul on Malta (Acts 28:1-6). Then there’s Daniel who was the head of the Magicians (do you know what Magic is?). There is Nebuchadnezzar and his dream (Daniel 4), Pharoah and his dream (Gen. 39ff), and even Pilate’s wife’s dream. There are mandrakes, and Pharaoh’s sorcerers.

There is Rhabdomancy, (Ezk. 21:21. Sticks or arrows were thrown into the air, and omens were deduced from their position when they fell); Hepatoscopy. (Ezk. 21:21. Examination of the liver or other entrails of a sacrifice was supposed to give guidance); Teraphim. (Associated with divination in 1 Sam. 15:23; Ezk. 21:21; Zech. 10:2); Necromancy, or the consultation of the departed (Deut. 18:11; 1 Sam. 28:8; 2 Ki. 21:6); Astrology (draws conclusions from the position of the sun, moon and planets in relation to the zodiac and to one another). The wise men (Magi) who came to the infant Jesus (Mt. 2:9) were probably trained in Babylonian tradition which mixed astronomy with astrology and Hydromancy, or divination through water. (Here forms and pictures appear in the water in a bowl, as also in crystal-gazing. The gleam of the water induces a state of light trance, and the visions are subjective, Gen. 44:5, 15).

Speaking of visions Matthew has argued that there is a visionary basis to Christianity.

And our world is different than the ancient world. We can see how applied science has impacted us (in no particular order) in the areas of medicine, biology, earth science, computer science, engineering technology, zoology, geology, electricity, botany, genetics, dental technology, rocket science, astronomy, forensics, meteorology, chemistry, laser surgery, hydraulics, X-rays, Plasma Physics, increased the number of elements in the Periodic Table of Elements, understanding the nervous and muscular system, brain science, the whole notion of friction, etc, etc. [See the popular treatments in New York Public Library's Science Desk Reference, or the Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, ed. James Trefil, (Routledge, 2001)].

Compare the above scientific disciplines with such things as divination, casting of lots, dreams, visions, trances, magic, exorcisms as healings, astrology, necromancy, sorcery, prophets for every religion, idol worship, gods and goddesses for every natural phenomena, human and animal sacrifices, priests, omens, temples, festivals, sacred writings, and the Pseudepigrapha. We live in a much different world than the ancients, primarily because of Newtonian science.

Consider also how that in a modern world Christian Prayers have been secularized. This all makes me wonder why Christians presuppose the Bible is true?

Jason: Christians would justify their acceptance of the book of Jonah on the basis of something like the evidence we have for the inclusion of Jonah in the canon of the ancient Jews and Jesus and the apostles. In other words, the evidence we have for the apostles' reliability, for example, would be applied to their comments relative to the canon. We would accept Jonah on the basis of apostolic authority.

Sure you do. And I make no outrageous claims here that you are unreasonable to do so, like you fault me when I think the opposite. Look at the book of Jude. He believed that Enoch, “the 7th from Adam” prophesied something (v.14). Jude made it into the canon too. But it’s crystal clear Enoch’s book is pseudonymous and not written by Enoch. So if I’m right that there was no evidence for Jonah’s prophecy, then those who accepted Jonah into the canon didn’t have any either! (Did you miss this point?) You must argue from within the book of Jonah rather than claim that because his book was canonized it proves what you think it does. I’m questioning Jonah and the people in his story. They did not act like modern people would act today (even if there are always superstitious people in every age).

Jason: There would be false prophets alongside true prophets.

Of course there were. But in such a superstitious age they were everywhere. They had a dream. They claimed to see a vision, which according to fellow Blogger Matthew J. Green is the basis of the Christian religion, and able to be explained naturalistically. How would anyone know which visions or prophesies were true? Jeremiah had a battle over this. In his day the people didn’t know whom to believe since prophets abounded saying this or that, and Jeremiah advocated that God’s people surrender the city of Jerusalem. With so many prophets saying this or that, someone was bound to be right. The fact that Jeremiah labels them “false” prophets is simply because he ended up being correct and wrote his book telling the story(if it was written by him). History would’ve been written differently by those whom he called false prophets, if what they said eventually happened. Then Jeremiah would have been called a false prophet by them.

Jason: If unreasonable and reasonable people can co-exist in today's world, why not in the ancient world as well?

Sure they do. But I never claimed ancient people were stupid. I think the collective IQ has pretty much been the same down through the centuries. I’m just claiming the ancients were overly superstitious by today’s standards. They were much more willing to believe something without evidence when it came to God, gods, or goddesses.

Jason: Why should we think that there were "police" in Tarshish who checked ships for lists of passengers? How does Loftus know what happened when the ship did arrive at its destination? Why would ancient court systems have to operate as John Loftus describes in order for us to conclude that the Bible is credible?

Our modern standards are different, then? This grants my point, does it not?

Jason: Making a judgment about whether God is going to punish the ship you're traveling on or the city you live in isn't in the same category as making a judgment about whether you saw a man perform miracles and heard that man speak with you after He had risen from the dead. Mental judgments about unseen and complex entities aren't in the same category as judgments about what you see with your eyes, touch with your hands, etc. Saying that the Ninevites believed Jonah too easily doesn't justify a rejection of the eyewitness testimony of a John, a Paul, or a Luke.

Well then, Jonah also describes himself as swallowed by a great fish; probably one of the mythical sea creatures of the deep, like Leviathan, Behemoth, or Rahab. This is something he claimed to have seen, but taken with the rest of what he writes I have no reason to believe it.

Besides, when it comes to John, Paul, and Luke, which ones can actually claim to be an eyewitness of Jesus’ miracles and resurrection? John? And where can we find his testimony? The book of John? Most scholars dispute he wrote it. And what makes you so sure that the book of John didn’t embellish the stories, since gospel scholars see him doing so with Jesus’ long discourses?

Jason: Loftus ignores the potential conditional nature of the prophecy, and he ignores the indicators within the narrative that point to a conditional nature. It seems that, again, he's going to the text with a desire to find error, and his desire leads him to wrong conclusions.

Hmmmm. Then the conditional nature of prophecy is something added to the Mosaic tradition which originally didn’t provide for any exceptions or conditions…it must come to pass.

Jason: How does Loftus know that Behemoth and Leviathan were "mythical"? He doesn't. How does he know that the creature mentioned in Jonah was mythical? He doesn't.

Rahab? Then whom was God fighting in order to create the universe? (cf. Isaiah 51:9-10; Ps. 74:13-14; 89:10-12; Job 26:7-13).

