It’s Not About Intelligence or Education At All!

People assail us here at DC all of the time because we dare to try to debunk Christianity. We threaten these believers, so like a swarm of bees when startled they attack. Since we disagree with them they have three explanations for why we no longer believe. They claim that we are either being deceived by Satan (or the Calvinist God), or that we know the truth but we just deny it, or that we are just plainly ignorant and/or stupid, or all three. That’s the sum of their explanations as to why we don’t believe. Believers in every faith must have an explanation for why others do not share their beliefs. Many of them will say similar things about Christians who don't believe as they do, too. Such charges are leveled back and forth all the time here, there, and everywhere people disagree about their faiths. In my opinion it reveals a fortress mentality, and an unwillingness to think beyond what they have come to believe for less than adequate reasons.

For anyone who wants to seriously look at the issue of the hiddenness of God (why is God purportedly hidden such that people do not all understand that he exists) and the problem of religious diversity (why is there such a diversity of religious faiths around the globe), I recommend Robert McKim’s book, Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity (Oxford, 2001).

Here are some quotes from his book:

“We seem to have a remarkable capacity to find arguments that support positions which we antecedently hold. Reason is, to a great extent, the slave of prior commitments.” (p. ix). This is exactly what I said elsewhere.

“The majority of people get their religious beliefs from their upbringing, and they grow up to inhabit a religious world that feels as real and solid, or almost as real and solid, as the physical world.” (p. ix),

“The fact that god is hidden (if God exists) suggests that one ought to be wary of the claims that the theistic traditions make about God: they probably are claims that exceed what may be reasonably be said with confidence.” (p. 123).

“The implication is that theists ought to be skeptical of many of the claims about God that are made by the dominant theistic traditions, including their own tradition.” (p. 124).

“We should look with skepticism on the claims of those who believe that they have a clear account of God’s nature—who carry on, in short, as if God were not hidden.” (p. 124).

“A main project in this book is to present a case for tentativeness in beliefs about religious matters.” (p. 124)

“Responsible religious belief should involve dialogue, openness, exchange, open-ended exploration, and conversation with various other bodies of discourse. Anything less is parochial and unsatisfactory.” (p. viii).

This mirrors the Outsider Test that I'm developing.

Former Christian theist turned atheist Michael Shermer has done an extensive study of why people believe in God and in “weird things” and concludes:

“Most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning. Rather, such variables as genetic predispositions, parental predilections, sibling influences, peer pressures, educational experiences, and life impressions all shape the personality preferences and emotional inclinations that, in conjunction with numerous social and cultural influences, lead us to make certain belief choices. Rarely do any of us sit down before a table of facts, weigh them pro and con, and choose the most logical and rational belief, regardless of what we previously believed. Instead, the facts of the world come to us through the colored filters of the theories, hypotheses, hunches, biases, and prejudices we have accumulated through our lifetime. We then sort through the body of data and select those most confirming what we already believe, and ignore or rationalize away those that are disconfirming. All of us do this, of course, but smart people are better at it…” “Smart people, because they are more intelligent and better educated, are able to give intellectual reasons justifying their beliefs that they arrived at for nonintelligent reasons.”[See Michael Shermer How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science (New York: W, H. Freeman and Company) 2000, and his Why People Believe Weird Things 2nd ed., (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC), 2002, pp. 283-284,and 299, from which the quotes were taken.

Then consider what Richard Dawkins wrote:

“Out of all of the sects in the world, we notice an uncanny coincidence: the overwhelming majority just happen to choose the one that their parents belong to. Not the sect that has the best evidence in its favour, the best miracles, the best moral code, the best cathedral, the best stained glass, the best music: when it comes to choosing from the smorgasbord of available religions, their potential virtues seem to count for nothing, compared to the matter of heredity. This is an unmistakable fact; nobody could seriously deny it. Yet people with full knowledge of the arbitrary nature of this heredity, somehow manage to go on believing in their religion, often with such fanaticism that they are prepared to murder people who follow a different one…. the religion we adopt is a matter of an accident of geography.” [from The Nullifidian (Dec 94).

All of which makes me ask What if I'm wrong about Christianity?

Sam Harris on Islam

I know we debunk Christianity here, but in our present world I consider militant Islam to be a more dangerous faith. What's so astounding is how many Muslims think there is nothing much wrong with suicide bombings against civilian targets in order to defend Islam.

Logic and the Quest for Metaphysical Truths

I am finding that logic doesn't help us much at all in the quest for metaphysical truths.

We use logic in the service of our faith. It is not the reverse. Logic does not lead to God, for instance. What we believe about God (which is prior) leads us to our view of logic (which is posterior).

Take for instance this valid modus ponens:

If (P) Elvis is dead then (Q) Bush is the president of the USA.

P: Elvis is dead.

.: Q: Bush is the president of the USA.

This conclusion is not only true, but it follows from this valid argument.

But the question here is whether the first premise is a non-sequitur. What is the connection between Elvis being dead and Bush being the president? How do we decide if someone says that's what he believes because of a dream he had or that God makes the connection? What then? How do you use reason to deny this? [To see the problems of informal fallacies when applied to metaphysical truths see here.]

And what do you say to the pantheist who will choke out a koan in response to any of your logical questions?

And what can a theist say to the atheist who believes logic is biologically based? There's no logic that can change his mind if he has different presuppositions, just like there is no logic that can change a theistic mind either.

What one thinks about logic is a worldview issue. When a theist uses his view of logic to defend the existence of his God all he's doing is spelling out the implications of his worldview when it comes to logic.

In essence what he's saying is that if his God exists, then this is how a theist should view logic.

If God is everything (pantheism) or if there is no God at all (atheism), then logic is viewed differently, that's all.

So the real question is as exbeliever has posed: what is the reason for believing in God in the first place? Because it all hinges on whether or not God exists, and if he does, what he's like.

My particular attack on religious faith is to consider how we gained our presuppositions in the first place. We do so because of when and where we were born; an "accident of birth," or and "accident of geography." Go here and scroll down to the Outsider Test, to see for yourselves. This is the biggest background factor of all when it comes to religious faith..when and where we were born. So basically the theist is using an "accident of birth" to adopt his view of God (which is prior), and then arguing that logic leads him to believe in God (which is secondary), and that's it. So there is no significant way that the theist can use his view about logic (which is posterior) to show his God exists (which is prior). The cart is before the horse here. The truth of the matter is that the whole reason he defends his belief in God, and subsequently logic, is because of an "accident of birth."

In my opinion the Outsider Test leads me to agnosticism, and agnosticism leads inexorably to atheism.

A Method to the Madness

Anyone who has engaged me for even a short period of time, will hear me say, “What is your methodology?” Apparently there is some confusion as to what I mean by it, or why I am asking this question.

Primarily (albeit not exclusively) I use this question in discussing the Bible. I believe it is helpful in order to focus the discussion as to how the other person views it, and also reveals our own personal biases. It may even give us a chance to pause and reflect as to the viability of the process we use to make a claim and why it is not persuasive on those that may not agree with us.

Imagine two people discussing over who the smartest person in the world is. The debate quickly deteriorates to:

“Jan is.”
“No, Jim is.”
“No, Jan is.”
“No, Jim is.”

And it turns out that the two people are using two different methodologies to determine “smart.” One may be using an IQ test (in which Jan prevails) and the other is using Grade Point Average (in which Jim prevails.) They can discuss and debate and outright fight until the cows come home, and neither will ever get the other one to agree, because they are using different standards.

Of course a third person may join in, who feels the number of published articles is how we determine the smartest person, a fourth may join in using another standard, and we watch it fragment into a mess.

Unless we agree, or at least recognize a mutual methodology, the debate will never even get off the ground. The two people may walk away with “IF we use IQ, then Jan is the smartest, but IF we use GPA, then Jim is the smartest.” We might disagree on the methodologies, but at the least we have gained an appreciation of an alternative position, using an alternative method.

One of the easiest demonstrations of this problem is in the field of inerrancy. A skeptic may point out what appears (to them) to be a contradiction, say in Judas’ death. They would point out that the Gospel of Matthew has Judas dying by hanging, the priests buying the field, and it being called a “Field of Blood” because it was purchased with “blood money.” (Matt. 27:3-8) The Book of Acts has Judas dying by evisceration, Judas buying the field, and his blood all over the place resulting in it being named “Field of Blood.” (Acts 1:18-19)

To the skeptic, the two different modes of death, two different purchasers, and two different reasons for the name of the Field, all in a relatively short account, add up to a contradiction.

However, the Christian inerrantist quickly points out that Judas’ body could have fallen, causing it to sustain further injury, that the priest’s purchase was in the form of agency on behalf of Judas (or vice versa) and that field of Blood could certainly have double meaning. Hence no contradiction.

“Ding!” And the fight is on…

After pages of posts which dredge up analogies and counter-analogies, and what is wrong with the other person’s analogies and “How can you not see that…?” Each walks away partially frustrated at the blindness of the other person and partially with the feeling of vindicating their particular position. Neither has remotely persuaded the other. The choirs of both camps have cheered (or jeered) as expected.

The debate never even had a chance to get off the ground because each party was approaching it with a different methodology. The skeptic was using a method that a contradiction exists, if literally taken on its face one account does not align with another account. The Christian was using the method that any feasible explanation that could possibly align the two accounts would prohibit it from being a contradiction.

