In my book I explicitly state that some skeptics may not like the way I argue. One of the reasons is because I talk about presuppositions, assumptions, worldviews, and control beliefs. In one of my posts a discussion flared up about this starting with author
Jeffrey Mark’s comment. While he wasn’t responding directly to anything I had written let me respond.
I think scientifically minded and theologically or philosophical minded people go head to head over these ideas. As a philosophical minded person let me try to explain this to scientifically minded people, if I can.
The definitions of these words are similar but not exactly the same. They apply differently depending on the particular subject at hand. And they involve different things depending on whether the context is a discussion with someone else, or simply describing what we believe to be the case.
Let’s say we are discussing or debating an idea with someone else. When we engage in any argument we all have our presuppositions and assumptions. Those beliefs are the ones we presuppose and are assumed to be true. These beliefs are not presently on the table at the moment. They are presupposed for the sake of further conversation. If two Christians are debating over Arminianism and Calvinism they do not need to begin by arguing whether or not God exists or whether the Bible is God’s word. They are presupposing them in this context. If two philosophers are arguing about the existence of God they must presuppose that they are communicating with each other in a real material world, and that the discussion is an important one. If two scientists are arguing about something the same thing applies with regard to the importance of science, the reliability of induction and their senses.
Any presupposition or assumption can be laid on the table though, and discussed. A Christian Arminian would be frustrated in discussing Christian theology with someone who didn’t accept the Bible as the word of an existing God. A philosopher may be frustrated in having to continually revisit whether there is a material world before he can argue other things with other philosophers about other topics. A scientist would abhor having to go back and revisit the reliability of his senses with a pantheist who might require it, since the pantheist believes everything is maya, or an illusion. So some discussions between people who see things differently might be extremely frustrating, for they don’t agree on some basic common beliefs. That’s why Christian philosopher James Sire’s book is called, The Universe Next Door. Some of us see things so differently we live in different intellectual universes. There is even debate among theologians, philosophers and philosophers of science whether or not there is common ground between people who live in these different intellectual universes. Philosophers of science debate whether differing scientific paradigms are commensurable or incommensurable (ala Thomas Kuhn). Applied scientists are usually not informed about this kind of debate.
When it comes to what we believe, our problem is to try and isolate one of our particular assumptions for analysis. It’s extremely difficult if not impossible to do. For all assumptions and presuppositions we hold to are placed within the context of a whole worldview. We try to make consistent sense of our beliefs about God, the universe, ethics, politics, history, death, and so forth. A worldview is our particular way of making all of our beliefs cohere into a single consistent system of thought. Since it's impossible to lay our whole worldview on the table for analysis we can only isolate and analyze one or two particular beliefs at a time within it. But when we do so the other beliefs that form our worldview play a part in our analysis of that one particular belief we are trying to isolate for analysis. These other beliefs are called background beliefs. Our background beliefs consist of everything we have ever experienced and everything we have ever come to believe (minus that one particular belief we are trying to analyze). These background beliefs of ours control how we evaluate that particular belief in question, so I call them control beliefs. They control how we view that one particular belief in question. These control beliefs can actually explain away the evidence if they are strongly held ones. This is little different than the differing stories that a prosecutor and defense attorney might tell based upon the available evidence, one showing the defendant guilty and the other one showing that he is innocent. The evidence is the same. How do you decide?
An additional and telling problem is that no one has probably analyzed all of his beliefs. There are beliefs we have assumed are true based upon early childhood experiences that we have never placed on the table. Analyzing all of our beliefs is probably impossible otherwise we’d have to revisit every book we’ve ever read, every conversation, and every experience. So we all have unexamined beliefs we assume to be true, all of us. Some beliefs are more important and controlling than others, some have less evidence for them than others, and some are so well founded in our minds that we cannot question them, but we all have them. And they control how we see things, everything, for they are all placed within our own particular worldview. Furthermore, every belief we have is disputed by someone else in the world who can offer his reasons for doing so, even if we may disagree. Throughout history you will find this the case as well. No matter what you believe there has been a scholar, a philosopher, or a scientist who believed differently. That’s why philosopher/scientist A. N. Whitehead wrote, “Some assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know that they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them.”
I haven’t covered everything on this topic but for the record I do think we should follow the evidence and I do trust the reliability of our senses and the scientific method as the only possible way out of this quagmire of beliefs. And I think it is intellectual dishonesty to assume with any kind of certainty a whole worldview like the presuppositionalists do. To do that is to be impervious to all outside criticism. It is to lock oneself inside an ivory tower in the sky that never has to touch down on earth. I do not assume my whole worldview web of beliefs are all true with any degree of certainty. Some beliefs form the center of my web, like logic and my senses, while those in middle and on the periphery become less and less firmly held ones. And I must continually isolate one belief after another for analysis, even I cannot give up those that are closer and closer to the center of my web because I have solid reasons for trusting in them.
In any case I acknowledge the problem. So when it comes to my critique of the Christian theistic worldview I spend over half of my book arguing for my particular set of skeptical control beliefs. I do not assume them when crossing over into a different intellectual universe such as Christianity. As an outsider I shouldn’t do this if I want to be heard. I must first argue for them. To anyone who attempts to critique a different worldview he must argue for why he sees things differently. In the case of Christianity he must argue why he trusts science, rather than assuming it, and he must argue for why he adopts a skeptical set of control beliefs, rather than merely assuming a skeptical position. He must truly engage their worldview by understanding it. And he must start by critiquing their supernatural assumptions and their belief in the Bible as God's word.
Since DC readers have asked for more on this question,
here is the link. Bob is a friend of mine who wrote the book,
Deconstructing Jesus. With Paul Rhodes Eddy, Greg co-wrote the book,
The Jesus Legend.
Given the fact that skeptics are only making meager progress toward our common goals in society let's think together about a long term strategy. Do we have one? Does anyone? Care to discuss this?
As a former minister I know that Christians have several long term strategies with strong organizations. Maybe we can learn from them?
Their first strategy is to reach children. They target children in the home and the church. The younger the better. There is a group called Childhood Evangelism, which seeks to convert kids as young as they can. Richard Dawkins calls things like this "child abuse." There are bus ministries geared toward getting kids to church. Norman L. Geisler, who is considered the "dean of apologetics," was raised in an atheist home but was converted as the result of a bus ministry that brought him to church every Sunday for ten years!
Then there are college campus ministries like Bill Bright's Campus Crusade for Christ. William Lane Craig is involved with this group. There are even rich Christian benefactors who have bought up hundreds of thousands of copies of Josh McDowell's books which are distributed for free on college campuses!
Then on the cultural level there is the important Samaritan Strategy, where by doing good works in the name of Jesus they influence our society.
Christians have legal groups to protect their rights as well, like The Christian Legal Society.
There are other things Christians do to reach people and inflence society. Are we as skeptics interested in doing likewise? I know we don't have the numbers or means to do as much as Christians do, but are we serious about changing society and influencing minds, or not? I think most people who become skeptics simply get on with life, since after all, this is the only life they will ever have. Only a small minority of them become passionate to change minds and change society.
As an agnostic, Robert G. Ingersol was probably the most powerful orator in the 19th century, speaking to standing room only crowds. He was rich and he was powerful. He could speak out as he desired, and he did. There are many books available that contain his speeches. As such, he could've financed a national atheist/agnostic organization to influence American society. Our movement could've been started much earlier if he had. But he didn't. Now we have several of these organizations. Are YOU involved in any of them?
Is there more we can do? Is there more YOU as a skeptic can do?
The biggest problem might just be fear, and some of this is justified. There is the fear of coming out of the so-called closet. If you have not yet done so, at least seriously consider doing this. There is power in numbers. You realize, don't you, that in numbers we may be the second largest denomination in America behind Catholics! One in four Americans may be either agnostic or atheist. The more of us who tell the people we know what we think, the better. Just think of it this way. There have been a great many people who went before us and suffered a great deal so that we have the freedom to speak out, some of whom were burned at the stake. Don't trample on their blood. If they did this for us then we should do it for those who come after us.
Any other thoughts?