It is claimed that Behemoth and Leviathan denote respectively the hippopotamus and the crocodile. However, "they are probably instead chaos monsters. The description of neither Behemoth nor Leviathan corresponds to any known creature, and certainly not the hippopotamus and crocodile. It seems fundamental to the argument in Job 40–41 that the beasts in question can be captured by God alone, otherwise Job might have replied that he could have captured them, and then God would lose the argument!” [The Anchor Bible Dictionary].

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GeneMBridges said:
It's really funny to watch this one unfold. Loftus denies the historicity of the Bible, yet he appeals to it as historically reliable in order to make his case for the gullibility of its people, but if the Bible "debunks itself" and is not historically reliable, then how can he use it as historically reliable evidence for the gullibility of the ancients?

I provisionally take Jonah at face value, as if it happened. Then I ask questions about those purportedly historical claims, to test them. If the questions I ask lead one to think ancient people acted in ways that would be rejected by most all of us today, then I can subsequently reject those historical claims of Jonah. There’s nothing absurd with that, and if I don’t miss my guess, this is what you call an “internal critique” of the book.

Jason: Apparently, Loftus thinks it's significant that not only does he consider ancient people gullible, but so does the Bible. If he wants to argue that something like the account of Thomas was fabricated so as to give an appearance of having evidence for Christianity, then why would the ancient Christians have done such a thing? Why would gullible people living in a gullible world fabricate evidence in order to persuade people? Why is evidence fabricated in a world that's unconcerned with evidence? How does Loftus explain the many Biblical passages that make arguments from evidence and advocate evidential concepts like prophecy and eyewitness testimony?

In the case of the disciple Thomas, John describes a risen Jesus who appeared to Thomas, even “though the doors were locked,” indicating that Jesus either walked through the doors, or just appeared out of thin air. And then Jesus proceeds by asking Thomas to put his finger in his hands, and his hand in Jesus’ side. How can both of these descriptions of Jesus be of a flesh and blooded person? The way Jesus appeared to Thomas leads us think that this was nothing but a vision. How then can Thomas touch the flesh of Jesus, which still had open fatal wounds? Did the post-resurrected Jesus still have blood running in his veins? We now know that blood is necessary for the body to function, and that breathing gives the blood its oxygen, which is pumped though the body by the heart. Did he have a functioning heart and a set of lungs? Did the post-resurrected Jesus breathe? To speak, as it’s claimed Jesus did, demands a functioning set of lungs. John specifically said that he breathed (John 20:22). But didn’t Jesus lose all of his blood on the cross, and didn’t the post-resurrected body of Jesus still have open fatal wounds, according to John? These fatal wounds would cause him to lose any remaining blood out of his body. All of this leads me to suspect, at best, it was a vision.

There was no evidence. It was a story about Thomas. A vision. And it subsequently became a legend, which grew and grew as people passed it on, not unlike how the myth of Santa Claus grew up until the poem, “’twas the Night Before Christmas,” which revolutionized the way we thought about St. Nick.

Jason: Jonah was able to accurately predict the future, such as in his prediction of how the storm at sea would end (Jonah 1:12-15). He may have had evidence for answered prayer, if his deliverance came around the time that he prayed (Jonah 2:1-10). And he heard God speak in some manner (Jonah 1:2, 4:4-11). Loftus' suggestion that prophets like Jonah had no evidence to go by is unproveable and contrary to the data we have.

There's no evidence here. This is just Jonah's story-telling. Jonah tells us this. And I've already argued he was a superstitious ancient person (if he existed), who believed God chases people down for running away from them and who believed the lot will reveal God’s truth (divination—do YOU do this?).

Jason; Jonah's shipmates: The fact that they also appealed to the supernatural doesn't prove that they would believe any supernatural claim they came across in any situation in life.

They would have believed Poseidon (or some god of theirs) sent the storm if the lot had been cast saying so. And if the storm didn't subside, it must've been a different god who sent it, or this god refuses to be appeased for some reason.

Jonah, Evidence and the Superstitious Past

Since I have recently argued the Bible itself tells us ancient people were superstitious, compare what I argued there with this older post of mine on the story of Jonah:

For what I consider a typical look at the evidence of a prophetic word, take a look at the prophetic story in Jonah. Although I do not believe there is a shred of historical evidence for this story, let me treat it as if it were historical in every detail. Try to put yourself in the shoes of each of the characters involved, including Jonah, the sailors, the police in Tarshish, the king of Ninevah and his people. Read the story as if you are each of these characters respectively. What would you think and do?

Prophets received their prophecies by means of dreams and visions (Numbers 12:6). Several of the prophetic books claim to be based upon visions (Isaiah 1:1; Ezk. 1:1; Obadiah 1:1; Nahum 1:1), while most all of the rest of them start out either with “the word of the Lord came to me,” (Jonah 1:1) or simply, this is “an oracle.”

In the O.T. there were many prophets (I Sam. 10:10-13), and they sought guidance from God in dreams and visions. So how did any of them know for sure their prophecies were truly from God? They had a dream. They saw a vision (which probably is indistinguishable from a dream like state anyway). I take it that Jonah was upset at the corruption in Ninevah, much like Christians today are upset at the corruption in America, and had a dream about it, and just felt certain about it.

There were lots of prophets in the land, false ones, and prophets for other gods. THEY ALL FELT CERTAIN THEIR PROPHECIES WERE OF DIVINE ORIGIN. ALL OF THEM. The tests of the prophet laid down in Deut 13, and 18 just demand that they spoke in God’s name, and the thing should come to pass.

But when God purportedly called Jonah to preach against the city of Nineveh he tried to flee from God by sailing to some place called Tarshish (v.3). Even though Jonah felt certain about the prophecy, he didn’t like it, because he didn't want to warn the Ninevites of their impending destruction. But the kind of God he believed in when he fled was a tribal, localized god, and certainly not the later monotheistic omnipotent creator God.

1:4 Then the LORD sent a great wind on the sea, and such a violent storm arose that the ship threatened to break up. 5 All the sailors were afraid and each cried out to his own god. And they threw the cargo into the sea to lighten the ship.

Of course, any sailor back then would blame God for the wind and the storm, but this is also Jonah’s belief, since this is supposedly his writing. Is that what we do today?...blame someone for a storm?

1:5-6 But Jonah had gone below deck, where he lay down and fell into a deep sleep. The captain went to him and said, “How can you sleep? Get up and call on your god! Maybe he will take notice of us, and we will not perish.”