We may smile at the idea of two people fighting over who is smarter, because of how many ways that can be determined, yet it is the same problem here, and rarely is it even discussed, let alone agreed upon. How many ways can a contradiction be determined?

Rather than wade in with swords drawn and shields up, I would prefer we first establish how we recognize a contradiction or not. We first establish a method by which we can determine if two accounts should be considered aligned, or that they disagree. Of course, both sides are wily enough to understand the import of methodology, and this, too, can degrade into dispute. But at least it is revealing, and generates further discussion.

For example, (continuing with inerrancy) if the Christian desires the methodology of any possible explanation eliminating the claim of contradiction, I would willingly agree. The question is whether we can stay wedded to it. I could then point out, using the method that “any possible explanation means no contradiction” how we could align any number of accounts. The Gospel of Peter records that Jesus stated on the cross, “O Power, My Power, why have you forsaken me?” Using the “any possible explanation methodology” this is easily aligned as Jesus having said it in addition to the “My God, My God…” Or we could state that the author of the Gospel of Peter was emphasizing how Jesus obtained his “Power” from God.

Using any possible explanation, we could eliminate almost all contradictions in all accounts of history. This renders inerrancy as not singular, but rather “designed” by reducing the requirement of determining a contradiction.

Simply put, the Bible would lose its special status of inerrancy, since by this methodology, many more books would be inerrant. It would no longer be a sign of divinity.

The danger of establishing a methodology is that we may be called to be consistent in it. If I claim Jim is the smartest because of GPA, and all of a sudden Joe has a higher GPA, my own methodology would force me to recognize Joe as smarter than Jim. In the same way, if we utilize “any human explanation” our own methodology would force us to recognize vast numbers of works that are equally inerrant. Making the very concept of an “inerrant Bible” about as unique as the fact that it is printed on paper.

Or another way in which methodology can dig deeper into the discussion is to question how certain verses are used in the manner most convenient for the person making the proposal.

At one time, in discussing Paul, I pointed out how he indicated he went to Jerusalem on two occasions, 14 years apart. (Gal. 1:18 – 2:1). However Acts indicates that it was at the initial meeting that Barnabas introduced Paul. (Acts 9:26-27) At least one apologist proposed a 14-year gap between the sentence in vs. 26 and the sentence in vs. 27.

Being me, I asked how someone came up with this method of inserting 14 year times, when none is even hinted at. I was criticized for asking the apologist for coming up with a system, when history does not provide us with enough information as to why the author wrote what they did.

Wait a minute. I am asking why the apologist is requesting, within their method, for me to read the verses differently than what is a straight rendition. If they can insert, solely to support their argument, a 14 year period between sentences, can I, equally, to support my argument, insert a 14 year period where I desire? And if they complain, can I equally assert I should not be under the requirement of determining what system an author uses?

No Christian apologist would allow me to insert time as desired, why would they expect me to accept it in them?

Don’t get me wrong, perhaps the methodology CAN be established. Perhaps one could point out how an author tended to combine their accounts by topic, rather than chronologically. If it was pointed out that an author talked solely about Herod, and after completing that account, reverted back to a story about James, and after competing that account, reverted back to a story about Paul, it may make sense to insert periods of time between sentences. Is that how the author of Acts wrote?

If one could establish that as a methodology, it would certainly bolster the claim of inserted time. Remember, it is the apologist making the claim that what would not be normative (that if a person is in Jerusalem in Sentence one, and is still in Jerusalem in Sentence two; it is the same trip) rather than shy away from showing why we should read it differently—bolster it! Don’t complain that we are asking too much—demonstrate your argument!

I find that each person, whether they realize it or not, are using some type of methodology to make determinations as to what historically happened.

Another example—I may point out I believe the Gospel of Peter is historically accurate.

An apologist may claim, “No, that was written too late.” Bam! We have our methodology. In order to determine what is historically accurate, apparently we are to use a cut-off date. It is timing that will determine historical accuracy.

But this presents two problems:

1) How does timing have anything to do with historical accuracy? What date does one use for our cut-off date? 100 CE? “Within the lifetime of eyewitnesses”?

Can we reasonably state that no person could lie prior to that date, and no person could be accurate after it? What if I had heard some tales about Jesus, and thought, “What a great character! I will write a fancy story about him” and completely make it up. Yet I write in 80 CE. Does that mean, under this method, we must determine it to be accurate?

Or we have another poor author that obtained his information directly from a Disciple. It is confirmed by Mary’s granddaughter. It is reiterated, in exact form, by another friend of another Disciple. But he has the gall to write in 150 CE. Too late? Can’t be true?

2) Can one stay consistent in this methodology? What about the Torah? It records events long before it was written. It is (I believe) a universal consensus that some of the stories were passed by oral tradition over at least 400 years. Is that too late? Within our “cut-off” date, why does the Tanakh get a pass, yet the New Testament adheres to such strict time-constraints?

Further, we have books written within this time frame. The Gospel of Peter could have been written prior to 100 CE. 1 Clement and the Epistle of Barnabas beat 2 Peter. Why are they excluded? Even within the timing method some “oops” occur.

(A parenthetical thought. Some may think I am being too harsh, too literal or too stringent by demanding a date. Remember, it was not me that proposed “too late” as a reason to exclude a certain book as being historically inaccurate. Even by the word “late” timing is implied.

I would agree that accounts recorded closer to the events may be more accurate, due to failing memories, but we must also consider the ability of the source to observe the events, their own bias, and an opportunity to modify. Since all of the books were written years after the events, all of them introduce these problems. The fact they were written in 50, 100 or 150 CE does not diminish that problem.

Besides, these are alleged to be inspired by an eternal God. He could write history at any time, and be accurate. Why is the New Testament limited to such an exacting time-frame? If God inspired an author to write of Joseph accurately over 400 years later, could he not do the same with Jesus?)

Or does one exclude a book because of it not being accepted by tradition? By the Church fathers? Again, we run into the same problems.

Which church fathers? Some questioned Revelation, some did not. Some questioned James, some did not. Many accepted 1 Clement, Epistle of Barnabas, and Shepherd of Hermas. Why did they become excluded, if we are using Church tradition?

Further, if we are to rely upon the Church fathers, what else do they tell of that within this method, we are to include as historical? Papias wrote that Judas was killed by a chariot. If we accept Church tradition, then Matthew and Acts are incorrect. Unless we hold to the earlier account. (Ah-ha! That “timing” method again. Did you catch it?) In which case Acts must be incorrect.

Or does one use doctrine to determine what is historically correct? Can one exclude the historicity of a book, simply because it is Gnostic?

This is a particularly revealing method. If the book makes claims as to Jesus’ statements which are unwelcome to the Christian, is it excluded, NOT on the basis of its accuracy, but on the doctrine contained therein. Doctrine the Christian does not like. This demonstrates a bias.

We all have bias, there is nothing inherently wrong with that. But we must be careful, due to our bias, to not exclude what actually happened, things we don’t want to happen. Orthodox Christianity does not want a Gnostic Jesus, and therefore is prone to a bias against it. Desire is a poor methodology.

Most likely, though, is that people use a combination of each of these methods. A combination that unwittingly manages to conform to exactly what the person wants to be true.

If your methodology is convenient, just to bolster your own argument, it is not as persuasive.

That is why I ask for methodology over and over, to the point I am sure many are tired of it. To see if we can break out of the mold of “This is what I want, how can I get there?” to “Can we be consistent in determining what happened?”

Rather than inspect Jan, and attempt to determine a method by which we can claim she is the smartest person, can we develop a method and live with the results, even if they are not Jan?

If a person presents an assertion as to an unusual or unique situation, such as a certain set of books being divine, or a set of miracles happening, or a complex reading of a straightforward sentence, I wonder how they come up with a way to differentiate and separate out these books, miracles and readings from all the others. I am curious to know the “why” they are different and the “how” we determine it.

That is the reason I so often ask for methodology.

Yet More on The "Many Resurrected Saints"

The "many raised saints" tale found only in Matthew is an interesting one. I have a few pieces on the web concerning it and the questions it raises [See below]:

What happened to the resurrected saints?

More about the resurrected saints

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE RESURRECTED SAINTS? The "Christian Think Tank" Response

One interesting tidbit about the tale of the "many raised saints" found only in Matthew is the probable insertion of the phrase "after his resurrection" which appears to have been inserted so awkwardly into the Greek that it makes the sentences read as though the tombs were opened and the saints raised at Jesus's death, but then they lingered about until "after his resurrection" a day and a half later when they finally "entered the holy city."

Some of course don't think that those two little verses about the anonymous "many raised saints" are historical at all but merely midrash added by Matthew, just as Matthew appears to have added incidents in Jesus's birth and childhood filling in gaps in knowledge with tales composed to add understanding in a similarly midrashic fashion. (One prominent inerrantist scholar was voted out of the Evangelical Theological Society in the 1980s for acknowledging that there was indeed a case to be made for Matthew's use of midrash in his telling of the Jesus story.)

As for inerrantist Christian apologists on the web who acknowledge the ancient use of midrash and even pesher to help try and explain the way some Gospel authors stretched the meanings of Old Testament verses to suit their prior view of "who Jesus was," please read "The Fabulous Prophecies of the Messiah" which includes comments from Christian apologists at the end.