In this article, I will revisit some thoughts I made last week about Dr. William Lane Craig's morality argument for the existence of God. The critique has been adjusted to answer the top two or three objections presented in the post, and also adds some additional thoughts I've had over the past week.
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin
This is the place to do so if you wish.
I had caught one or more Christians poisoning the well by coming in from several different anonymous proxy servers to vote negatively on the first poll. There were fifteen that came in from one of these servers during a short period of time. This made the poll completely unreliable. It still isn't anywhere near scientific, but I'm interested in hearing from our honest readers, so I'll try again.
You'll notice that the poll now doesn't allow a skeptic reader to say this site is bad. It may be. If so state your reasons here. I am of the opinion that honest readers wouldn't say this of us unless they were Christians. And I'm also of the opinion that even Christians, if they were honest, could say this is a good site even if they disagree. If I'm wrong about any of this then I only ask skeptics who think this is a poor site to state your reasons why here. And while you're at it please tell us why you visit us if the site is so poor. Why would you do that?
To anyone disappointed that there's no longer an option for a skeptic to say this site is a poor one then you only have a Christian or more who repeatedly voted negatively on the previous poll for this.
Cheers.
Christian apologists often complain about New Testament critics who bring an
a priori rejection of the supernatural to their studies of the New Testament. The underlying rationale, I take it, is that such a presupposition will determine a non-supernatural historical reconstruction of Jesus before they even begin their historical investigations. But if the historical Jesus turns out to be the miracle-working, resurrected Son of God that conservative Christians take him to be, such an assumption will lead them to construct a historically inaccurate conception of Jesus.
I agree with them in this regard: one shouldn't assume what can or can't be true on empirical matters before one even begins one's investigations. Although it's probably unavoidable that we bring assumptions about reality to all of our empirical inquiries, we should hold them tentatively, and allow them to be altered in light of our findings.
Of course, this assumes that supernatural events, if they occur, are capable of empricial detection, but I grant that they are detectable, at least in principle (I say this as someone who has read his Hume).
I also agree with them that there are some NT critics who do reject the supernatural a priori (e.g., the members of the Jesus Seminar, Gerd Ludemann, etc.). Having said that, however, I'd like to make three points with respect to naturalism, a priori commitments, and NT studies.
First, many New Testament critics do not assume that supernatural events do not or cannot occur; rather, they have principled reasons for thinking that, even if they do occur, the evidence for such events is never sufficient to establish their occurence. There are two ways to construe the 'never' here: never in practice and never in principle (both construals go back, of course, to Hume's famous essay "Of Miracles" in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding). Now one may disagree with their arguments on these matters (I tend to think that Hume's "in principle" argument is too strong, although I think his "in practice" argument has considerable force), but that's not the point. Rather, the point is that apologists too often attack straw men here, viz., by attributing to NT scholars a metaphysical basis for their conclusions, when in fact they're often based on epistemological considerations.
Second, although some NT critics do base their non-conservative conclusions about Jesus in particular or the New Testament in general on an a priori rejection of the supernatural, they need not do so. In fact, many don't. Indeed, there are plenty of NT scholars who are also serious Christians, yet who nonetheless reject the doctrine of inerrancy, based on their research.[1] In other words, non-conservative views of Jesus and/or the New Testament are supportable merely from applying ordinary historical methodology. For example, one can see how the geneologies and pre-birth narratives in Matthew and Luke contradict both each other and established historical fact in order to make theological points. The same goes with John versus the synoptic gospels on the day and time of Jesus' crucifixion: John changes it in order to fit his theological theme of Jesus as the Passover "Lamb of God" (I know that inerrantists argue against these discrepancies. I have no desire to argue with them in vain. I merely ask them to read a sufficiently representative sampling of NT scholarship outside of their conservative circles). Also, once one does their source-critical homework, they can see how, e.g., Matthew and Luke modified the portrait of Jesus they inherited from Mark and Q, and how John went even further. Thus, a non-conservative account of Jesus in particular and the New Testament in general often results from ordinary, non-controversial use of source criticism, redaction criticism, and the criteria of authenticity -- it need not be based on an a priori rejection of the supernatural.
Finally, if some NT critics are guilty of an a priori commitment to naturalism, many conservative NT scholars are guilty of an a priori commitment to inerrancy. Yet many apologists don't seem to mind when the latter determines the conclusions of conservative NT scholars. This leads one to question the sincerity of apologists in their criticisms of a priori commitments creeping into NT scholarship. For again, the basis of their criticism appears to be that such a priori commitments are liable to result in an inaccurate historical reconstruction of Jesus, should the person of Jesus turn out to be in conflict with those commitments. But if that is the basis of their criticism, then they should be equally diligent in their criticisms of conservative scholars who have an a priori commitment to inerrancy -- and to a conservative view of Jesus in particular and the New Testament in general. In other words, the potential danger here is not naturalistic a priori commitments, but a priori commitments per se.
But it's hard to deny that there is an a priori commitment to inerrancy among the majority of conservative NT scholars. For one thing, many of them work at conservative seminaries, where one must subscribe to and even sign extremely conservative doctrinal statments in order to obtain and keep one's job. Such scholars can't let an admission of errancy through the door, no matter what the relevant data should turn out to be, and no matter how convoluted and implausible the stories may be that are required to reconcile a given set of biblical texts.[2] Thus, it's a bit odd to hear apologists complain about a priori committments determining one's portrait of Jesus, when their own a priori commitments often determine, or significantly influence, their own portrait of Jesus.
To sum up: Christian apologists have a point worth hearing when they criticize certain NT critics for bringing an a priori commitment to naturalism to their studies. For one should let the empirical data about Jesus and the NT materials speak for themselves, lest one's conclusions be determined from the get-go, quite possibly distorting the data in the process. However, the apologists have failed to see that the point about a priori assumptions is a perfectly general one, and can't be limited to naturalism. And this entails that conservative NT scholars need to abandon a priori assumptions about inerrancy and orthodoxy when they come to their study of the empirical data, lest they, likewise, allow their assumptions to determine their conclusions from the get-go, quite possibly distorting the data along the way. The lesson is that all sides of the debate should hold their theoretical commitments tentatively, not forcing the pieces of evidence to fit within them when the fit is unnatural. Rather, one's assumptions should be malleable, and even disposable, thereby allowing the data to speak to us clearly, unmuffled.
-----------------------
[1] Examples include Raymond Brown, Dale Allison, James D.G. Dunn, John Meier, and Luke Timothy Johnson.
[2] For many examples of such reconciling stories, see, e.g., Craig Blomberg's The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, Norman Geisler's When Critics Ask, and Gleason Archer's Encyclopedia of Bible Difficulties. I leave it to the reader to decide whether these reconciliations are more plausible than not (more plausible, that is, to someone who doesn't already accept inerrancy).
If you want to see an index to either of my two books they can be found on Amazon:
1.
Why I Became an Atheist.
2.
The Christian Delusion.
Click on the links above and do a search "inside the book" for any name or subject you want to find.
“And I will bless those who bless you, And the one who curses you I will curse. And in you all the families of the earth will be blessed." Genesis 12:3
This past Sunday night, the National Geographic Channel aired a program based on the documented facts that there were 42 failed attempts to kill Hitler in: 42 Ways to Kill Hitler.
While attempting these 42 failed assassinations to kill this monster; six millions Jews, Jehovah Witnesses and other “undesirables” died in Nazi concentration camps along with millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
When I was a student at Columbia Theological Seminary, the bottom floor of the school’s library housed stacks of books (many written by Jews) trying to explain or deal with the crimes against humanity of Hitler and the Nazi forces in World War II.
If there is a God seated on his Royal Throne in Heaven, why did he not let at least 38 of these assassination attempts succeed since the death of Hitler could have stopped the Nazi machine or the latter of the 38 attempts would have ended the war?
In fact, the documentary noted Hitler consider himself immortal and protect by God. Plus, after 42 failed attempts on his life, Hitler was allow to end his life on his own terms and when he was ready to.
Here are a few basic questions:
If there is really some God of love watching over his creation, why did this God leave millions of his chosen / Covenanted people to suffer and die horrible deaths?
Why did thousands of Christian Jehovah Witnesses also died in Nazi concentration camps?