The captain didn’t care which god Jonah prayed to, so long as no god was left out of their prayers. This is a true polytheism.

1:7 Then the sailors said to each other, “Come, let us cast lots to find out who is responsible for this calamity.”

They cast lots and the lot fell on Jonah. This is a form of divination. Do you want to cast lots to see who’s to blame for any hurricanes that come our way? Jonah accepted the results too.

1:8 So they asked him, “Tell us, who is responsible for making all this trouble for us? What do you do? Where do you come from? What is your country? From what people are you?” 9 He answered, “I am a Hebrew and I worship the LORD, the God of heaven, who made the sea and the land.” 10 This terrified them and they asked, “What have you done?” (They knew he was running away from the LORD, because he had already told them so.)

Jonah expresses a view of God here that is at odds with his running away from God earlier. It’s hard to reconcile the fact that he thought he could run away from God with his belief that the God is a “God of heaven, who made the sea and the land,” except that Jonah may have truly realized this for the first time in the storm itself. But he states this as if he thought this way all along.

With the casting of lots and the fact that he was running away from this kind of God, it terrified these sailors. These things would not terrify us today. Does God zap people who disobey him today? Like Ananias & Sapphira? Uzzah? Lot’s wife? What if the lot had instead fallen on some follower of Zeus who was running away from him, or fighting against him, like Odysseus in the Odyssey? These sailors would still respond in the exact same way, because the proof was in the casting of lots, and the storm, and the story. They didn’t need any other proof or evidence. Does this type of gullibility describe any thinking person today?

1:11 The sea was getting rougher and rougher. So they asked him, “What should we do to you to make the sea calm down for us?” 12 “Pick me up and throw me into the sea,” he replied, “and it will become calm. I know that it is my fault that this great storm has come upon you.”

Yep, that’s what Jonah concluded. Kill me and it’ll be okay for you. We learn at the end of this book that he was suicidal anyway, so there’s no difference expressed in this attitude of his. Jonah believes the storm is his fault? Have you ever blamed yourself because of a storm? Does God or nature act that way?

1:13 Instead, the men did their best to row back to land. But they could not, for the sea grew even wilder than before. 14 Then they cried to the LORD, “O LORD, please do not let us die for taking this man’s life. Do not hold us accountable for killing an innocent man, for you, O LORD, have done as you pleased.”

Here they faced an ethical decision. They "know" Jonah is to blame for the storm, but does Jonah’s God also demands they kill him? If they kill him, will Jonah’s God be more upset with them for doing so? But Jonah eased their minds, because he himself says that’s what they should do.

1:15 Then they took Jonah and threw him overboard, and the raging sea grew calm. 16 At this the men greatly feared the LORD, and they offered a sacrifice to the LORD and made vows to him.

These sailors should be tried for attempted murder. Surely they had a list of the people on board. And when they docked to a port someone would notice him missing. What would the police in Tarshish do then? Anything comparable to what our police would do? What would these men say to the police? Would their story hold up in today's courts? Absolutely not!

1:17 But the LORD provided a great fish to swallow Jonah, and Jonah was inside the fish three days and three nights.

Hmmm. With a person like that telling the first part of this story, I doubt that he can be trustworthy telling the rest of the story. And if people were superstitious enough to believe God caused a storm to stop Jonah in his tracks without any evidence but nature and the story itself, then they would also believe he was swallowed by a fish simply because he told them it happened. If no evidence is required to believe the first part of the story, then no evidence is required to believe the last part.

But lookee here at the end (chapter 3) after the fish puked him up:

1 Then the word of the LORD came to Jonah a second time: 2 “Go to the great city of Nineveh and proclaim to it the message I give you.” 3 Jonah obeyed the word of the LORD and went to Nineveh. Now Nineveh was a very important city—a visit required three days. 4 On the first day, Jonah started into the city. He proclaimed: “Forty more days and Nineveh will be overturned.” 5 The Ninevites believed God. They declared a fast, and all of them, from the greatest to the least, put on sackcloth.

Jonah obeyed his vision or dream, and preached the message he felt certain about; That “Forty more days and Nineveh will be overturned.”

That’s what he said. Remember this.

3:6 When the news reached the king of Nineveh, he rose from his throne, took off his royal robes, covered himself with sackcloth and sat down in the dust. 7 Then he issued a proclamation in Nineveh: “By the decree of the king and his nobles: Do not let any man or beast, herd or flock, taste anything; do not let them eat or drink. 8 But let man and beast be covered with sackcloth. Let everyone call urgently on God. Let them give up their evil ways and their violence. 9 Who knows? God may yet relent and with compassion turn from his fierce anger so that we will not perish.”

In the first place, what evidence did the king of Ninevah have for believing Jonah? We are simply not told. Presumably none was needed because of the supposed fame of the Hebrew God. But even with the supposed fame of the Hebrew God, how would the King know that Jonah was his true prophet? That's a fair question, isn't it? Even Moses supposedly had wondered how the Pharaoh would know he was sent from God, didn't he?

Still, how would America react to the same prophetic message by none other than Billy Graham: “Forty more days and America will be overturned.” The laugher would be constant. Jay Leno and David Letterman would have a field day with this. That’s because we today would demand some evidence. And there have been some prophets of doom in America too. Just listen to Jack Van Impe. But for the last 30 years or more he's always been wrong!

3:10 When God saw what they did and how they turned from their evil ways, he had compassion and did not bring upon them the destruction he had threatened.

WHAT? WHAT? WHAT? I’m sure I read somewhere that the test of a prophet was that what he said was to come to pass. Didn’t he say Nineveh would be destroyed? Did he or didn't he? Answer the question. But it wasn’t destroyed after all, was it? What if Billy Graham used this excuse to explain why America wasn’t destroyed? Laughter again. What would you say about Jonah then? After all there were a great many prophets running around proclaiming that God spoke to them too. If what he prophesied didn't come to pass, then is there any evidence at all that he was really called to speak God's word?

And how should we now think about Jonah? After all, his prophecy failed the test of a true prophet! But yet his book is in the Bible.

What's missing in this story is evidence. No evidence was offered for any claim, except that Jonah said it was true. Without a doubt no Christian today would believe the same type of story told by a modern Christian, unless there was some pretty hard evidence.