On this topic of the Gospel author's use of midrash and pesher, even J. P. Holding has listed it among "leading Christian myths" that "OT prophecy fulfillment is a good apologetic. It actually isn't useful in the way it was at first. We need to understand (as do Skeptics) Jewish exegesis of the first century. It is not so much that the OT predicted the NT events as that the NT writers looked at history and sought OT passages that echoed what they had seen. This does not mean that there is not actual predictive prophecy at all (for even then God may have orchestrated the pattern) but rather that we cannot present an apologetic on this basis as we normally have; or else we are forced into a corner of explaining ie, why the NT allegedly uses OT passages "out of context."

Personally, I suspect that the ancient world was generally more mysterious and wondrous than today's and average people were more capable of believing stories or weird strange tales, and capable of repeating them and embellishing them as well. The story of many raised saints, the story of a bodily ascension, the story of a resurrection. I don't doubt that Christians were motivated in their beliefs, nor that Christians were motivated to compose not one, but three additional variant endings to Mark's Gospel, none of them apparently original to that Gospel, and continued to compose additional Gospels and Acts. Truth telling does not seem to have been as important as convincing themselves and others of their beliefs. But certainties are more difficult to come by once Christianity began being examined by more rigorous standards. Historians are not easily cowed by partisan stories of miracles, or by miraculous partisan tales of how various religions allegedly began. Jerusalem itself was turned into rubble in 70 A.D. but the Romans, rubble such that Josephus pointed out if they hadn't left the towers of the city standing, one might even doubt that such an immense proud city such as Jerusalem ever had stood on that same spot. So there's no evidence, and no non-partisan writings aside from Josephus's mention of Jesus, and even he would have gotten his brief paragraph of info from partisan believers not from actually having seen Jesus himself. The Gospels themselves are written without the author's identifying themselves, and one could read all of the inerrantist and non-inerrantist historians one wants to try and guess who wrote them, and remain uncertain. (And I say that having read Holding's collection of arguments for traditional authorship.)

Nuff said for now, I doubt any single argument can change another person's mind that has built up connections with other arguments in a web-like fashion over time, or relieve them of the doubts they may have.

Cheers,
Ed

To the "gay atheist" blog owner of "Discomfiting Christianity"

THE DISCOMFITER'S SELF-DESCRIPTION IN HIS BLOGGER PROFILE:

Industry: Fashion
Occupation: Interior Decorating

Interests
Refuting Christians reading John Loftus' blogs and books and remodeling Tuscan style villas

So based on his blogger profile I'd like to address the "gay atheist" blog owner of Discomfiting Christianity [I put those words in quotation marks because I do not believe the Discomfiter is gay nor an atheist, but attempting to satirize both.]:

I suggest dropping the balpeen-hammer hints that homosexuals are worthy of derision, and also suggest you leave sarcasm to the experts [read more below]:

The Simpsons as Religious Satire

The Onion [on God]

The Onion [on Christ]

The Onion [on religion]

Which Circle? [celebrating the truth, beauty, & absurdity of Christian campus ministry]

...or leave it to Christians who have a more expansive sense of humor:

The Door Magazine [Christians satirizing excesses of fellow Christians]

Ship of Fools [another Christian site run by Christians willing to laugh at their own excesses,including links to other religious satire sites]

Landover Baptist: America's Favorite Church

Not to mention the fact that Catholic wits like G. K. Chesterton were lifelong friends with his atheist and unorthodox friends even though they debated and satirized each others' views, even telling his atheist friend, H.G. Wells, that he saw him going to heaven for all the good he did for mankind, and even writing a novel about a Christian and atheist who wanted to duel to the death, but later came to be close friends (The Ball and the Cross).

Lastly, from what I've read at Tekton apologetics (a sexy female screaming bunny), or in The Best Christian Writing of the Year, there do not appear to be very many Evangelical Christian satirists up to say, Dave Barry level, let alone who could keep up with Voltaire, Twain, Mencken, or stand up routines by Sam Kinison, Bill Hicks, Eddie Izzard, Rowan Atkinson, George Carlin, or movies by Kevin Smith and Monty Python.

I would add that the opposite of fanaticism is not a rival fanatical spirit but simply acknowledging doubts in general and allowing bygones to be bygones, i.e., allowing people to start over, and attempt to get to know each other again.

For such reasons I tend to doubt that beliefs determine ones eternal destiny. Because even interpreting other people's ideas when communicating with them, people that you know, who live in the same time and era as yourself is fraught with difficulty, let alone "biblical exegesis," and trying to make "doctrines and dogmas" sound like nothing but pure rationality to other folks.

Defining Evil

Believers in Christianity are not like they were decades and centuries ago. When confronted with harsh biblical criticism, they will not tell you things like "just have faith because nobody really 'knows' anything", nor will they admit "I can't prove the Bible or Christianity, but I believe in them." No, those days of quaint and humble honesty are long gone.

What believers of today will tell you is a minimum of ten ways to explain the days of Genesis 1 and the snake of Genesis 3 as figurative rather than literal. On accepting Jesus, they will present the trillemma, "Lord, liar, or lunatic" and try to buff it up with skewed logic. They will refer to Blocher's Thesis time and again, and wax eloquent quoting Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig on issues of common dispute. Concerning the problem of evil, instead of admitting that the existence of evil troubles them, they shine on asking skeptics to "define evil," as though this somehow helps to alleviate the problem. Looking to score points in a debate, believers want a formal definition, which is fine, though it is unnecessary. I suppose, if someone wanted me to, I could give them a definition of sadness, though we all know what it is! Even so, there is no one alive who doesn't know what evil is. Well, I will accommodate them here anyway.

The definition of evil I formulated is as follows...

Evil is..."any action(s), of nature or mankind, or omission(s) of action(s) thereof, that work against the life, health, happiness, and well-being of a species, society, and/or individual."

Rather than break it down further, this sounds pretty self explanatory to me. I think one must have help to misunderstand it. As far as I can tell, this definition covers it all. And naturally, by reversing the definition, you have the definition of good.

In providing our definition, we have just formalized what is already common sense. It doesn't take a formal definition to see that evil can be something passive as is seen in nature...predator-prey relationships, a bear killing a man, a volcano erupting and destroying an entire village, a plaque spreading and wiping out thousands of inhabitants, or it can be something actively evil as committed by sentient, intelligent human animals, like the more obvious crimes...murder (the societally unjustified taking of life), rape, fraud, the torture of a human or lesser animal and gratification received therefrom, etc. It is also obvious that an omission of an action can be called evil. A governing body of people who refuse to deliver on their promises, that failure resulting in a breach of contract and/or misfortune, is evil. A person of leadership or of great financial means refusing to use their resources to feed and help his people could well be called evil. Even the Bible acknowledges this, "He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be upon the head of him that selleth it." (Proverbs 11:26). An omission of good resulting in evil might well be citizens of a country harboring terrorists, refusing to turn them in to the law, or an individual refusing to testify against a known murderer to put that person away. Even nature, you could say, can commit evil by omission of good; the village might not be destroyed by a flood, but by a lack of water, by drought. No one could deny any of these things as being categorically evil. Some might well contest my calling a natural disaster evil, but the same people readily contradict themselves as they'd have no problem understanding someone who came to them and told them, "something bad has happened to me! My house caught on fire!" We could replace bad with "evil" and the meaning is the same, quite obviously. We use this kind of language all the time, and the meaning is abundantly clear. No one has the slightest trouble understanding it...until God is attacked with the argument from evil, then suddenly we are taken to task on how to define evil!

Of course, the issue gets more complicated, but not much. Evil, as we have seen, is easy to define, and missing it is all but impossible. But applying it is somewhat more technical. Is it evil to inflict pain on a child by taking him/her to the doctor to get a shot if that shot will save the child's life and make the child healthier? Using common sense, that obviously isn't an evil thing to do even though some pain is inflicted, but there is still natural evil here. Where is it from and to whom lies the blame for this child having to be taken to the doctor? The blame lies on the theist's God. I may take a sick child to the doctor to save it's life because it's the only option I have, but an omnipotent God has infinite options and is the one bearing the blame of allowing the child to get sick in the first place. Through the same understanding, I am not to blame for killing a man who snook into my house at night to do me harm. In such a case, I would be just in preserving my own life by taking someone else's, but God would still bare the blame for allowing that to happen in the first place. We humans find ourselves stuck having to choose the least painful, least regrettable solution to a problem when a perfect one isn't to be found. Things like this we call "necessary evils", or "the lesser of evils" as we humans can often only choose from a small and disappointing array of options open to us. The same must be said of natural evils. When the sperm whale eats tons of fish a day, it is not "evil" as we commonly use the term. It is just feeding to sustain itself. The cheetah chasing down and killing the gazelle to survive is only taking the course nature plotted for it. But again, there is evil here, not by intent, but in result. Who is it that set up a system whereby a smaller, weaker animal is consumed by a stronger one? God created such a system and it is he who bares the blame every time a predator's jaws and claws inflict pain on the hide of a bison who struggles to escape it's killers. No intentional evil need be committed to see when "a great evil has befallen" a city. The volcano doesn't bear the blame for leveling a town, but the theists' God does for constructing a dangerously quirky planet that must relieve it's pressures in such a manner.