If God is “teaching us a lesson” what is it? He does not exist? He is now dead? He dose not / can not answer prayers? He wants his believers to prop him up theologically? Is he is doing some sort of religious test on believers?
And just what the Hell was Jesus doing as hundreds of millions of Christians cried out to him for help daily?
Christians, you have your work cut out for you now. It’s time to create
some major theological excuse!
...so argued Jeffery Jay Lowder, co-founder of the
Secular Web. I think people who deny the existence of a mere man named Jesus who was the founder of the Jesus cult have to explain away too many things to think the way they do. They could likewise claim Paul never existed by the same standards of reasoning that they do with Jesus. Where is Paul's existence independently confirmed outside of the New Testament?
Historical studies can be used to deny almost anything in history. Historical studies are like that, so we must exercise caution. There must be a limit to how skeptical a historian can be about historical conclusions simply by virtue of the fact that someone could be skeptical of almost all of them. As evidence for this, people today even deny the Holocaust happened.
Lowder makes the case that independent confirmation of a man named Jesus is not necessary, and I agree. He writes:.There simply is nothing epistemically improbable about the mere existence of a man named Jesus. (Just because Jesus existed does not mean that he was born of a virgin, that he rose from the dead, etc.). I think that the New Testament does provide prima facie evidence for the historicity of Jesus. It is clear, then, that if we are going to apply to the New Testament ‘the same sort of criteria as we should apply to other ancient writings containing historical material,’ we should not require independent confirmation of the New Testament's claim that Jesus existed.”
Again, the standards for accepting historical conclusions cannot be as rigorous as the standards for scientific conclusions; otherwise we could not believe anything happened in the historical past. But something did happen in the past. So we cannot demand such high and rigorous standards. This is basic Philosophy of History.
What I do know is that charismatic leaders start religious cults, not committees and not authors. I also know that end time prophets have a higher than normal likelihood for starting religious cults. I also believe the best understanding of the Jesus in the New Testament is that he was a doomsday prophet, and that there is a likelihood the Jews of that era were expecting a Messiah, especially since they were under an oppressive Roman rule. Without a better explanation for how the Jesus cult started, I have good solid reasons for thinking it started with an end time prophet like the one described in the New Testament named Jesus.
Look at it this way. Since we can deny almost anything in the historical past, then when we read in an ancient text where a person existed and where it’s also said he did something, the burden of proof is on those who would deny this, under normal non-miraculous circumstances which have the burden of proof. This applies to characters like Adam, Noah, and Moses as well as for Jesus. We must take what the text says as a given in a prima facie sense, until shown otherwise. If, on the other hand, the burden of proof is on the person who accepts this textual testimony, then she could probably never meet that burden simply because historians cannot meet that burden in the first place.
--------------
This is Part 3 of my case for the existence of the end-time prophet named Jesus described in the New Testament. Other parts can be found here: Part 1, and Part 2
In this installment, I complete the series on Draper's critique of Behe's design argument from irreducible complexity.
I. Review and Setup
To review, recall that the article focuses on stage one of Behe's two-stage design argument, which argues that certain biochemical structures cannot have arisen via gradualistic Darwinian processes. The argument of this stage crucially relies on his notion of irreducible complexity, where this is defined as a system "composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein removal of any of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning".[1] With this notion in hand, Behe argues that there are irreducibly very complex biochemical systems (e.g., the bacterial flagellum), and that these systems can't plausibly be explained in terms of gradualistic evolutionary processes. And the reason is that evolution can only create systems via direct and indirect evolutionary pathways.[2] But evolution can create no irreducibly complex system via a direct evolutionary pathway.[3] And while evolution can create simple irreducibly complex systems via indirect pathways, and reducibly complex systems via direct and indirect evolutionary pathways, the odds are overwhelmingly against creating irreducibly very complex systems via indirect pathways.[4]
Given Behe's argument, there are at least three ways to criticize his argument directly:
(1) Undercut or rebut the claim that his example systems are irreducibly complex (or at least irreducibly very complex)
(2) Undercut or rebut the claim that irreducibly (very) complex systems can't be created via indirect evolutionary pathways
(3) Undercut or rebut the claim that irreducibly complex systems can't be created via direct evolutionary pathways
In previous installments, we saw that Draper has offered criticisms of type (1) and type (2). Each of these criticisms is sufficient by itself to defeat Behe's argument. However, Draper doesn't stop there. In this installment, we'll look at one of Draper's criticisms of type (3).
II. Behe's Argument Against Direct Evolutionary Pathways to Irreducible Complexity
Now as mentioned above, Behe argues that direct routes to irreducibly complex structures are impossible. But why think that? His argument can be stated as follows: consider some irreducibly complex system S composed of parts A and B, which together perform function F. Now since S is irreducibly complex, neither A nor B can perform F by itself. Therefore, if we assume that neither A nor B served some other useful function in the interim[5], then if either A or B came into existence before the other, it would've been eliminated before the second part came into being to interact with the first part to perform F. Therefore, direct routes to irreducibly complex systems are impossible.[6]
III. Draper's Reply
What to make of this argument? To set up Draper's critique, recall that Behe distinguishes between two sorts of evolutionary pathways for creating biological systems: direct and indirect. A gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to a function F of a biological system is direct if it produces F by continuously improving it without changing F itself, and without changing the system's mechanism. And a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to F is indirect if it does so by changing the system's function or mechanism.[7] But as Draper points out, this account of evolutionary pathways is too coarse-grained, as it fails to distinguish different kinds of direct and indirect evolutionary pathways. And it turns out that these further distinctions have a bearing on whether Behe's argument succeeds.
Thus, to redress this shortcoming, Draper distinguishes between two sorts of direct routes to irreducible complexity: simple and complicated. A simple direct route amounts to adding parts to a system without changing the function or the mechanism. By contrast, a complicated direct route can involve both adding and subtracting parts (again, without changing the mechanism or the function).
Thus, Behe fails to distinguish between simple and complicated direct evolutionary pathways. But the problem is that Behe wrongly assumes that all direct pathways are of the simple variety. For as it turns out, it's possible for complicated direct routes to generate irreducibly complex systems. Draper states his criticism as follows:
"The possibility of an irreducibly complex system's being produced by a complicated direct path is fairly obvious. For example, an irreducibly complex two-part system AB that performs function F could evolve directly as follows. Originally, Z performs F, though perhaps not very well. (This is possible because, from the fact that AB cannot perform F without A or B, it doesn't follow that Z cannot perform F by itself.) Then A is added to Z, because it improves the function, though it is not necessary. B is also added for this reason. One now has a reducibly complex system composed of three parts, Z, A and B. Then Z drops out, leaving only A and B. And without Z, both A and B are required for the system to function."[8]
Thus, Draper shows the logical possibility of a complicated direct path to an irreducibly complex system in four stages:
Stage 1: A system S is composed of Z, which performs function F. (simple system)
Stage 2: Part A is added to Z in S, leading to an improvement in F. (reducibly complex system)
Stage 3: Part B is added to Z and A in S, leading to an improvement in F. (reducibly complex system)
Stage 4: Part Z drops out of S, and without Z, BOTH A and B are required for S to continue performing F. (irreducibly complex system)
Draper's criticism surfaces an illicit assumption implicit in Behe's reasoning about what follows from his definition of irreducible complexity: that the irreducible complexity of a system is insensitive to the parts that make it up. But as Draper's counterexample shows, this isn't so: whether a system is irreducibly complex is relative to the constituents of which it's composed. Thus, while a system S may be irreducibly complex if composed of A and B, it may well be reducibly complex if it's composed of C and D. In short, irreducible complexity is parts-relative. And this leaves open the possibility of creating an irreducibly complex system directly by (e.g.) first starting with a reducibly complex system composed of CD, then successively adding parts A and B to improve its function, and finally losing CD, resulting in an irreducibly complex system composed of AB. And given this possibility, Behe's argument against the possibility of direct routes to irreducible complexity is defeated.