Is there even any evidence that Nineveh became monotheistic and righteous? If they remained polytheistic and failed to worship the Hebrew God, that wouldn't be enough for Jonah's God, would it? If it was just about their moral behavior, then cities and countries all go through some cycle of "revival" from time to time, so it might be that Jonah was taking credit for something that happened on its own anyway.

And where's this fish? The ancients had the superstitious belief that mythical beasts and fish lived in the seas, likened to the Loch Ness Monster, like "Rahab," "Behemoth," and "Leviathan."

This is what I mean by superstition. Little or no evidence is required, just a good story, based in fear, along with the storms of life. The Bible Debunks itself.

Exbeliever's Swan Song

Because of other obligations (e.g. finishing my thesis, moving across the country, starting a new PhD program, etc.), I've decided to resign my membership in this wonderful blog.

During my time here, I repeatedly asked Christians to give some kind of reason for their faith. I asked them to supply some kind of argument that ends in "therefore, god exists." This challenge was repeatedly ignored. Instead, the Christians' strategy was to point out philosophical problems that have been studied by philosophers for centuries and say that somehow a term "God" was the answer to all of them. When an atheist had an understandably difficult time resolving a difficult problem, the Christian would declare himself the winner because of his "answer"--which really is a non-answer.

A couple of months ago, Richard Carrier and Tom Wanchick engaged in an on-line debate published on The Secular Web.

Below, I respond to Wanchick's opening statement. I decided that I would only read his opening statement in the debate and respond to it without reading Carrier's rebuttals or Wanchick's answers. It is possible, then, that Wanchick later clarified his statements and a further response would be necessary. I'm satisfied, however, with my responses.

Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

It seems reasonable to believe that every substance has an explanation for its existence: it was either caused by something else, or exists necessarily (it cannot not exist). This premise is evidently more plausible than its denial, for if confronted with a new substance, everyone would assume it has an explanation before they assumed it didn't. Absurdly, if the latter presumption were equally plausible, we could justifiably pronounce everything to be a brute given, making science, philosophy, etc. frivolous. Indeed, the general assumption that objects have explanations has been successfully confirmed so often that those wishing to reject it must provide good reason for doing so.

Additionally, if we have an adequate explanation for an object, it would clearly be unreasonable to conclude instead that that object was unexplained. Again, explanation is prima facie more reasonable than nonexplanation. Thus, Quentin Smith, the foremost atheist expert on cosmological arguments, admits that if naturalism cannot explain the universe like theism can, that is evidence for theism over naturalism.

Now, interestingly, the universe itself is a substance having properties: density, temperature, etc. Therefore, like all substances, it has an explanation. Indeed, scientists have long assumed this in cosmological studies, as they've developed myriad theories as to how the universe exists.

Thus, we construct this argument:

1. Every substance has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature.
2. The universe is a substance.
3. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature.
4. The universe does not exist necessarily.
5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is an external cause.


This conclusion follows from the premises. I've justified 1 and 2 above. Premise 4 requires little argument, since the universe appears obviously contingent. Scientists even tell us that it had a beginning and will end somewhere in the future. Being non-necessary, then, it finds its explanation in an outside cause.

This cause can exist timelessly and spacelessly, since it can cause the space-time universe. Moreover, it must be immaterial, since it is nonspatial. And it must also be a mind, since only minds and abstract objects can exist timelessly and immaterially, and only the former can cause anything. Furthermore, the only two types of explanation are natural/mechanistic and personal; and since there was no nature prior to the universe, its cause is personal.

Moreover, the ultimate cause cannot itself be a contingent reality. As Charles Taliaferro notes, "If contingent object A is explained by B which is explained by C and so on into infinity, we will never get a complete or fully satisfactory explanation of A." Thus, the explanation of the universe must be a metaphysically necessary, uncaused being.

My first argument therefore proves the reality of a transcendent, timeless, and spaceless mind that exists necessarily and has the ability and know-how to cause and sustain the universe.

Wanchick's first premise is "Every substance has an explanation of its existence either in an external cause or in the necessity of its own nature."

How does one know this to be true? Wanchick attempts to substantiate his claim when he writes, ". . . for if confronted with a new substance, everyone would assume it has an explanation before they assumed it didn't."

In other words, this claim is true because of induction. Everything that we have observed that exists has an explanation for its existence. I certainly agree with this claim, but I wonder how it can be extrapolated and used to describe the existence of the universe.

Let me explain. Every existing thing that we have observed has been observed in a physical universe acted upon by physical laws. These physical laws certainly affected the "substances" observed.

How is it, then, possible to confidently assert that, in the absence of our physical laws, the universe (even if we allow the dubious claim that the universe is a "substance" and not "the set of all substances") must have an explanation of its existence? In other words, Wanchick is applying an inductive argument that is true under one set of conditions to an entirely different set of conditions that he knows nothing about. Scientists agree that, in the earliest stages of the beginning of the universe, the laws of physics break down. There are no physical laws that we know of that can exist when the universe is at infinite mass and space time is bent infinitely.

Perhaps an analogy would help. Let's say that I make the claim, "In every case in which I weigh a person and then strap 20 lbs of Styrofoam to their waists, their weight increases by exactly 20 lbs." This is a very reasonable claim under what we consider "normal" conditions (e.g. they are in a doctor's office on a true scale). Now, imagine that I am weighing people in a pool of chest-high water. When I strap the 20 lbs of Styrofoam to their waists, their weight would actually decrease, because the Styrofoam is buoyant and would lift them off the scales. The exact opposite effect would occur.

In the same way, Wanchick is taking an inductive claim made under a specific set of conditions and applying them to a situation in which the conditions are completely unknown. In fact, we know that the conditions of the earlier universe in a singularity are very different from the conditions of our current universe. Why should we accept his claim, then, that we can apply the same inductive argument that we have observed under specific conditions to "a substance" that did not come about in those same conditions. How do we know that the universe does not exist in conditions that are exactly the opposite of all of the substances we observe within the universe? How can we say that this first premise holds in different conditions?

Wanchick's first premise cannot be substantiated and his argument fails before it begins.

Kalam Cosmological Argument

Like the universe's existence, its origin too needs explaining. Leading philosophers and scientists confirm that the universe came into existence from nothing. Currently, the big bang model leads the pack among cosmological theories and entails a definite beginning of space-time. Renowned physicist Stephen Hawking admits, "almost everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the Big Bang." Carrier concurs.