What I am needlessly laboring to prove here is one simple fact -- that defining evil in it's many forms was never a problem. It is impossible to turn away from even by the most staunch standards of optimistically warped theists who refuse to see reason on the issue. Evil is all around us, and regardless of which side of the debate on the existence of God our convictions may fall, we cannot help but recognize it when we see it. Yet Christians, in the spirit of trying to blend in with the academic mainstream of western thought, have resorted to making silly formalized arguments against the problem of evil and asininely quibbling over definitions of the word itself! An entire world is losing faith in God over the abundance of evils, and all the while, we are being told by Christian philosophers that we can't even define the term! I can, and just did, but don't have to. I see it every time I see a hospital, a police car, an ambulance, or when I turn on the local 6'o clock news. I see it every time I see a pair of reading glasses, a walking cane, or a sign on the highway that says "Buckle Up for Safety." I see evil, and everyone around me sees it too, even those who swear up and down that it doesn't shake their faith.

The buck of the existence of evil cannot be passed from God. He will never escape his appointment to stand forever convicted in the court of human reason as the most evil and fiendish being ever conceived. The standard by which we convict is that of the senses, the same senses with which we judge all of reality, and who could ask for a more objective standard than that? Explaining something can only be so difficult, but eventually we are bound to get it. The only exception is when we don't want to get it! Good old fashioned stubbornness will thwart any effort to learn, particularly on the part of blind god-believers who refuse to see the obligation to hold their higher power responsible for the woes of humanity instead of issuing him a get-out-of-jail-free card.

(JH)

Answering Objections to Visions: Part Four

Defending Visions: Part Four

This will probably be my final post on the subject of visions in this series. I want to concentrate on answering one final objection to the kind of visionary hypotheses of Christian origins that I happen to advocate. This argument concerns the disciples' expectations of Jesus. I wish to address the argument of an online Christian apologist, Robert Turkel, who uses the writing name "James Patrick Holding". But before I proceed to answer his argument, I want to make some preliminary comments. First of all, I have been wrestling with hesitancy in writing this post. It's not due to a lack of confidence in my reply to Mr. Holding's argument. Rather, it's because I am opening a can of worms or so I fear. The fact of the matter is that I am taking quite a risk in replying to Mr. Holding's argument. For some reason I have never been able to fully understand, I believe that Mr. Holding has an obession with always having the last word in a debate or exchange with someone. Just as bad is what I consider to be Mr. Holding's overconfidence. It's not enough to simply think that he may have done a good job in answering an argument; rather, I have seen him brag about destroying an argument. Likewise, it's not enough that Mr. Holding simply think that he has answered someone; rather, I have seen him act as though he gave someone a good intellectual flogging. It's this egotism of his that makes me wince.

I try a different approach. I try and let readers decide for themselves whether I have answered my critics or I have successfully argued a point. Sometimes I might come across as more confident than my argument warrants. For this apologize to readers. I want to be able to articulate my arguments and let readers decide for themselves if I have met my stated burdens. Having said this, I will adopt this tone for these posts. I simply leave it to readers to evaluate my arguments and see if they hold water. The exception I am willing to make is if I feel that a rude, cocky, and all-around obnoxious spin-doctor needs a douse of humility or perhaps a dose of his/her own medicine then I will drop the niceties and turn quite confrontational myself. So I write this essay in response to Mr. Holding and I will leave it to readers to judge whether I am successful or not; I simply trust the intelligence of readers. I doubt that Mr. Holding's readers will read this open-mindedly or in its entirety to see if I, perhaps, have a good argument. I suspect that many of Mr. Holding's readers have gotten to the point where they see him as a faultless guru who simply cannot be wrong and will only read what he has quoted in terms of rebutting my arguments without having to see anything written by me. As much as I regret this, I have come to accept that many Christians only want their doubts quenched and will only read rebuttals to atheists and skeptics like myself, only, ever, with the intention of seeing us refuted, stomped on, intellectually flogged (and perhaps even bullied into salvation, hopefully).

I will state my argument here and perhaps only write one rebuttal to what Mr. Holding has written if he responds to me (I have no doubt that he will and I predict it as utterly inevitable that he will. I don't believe he can pass up an offer to respond to what he admitted is a rising star in biblical academia). I really lack any desire to drag out any exchange with him ad infinitum but I am not always sure where to draw the line. Where do I simply stop, having said my piece, and then move on? I don't want to get into a prolonged exchange with him because I dread that it will only charge his ego. I believe Mr. Holding's is overconfident as it is and I regret the thought of having contributed to that and I fear that a prolonged exchange like this will likewise bolster his ego. This is the last thing I want to do! Having aired these concerns, here into the murky waters we go....

1.) Holding's Argument Against "Visions" and "Hallucinations"

Mr. Holding's chief argument against the hypothesis of visionary origins was stated in response to atheist philosopher Keith Parsons. Readers will recall that Parsons contributed a chapter to the skeptical anthology The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave, writing a rebuttal to the arguments against theories of hallucinations by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli. I have to state here that I do not agree with Parson's rebuttal actually. I believe that Parson is not familiar with the relevant social-science literature on visionary experiences involving A.S.C. and I don't particularly think that his rebuttal arguments for Kreeft and Tacelli are particularly effective (this may well make a good post one of these days on here!) Holding states his main thesis as follows:

"Here is why I regard the hallucination theory as completely untenable: As noted in the link above, "expectation plays the coordinating role in collective hallucinations". The critical problem here is that the disciples were not expecting a resurrection; any hallucination of Jesus would be interpreted as, if anything, his "guardian angel" (an exact twin), but not as a ghost of Jesus himself, nor especially as Jesus resurrected."

In this statement, Holding linked to a response he wrote to Bible skeptic Farrell Till of The Skeptical Review. Holding's argument is that the disciples would not have been expecting a resurrection, at least not as defined by Jews at the time of Jesus. The core of Holding's argument is that the Greek word "anastasis" when employed in reference to the resurrection referred to what conservative theologian N.T. Wright termed a "tranphysical" body. This is a glorified, immortal, imperishable, body of flesh that rose from the dead. Holding argues that no Jew would have been expecting anyone resurrected in this kind of body and, hence, it would've taken an actual transphysical body to convince the original disciples of Jesus that this is precisely what Jesus had.

Naturally, I am skeptical of this argument. The chief basis for my skepticism has to do with the very Greek word "anastasis" itself. I am not an expert in biblical Greek and the last thing I want to do is leave any readers with the impression that I am so I will offer what I consider to be a potential argument against Holding's argument here. I honestly don't know if my argument will succeed-that remains to be seen. At the very least though, if my argument has any substance at all, what I do want readers to do, especially if they're convinced that Holding is really onto something here, is to pause and think. At the very least, I hope that my argument here, if it doesn't answer Holding's argument in its entirety, can at least take the wind out of Holding's sails. In other words, I hope that my argument can at least have the effect of cancelling out the effectiveness of Holding's argument. Perhaps we can reach a stalemate and conclude that the expert opinion of a Greek scholar is needed to settle the question once and for all.

2.) "Anastasis" and the Resurrection

Holding argues that the Greek word "anastasis" specifically refers to the resurrection, that is a risen body of immortal, imperishable, glorified flesh! Holding writes: "The only word that is term-specific to resurrection is the noun form of anistemi -- and that is anastasis." If this is the case, then whenever, "anastasis" refers to the resurrection, any other raising of the dead, if by "raising of the dead" one means a resuscitation, like that of Lazarus, then it must be described by some noun other than "anastasis". Let's look at some examples here:

"Matthew 10:5 These twelve Jesus sent out with the following instructions: "Go nowhere among the Gentiles, and enter no town of the Samaritans,
6 but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.
7 As you go, proclaim the good news, 'The kingdom of heaven has come near.'
8 Cure the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out demons. You received without payment; give without payment...."

The Greek word here is a verb form of "egeiro". It is spoken in in terms of raising people from the dead. Holding might argue that because a verb form of the Greek word "anastasis" was not employed, it couldn't have been referring to the resurrection, that is the raising of a glorified, immortal, imperishable, body of flesh. The phrase "raise the dead" pairs the Greek words "egeiro" and "nekros" not "anastasis" and "nekros", so it couldn't have been referring to the resurrection but rather a resuscitation.

In Matthew 11:5, these same words are used in referring the the "raising of the dead" in Matthew 10:5. It would seem that they folks have been resuscitated and the verb form of the Greek word "egeiro" is used here. In Matthew 14:2, these word pairs are used again, to describe Herod's belief that John the Baptist had risen from the dead. He mistakenly thought that Jesus was John the Baptist. Likewise, in Mark 6:16. However, in some passages, when Jesus speaks of his own "rising from the dead"- the Greek word used is "anastasis" and it's verb forms are employed. Consider Jesus' prediction in Matthew 20: 19. Here Jesus says "They will condemn him to death and will turn him over to the Gentiles to be mocked and flogged and crucified. On the third day he will be raised to life!" Here the Greek word is "anistemi".In Matthew 17: 9, Jesus tells his disciples "Don't tell anyone what you have seen until the Son of Man has been raised from the dead." Here the Greek words "anistemi" and "nekros" are used in conjunction with each other.