IV. Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier, Draper raises a number of other criticisms of Behe's design argument from irreducible complexity, but I think enough of his criticisms have been discussed to indicate that Behe's argument is a failure. For his key clams -- that some biochemical structures are irreducibly complex; that irreducibly complex systems can't be produced by indirect evolutionary pathways; and that irreducibly very complex systems can't be produced by direct evolutionary pathways -- are defeated.
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[1] Behe, Michael J. Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 39.
[2] Recall that a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to a function F of a biological system is direct if it produces F by continuously improving it without changing F itself, and without changing the system's mechanism. And a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to F is indirect if it does so by changing the system's function or mechanism. Draper, Paul. "Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism: A Reply to Michael J. Behe", Faith and Philosophy 19:1 (2002), p. 5
[3] Irreducibly complex systems "cannot be produced directly, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing even a single part is by definition nonfunctional." Darwin's Black Box, P. 39.
[4] "Even if a system is irreducibly complex (and thus cannot have been produced directly), however, one can not definitively rule out the possibility of an indirect, circuitous route. As the complexity of an interacting system increases, though, the likelihood of such an indirect route drops precipitously." Behe, Darwin's Black Box, P. 40.
[5] As many -- including Draper -- have noted (e.g., Kenneth Miller), this assumption is fatal to the argument. For from the fact that neither A nor B can perform a particular function F without other parts, it doesn't follow that neither part can perform some other funtion(s). And in fact, there are plausible evolutionary pathways where Behe's paradigm case of an irreducibly complex system -- the bacterial flagellum -- has evolutionary precursors that performed different functions. (See the following YouTube clip of a talk by Kenneth Miller for a helpful example of such a criticism.). However, that sort of criticism is one demonstrating the possibility of indirect pathways to irreducible complexity. I therefore relegate the criticism to a footnote, not because it isn't important, but because it falls outside the scope of the current topic, which focuses on direct evolutionary pathways to irreducible complexity.
[6] This statement of Behe's argument is a paraphrase of Draper's. See Draper. Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism: A Reply to Michael J. Behe", Faith and Philosophy 19:1 (2002), p. 15.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
The acknowledged authority on the life and works of Josephus is Louis H. Feldman of Yeshiva University.
Education: B.A. (Phi Beta Kappa, Valedictorian), Trinity College, Hartford, 1946; M.A. (in classics), Trinity College, 1947; Ph.D. (in classical philology), Harvard University, 1951 (diss.: "Cicero's Conception of Historiography"); L.H.D. (honorary), Trinity College, 1998.
Teaching Positions: Ford Foundation Teaching Fellow in Classics, Trinity College, 1951-52; Instructor in New Testament Greek, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1951-52; Instructor in Classics, Trinity College, 1952-53; Instructor in Classics, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 1953-55; Instructor in Humanities and History, Yeshiva and Stern Colleges, 1955-56; Assistant Professor of Classical Civilization, Yeshiva College, 1955-61; Associate Professor of Classical Civilization, Yeshiva College, 1961-66; Professor of Classics, Yeshiva University, 1966-present; Abraham Wouk Family Professor of Classics and Literature, Yeshiva University, 1993-present.
Fellowships and Awards: Guggenheim Foundation, Fellow; American Council of Learned Societies, Senior Fellow; Selected to conducted seminar for college teachers, National Endowment for the Humanities, "The Greek Encounter with Judaism in the Hellenistic Period," at Yeshiva University, Summers of 1980, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1992; "Classical and Christian Roots of Anti-Semitism," Summer of 1987; Award for excellence in teaching the classics, American Philological Association, 1981; Judaica Reference Book Award, Association of Jewish Libraries, 1985; Fellow, Annenberg Research Institute for Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, Philadelphia, PA, 1988-89; Elected Fellow, American Academy for Jewish Research, 1993; Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1994.
Of his fifteen books on Josephus and 138 articles on Josephus and Judaism, I would like to quote what this Josephian scholar says about the Testimonium Flavaianum taken from "Josephus (CE 37-c.100)," in William Harbury et al., ed., The Cambridge History of Judaism vol. 3 (1999) pp. 911 - 912.
“We may remark here on the passage in Josephus which has occasioned by far more comment than any other, the so-called Testimonium Flavianum (Ant. XVIII. 63 - 4) concerning Jesus. The passage appears in all our manuscripts; but a considerable number of Christian writers - Pseudo-Justin and Theophilus in the second century, Minucius Felix, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Julius Africanus, Tertullian, Hippolytus and Orgen in the third century, and Methodius and Pseudo-Eustathius in the early fourth century - who knew Jeosphus and cited from his works do not refer to this passage, though one would imagine that it would be the first passage that a Christian apologist would cite. In particular, Origen (Contra Celsum 1.47 and Commentary on Matthew 10.17), who certainly knew Book 18 of the Antiquities and cites five passages from it, explicitly states that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as Christ. The first to cite the Testimonium is Eusebius (c. 324); and even after him, we may note, there are eleven Christian writers who cite Josephus but not the Testimonium. In fact, it is not until Jerome in the early fifth century that we have another reference o it.
The principal internal argument against the genuineness of the Testimonium is that it says that Jesus was the Christ, whereas Josephus, as a loyal Pharisaic Jew, could hardly have written this. To be sure, there was several claimants to the status of Messiah in this era, and those who followed them were not read out of the Jewish fold; but in view of the fact that Josephus nowhere else uses the word Christos (except in referring to James, the brother of Jesus, Ant. XX.200) and that he repeatedly suppresses the Messianic aspects of the revolt against Rome because of the association of the Messiah with political revolt and independence, it would seem hard to believe that he would openly call Jesus a Messiah and speak of him in awe. The fact that Jerome (De viris illustrious 13) read that ’he was believed to be the Christ (credebatur esse Christus) would suggest that his text differed from ours. Another objection to the authenticity of the passage is that it breaks the continuity of the narrative, which tells of a series of riots. Those, such as Eisler, who regard the passage as interpolated, suggest that the original spoke of the Christian movement as a riot.
Pines (An Arabic Version of the Testimonium Flavianum and Its Implications (Jeruslame 1971))has created a considerable stir by bringing to the scholarly world’s attention two hitherto almost completely neglected works containing the Testimonium, one a tenth-century history of the world in Arabic by a Christian named Agapius and the other a twelfth-century chronicle in Syriac by Michael the Syrian. There are a number of differences between Agapuius and our Testimonium, notably in the omission of the statement ‘if one ought to call him a man’ and of Jesus’ miracles and of the role of the Jewish leaders in accusing Jesus, and, above all, in the assertion that Jesus was perhaps the Messiah (‘was thought to be’ in Michael). Since Agapius declares that ‘This is what is said by Josephus and his companions’ and indeed includes a number of other details not found in Josephus, we may conjecture that he used other sources as well. Inasmuch as there are changes in the order of the statements of the Testimonium in Agapius and Michael, we are apparently dealing not with a translation but with a paraphrase.”
So, by the account given by Louis Feldman, Christians are not above forgery and lies to give credence to Christianity!
I believe there are some identifiable fables and mythic tales in the Bible, such as the Genesis creation accounts, the sons of God producing children from the daughters of men in Genesis 6, the Exodus, wilderness wanderings and Canaanite conquest in the Old Testament. In the New Testament there are some other identifiable fables and mythic tales, like the virgin birth story about Jesus, several miracle stories, the existence of Judas Iscariot, Joseph of Arimathea, and the resurrection story about Jesus. There are others. Given these things it becomes an important task to try to figure out if Jesus himself really existed.
I do not intend to revisit this question very often, because while it is an interesting one it’s not essential to debunking the Christian faith, nor are Christians likely to even consider the question unless they are first convinced that the other things I just mentioned are mythic tales. That’s why I focus on these other fables and myths. Getting them to recognize these things as myths is hard enough. Why focus on that which is harder when there is an easier route?
I’ll be excited to hear the conclusions that will come from next weekend's seminar on the Sources of the Jesus Tradition: An Inquiry, which includes participants Hector Avalos, Robert Price and Richard Carrier, all friends of mine
In any case let me once again delineate the problems for someone wishing to deny that a man named Jesus existed and further argue that he did. If you haven’t read my first foray into this field you must stop reading and begin reading what I have previously wrote about this issue right here. Again, stop reading and go there.