An eternal universe is disconfirmed philosophically, too, for it implies that there are infinite past events. But it would be impossible to reach the last event in this series--i.e., the present. We could literally never reach the end of infinity; no matter how many events we traversed, there'd always be infinite to go. But since we have reached the end, the set of past events must be finite.

Moreover, an infinite set of things entails metaphysically impossibility. If we have infinite things numbered 1 through infinity and subtract all even ones, we would have an infinite number remaining. But if we subtract only those marked over #5, we would be left with 5. Since it is metaphysically impossible to subtract equal quantities and get contradictory answers, it must be impossible for an infinite to exist. Thus, the number of past events in the universe is finite. The universe had a beginning.

This is significant, since, as we all know, objects cannot just pop into being from nothing, uncaused. Imagine finding a whale or a stadium simply appearing willy-nilly on your doorstep! David Hume even announced, "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause."

Inductively, of course, no one in all of history has witnessed an object leap into reality this way. If this is possible, it's strikingly curious that it's never occurred.

Indeed, the inductive evidence simply accords with sound metaphysics, for if nothing existed without the universe, then not even the potentiality for it existed. But how can something come into existence if there was no potential for it? Carrier's own view is that "things exist potentially wherever the elements necessary to form them exist." But since nothing existed without the universe given naturalism, neither did its potential, thereby ruling out its actuality on that view.

Thus:

6. Every substance that begins to exist has a cause.
7. The universe began to exist.
8. Therefore, the universe has a cause.


Premise 6 and 7 are more reasonable than their negations, as argued above. And since the argument is valid, the conclusion follows unavoidably.

As noted in the prior argument, the cause of the universe will be an uncaused, timeless, spaceless, and nonphysical mind. However, other significant qualities come through here: its incomprehensible power and knowledge. This creator has the awe-inspiring power and knowledge to create whole universes from nothing. It's hard to see, then, what power or knowledge he lacks.

This cosmological argument fails in exactly the same place that the previous one did. The first premise states, "Every substance that begins to exist has a cause." Even if we grant that the universe is a "substance" and not "the set of all substances," this is still an inductive claim made within conditions in which the universe itself does not exist.

Wanchick explicitly states that his is an inductive argument. He writes, "Inductively, of course, no one in all of history has witnessed an object leap into reality this way. If this is possible, it's strikingly curious that it's never occurred."

Again, however, everyone "in all of history" has only witnessed objects coming into existence within the physical universe. The universe itself does not exist within the physical universe, so it is impossible to extract an argument that relies on the conditions within the universe and apply it to the universe itself which does not exist within the universe.

The statement, "Every substance that begins to exist has a cause." Is a statement that is true because of the physical laws of the universe. All of the physicists that I am aware of admit that physical laws break down if there is no physical universe. We simply can't know if those laws apply outside of the universe.

Wanchick cannot maintain his first premise, therefore, the argument fails to prove anything.

Design of/in the Universe

In the past 30 years, science has revealed the razor thin conditions that make life in our universe possible. The universe is "fine-tuned" for life. Indeed, there are dozens of factors that must be set precisely in order for life to exist here. With their slightest alteration, life would be impossible. Thus, while there are millions of ways the universe could physically be, very few of them are life-permitting. Robin Collins sums up the scientific consensus:

Scientists have increasingly come to realize how the initial conditions of the universe and the basic constants of physics must be balanced on a razor's edge for intelligent life to evolve.... Calculations show that if the constants of physics--such as the physical constant governing the strength of gravity--were slightly different, the evolution of complex, embodied life forms of comparable intelligence to ourselves would be seriously inhibited, if not rendered impossible.

But the unimaginably precise fine-tuning appears more epistemically probable given theism than it does given naturalism. For because conscious life is good, it's not surprising that God would make a world containing it. But why would we ever expect the world to have life-permitting conditions if naturalism were true? Indeed, this appears wholly improbable, since the possible universes that disallow life incomprehensibly outnumber those that allow it. It's like picking the prize-winning white marble out of a barrel of black ones. Thus:

9. Fine-tuning is not improbable given theism.
10. Fine-tuning is improbable given naturalism.
11. Thus, fine-tuning is more probable on theism than naturalism.


In other words, fine-tuning provides evidence that theism is more probable than naturalism.

This seems, to me, a particularly bad design argument, but I'll address it as is.

Wanchick writes, "But the unimaginably precise fine-tuning appears more epistemically probable given theism than it does given naturalism. For because conscious life is good, it's not surprising that God would make a world containing it. But why would we ever expect the world to have life-permitting conditions if naturalism were true?"

The addition of God to this "problem" does nothing to solve it. If a god existed, he would have available to him an infinite number of options in creating the universe. There were as many possible universes without conscious life available to a god as there are available to chance. Why should we believe that a god would be compelled to create one with life? Could he not have just as easily created a universe that did not sustain life?

Wanchick tells us it is more probable that a god would have created a universe supporting life because "conscious life is good." Well, that's interesting. I don't think of conscious life as "good" or "bad," I simply believe it "is." What reasons are there for me to believe that conscious life is "good"? Would it be "bad" if life didn't exist? If a god did eternally exist, was it "bad" until life was created?

I do not see how existence can be labeled "good" or "bad." Existence is a precondition of moral judgments. It simply makes no sense to make a moral judgment about a precondition of moral judgments.

It does not matter, then, that ". . . the possible universes that disallow life incomprehensibly outnumber those that allow it." This is true whether if chance is responsible for the universe or if a god freely chose to create. Both chance and a god would have the same number of possible universes. That this universe exists the way it does is no less statistically "miraculous" whether by chance or by a god with infinite possibilities.

Knowability and Discoverability

Additionally, many things within the universe indicate a God-like designer. Scholars have documented that our universe is not only fine-tuned for sentient life, but also for scientific discovery and knowability. The universe is structured in just the right way to allow the study of natural laws and phenomena, greatly adding to our scientific knowledge. Such features make sense if God wants us to discover and enjoy creation; but why would these features exist on naturalism?

Same problem. If a god existed, he would be able to create any number of universes in which laws and phenomena are not knowable or discoverable. Chance is no different. There are the same number of options available to both chance or a god.

Beauty

Collins notes that "beauty is widely recognized by physicists as being an important characteristic of the laws of nature, one which has served as a highly selective guide to discovering the fundamental laws of nature in the twentieth century." Moreover, the laws of nature (and many things in nature) exhibit simplicity, harmony, and elegance. It wouldn't be surprising for a creator to make such a universe, but, again, why would this be so if naturalism is true?