So, it would appear here, then, that there are two Greek verbs in use here "anistemi" and the verb form of "egeiro" used in conjunction with "nekros". I have to be careful to point out that I am not an expert in Greek but I am willing to make a prediction that I believe that my studies of Greek will bear out. Here goes: "Anistemi" is a verb form of "anastasis", correct? If "anastasis" as a noun, specifically means "resurrection" in the sense of a glorified, immortal, imperishable, body of risen flesh, then I am predicting that whenever the Greek verb form "anistemi" is used in conjunction with "nekros" it can only refer to whatever "anastasis" refers to as a noun. If "anastasis" refers to a resurrection in the sense of a glorified, immortal, imperishable body of risen flesh, then whenever "anistemi" is used as a verb in referring to people being raised from the dead, it can only refer to the actual act, of raising someone from the dead in this kind of body. "Anistemi" when used in any other sense can refer to any "rising" or any sort, whether from sleep, from a chair, or the sun, but whenever it's used in conjunction with "nekros", Christians would have to argue, then, that it can only refer to the action (denoted by the verb) of raising someone in the sense that "anastasis" demands.

Likwise, whenever "egeiro" is used, it can be "to raise" in any sense, but whenever its verb form is used in conjunction with "nekros" it, logically, can only refer to people raised from the dead as in a resuscitation, never a resurrection, never a transphysical body. I believe that this is the logical outcome of Holding's argument here! Now, here is my prediction. My prediction is that the Greek verb form for "egeiro" will never be used to describe the rising of Jesus, whether by itself, or in conjunction with "nekros". If Jesus was risen in a body of glorified, immortal, imperishable flesh, then the only word that will ever be used of Jesus to describe his risen, glorified body, is "anistemi". How might my prediction bear out? I believe that if I am right about this, then these following examples should bear out my prediction:

Jesus predicts his future suffering, his death, his resurrection, and his future meeting with the disciples in Galilee in Mark 14: 28 "But after I have risen, I will go ahead of you into Galilee". Here the Greek verb employed is a form of"egeiro" not "anistemi"! In luke 9:22, Jesus predicts of himself: "The Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, chief priests and teachers of the law, and he must be killed and on the third day be raised to life!". Once again, the Greek verb here is of "egeiro" not "anistemi"! Again, the author of John's gospel, apparently writing in retrospect regarding the words of Jesus, had this to say about Jesus' resurrection: "John 2:22 When therefore he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said to them; and they believed the scripture, and the word which Jesus had said."

Here the Greek word is "egerthe", not "anistemi"and worse of all, it's paired with "nekros!" If Jesus had a risen, glorified, immortal body of flesh, why isn't the Greek word "anistemi" used in conjunction with "nekros"? This would better fit the meaning carried by the noun-form of the word "anastasis". It gets much worse. Perhaps St. Paul is the most damning of all. He constantly uses the Greek verb form of "egeiro" in conjunction with "nekros". Here are some examples I have seen used before.

"Romans 6:4 Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." So, the Greek verb "egeiro" is used in conjunction with "nekros". Why not "anistemi" since this would convey whatever meaning "anastasis" had? Likewise, verse 9 also has the same thing: "egeiro" paired with "nekros" in reference to Christ's resurrection. In 1st Corinthians 15, we find this very strange reference to Jesus rising from the dead:

"But if it is preached that Christ has been raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection from the dead?"

This should be enough to make one's head spin! Paul is using the Greek word "egeiro" in conjunction with "nekros" and not "anistemi". Why though? Why use the same Greek verb used of people resuscitated like those resusciated by the disciples in the above verses? Why does Jesus use "anistemi" sometimes and yet the verb form of "egeiro" at other times? It would appear that Jesus in one case is saying that he will "rise" in the same way as those whom he had his disciples raise from the dead and these same people, whom Jesus had used as examples to John the Baptist, in efforts to answer his doubts about the Messiahship of Jesus. But why would Paul ever use "egeiro" to speak of Jesus being raise from the dead when "anistemi" would've accurately carried the meaning of "anastasis".

If Holding's argument is that "anastasis" can only refer to the raising of a transphysical body of flesh from the dead, then "the resurrection of Christ" which uses the word "anastasis" as a noun, should mean the same thing as "Jesus raised from the dead" in which "anistemi" would be the verb form used in conjunction with "nekros" to mean dead. "Egeiro" should never be used in conjunction with "nekros" to describe Jesus rising from the dead.

As for Holding's argument that no Jew would've been expecting any individual to rise from the dead before the general resurrection, I have to say that I cannot agree with that. In luke 9:18-19, we read the following:

"Once when Jesus was praying in private and his disciples were were him, he asked them, 'Who do the crowds say that I am?' They replied 'Some say John the Baptist; others say Elijah; and still others, that one of the prophets of long ago has come back to life'". The Greek word used here in verse 19 is "anistemi". Now, if it was believed that no one would rise from the dead prior to the general resurrection, why is it that some believed that one of the prophets came back to life and that this "raising" was described by the Greek word "anistemi"? How could anyone get the impression that one of the prophets had come back to life before the general resurrection? If they believed that one of the prophets from long ago was resuscitated, why? Why would God resuscitate a prophet temporarily, only to have that prophet die and then raise him up, transphysically, at the general resurrection from the dead? Finally, if people could become convinced that a prophet from long ago had risen from the dead before the general resurrection, without any one of those prophets from old actually rising from the dead to convince them, how hard would it be to convince the disciples that Jesus had risen from the dead, without requiring that Jesus actually rose from the dead? The disciples of Jesus strike me as being no more literate or educated as many people who believed that Jesus was a risen prophet from old, so if they could become convinced that one of the prophets had risen from the dead before the general resurrection, I don't imagine that it was very difficult at all for Jesus' disciples to believe that he could be risen from the dead prior to any general resurrection.

Here is a question for Christians. If the same words for Jesus' resurrection is used of the "raising-from-the-dead" of all of these people, then whatever Jesus meant by it in reference to his own alleged resurrection would probably have to be the same as what it meant for other people who rose from the dead. If Christians accept the authenticity of these passages and that the disciples really did do these "resuscitations" (Christians do not think of these as genuine resurrections because the body in which they were raised were not glorified, immortal, imperishable, and incorruptible), then wouldn't there be at least a historical precedent in terms of expectation? For Pete's sake, it was the actual disciples bringing these people "back to life"! If the Greek words are the same in referring both to the activity of the disciples and the resurrection prediction of Jesus, then, by all means the disciples should have been expecting Jesus to have been raised from the dead! If the disciples were merely performing resuscitations, at the very least, they should have been expecting Jesus to have been resuscitated. If not, why not?

3.) The disciples would've been expecting an angel and not Jesus.

Except for a passage in Acts that was once cited to me as evidence, I am not all that sure that this would've been the case with Jesus' disciples. Consider the resuscitations that the disciples are believed by Christians to have performed. I ask Christians this: why did no one think that these people who had come back to life (mentioned in the above verses as being raised by the disciples as proof for John the Baptist) were still dead and that they were seeing angels of these dead people instead? In other words, why weren't people expecting the angels of the deceased rather than conclude that the deceased had been raised to life? Consider the confession of Peter to Jesus that he was the Christ and Son of God. Jesus asked who the crowds thought that he was. One of the answers is that people believe that Jesus was actually one of the prophets of old that came back to life. Why didn't the crowds, instead, believe that Jesus was simply the angel of one of the prophets who had died long ago? (I am quite sure that the crowds thougt that one of the Hebrew prophets such as Isaiah or Jeremiah had come back to life and that the crowds were Jewish)

Also, consider the fact that when Herod had John the Baptist beheaded, he concluded that Jesus was John the Baptist who had risen from the dead and that's the reason these miraculous powers were at work in him! Why didn't Herod conclude that Jesus was simply an angel of John the Baptist? Consider the dead raised in the great earthquake following the crucifixion of Jesus. According to Matthew, after Jesus died, there was an earthquake, the tombs were broken open and the dead were raised. Matthew's gospel doesn't add anything in the way of people thinking that they had seen the angels of those who had died, so even Mr. Holding cannot say with complete certainty that this was an expectation of all Jewish people.

4.) The disciples would've been expecting Jesus to directly ascend into heaven.

I have read Mr. Holding argue this in his response to Farrell Till. If I am to accept that Jesus really was buried by Joseph of Arimathea and that this tomb was subsequently found empty, I would probably have to accept that this was, in fact, the original belief of the disciples of Jesus. I would probably have to conclude that the appearances stories came later, perhaps as a anti-Docetic apologetic or an apologetic against would-be critics who might've alleged that the disciples were hallucinating the whole thing. At any rate, I really do not accept the resurrection stories as original but later creations of the evangelists who wrote the gospels. As I have written elsewhere on the subject, I believe that any distinction between visions on one hand and appearances on the other hand would've evolved later as an apologetic by the early Church, against possibly Gnostics such as the Docetics, or even against critics who might've alleged that the disciples were hallucinating or that the visions were self-induced. I believe, then, that the earliest disciples would've believed that Jesus had directly ascended into heaven and only after the distinction between visions and appearances was concieved of by the early Church, would the need to place such a distinction in its historical context arise, thereby creating a gap between the empty tomb and the ascension for apologetic purposes.