Let me elaborate in this post and further make my case.
That there are myths in the Bible doesn’t automatically lead to the conclusion that it is all mythic in nature. It may be, as I admit, but what reason is there for throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Let’s say Benny Hinn’s followers are called Hinnites and carry on after he dies. Does the mere fact that they claimed he did miracles, something we would call myths and fables since we don’t believe he actually did any miracles, automatically mean he didn’t exist? No.
Furthermore, what good reason can be given for demanding that there must be independent confirmation outside the NT before believing anything inside of its pages? That there is some need to do this I don’t doubt, given the nature of the stories, but why must we discount anything in the NT unless it is independently attested? What if there was no independent attestation to the existence of the Pharisees outside the NT? Why must we doubt they existed merely because of this? That’s one of my questions.
There are plenty of details in the NT that have been confirmed, most notably the historical setting of the gospels and the book of Acts. It hasn’t all been confirmed, of course, like the fabricated Roman census at the time of Jesus’ birth for instance, but much of it has. Sir William Ramsay has documented that the setting of the book of Acts, the places mentioned, the people who ruled, and other details are remarkably historical in his classic book, St. Paul, the Traveler and Roman Citizen, as has A.N. Sherwin-White, in his book, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament. The setting of the Gospel of John has a remarkably historical setting as well, when it comes to its description of buildings, people groupings, and geographical landscape at the time, like Jacob’s well, the Samaritans, Solomon’s porch, the pool of Siloam, and so forth. According to Christian apologist Paul Barnett, “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the fourth evangelist was quite familiar with the topography and buildings of southern Palestine.” (p. 64).
Sure this isn’t enough, but it is something. It leads us to think the authors (or the sources they draw from) lived at that time, although it doesn’t prove this.
What would prove that Jesus existed? Nothing. Nothing in the historical past can be proved anyway. Almost anything can be denied in history even if it happened. So what can show us Jesus existed? No single piece of evidence can do this, since no single piece of evidence ever led people to believe he did in the first place. It's the convergence of evidence that leads people to think he existed.
In the first place, there is no testimony in the ancient world that denies he existed. There may be some significant silences about his existence, but arguing from these silences doesn’t show he never existed. They are merely silent about it. One cannot conclude from silence that the author didn’t know of a Jesus or an early Jesus sect. That’s an informal fallacy, especially when we have NT documents maintaining he did, including Paul who was the earliest writer of the NT.
What did Paul claim? He claimed he received what he knew about Jesus from revelation of course, which makes us suspect his knowledge, but he also claims he met with the early leaders in Jerusalem and that he had received information directly from them in I Corinthians 15:3-8. What he received from them he passed on to the Corinthians a few years earlier expressed in that creed. He also says he spent fifteen days with Peter three years after his conversion (Galatians 1:18-19), where one could conclude he first learned the creed he repeats to the Corinthians. Paul gives us several details about Jesus, depending on how we date his letters and whether we think he wrote them. Jesus descended from Abraham (Gal. 3:16); was the son of David (Romans 1:3); was born of a woman and lived under Jewish law (Gal. 4:4); had a brother named James (Gal. 1:19) and other brothers (I Cor. 9:5). Paul tells us Peter was married (I Cor. 9:5), and that Jesus instituted the Lord’s Supper (I Cor. 11:23-25); was betrayed (I Cor. 11;23); was killed by the Jews of Judea (I Thess. 2:14-15), and that he was buried and seen as resurrecting (I Cor. 15:4-8).
This is evidence that shouldn’t just be ignored simply because mythic elements to the life of Jesus were added in the telling of his story. Did Jesus think his last supper was his last one? I don’t know. It might be reasonably concluded that he did, since he would certainly know that people wanted him dead. In any case, such a story and the subsequent weekly practice of communion is evidence he ate the Passover meal at least one time with some men he called his disciples. It might even be thought Jesus did this on the night of his crucifixion, regardless of whether he predicted his death or not. Cultic leaders have been known to be paranoid and to think the authorities will kill them for their teachings, anyway. Some have called upon their followers to die with them, like David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite, and Jim Jones.
I have proposed that the best explanation for the rise of the Jesus cult is that Jesus was an apocalyptic doomsday prophet who called for the end of the world. There have been a lot of charismatic doomsday prophets who have gathered a following. Such an explanation fits the facts of what we read in the NT itself and has been the dominant view of Jesus since the time of Albert Schweitzer, as I said. There are other alternative suggestions, but this one makes the most sense to me. That there are ancient pagan parallels to some of the elements in the life of Jesus is interesting to me. Certainly the life of Jesus as told by the early believers took on some of those characteristics. Whether they completely explain the rise of the Jesus cult is something I doubt. Again, I could be wrong since historical studies are fraught with problems like this. It just makes better sense to me personally, even if I might be shown wrong at a later date.
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To read my next installment on this see Part 3.
(I am a new blogger. For my introduction, please see below and ask me a question there. I am doing a rare double-post to provide the blog and its readers with an example of my own mode of analysis, so if you have a question about the Moral Argument specifically, ask here). Dr. William Lane Craig's moral argument for God goes as follows:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
Although the argument itself is (deductively) valid, we will discuss how Bill's definition of "objective moral value" given in Reasonable Faith leads to the logical impossibility of Premise (1) and at least a shaky ground for Premise (2), thereby literally closing the book on this version of the moral argument for good. The argument is presented within a letter I sent my friend Dr. Paul Copan, who spoke with me personally at the same time I was addressing Bill at the conference.
Paul,
One point of interest that needs to be brought up: we got distracted on Calvinism in the middle of what I was supposed to say for the Moral Argument.
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." My friend Marques, the fan of Bill's whom I mentioned during our session, informed me that Bill defines an objective moral value as essentially "a moral assertion that remains true independent of human consciousness." I think this is the notion you and he defined during our talk and that which is given in RF.
The problem with Premise (1), as I mentioned, is that Bill only uses Existentialists in his lectures and similar notions in RF to provide an argument from authority - but we already discussed the "argument from authority" problem when we spoke, so I'll move on.
The further problem, which I did not get to address due to my unfortunate forgetfulness of how much gas the Calvinism subject empties out on a room (honestly sorry!!!), is that Premise (1) is logically equivalent to "If objective moral values exist, God exists,"; to prove this statement logically without appeal under Bill's definition, one must show that either:
(a) Objective moral values are present as an inherent property of reality qua reality independently of any consciousness, including God's, not unlike a Platonic "form" or Aristotelean "essence";
(b) Objective moral values exist because God delivered them by Divine Command, Divine Decree, creating Platonic forms to house them, etc., or in the hearts of men as Paul states.
No other means of morals being objective is at all possible. With what Bill says,
Option (a) is immediately an invalid option to prove Premise (1), for if morals existed as an inherent quality of reality, then either God created them in reality, leading to my objection for Option (b), or they exist in reality apart from God, making Premise (1) automatically invalid prima facie due to the fact that it presents either a possibility for objective moral values under atheism or objective moral values under a nonlawgiver God.
Option (b) renders any proof of Premise (1) automatically invalid by improper deduction. Premise (1) states that "if objective moral values exists, then God exists." But if we assert that objective moral values rest on God's existence due to either Divine Command/Decree, His creation of independent Platonic "moral vats" in reality, etc., as pressed forth in option (b), then Premise (1)'s logical proof fails deduction, to wit:
(1a) Assume objective moral values exist.
(1b) If a Moral Lawgiving God exists, then objective moral values exist due to His Divine Decree/Command, creation of independent "Platonic Morality Vats," etc.
(1c) Therefore, God exists.
(1d) Therefore, the statement "if objective moral values exist, then God exists" is true. Premise (1) is proven.
This argument is wrong from deduction.
Additionally, Bill's definition for an "objective moral value" drops the context of the identity of man, i.e. the context of a **finite** rational being. Indeed, Bill said both that these values would exist if God did not decide to create mankind, and that these values are nonbinding on a God of infinite nature. You might be interested to know that I assert that objective moral values *do* exist, but in a different sense than Craig; they are only possible if men exist, but they are *not* subjective because men exist *in reality.*
objective moral value != "a moral assertion that remains identically true for any rational being within this assertion's context."