This, of course, assumes that "beauty" is universal. Aesthetic judgments, however, are notoriously subjective. Beauty has no universal properties. The very property that makes one thing beautiful makes another thing ugly (e.g. the curve of a "beautiful" vase could be the reason that vase is beautiful, but the same curve in another vase with different properties could be the reason that vase is ugly).

Additionally, this argument falls prey to the same problems listed above. Both chance and any supposed "god" would have the same number of possible universes. Why would a god be any less likely to choose one over another? Maybe an uglier universe would have better fulfilled a purpose this god had.

Evil

Typically, if an object is undesigned or serves a purpose only accidentally (e.g., a hillside serving as a stage), we conclude that it cannot be used correctly or incorrectly. Design or intention appears to be a necessary condition for proper function. A bike can be used properly; a fallen meteor cannot.

It's interesting to apply this insight to sentient beings. Can they be misused? The obvious answer is 'yes.' Humans shouldn't be used as slaves, for instance; doing so is evil. Indeed, the misuse of beings seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for evil. Evil events involve a patient out of its proper state.

So evil is a departure from the way things ought to exist. But this contradicts naturalism, wherein every living thing is like the hillside: accidental byproducts having no design plan, no proper state.

Objectors might hold that if we used the hillside as a stage long enough, this would become its conventional function, and to stop doing so would seem a misuse. Thus, objects can acquire proper function accidentally over time. But this seems false for at least sentient beings, for no matter how long humans are enslaved, they should never be used as such. Their function is inherent rather than conventional.

Evil obviously exists; think of child pornography or rape. And since evil entails that the universe and its inhabitants have a specific function or purpose, it follows that they were designed by an intelligent being having the knowledge, ability, and intention to build a world with purposeful and moral dimensions.

Wanchick asserts that "Evil obviously exists. . ." Actions certainly exist, and people certainly call some actions "evil" sometimes, but does something called "evil" obviously exist? I can't taste, hear, touch, see, or smell it. How is this obvious?

Also, how is it that objects can be improperly used? It is true that a bicycle has a design function, but what if I don't want a bicycle for the function for which it was designed? Is that an "improper" use of it?

Say that I am a set designer for a movie production. My company is making a horror film set in an old cabin in the woods. I have to decorate that cabin, and I want to hang a rusty, non-functional bicycle from the wall. For me, a brand new mountain bike is a "bad" bike. A rusty, old, non-functional bicycle, however, is a "good" bike for my purposes. That this bike does not do what it is designed and intended to do is exactly what makes it "good."

Wanchick states, "Humans shouldn't be used as slaves, for instance. . ." I agree, but others don't. Some people believe that others should be enslaved. They believe it is "good" that people are enslaved.

I would certainly fight to keep people free from slavery, but that doesn't mean that I believe it is universally "wrong." It is, however, wrong according to my moral framework, and my moral framework forces me to fight against slavery with all of my power (and within my ethical guidelines). Whether I believe it to be "universally" immoral is irrelevant.

The "power" of this argument is its emotional appeal. Most people agree that slavery is evil, but they feel that it lessens the immorality of it if it is not "universally" so. I will deal with this more in the next argument.

[As an aside, it is interesting to me that Wanchick argues for the immorality of slavery when the Christian god is quoted as saying, "Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life. . ." (Leviticus 25:44-46) and "If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property." (Exodus 21:20-21). If slavery is "evil" and the Christian god calls it "good," then is the Christian god "evil" or is slavery "good"?]

Moral Argument

But what makes us obliged not to mistreat humans? After all, if naturalism is true, "a human being is a biological animal," as naturalist Julian Baggini admits. But unless humans have unique moral worth not had by beasts, it seems objective moral truth wouldn't exist. It wouldn't, for instance, be immoral to rape or kill, for animals do so to each other regularly with no moral significance.

Paul Draper pinpoints the problem such properties would cause for naturalism: "every human being has a special sort of inherent value that no animal has, and every human has an equal amount of this value. Such equality is possible despite the great differences among humans, because the value in question does not supervene on any natural properties. It is a nonnatural property that all (and only) humans possess." The great naturalist philosopher J.L. Mackie, and myriad others, agree.

Unfortunately, to defend naturalism, Draper and Mackie (like Carrier) have to absurdly deny that humans have such unique inherent worth. Carrier even says some animals are more morally valuable than certain humans in virtue of their superior intellect, rationality, etc. But such positions are obviously false. Humans have moral worth not found in animals, regardless of their comparative capabilities, and the failure to recognize this is simply a lack of moral insight.

But since these moral properties obviously do exist in human beings and aren't natural, they must have a supernatural source. And since moral properties exist only in persons, the source of moral properties must be a supernatural person.

The moral order, then, is evidence of a supernatural person who grounds moral truth. Additionally, at least some moral truths are necessary, and thus their foundation must be a necessary being grounding moral facts in all possible worlds.

I've dealt with the issue of morality at length before. I believe that moral judgments are relative to moral frameworks.

***
But are all relative judgments invalid?

Consider motion. Imagine sitting next to me in a bar when I suddenly begin screaming, "My Guinness is moving! Sweet Lola, save me, my Guinness is moving!" You look at my glass, however, and say, "Man, atheism is really rat poison to the intellect! Your Guinness isn't moving; it's perfectly still."

Is it both possible that my Guinness is moving and that my Guinness is not moving? Of course it is!

I could respond to your skepticism, "Isn't this continent drifting, the earth rotating and revolving, our solar system spinning in a pinwheel galaxy, and our galaxy speeding away from others in the universe? How can you say my Guinness isn't moving?!"

At the same time, you could have said, "Look EB, there is a spot on the bar next to your glass and we can tell by this ruler that your glass is neither moving towards that spot nor away from it. Your glass is stationary."

Both contradictory statements are correct, but are relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks. From certain spatio-temporal frameworks, my Guinness is stationary; from others, it is moving. The "fact" of the motion of my Guinness is relative to the spatio-temporal framework that is adopted. There is no one, "true" spatio-temporal framework that truly determines whether something is "really" moving or not, there are only different frameworks from which to judge.

But though my Guinness' motion is relative, it is still "objective." You would certainly admit the validity of my statement that my Guinness is moving from any of the other spatio-temporal frameworks that I mentioned as justification. I would certainly admit the validity of your statement from the spatio-temporal framework that you mention. Both statements are correct, but are so relative to specific spatio-temporal frameworks.