In conclusion, I have to say that I really do not buy into Holding's argument. I am not saying that I believe I have actually refuted Holding's argument; only that I might have a potentially powerful rebuttal. I believe that my future studies of New Testament criticism and biblical Greek will bear this suspicion of mine out. But if I do have an argument here, it's my sincere hope that Mr. Holding will not put too much emphasis on his own argument and will offer it as a potential argument. Mr. Holding is not an expert in Greek and I am glad that he acknowledges that he isn't (although from the way that he constantly makes usage of Greek words without referencing his sources, or qualifying his understanding of Greek, you'd never know that he didn't think of himself as an expert in Greek or someone who has mastered it). I am not at all an expert in Greek and I don't pretend to be and I usually go out of my way to qualify my understanding of Greek in my writings, although sometimes I might fall short of it and give a mistaken impression that I know for more than I do. I am sorry if anyone has gotten this impression because, frankly, it was never intended.

Matthew

This From the Closet Atheist

According to the Closet Atheist who writes here:

I'll tell you, I would come closer to believing in 'god' if
1) Everyone that read the bible got the same message.
2) If you could take any 2 people from any part of the world, asked them about 'god' and got the SAME answer.
3) You could physicaly prove 'god' existed.

Are these "demands" unreasonable, or not, and why?

Intense Suffering and a Moral Kindergarten

Over at professor Victor Reppert's blog here, he challenged atheists to come up with a specific version of the argument for evil, which spilled over into a further discussion here, where I asked this question: "Has someone actually shown that moral choice-making is qualitatively different in times of intense suffering over normal choice making?" What do you think? What is there about intense suffering or horrendous evils which purportedly improves or enhances or strengthens moral choice-making such that without this suffering we might be moral pigmies living in a moral kindergarten? Anything?

Love is a many splintered thing

We all come from different backgrounds. I was raised in an environment that the Books of the Bible were written by the traditionally claimed authors. Moses wrote the Torah, Matthew wrote the Gospel of Matthew, Paul’s companion wrote Luke/Acts, and John the Disciple wrote the Gospel, three short letters and Revelation.

The only questionable authorship was Hebrews, which gave us lively debate, and an opportunity to snicker at the “old school” which held to Paul being the writer.

It was not until I began discussing with skeptics that I realized all of the questions involved in establishing who the authors were on the various books. I know that many who pass through here have had classes, and read countless books on the subject, and can (justifiably) scoff at my naiveté. I have since studied vociferously on the subject.

Yet my discussing with Christians, here and elsewhere, has reminded me that there are many, many Christians who still do hold to the traditional authorship, and have never considered the possibility that John the Disciple did not write the Gospel of John.

Part of my journey was discovering that the authors of the Gospels were not eyewitnesses to the events, and therefore subject to the same troubling problems of error being introduced into their accounts.

Was the author of the Gospel of John an eyewitness to Jesus’ life?

Much of this is may be old-hat, certainly to the contributors of this blog. Yet, for me, a Christian of more than three decades, it was something new that I had never properly considered. It is possible I was the last person in the world to ever be introduced to this, but it seems unlikely. If this has been well-studied by you, feel free to skip elsewhere. Believe it or not, for many of us, this is (was) a new concept.

A brief background. The Gospels can be divided into the Synoptic Gospels (Mark, Matthew and Luke) and what has been termed as the Gospel from the Johannine school of thought (the entire Johannine is the Gospel and the three letters. For purposes of this blog entry, I will ignore Revelation entirely.)

“Synoptic” means “from the same point of view” and the reason the three Gospels are lumped together and given this title, is that they give a similar point of view. In fact, they are so similarly written, most Biblical scholars recognize an element of sharing between the accounts which gives rise to what has been termed “the Synoptic Problem” as in determining who was sharing from whom.

The most common (although not universal) solution is that Mark was written first, and then Matthew and Luke utilized Mark in composing their own Gospels. There is other material shared by Matthew and Luke (but not Mark) which has resulted in the suggestion of another written document which was also used by Matthew and Luke, termed “Q.” Here is a useful article on the Synoptic problem.

The events recorded in the Synoptics are not shared by John. The Synoptics imply one year of ministry, John implies three. The cleansing of the temple occurs at the end of Jesus’ ministry in the Synpotics, at the beginning in John. John has numerous unique sayings, a lack of parables, and refers to Jesus doing signs, all of which are vastly different than what we see in the Synoptics.

Presuming the accounts of Matthew, Mark and Luke are an accurate portrayal of the events surrounding Jesus’ ministry—what is the likelihood that the author of the Gospel of John witnessed the same events? There are far too many concerns to cover in just one blog entry, so let’s just look at the use of “love.”

According to Mark, John and James were Galilean fisherman brothers, that Jesus called as part of the Twelve inner-circle of disciples. Mark 1:19-20. Neither John nor James are explicitly named as disciples in the Gospel John, although there is reference to “the sons of Zebedee” in John 21:2. Caution should be noted, that Chapter 21 of John appears to be an additional chapter. Chronologically, it makes little sense, nor the fact that the Disciples, after having seen Jesus, would fail to recognize him. It reads as if it was a first appearance, not a third. Chapter 20 ends on what makes an appropriate final note.

This would mean there is no reference to John in the Gospel of John, let alone claim of authorship. Of course, the argument is made that the author was too humble to provide his own identity and conceals himself under the acronym of the “disciple who Jesus loved.” John 13:23. Unfortunately, using just the gospel, this is speculation. Further, 21:24 refers to this disciple in the third person, as if the person writing Chapter 21 is not this disciple, but the person who wrote the previous section(s) is. If Chapter 21 is part of the original Gospel, what parts did the disciple write, and what parts did “we” write?

What do we know about John? He, his brother James and Peter appeared to constitute an even smaller inner-circle of the Twelve. They were the only ones with Jesus at the healing of Jairus’ daughter. (Mark 5:37). They were with him in the Garden. (Mark 14:33) And, most famously, they were the only three with Jesus at the Transfiguration. (Mt. 17:2, Mark 9:2, Luke 9:28)

Curiously, despite this intimacy with Jesus, after the ascension, both John and James drop off the map. We are told that James was killed by Herod (Acts 12:2), but nothing more is said of him. John also disappears, a mention is made of his missionary trip to Samaria, and no more. Acts 8:14. The primary leaders of the early Church, according to Acts, were not Disciples. Even Peter is relegated to a more minor role as compare to that of Paul and James, Jesus’ brother.

The brothers John and James were outspoken, and Jesus gave them the names “sons of thunder” (Mark 3:17) Luke records an incident in which John feels snubbed by a village in Samaria. In a knee-jerk reaction, John asks Jesus to call down fire on the village. (Luke 9:52-54) Not surprisingly, the author of the Gospel of John fails to record this incident. But what IS surprising is what he fails to record next.

Soon after this, Jesus is questioned by a lawyer as to inheriting eternal life. The lawyer believes it is loving God, and loving one’s neighbor. Being a lawyer, he wants to qualify “neighbor” as to who is entitled to receive this loving. (Luke 10:25-29) Jesus launches into the famous story of the Good Samaritan. John, who had most recently been ready to wipe out a village of Samaritans, would have paid close attention to this tale, we would think.

Yet it goes unrecorded in the Gospel of John. Which is even more remarkable, considering the emphasis the author places on the concept of love.

The word “Love” is used more times in the Gospel of John, than in Matthew, Mark and Luke combined! To demonstrate how significant this doctrine is to the Johannine school, the word “love” is used more times in 1, 2 and 3 John, than in Matthew, Mark and Luke combined. If there was anything that would make a Johannine take notice, it would be the son of God saying “Love.”

Word count is not necessarily demonstrative of a person’s focus, depending on their audience, length of the book, etc. But I would defy anyone to read the letters of John and walk away with the thought, “Was he talking about love?” Or read the Gospel of John, and not notice the emphasis on Love.

Jesus talks of Father loving him. Jn. 10:17 Jesus repeatedly makes the connection between love and keeping commandments. Jn. 14:15 & 21 Jesus states compares the father’s love for the son and, if they keep his commandments, they will abide in his love, like he abides in Father’s love. Jn. 15:9-10

Jesus contrasts his love with how the world will hate them. Jn. 15:19

This author is keen on the idea of the Father loving the son, who loves his disciples, who must love each other. The word, “love” comes up, and he is paying attention. How does a person like that, who is intimately involved with Jesus, who (according to apologists) Jesus loved the most, NOT give the story of the Good Samaritan? It is perfectly adapt to what the Gospel and the letters are replete with. It is conspicuous by its absence.

In being questioned, Jesus is asked what the “greatest commandment is.” Jesus says that the greatest is to love God, and the second is to love one’s neighbor. There is no greater commandment than these. Mark 12:31. If John was there, with his emphasis, his ears would be burning up. He constantly ties keeping commandments with love, and this fits his motif perfectly. 1 John 3:23.

Yet John forgets to record this incident in his Gospel? John recounts again and again how the Jews confronted Jesus, in attempts to trick Him. John 5:18. Here we have a combination of both, and he doesn’t remember?