If evolution arrived at another humanlike creature, then this objective morality would be the exact same assuming this, um, hypothetical "frog man" is rational; it depends on the identity of a rational being, not just on man qua man. It is objective because rational beings exist in reality, and the contexts of such moral actions exist in reality (i.e. outside of "Sophie's Dilemma" type extremes, all logically demonstrable). I will not go into this morality here, but it is much like Rand's morality that you provide a critique of in your God goes to Starbucks book - however, you'd be surprised that you have some incorrect notions, and that the morality - especially the neo-Ayn Rand version without the harshness she added to it - *isn't* as horrible as it sounds, and *is* objective (i.e. pertaining to reality above subjective consciousness), and *does* bridge "is-ought." I will describe it further if it is of interest to you.
Note that none of this disproves God, or even a moral lawgiver. But it shows that Premise (1) is invalid and that Premise (2) is on shaky ground given Bill's definitions, rendering his standard presentation invalid. Bill would do better to not use it as an isolated argument, but instead depend on Kalam and the Teleological Argument to first establish a God, and then to rule out atheistic "Platonic moral vats" or potential "Moral Lawgiving Gods" separate from a creator and designer of the Universe (as Bill does in his book on both counts, but not as well-developed by method) to then leave God the property of being the moral lawgiver. This is the most that is left for the moral argument given that my critique stands.
Best,
Darrin
Another new member for the blog!
My name is Darrin Rasberry, and I am a student at Iowa State University and a personal friend of John's. I am a nontheist and a former Christian, and I hope I can get to know all the rest of you (on both sides of the debate) much better as people and as deep thinkers about important ideas. Other than theology and philosophy, I study mathematics, a subject in which I currently hold a Master's and which I teach to college level students; I additionally am a storm chaser (my primary hobby) and lover of literature and fantasy/sci-fi games. I just crossed the big 3-0, but I don't feel a hair over 18, and likely never will.
Unlike many other nontheists, my loss of faith happened literally overnight in an emotional fit. I deconverted to Deism and then Agnosticism when I was 18, having been convinced that the Bible preached that Calvinism "stuff" which, being from Wichita Falls, Texas originally, I thought died out close to the last time the Puritans were mentioned in my pre-1865 American History class. Convinced I was being fed lies, I left the fold, vowed to declare to God that I denied the "evils of Calvinism" for Him. Imagine all you hold dear being swept from you in one night - that's what happened that evening. The pain was worse than losing any relative who has died; worse than losing those friends and family who did not appreciate my heretical move; worse than anything I've experienced so far in life. Like the few "Calvinist deconverts" I've met, my values stuck for a while, but I could never see any way out of what I saw when I actually read the Bible completely on my own for the first time.
Many Arminian holders to the P in TULIP will likely doubt all of this, which is fine, but for a moment I'd ask you to let go of your control beliefs and think about the anguish you'd feel if somehow someone were to show you something that would undermine all that you believed in just a few hours. Yes, I received Christ and was baptized at the age of seven; I prayed, believed, told others, lived as much of the regenerated life as I could. But my heart couldn't hold Calvinism, and even though my arguments have expanded well beyond that subject (arguments which may - or may not! - have caused me to deconvert later), that emotional response ended everything. I am not hiding from my sins - being grounded in morals from a philosophical basis, I know I've done them, and if I owe to God for them then I will accept my just desserts (or if Methodism is right, say "phew!"). But I have a mind for truth, not conditionality, and like John, I have not seen sufficient responses to the non-Christian position, on many different grounds far outside of the Calvinism vs. Arminianism debate.
Looking at different arguments for God outside of Scripture reference, I eventually came to atheism from my Deist/Agnostic beliefs. With my "examine everything theologically major" neutral point of approach, I must honestly call myself agnostic to other significant theological God(s) (i.e. from some Islam sects I haven't studied, Hinduism, Judaism, theological Buddhism, etc.), so I now call myself "nontheist." I'll regain the "atheist" tag when I examine all the major Gods which have examinable definitions to begin with; any conversion to any religion is not probable by a long shot, but hey, if I go Section 8 and start preaching the word of Brahma or whatever, I'll spare the audience and start my own blog. ;)
~~~
Unlike many in the recent "New Atheist" movement, I am interested in approaching the ideas of many religions from a neutral position (or, if you're Calvinist, from as neutral of a position as possible). After all, if we ask Christians to apply the Outsider Test to their worldview, we ought to be consistent and apply it to ourselves. I traveled to the evangelical conference in Providence with John as a result of this thought, and got to meet and befriend the most respected evidentialist apologists out there - including an opportunity to talk Kalam, the Moral Argument, and Calvinism with Bill Craig and Paul Copan two-on-one for over an hour and a half. I made good friends with them and many others, including Mary Jo and Roger Sharp, whom I hope I convince to share a message board with the idea of holding civil standards of scholarly discussion.
John and I went to one of the top places in the world where we could find people to help us see how nonbelievers are seen from the Fundamentalist Christian "outside," and not only did we survive, but we still "nonbelieved" afterward! I would challenge not only Christians to take John's challenge, but my fellow nontheists as well, so long as the people you find aren't of the "no religious neutrality" types of Calvinists or their "alpha-male" counterparts that roam as an undesirable subset of the Arminian and Catholic camps.
Once you see that the good-hearted and open Christian scholars, although mistaken, are not wholly unreasonable, you'll open yourself to better standards of research and respect and reach a level of thought more in tune with a Quentin Smith, Hector Avalos, or Bart Ehrman rather than a Dawkins or Hitchens. The latter two are, of course, every bit as smart as the former, but the same level of respect and dedication to consistent, philosophical thought and scholarly analysis is quite different, and it shows.
John mentioned I may have trouble with the title of this blog, as my ultimate aim isn't to debunk Christianity, but merely to analyze the ideas Christianity (or any religion) present critically and temper those ideas with the greatest minds the opposition has to offer. The reason I am interested in your religion is that it is both a very important, deep claim, and also it serves as probably the best portrait available of how people both think and feel.
I ultimately decided to join this blog because there is one area where I become quite rabid in regards to fundamentalist Christianity, or at least with some portions of the group: politics. It is unfortunate that some of the best minds in the field of Christian scholarship advocate ideas such as Dominionism and Theonomy; even though they are minority rule, we may be a terrorist attack or two away from those who believe America is a Christian Nation finally getting their way and, say, stoning all of us nonbelievers in a public square (see Dr. Gary North).
Nonetheless, my postings and replies to questions on that particular subject will be scant - their theology is the deeper basis. I do not think I could ever debunk a two thousand year old religion completely out of existence, and I do not wish to "deconvert" a single person (although that won't be a necessarily awful side-effect ...), but if I moved one advocate for theocracy to a more liberal system which caused her to abandon that dangerous notion, I'd have accomplished one of my goals. Other than that, my posts should be considered "discussing Christianity," in accordance to the approach I wish to take.
I differ with John on quite a few points, but John is still the atheist who holds my point of view as close as I've personally found. To introduce a bit of controversy to some of the nonbelieving crowd here to clarify why I feel a bit isolated as the kind of atheist unwilling to walk with the "brights," here are some controversial points in my own worldview (i.e. "control beliefs!"):
*A belief in a knowable reality and groundable morality;
*A belief in human free will not described either by the common notions of "compatible" or "libertarian";
*A belief that Christ was a historical person, based mainly on the explosion of the early Church and the inability of the gigantic genetic fallacies inherent in the Christ Myth hypothesis to explain the historical Christ away, although with the belief that the historical Christ was distorted by legend;
*A belief that Paul authored a few of the letters attributed to his name, including I Corinthians, Romans, Galatians, Colossians, etc., and perhaps served as the primary theological influence for the Book of John;
*A belief that engaging less informed, more preachy believers (see: Ray Comfort) in a nice but decisive manner about nonbelief is necessary, given their word - not the scholar's word - is what is being preached to the "masses" who have the power to gang up on us at he polling station.