Now, what if the same could be said of moral judgments? What if I could say objectively that it is morally wrong of P to D (I'm stealing all of this from Princeton's Gilbert Harman if you are wondering), but had to qualify my statement that it was morally wrong according to a specific moral framework? My judgment would be objective, but not universal.

If morality is not universal, though, must I accept everyone's moral judgments as equally valid? Of course not. For one thing, it is certainly possible that someone makes a moral judgment that does not fit the moral framework they use to justify it [Just like it would be possible for someone to say that something is stationary from a framework in which that judgment is inconsistent].

Secondly, acknowledging that a belief may be justified by reference to another moral framework does not mean that I have to abandon my own moral framework. For example, I believe that it is morally wrong to rape someone. If I were to happen upon a man trying to rape a woman, my moral framework demands that I do whatever action is permissible according to that framework to prevent that action from taking place. I may acknowledge that the action is permissible according to the rapist's moral framework, but that does not mean that I must ignore what is demanded by my own moral framework.

Moral relativism, then, does not necessarily lead to moral nihilism.

Anyone familiar with Foucault's work on power structures will know that, if he is correct, social ideas and morality are shaped by power. There is nothing called "madness" out in the world. One cannot catch "madness" in a bucket and paint it pink. It is an idea that must be defined. Originally, the church and the family were the primary power structures that made this definition. The church needed a way to distinguish between God's directions to his people through the Holy Spirit and the babblings of a madman. People that had certain heretical "visions" and "promptings" from God were considered "mad." Now, it is the physicians who define these kind of terms. Whatever the age, though, power is the driver behind these definitions.

In the case of morality, then, power will be the stabilizing (or destabilizing) force behind societal morality. Obviously, that does not mean that one must accept society's morality (both the Christians here and myself reject our current society's morality, but for drastically different reasons). For example, though most of current, American society opposes same-sex marriage, I adamantly support it. I do not have to accept the majority opinion even if I acknowledge that that opinion is justified by reference to a certain moral framework. I can exert my power (however limited it is) to try to change societal opinion. I can also point out that denying homosexual couples marriage is inconsistent with other, primary societal values like equal treatment under the law.

Just like one can make objective statements about motion even though the statements are relative to spatio-temporal frameworks, so I can make objective statements about morality that are relative to specific moral frameworks. So, contrary to Bahnsen's argument, I can be outraged by the Holocaust and not have a universal morality to do so. Does someone else have to agree with my outrage? Certainly not, but I will exert every power available to me via my moral framework (which excludes violence) to make others see things my way. Morality, like every idea (according to Foucault) is a power struggle.
***

Wanchick writes, "Unfortunately, to defend naturalism, Draper and Mackie (like Carrier) have to absurdly deny that humans have such unique inherent worth. . . But such positions are obviously false. Humans have moral worth not found in animals, regardless of their comparative capabilities, and the failure to recognize this is simply a lack of moral insight."

Well, this is certainly a passionate assertion! It is only that, though, an assertion. If it is "obviously false" that humans do not have a "unique inherent worth," why didn't Wanchick demonstrate its falsity? All he did was follow it up with rhetoric.

That humans are capable of feeling a stronger attachment to our fellow humans is not surprising given the nature of our brains and our evolutionary history, but other animals also experience loss and pain at the death or injury of another animal. That a human life is more significant to us, humans, is no surprise. That we feel a unique bond to other humans is no surprise. This is mirrored (to a lesser extent) in the animal kingdom as well (i.e. some animals "value" the lives of other of their kind more than they "value" the lives of other animals).

Ontological Argument

Philosophically, to say something can possibly exist is to say it could exist in at least one 'possible world' (PW). PWs (including our own) are simply possible total states of affairs. (These are not necessarily possible universes--e.g., God existing alone is a PW excluding any universe.)

By definition, a necessary being is one existing in all PWs. Obviously, if such a being were found in our (actual) world we would know that it exists in all PWs. The reverse also holds. Label our world X and another PW Y. Assume Y holds a necessary being. Inhabitants of Y would know that that being would exist in X too, since it would exist in all PWs. Thus, if any PW holds a necessary being (i.e., if that necessary being is possible), then that being must exist in the actual world, too.

Some theists have seen God as a necessary being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. He is maximally great (MG). But then if God is possible, He is actual. Theists have developed this ontological argument:

12. It is possible that an MG being exists.
13. If it is possible that an MG being exists, then an MG being exists in some PW.
14. If an MG being exists in some PW, then it exists in all PWs.
15. If an MG being exists in all PWs, then it exists in the actual world.

The argument is valid. The question is, why think an MG metaphysically possible?

First, nothing about this being seems impossible: He appears compatible with our modal intuitions. Much of mankind has indeed thought He exists. In the absence of a defeater, there seems no reason to reject our intuitions.

Moreover, my prior arguments establish 12. The Leibnizian argument proves a necessary mind who caused the universe. This being is seemingly omnipotent and omniscient given the kalam and design arguments. And He is the necessary source of moral goodness and truth, as shown in the moral argument. So my case reveals the reality and thus the possibility of an MG being. Indeed, even if the arguments aren't sound, their conclusions appear at least metaphysically possible. One doesn't simply look at the conclusion and see its obvious falsity; quite the opposite. The beings entailed appears possible, and thus the argument must be evaluated. But if the beings in those arguments are possible, then why is it impossible for one being with all those properties to exist? Since this surely does seem possible, then that person must actually exist. The MG God is a reality.

Ontological arguments suck. Fight fire with fire, though, I guess. Here is my ontological argument:

P1: It is possible that a possible world in which a god does not exist exists.

P2: If it is possible that a possible world in which a god does not exist exists, then a possible world in which a god does not exist exists.

P3: If a possible world in which a god does not exist exists, then a god would not exist in every possible world.

P4: If a god does not exist in every possible world, then it is possible that a god does not exist in the actual world.

P5: A god does not exist in a possible world in which a god does not exist.

C: Therefore, it is possible that a god does not exist in the actual world.

Theists assert that a god does exist in the actual world. It is their responsibility, then, to demonstrate this.

I'll give my argument the same support that Wanchick gave his above:

The argument is valid. The question is, why think a possible world in which a god does not exist possible?

First, nothing about this possible world seems impossible: It appears compatible with our modal intuitions. Much of humanity has indeed thought it exists. In the absence of a defeater, there seems no reason to reject our intuitions.