Perhaps he was not there that day—it was his turn to go into town and pick up bread. Would no one tell him of the wonderful confrontation, in which once again Jesus befuddled the Pharisees with their own sayings and gave out the Greatest Commandment? No one claims that Mark was there, either, but they claim that Peter thought it of enough import to share it with him. Luke wasn’t there, but it is told to him. Poor John, the one fellow that is salivating over this tidbit is the one that just happens to not hear of it.

It gets worse for John. Apparently he was not there when Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, tells of loving one’s enemy. (Matthew 5:38-48) I imagine that if the author of the Gospel of John was there, his pen would have been scribbling furiously at the wonderful statements about love indicated there. But alas, again he missed it.

And when Jesus repeats and expounds on this in the Sermon on the Plain, AGAIN, John is off fishing and AGAIN misses this. (Luke 6:29-35) Every time the Synoptics indicate that Jesus gave a statement on love, John has the dastardly bad luck of not being there. And no one tells him.

At what point does the Christian start to scratch their head and say, “It is a might bit odd that Matthew, Mark, and Luke record incidents of Jesus giving sayings on love, and John who is allegedly there, and concentrates on love, misses every one.”

John emphasizes how the Father loves the son. A miracle of the voice of God reiterating this from the sky would be hard to pass up. Even the other Disciples, who ALSO were not there, recorded God the Father proclaiming His love for Jesus at His baptism. Matthew records it. (Matt. 3:17) Mark records it. (Mark 1:11) Luke records it. (Luke 3:22) And the one disciple, the one that emphasizes the love the Father has for the son, misses it? The author records John the Baptist. He records John the Baptist seeing Jesus. He even records the Spirit coming down like a dove. (John 1:32) But he misses the voice saying those words he loves to hear?

O.K. perhaps he was buying bread on the day of the confrontation with the lawyer. Perhaps he was off doing other things, and with the rottenest of luck, missed both sermons. Perhaps he was not told everything about the Baptism.

But what about the Transfiguration?

Can’t skate out of this one, ‘cause the Synoptics make it a point to say he was there. (Matt. 17:1, Mark 9:2, Luke 9:28) Again the voice from heaven. Again a declaration of love from the father to the son. Again the author of the Gospel of John completely fails to write about it.

I know, I know. There were too many things to write down, and he had to pare out some. And I could even buy this, if it was a few non-important details. But this is the author, that within a few pages, has “For God so Loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son…” No mention of the explicit statement at the transfiguration? No mention of the Greatest commandment being love? By sheer coincidence alone, every single event that Matthew, Mark and Luke felt was important regarding love (the very focus of the author) the author fails to include?

The author records Jesus as saying a new commandment was given to the Disciples that they love one another. John 13:35 Now, he had previously heard what the Greatest commandments were (Love God, Love your neighbor.) Is this “new” commandment even greater, less, or the same? If it is the same, it is hardly new, eh?

I am stumped as to how one can have Jesus giving a new commandment of “love one another” after the stories recorded in the Synoptics. Was the Good Samaritan NOT about loving one another? What was new about this one?

Look is it possible that the author of John was an eyewitness and simply ignored, and or did not know, or did not record these luscious bits? Sure. Anything is possible. But is that the best we can do? To claim that the author went against every indication of his emphasis, and did not utilize these morsels?

I propose that the Gospel of John was written by someone unfamiliar with the Synpotic stories who was not traveling with Jesus. In that paradigm we would expect the author to present conflicting stories and more importantly miss important stories that fit his motif that are in the Synoptics.

That is exactly what we have. Can anyone explain, better than “it is possible” how the author of John could have left out the sermons, parables and confrontations regarding love that he would have viewed, had he followed Jesus? Something better than “it is possible…”?

What Do You Think?

David Hume argued that there are "four possible hypotheses concerning the first causes of the universe."
1) That they are endowed with perfect goodness;
2) That they have perfect malice;
3) That they are opposite containing both goodness and malice;
4) That they have neither goodness nor malice. [Dialogues, XI]

Which one do you think is preferable when you look at the world, and why?

"The Line Must Be Drawn Here!"

I believe correct reasoning is definitely an acquired characteristic. It is something we develop if only we are fortunate enough to start this life with the basic cognitive abilities nature provided.

I believe a good analysis on a position comes by knowing where to draw a line and whether or not a line has been crossed. What constitutes A? What constitutes B? What are the deciding differences between A and B? At exactly what point does A end and B begin? Then there is the ability to troubleshoot one's own thinking. How blurry is the line between A and B? Do A and B really deserve separate categories? Are the distinctions I have drawn between A and B to constitute a categorical change in thinking warranted, or am I drawing a distinction without a difference? Making a distinction without a difference happens to be a very common fallacy.

What made my departure from Christianity possible was the time I had to think and re-think the quandaries that troubled me. When I found no resolutions, it was only as my faith began to erode that I was finally able to see why I couldn't resolve the issues -- because I was unable to draw satisfactory lines between the available positions I was compelled to choose from...

- I considered how the faith-healer and the charismatic Christian who prayed at a revival meeting for someone to be healed of cancer, expecting "a miracle right now", differed little from the traditional Catholic or Protestant who believed in God's healing providential hand over time. The aggressive evangelicals who demand an immediate healing are saying little different than what any average Christian believes, that God will somehow bend the laws of reality to heal them of their infirmities.

- I considered how the same militant charismatics who believed in modern miracles differed little from those of my former religious persuasion, who believed in just the Bible miracles. The only difference is the time period, and realizing that, it only followed to wonder why God would perform miracles back then and not today when they would be no less needed.

- I considered how the extremist flat-earthers and geocentrist Christians differed little from the literal creationists who argued for a 6 day creation, or those progressive creationists who accepted an ancient earth, but rejected classical Darwinism -- all were in support of supernatural perversions of natural evolution; the literalists basically denied evolution altogether, accepting only "micro-evolution" occurring between God's created "kinds", and in the case of the progressives (depending on which breed you talk to), the evolution only occurred in the animal world, and some time later, God decided to transform an ape into a man and call him Adam, a hoky form of God-directed evolution!

- I considered how those who maintained belief in modern day Jesus and Virgin Mary apparitions were no different than those who believed that Samuel and Moses heard and spoke to God, or that Constantine saw a cross in the sky and received a commandment to conquer in it's name.

- I considered how the Catholics esteeming the pope and the church authoritative, and the Mormons following their own "12 apostles" of the new age whom they consider to be authoritative, is fundamentally no different from my former belief that the original 12 apostles (14 if you count Matthias and Paul) were authoritative as they spoke the will of God on earth.

Similarly, I found that those who stood in the more liberal Christian camps, and who held to the position of a local Noahic flood as opposed to a global one, that the days of Genesis 1 were figurative as opposed to literal, or that the Preterist's view of Revelation was correct, tended to differ little from secular commentators and higher critics, the same class of thinkers who might subscribe to later dates for the Bible books or accept the idea of Thought Inspiration instead of Verbal Plenary Inspiration.

I get asked all the time why I didn't accept a more liberal version of Christianity when I defected from the faith. Well, the answer should already be apparent, but if it isn't, here it is; I found it impossible to identify with any one liberal or conservative alignment of beliefs. I couldn't properly draw the dividing lines that allowed me to make the necessary distinctions to preserve some, and not all, of that superstitious scrapheap known as the Bible. Consequently, I had to reject it.

I cannot put myself in the same camp with someone who denies Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and then claims that such a position is consistent with the New Testament's Jesus, "If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote about me." (John 5:46) I cannot put myself in the camp with those who have no problem lopping off the first 12 chapters of Genesis as mythical, while accepting only the other parts of the book that are more believable to the modern world, and yet hasten to tell me that I should believe in a crucified and risen savior-god. It just doesn't jive! I am respecting neither Christianity, nor science (not to mention myself) by half-heartedly trying to believe them both.

And one must ask, is there any real incentive seeking out solace in a dethroned Jesus, a Christ robbed of his deity, one who's ass has been kicked by reason and modern science? If I want to learn from and admire a humanitarian, I'll read Gandhi. If I want a self-help specialist, I'll read Dr. Phil.

For me, the findings of assessing Christianity had only one consistent pull -- away from being considered the products of any divine origins at all. The pieces of the puzzle had to fit, and they finally did. I was forced to naturalize what had been pounded into my head as supernatural. Those horses and chariots of fire that took Elijah to heaven had to mean something that would click with my rational mind. Well, in time, they did, but the answer I came to did not bring God any glory. The Bible was a complete work of fiction. That was the answer I came to embrace.

I believe the matter boils down to this; if I'm going to fudge the laws of reality to make room for the possibility of a supernatural god who intervenes in nature, then there are lots of gods to choose from, less defined gods to whom I can assign whatever positive attributes I see fit. But if I want to stay with the Christian God, even preferring a nicer, more scientifically pliable version of him to posit as my creator, I cannot find the consistency to do so; if I can fudge the laws of nature to make room for a supernatural being, then I can fudge a few more laws to preserve the Bible's testimony of who this god is and what he has done, and indeed, I must do so.

If I want to start a new line of Superman comics, my readers are not going to be very happy with me if my rendition of Superman doesn't have X-ray vision, heat vision, and the ability to fly because those are three of the characteristics of Superman. If I am going to expect people to identify with my portrayal of the character, the image I portray of him must be characteristically identical with he who is known as "Superman." Otherwise I would just be stealing his name and creating a new character.