My writings may appear critical, even harsh; however, I intend to attack no person unless first attacked (I will even try to withhold on this point unless good people I know, like John or Hector, are unfairly personally attacked).
As long as nothing is forced on anyone via law, I take Dr. Will Provine's point of view in that recent Creationist documentary which probably saw more time in the cutting room than all its theatre airtime combined, "Expelled":
"I don't care what they end up as being. I don't care if they end up being religious Young-Earth Creationists if they have thought their way through the issues to get there. I'm all for them."
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Thanks for enduring this (rather long) post. I leave the floor to you now. You may ask any question you like, so long as it is civil; as long as John approves, all marks of overriding arrogance and personal attack beyond an occasional hiccup of temper or attitude for obvious nonserious show from either side will be removed by me from any of the blog posts I make. I'm here for the facts - not the fights. I hope you will be, too, and I'm interested in the discussion of the evidences and arguments from both sides.
-Darrin Rasberry
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P.S. Some may realize I am unafraid to post my real name (yes, "Rasberry" is my real name, take a look at the Iowa State Mathematics grad student page!) and that any potential job, unlike, say, a self-employed writer like John's, would carry the risk of being rejected based on a quick search of my name from any potential employer. This is especially "risky" given that I'm looking in the storm-rich area of the Midwest for teaching, so I can drive my car into tornadoes on stormy afternoons right after work. If an employer rejected me for having an approach to religion that their top scholars respected, though, it would come out sooner or later - and better sooner, because I would not work for someone willing to decide an unrelated job position on religion in the first place. I am unafraid of where I stand in regards to religion, and having my name as-is here displays that IMO. Speaking openly also helps me remember to hold my tongue and continue my pledge to treat everyone fairly. I would invite as many nonbelievers as are reasonably able to introduce themselves with their real names as well, if they have not done so already ...
That's my argument despite the fact Christians claim the evidence is overwhelmingly on their side, and despite the fact that Christians claim to have direct assurance of their salvation by an inner witness of the Holy Spirit. I think this can easily be shown to be the case...easily.
Take for example Paul's words in I Corinthians 2:10-12: 10-But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. 11-For what man knoweth the things of man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. 12-Now, we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God."
Let's say this passage gives you this certainty, okay, among the other evidences. How certain are you that Paul wrote I Corinthians? How certain are you that your interpretation of that passage is correct? How certain are you that Paul was not a deluded man himself and that you should trust what he wrote? After all, Mohammed claimed God spoke to him too! And how certain are you that this experience you claim to have isn't self-generated due to wishful thinking? Lots of people claim such things as you do. I stand as a witness against such a testimony, you see.
Christian, what makes you certain isn't your experience or your investigation of the facts. What makes you certain is a psychological need to have faith. It's simply impossible for the evidence and your experience to lead you to certainty. No one in his right mind would claim to be certain about such things. You need to distinguish between the evidence and the level of certainty you have. The evidence, as judged by you, can only at best lead you to a 75% level of assurance (granting this to you). From where then comes the other 25%?
The bottom line is that you have acted upon faith so often you cannot distinguish between the probabilities of your faith from your God's demand for faith. You are simply obeying your God when you say you are certain, that's all. But it's not true.
Let me put it to you this way, and I would sincerely like an answer. You sin, correct? Daily, if I'm not mistaken, right? There are not only sins of omission, but you actually do wrong. If you were certain that your God exists you would not sin. That's my argument and here's two examples of what I mean: 1) If you knew with certainty that by crossing a line drawn in the sand you would get beaten to a pulp by a biker gang, would you do it? 2) If you loved your wife and another girl approached you to have sex with you in front of her would you do it?
I think the answer in both cases is an emphatic no. The first example emphasizes punishment for disobedience and the second one emphasizes your love for another person.
I think there is no way around this. You simply are not certain your God exists. Face it. Be honest. No more crap. This is a Debunking Christianity site. We will not let you get by so easily here.
Admit this and we can talk. If you deny it I want to know why.
Cheers.
Actually I've known this for a long long time. It's non-controversial and as sure as the odds can be. Let me explain
No one can be right about everything. No one. No one can write about the topics of God and the universe and be right about it all. No one can have a good grasp of theology, biblical studies, philosophy, science and history to claim he's correct about all of his conclusions in those areas. I know this. I know I am wrong about some things, maybe a great deal, who knows?
I want to know where I'm wrong. I don't think I'm wrong about my overall conclusion that Christian theism is delusional (or false, which is its dictionary definition) though, but I do know there are arguments I make that are wrong because the probability is that I cannot be right about everything. What's the likelihood of being right about everything given the vast terrain I write on? Very slim indeed. So, I am very interested in knowing where I am wrong since the odds are that I am. I would think a healthy skepticism is warranted here.
Christians, you too believe a great many things which depend on a great many arguments about God and the universe involving theology, biblical studies, philosophy, science and history. So I would expect being honest people that you too would think you were also wrong about some of your beliefs and some of the arguments you make, since the odds are that you are. That's why Debunking Christianity exists. It's a place for us all to learn. If you think you have all of the answers this isn't the place for you, on either side of this debate. Teach us and we will teach you. That we each think the other is wrong is assumed. You think that of us and we think that of you. But we can still learn from one another. Your job is to show us where we are wrong.
It’s been said: The Bible said it! I believe it! That settles it!
This is now understood as: The Bible said it! But, based on reality and society, we now reject it!
Let’s consider some major Biblically based dogmas and how church dogmatics has had to reject these same doctrines to keep up with reality and society.
A. The Bible teaches a geocentric universe and the Catholic Church believed it!
In 1992 John Paul II said this view was wrong!
B. Based on the Bible’s view of slavery in 1845 the Southern Baptist Convention was formed believing it!
In 1995 the Southern Baptist Convention adopted a resolution renouncing it!
C. Likewise, fundamentalist Bob Jones University was created for whites only based on the Biblical view that races are to be separated!
In 2008 the University issued a statement renouncing this Biblical teaching!
D. At the time of the Protestant Reformation, the Lutherans, Presbyterians and followed later by the Methodists Biblically refused the ordination of women to the ministry.
Beginning in the mid ‘70’s they rejected the Biblical view of women as subordinate to men and all now fully ordain them!
E. In the same Bible believing confession, Joseph Smith instituted plural marriages / polygamy in the 1830’s.
In 1890 the LDS Mormon Church issued a Manifesto renouncing this Biblical teaching!
F. Based on the same racist ideas derived from the Bible, the leadership of the LDS Mormon said all blacks were not God’s chosen people and were cursed!
In 1978 the LDS leadership renounced this Biblical based background and now lets all dark skin people hold the priesthood.
What’s next to go?!
While acknowledging that Jesus' usage of the term "son of man" has no consensus, this article shows how the term "son of man" was historically used to refer to mankind or Humans as a category, was never generally considered by the Jewish community to be a descriptive phrase for the Messiah, and therefore seems to be used incorrectly either by Jesus, by the authors and/or translators of the gospels as something like a personal pronoun for Jesus. In any case, presuming the Bible is the Word of God, the term still maps to two real world states fulfilling the criteria for Ambiguous Representation which is an Information and Data Quality (IDQ) design flaw.
This Article is part six of the series of articles applying Information and Data Quality (IDQ) Principles to the Bible. The purpose of the series is to show that the Bible is not a reliable or trustworthy source of information about God because it has problems identified in Information and Data Quality research as causing inaccuracy and unreliability. Links to the previous articles are listed below.
1. How Accurate is the Bible?
2. Applying Data and Information Quality Principles To The Bible
3. Applying IDQ Principles of Research To The Bible
4. Overview of IDQ Deficiencies Which Are Evident In Scripture
5. Jesus As God From IDQ Design Deficincies
A brief review of Ambiguous Representation and Mapping to a Meaningless State(1) follows.
Ambiguous representation
While it is permissible to use to a multiple datum to represent one real world state, it is not permissible to use one datum to represent two real world states. If multiple Real World states are represented by one datum there is not enough information with which to accurately represent either Real World state. This situation is called "Ambiguity". It is similar to incomplete representation because it can be considered an instance of missing information, even though one datum could incompletely represent two instances of a Real World state because it is not specific enough. It is analogous to using the term "she" in a conversation when discussing an event concerning multiple women. By not specifying which "she" is being referenced, the details of the event become unclear because the "she" being referred to is ambiguous.
Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing three instances of data represented by spheres in the column labeled RW (Real World) and two instances of Data in the D column. One instance of a Real World state is not represented by the Data in column D but instead, two instances of Real World states are represented by one instance of an information state.
Figure 1
Operation Deficiencies - Garbling: Map to a wrong state
In human terms, garbling occurs at the point of "consumption" or reading and interpretation. In Information Systems, it occurs at operation time or when the database is being accessed. Garbling occurs when a Real World state is incorrectly mapped to a wrong state in the Information System. Figure 2 illustrates this phenomena by showing two instances of data represented by spheres in the column labeled RW (Real World) and three instances of Data in the D column. One instance of an information state is not represented by or does not map back to a real world state and a Real World state in incorrectly interpreted as being represented by a valid however incorrect or unintended information state.
Figure 2
The son of man
In Hebrew, son of man can be used, generally speaking, as the word "Human". It originated in ancient Mesopotamia and was used to denote humanity or mankind in general especially when distinguishing between mankind and God (2, 3). In the Old Testament, "son of man" was used as the word "Human" would be used today. When the word "Human" is used to replace the phrase "son of man" in the Old Testament, the context retains its meaning. A list of instances where "son of man" appears in the Old Testament follows.
Old Testament instances
Numbers
-23:19
Job
- 16:18-21
- 25
- 35:6-8
Psalms
- 8
- 80
- 144
- 146
Isaiah
- 51:11-13
- 56:1-2
Ezekiel
- 2:1 - 47:6, used 97 times
Daniel
- 7:13-14
- 8:16-18
In Numbers, "son of man" is used to contrast God with Humanity showing how he is different using the example that he is above lying or repentance.
Numbers 23:19
God is not a man, that he should lie, Nor a son of man, that he should repent: Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not make it good?
In Ezekiel, the author is addressed as "son of man" in the context of addressing him by his type of being, emphasizing the difference between the author and God.
Ezekiel 2:1-10
1 He said to me, son of man, stand on your feet, and I will speak with you.
2 The Spirit entered into me when he spoke to me, and set me on my feet; and I heard him who spoke to me.
3 He said to me, son of man, I send you to the children of Israel, to nations that are rebellious, which have rebelled against me: they and their fathers have transgressed against me even to this very day.
.....
When the Book of Daniel was written the term turned up in chapter 7 verse 13. This instance of usage is believed by some to be a reference to the Messiah, and still it is consistent with the historical and cultural usage of the term. It is a reference to a being "like a son of man" which is believed, in Judaism and depending on the interpretation, to be either an Angel or a representation of the Messiah as a Human being. In either case though, it clearly is metaphorical and is not necessarily a reference to one single person that will get dominion forever because further on in verses 18 and 27, the text clearly states that "the Saints" and "the people of the Saints" (Plural) will have dominion. This is interpreted by some to mean the people of Israel will have everlasting dominion and that the human figure was representing a group.
Below are the relevant verses from Daniel discussing the "being like a son of man" and the plurality of who are going to get Dominion. I highly recommend that the reader look up the whole passage and read it in its entirety, in context. "Ancient of Days" is accepted as a reference to God in one of his constantly changing mystical anthropomorphic states.
Daniel 7:13-8:17
13 I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man, and he came even to the Ancient of days, and he was brought near before Him.
14 And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.
...
18 But the saints of the Most High shall receive the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever.'
...
22 until the Ancient of days came, and judgment was given for the saints of the Most High; and the time came, and the saints possessed the kingdom.
...
27 And the kingdom and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdoms under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High; their kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey them.'
Daniel 8:17
17 So he came near to where I was standing, and when he came I was frightened and fell on my face; but he said to me, "son of man, understand that the vision pertains to the time of the end."
There is consistent usage of the term "son of man" within Daniel 7 and 8, and its usage denotes a type of Human being. In verse 8, the author is referred to as "son of man". While most Jews don't seem to generally consider 7:13 a Messianic prophesy, some do, however they do not consider "son of man" a specific title for the Messiah as Christians do or as the authors of the Gospels had Jesus use it. Most Jewish Scholars don't think it likely that Jesus would have used the Aramaic term in that way because in Aramaic it never had that meaning(3). In other words, it never mapped to the Messiah as a Real World state, it only ever mapped to the category of Human.
And though it is written that Jesus used the term to describe himself, it is not clear that he considered himself God or the Messiah. For example, in Mark 8:27-31, and John 7:26-31, Jesus has the opportunity to say clearly and unequivocally that he is the Messiah, the Christ and God on Earth, but he doesn't. Numbers 23:19 says that God is not a man that he should lie, nor like a son of man that he should repent. There is a distinction between humans and God, one characteristic of that distinction is that he would not lie. A lie is hard to define so its hard to defend a claim that Jesus was lying, however, a lie does fall into the category of deception so if nothing else, Jesus was deceptive, which is considered to be a characteristic of Satan and Humans but not of God.
Numbers 23:19
God is not a man, that he should lie, Nor a son of man, that he should repent: Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not make it good?
Here the gospels have Jesus using the term "son of man" incorrectly and using a deceptive rhetorical persuasion technique just as Numbers said God wouldn't. Here he uses the bandwagon fallacy because who the people say he is is not relevant to who he really is, and he uses an improper appeal to authority because since the disciples have never seen a God on earth, and since they have not attempted to distinguish between Jesus and a Con Man, they are not qualified to assess. Jesus uses a rhetorical persuasion technique where he gets the "mark" to verbalize a commitment which increases the likelihood that they will defend the commitment even against disconfirming evidence and then he told them not to tell anyone which insulates them from having to defend their commitment because it decreases the amount of instances where a defense will be needed.
Mark 8:27 - 31
27 Jesus went out, along with His disciples, to the villages of Caesarea Philippi; and on the way He questioned His disciples, saying to them, "Who do people say that I am?"
28 They told Him, saying, "John the Baptist; and others say Elijah; but others, one of the prophets."
29 And He continued by questioning them, "But who do you say that I am?" Peter answered and said to Him, "You are the Christ."
30 And He warned them to tell no one about Him.
31 And He began to teach them that the son of man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again.
According to the Authors of the Gospels, when Jesus starting using the phrase "son of man", he was using it as personal pronoun to describe himself. If anyone who heard Jesus use this term in this way challenged it or asked for clarification, it is not recorded. There is no explanation of why Jesus changed the meaning of this phrase, presuming he had the authority to do so. But presuming he had the authority to do it, a sound general principle is that "if something can be done, doesn't mean it should be done". To maintain coherence over time and to explain to knowledgeable Jews who would not be able to have contact with Jesus, an explanation of the new use of the word was warranted. As it stands now it looks like Jesus didn't understand what the term meant or he was intentionally using it in an ambiguous way or that the authors and or translators of the Gospels didn't understand how the term should be used which is one reason why there is no consensus on Jesus' usage of it to this day.
Since Jesus was supposed to be God, then the Old Testament was Jesus' Word, and he used the phrase "son of man" in the Old Testament in the traditional way and he validated the authority of the Old Testament as the Word of God by using it as a reference for his teaching (5), he is not likely to have used the phrase "son of man" in that way because it is a new mapping to a real world state creating ambiguity.
It looks like the the phrase "son of man" was misunderstood by Jesus or the original authors (or translators) of Gospel resulting in a mapping to a wrong state, or a meaningless state depending on the perspective of the critic. In any case, if Jesus was god, then referring to himself using a term which he re-defined but did not explain is deliberately ambiguous and confusing. Since it is irrational for a teacher to teach and communicate to her students using ambiguous terms and deception, it follows that it would be irrational for God to do so as well, therefore the ambiguous use of the term "son of man" was an IDQ design deficiency of Ambiguous Representation in the origin of the text.
References and Further Reading
1. Anchoring Data Quality Dimensions in Ontological Foundations
2. Wikipedia, son of man
3. JewishEncyclopedia, son of man
4. Mechon Mamre
5. How Accurate is the Bible?