Moreover, my refutation of Wanchick's prior arguments establish that it is possible that a god does not exist. My refutation of his Leibnizian argument disproves a necessary mind who caused the universe. Given my refutation of the kalam and design arguments, there is no reason to believe an omnipotent and omniscient being exists. As shown in my refutation of the moral argument, it is not true that a god is the necessary source of moral goodness and truth. . .

Resurrection of Jesus

Despite media rumors, there is wide agreement among New Testament specialists regarding the events surrounding Jesus' death. Even a minimal list of almost universally affirmed facts among liberal and conservative scholars provides sufficient evidence that Jesus really was resurrected.

(a) Jesus died by crucifixion around 30 AD. Even radically liberal Crossan confesses, "That [Jesus] was crucified is as sure as anything historical can ever be."

(b) The tomb where Jesus was buried was empty days after His death. There are almost two dozen arguments for this: (i) If the tomb weren't empty, Christianity would've been defeated in Jerusalem by Jewish authorities revealing so. (ii) Women are the first witnesses to the empty tomb. However, women's testimony in Jesus' culture was considered generally unreliable and far inferior to that of men. If the empty tomb story were fabricated, why insert women as the primary witnesses? (iii) The empty tomb is noted by Paul in the 1 Corinthians 15:3-5 creed originating within three years of Jesus' death, far too early to be legend. (iv) The Jewish denial of the empty tomb implies its reality. Why concoct stories accounting for a tomb that's full? (v) The story is benignly straightforward, unlike legendary stories of Jesus' era.

(c) Jesus appeared visually to various people days after His death, as independently attested in early creeds, Paul, the Gospels, and nonbiblical sources. Paul tells of his and the other disciples' appearances in 1 Corinthians 15, explaining his personal verification of their accounts. Lüdemann concludes, "It may be taken as historically certain that Peter and the disciples had experiences after Jesus' death in which Jesus appeared to them as the risen Christ."

(d) James and Paul both believed Jesus was resurrected after seeing Him postcrucifixion. These appearances must have vividly occurred for such dedicated opponents of Christ to convert. Paul went from the main persecutor of Christianity to its main apostle! And James turned from confirmed skeptic to an early church pillar.

If the Resurrection occurred, this series of facts can be explained plausibly and coherently. But what coherent natural explanation can be offered?

Moreover, without the Resurrection, how does one account for Christianity's origin? A lone resurrection of an executed Messiah was utterly foreign to pre-Christian Jews and blatantly contradicted their Messianic expectations. It seems impossible that any would've conceived of, let alone invented, the resurrection account.

There were various other Messianic movements before and after Jesus, but they uniformly died with their founders. Only Jesus was claimed to have risen. Only His followers, who saw Him afterwards, turned from a failed group to a vibrant movement proclaiming resurrection unto death. Something remarkable must've occurred to motivate the transformation. Only the Resurrection seems sufficient.

Again, these facts are affirmed among virtually all scholars, Christian or liberal. As Craig notes, in denying any of them or that resurrection is their best explanation, Carrier will have to "believe that the majority of the world's historians who have studied the life of Jesus are mistaken about the historicity of his empty tomb, postmortem appearances, and the origin of the Christian Way, or else embrace some naturalistic explanation of these facts which has been overwhelmingly rejected by historical scholars."

But since men cannot rise from death naturally, the Resurrection must've had a supernatural cause. And since Jesus claimed allegiance with the Old Testament God, the most plausible cause of Jesus' rising is precisely He.

In answer to a - d above:

(a) I agree that a man named Jesus was crucified around 30 CE.

(b) I do not know whether or not Jesus' tomb was empty days after his burial. All I have to go on are works written by biased followers years after the event. (i) There is no indication that the Jewish authorities felt threatened enough by the Christian sect as to desire to disprove their claims. Plus, if the first record we have of an empty tomb was written 3 years after the burial of a body, there would be nothing left of that body to disprove the Christian claim. The Jewish authorities would be helpless to defeat Christianity because the body would have been unrecognizably decomposed (maybe completely so). (ii) Who knows why the biblical writers wrote what they wrote. As a team member recently pointed out, there are many inconsistencies with the gospel stories. Maybe the gospel writers were idiots. (iii) Legends can appear much faster than 3 years. (iv) By the time the Jews "denied the empty tomb" the body would have decomposed. They would have been denying that it was empty because of the resurrection. (v) How a story about a person miraculously raising from the dead can be considered "benignly straightforward" is beyond me. If this is straightforward, what is a "legend" to this man?

(c) Why should anyone believe the writers of the Bible and church creeds are attempting to give an honest historical account?

(d) This assumes that the conversion stories of James and Paul are not also made up. How do I know they are not?

Wanchick writes, "If the Resurrection occurred, this series of facts can be explained plausibly and coherently. But what coherent natural explanation can be offered?"

Jesus was buried in a tomb and his body decomposed before people started claiming he was resurrected. The gospel writers were people of faith who believed what they wanted to believe much like the Heaven's Gate cult. They were so convinced that they were willing to die, just like Marshall Applewhite, the founder of the Heaven's Gate cult. The conversion stories of Paul and James were embellished to make it sound better.

As to the argument for the Christian god. The arguments above do not prove that Jesus rose from the dead, so there is no need for a supernatural cause of an event that cannot be proven to have occurred.

Collectively, then, I've demonstrated the reality of a transcendent, immaterial, uncaused, metaphysically necessary, and morally perfect mind of unsurpassable power and knowledge who has revealed Himself in Jesus. My arguments, in effect, demonstrate the reality of not only God, but, alas, the God of Christianity.

Every one of Wanchick's arguments have been refuted above. The case for a god is unproven and must be rejected until some valid evidence is given.

I've collected all of my other posts on this blog here. I consider the following to be my best entries:

An Evidentialist Challenge, Restated--A post in which I answer the two most popular presuppositionalist's questions, "Without the Christian God, how can you account for universal laws of logic and morality?" I also issue a challenge for Christians to demonstrate the validity of their faith.

Step into My Vortex--Discussing the vastness of the universe and our insignificance in it. Has a cool link that shows how big (and small) the universe is.

Life After the Vortex (An Existentialist Reading)--My philosophy for living a full life in light of our insignificance in the universe. Discusses Albert Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus.

Presuppositionalism: Arguments 4, Supports 0--Argues that all presuppositionalists arguments are unsupported, that presuppositionalism is trickery, not a valid argument.

*I will respond to comments on this particular post until they die down in a few days. After that, I will fade away into the sunset.

It has been a true pleasure.