In precisely the same way, one should not be expected to identify with a new version of the Christian God, divorced from the characteristics that make him who he is known to be. But this is exactly what modern theologians want you to accept, a re-made Yahweh for the new age, severed from his barbaric past, one who cares more about science, about having his believers set up abortion protests, racial equality, and preachers in suits and ties, praying non-judgmentally and with tightly clutched hands at social events and the dinner table.

Contemporary apologists want you to forget that it was this same god of old who has been an opponent of science (I Timothy 6:20-21), the cause of abortions (Hosea 13:16; Numbers 31:15-18), racism (Genesis 9:24-27), and a fierce bringer of judgment on his many enemies (homosexuals, Leviticus 20:13, witches, Exodus 22:18, Sabbath breakers, Exodus 31:14, and those who worship other gods, Exodus 22:20, see also Luke 19:27). Yes, today's refined theologians are trying to sell you a new and improved Jesus, one who cares less about crusading against Jews and Muslims, and more about tolerance and compassion for the infidel. This is definitely not the god I read about in the Bible! Yet if the Bible itself is what serves as the basis for one's belief in the God of the Bible, then how can I but rely on that same testimony to define who he is?

Realizing this, I am now compelled to go down the list of less than admirable qualities and fantastic ideas attributed to this deity and accept the biblical testimony about him. The God of the Bible made the sun stand still (Joshua 10:12-13), an ax head float (2 Kings 6:6), and a chariot of fire, led by actual horses of fire (2 Kings 2:11) to take Elijah to Heaven. The God of the Bible is a vengeful war-god who kills seventy thousand men for one man's sins (I Chronicles 21:14). But since all of this smacks of nonsense and savage cruelty, I cannot square these things with sensibility or civility, so I am compelled to go the only other route I can find and accept that the Bible is not of divine origins at all and must be rejected as the testimony of a god in it's entirety. The line must be drawn here!

(JH)

Science and Religion

The Church says that the earth is flat, but I know that it is round, for I have seen the shadow on the moon, and I have more faith in a shadow than in the Church. Ferdinand Magellan, source unknown

I became skeptical of Christianity about a year before I resigned from my church. During that year, among other things, I began "secretly" reading modern scientific works.

To my amazement I found them filled with facts. Not emotional cries to believe, but experiments to consider. Not stories of old, but studies of today. And slowly, I began to put my stock in the scientific process, which I’ve come to see as the exact opposite of religion.

Consider for a moment the evolution of religion in comparison to science:

Religion usually begins with a single idea that is proclaimed as the one and only “truth” which many come to have faith in. As more and more people come to believe this “truth,” different opinions arise as to the true interpretation of that “truth.” Since there is really no experiment to prove anyone’s interpretation, those different opinions flourish and eventually become different factions and denominations of the religion.

In the end, what began as a single great movement is now splintered into a million pieces.

On the other hand, Science begins with a variety of different and opposing theories about some facet of the universe. It's then that scientists go to work to find verifiable or observable facts about a hypothesis, albeit sometimes with a bias. However, as experiments continue, biases are forced aside in the face of observable and repeatable facts.

In the end, what began as a variety of varying and contradictory ideas has come to something of a consensus with most scientists, if not all people, coming into agreement – a far cry from what happens to religions!

When you try to run the human race on "faith" with no evidence, it just ends in splintered factions, like Christianity and Islam today. Everyone is doing his or her own thing thinking it’s the most correct version. But science can bring humanity closer to agreement because it is based on evidence--something everyone can see if they just look at the facts. That observation alone is a very powerful evidence in my mind that science, not religion, provides a more secure future for humanity, and that religion is simply a man-made idea.

So, I think Magellan was right (if he really said that). Even if there are questions that scientists still cannot figure out, there's still no point answering one mystery with another (i.e. your particular god).

The truth is that if there is truth in the world, it shouldn’t take evangelism, puppet shows, preachers, emotional worship songs, or even a sword to get people to see it. I’ve never seen a scientist leave tracts in public restrooms hoping someone will be inspired and believe. No, science just takes evidence. And evidence, like a shadow, is so much more powerful than the faith that Christianity gave to me.

Particularism and Christianity

JP Moreland has an interesting lecture on Skepticism and Epistemology here. He argues that our current society is hostile to religious and moral knowledge and perhaps even knowledge in general. One of his goals is to explain how we know what we know.

He claims that the duty of "knowers" is to simultaneously believe as many truths as possible while disbelieving as many falsehoods a possible. In other words, be capable of sorting one’s beliefs from good to bad. If our goal were simply to believe as many true things as possible, our task would be easier, we could simply believe everything. Similarly, if our goal were simply to avoid false beliefs, our task would be easy, simply don’t belief anything. The "Problem of the Criteria" is how do we separate our true beliefs from our false beliefs? How do we begin our sorting task?

There are three main answers to the knowledge sorting problem. The first view is Epistemological Methodism. This view holds that before I know something, I must start with a criterion that answers "How do I know it?" Apparently Descartes tried to postulate the criteria of "That which is clear and distinct in the mind" to answer the skeptic leading him the statement "I think therefore I am." However, this view has a problem. Before knowing proposition P, one must know the criterion C, and the fact R: "P satisfies C." This leads the question of “how do I know both C and R?” which leads to an infinite regress.

The second view is Particularism. This view is that there are specific things I know and I don’t need to know how I know them in order to know them. This view starts with particular knowledge claims, criteria may be developed by reflecting on particular knowledge. The criteria developed can be developed to help with difficult cases, but the criteria are no more basic than the particular pieces of knowledge that inspired them. For example, I know 2+2=4. By reflecting on arithmetic knowledge, I may be able to develop axioms of arithmetic. But if my axioms then show 2+2 is not 4, I would conclude my axioms are wrong, not that I don’t know 2+2 = 4.

The third view is Skepticism. Skeptics conclude that there is no solution to the problem of the criteria. They think that the “Methodists” are caught in an infinite regress and the Particularist is begging the question. However, how would the skeptic know that the Particularist is begging the question?

J.P concludes that Particularism is the correct view. That we can know things even if it’s possible we’re wrong. The mere possibility we are wrong is no reason to think we are wrong. I think his view on Epistemology has some merit.

JP goes on to make the case that a “Divine Law Giver” makes the most sense of morality and moral knowledge. (It wasn’t in his lecture, but he could have said moral laws seem like commands, and commands only make sense as communication between minds). For the sake of this post, I will grant that there is a God who makes sense of moral law.

However, I think Particularism poses some serious difficulties for Christianity as well. To see how, it is helpful to reflect on the nature of morality. In some cases, the same action can be either moral or immoral depending on the motive of the actor. For example, suppose a boy tripped someone. If he did it to enjoy seeing the tripped in pain, the action would be immoral. However, if he did it to prevent the tripped from being hit by a bus, the action is commendable.

In addition, a lack of action can be moral or immoral. If one has knowledge of a serious pending crime like terrorism, they would have a duty to report it. Neglecting to act in this case would be immoral. Where there is no motive, like in natural disasters, we may think the results are tragic, but the natural cause is not blamed. Who would blame the meteor for falling out the sky and destroying property?

By reflecting on these and other particular moral truths, I am justified in claiming that I know:

• In order for an action (or inaction) to be moral or immoral a motive must attach to that action.
• Punishing someone for the crimes of someone else is immoral (also see Deuteronomy 24:16)

Now examine 1 Samuel 15:2-3. Thus says the LORD of hosts: ‘I will punish Amalek for what he did to Israel, how he ambushed him on the way when he came up from Egypt. Now go and attack Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and do not spare them. But kill both man and woman, infant and nursing child, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.’”

Samuel claims that God wants the Israelites to kill every man, woman, child, infant, cattle, etc. That in itself may not be wrong, however note the motive that Samuel attributes to God. This attack is punishment for crimes committed over 300 year prior. The sentence is carried out on infants and nursing mothers who cannot have taken part in the act that caused the judgment.

Notice that Samuel attaches an evil motive to the action. This makes the action evil. Thus, if someone believes that there is a God who is the basis for the moral law written on our hearts, they are justified in concluding that the God is not the one referred to in the Bible. If someone says “God wants you to make the board 5 feet long because 2+2 = 5.” I would conclude that person is slandering God’s intelligence. Here, I think I am justified in thinking Samuel is slandering God’s character.

There are some common rejoinders to this conclusion that I would like to address now. The first is God is within his rights to take any life and could have had a good reason the kill the infants and the killing could even be merciful. (Geisler and Howe make this point in their book “When Critics Ask.”) That is true, but misses the point. The point is that Samuel attributed a motive to God and that motive is evil. There could very well be good reasons for killing infants, but punishment for the sins of long dead ancestors is not one of them. Samuel is slandering God here. He should have offered a good reason, but he didn’t. If you are a Christian, what would Samuel have to say before you were convinced he was not speaking for God?

The second objection is that without God, I have no basis for claiming moral knowledge. Firstly, this objection confuses me (a particularist) with an epistemological Methodist. A second point is that I am not presuming God is not the basis for morality. I am merely claiming that if there is a God that is the Basis for morality, it is not the God of Samuel.