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Dearly beloved, it is with the Sacrament of Reconciliation that I bring you greeting in the Holy name of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.
Beloved, the Lord hath burden my heart with a new homiletic epiphany on marriage as first based in the Old Covenant:
The following two verses are from this Old Covenant when our Heavenly Father wanted men and women to be joined in the flesh for creation of the human race: “God blessed them; and God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it;…” (Genesis 1:28).
Again, we are told by the inspirited writer of Genesis (Moses) that “ For this reason a man shall leave his father and his mother, and be joined to his wife; and they shall become one flesh.” (Genesis 2:24).
However, Beloved, this is the Old Covenant of Moses where we were yoked up under the Law and marriage. Now, let us turn our attention and notice what the New Covenant tells us as revealed by our Lord Himself relating to women and marriage as He Himself set our example:
“But He said to them, "Not all men can accept this statement, but only those to whom it has been given. For there are eunuchs who were born that way from their mother's womb; and there are eunuchs who were made eunuchs by men; and there are also eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to accept this, let him accept it." (Matthew 19: 11-12).
And the most Holy Apostle Paul: “Now concerning the things about which you wrote, it is good for a man not to touch a woman….But I say to the unmarried and to widows that it is good for them if they remain even as I. But if they do not have self-control, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn with passion.” (I Corinth. 7: 1, 8, & 9).
And finally our Lord again emphasizes his divine requirements for us to be holy even has He is holy and unmarried in the Apocalypse: “ Then I looked, and behold, the Lamb was standing on Mount Zion, and with Him one hundred and forty-four thousand, having His name and the name of His Father written on their foreheads. And I heard a voice from heaven, like the sound of many waters and like the sound of loud thunder, and the voice which I heard was like the sound of harpists playing on their harps. And they sang a new song before the throne and before the four living creatures and the elders; and no one could learn the song except the one hundred and forty-four thousand who had been purchased from the earth. These are the ones who have not been defiled with women, for they have kept themselves chaste. These are the ones who follow the Lamb wherever He goes. These have been purchased from among men as first fruits to God and to the Lamb. And no lie was found in their mouth; they are blameless.” (Revelation 14: 1-5).
Beloved, I ask you to examine your sinful life while you are here in your temporary earthen vessel of clay in light our beloved Savior Jesus Christ, the Holy Apostle Paul and the 144,000 virgin men who followed the Lamb in Revelation and to renounced any sexual sin as a venal sin by which you can make it into Heaven but, as St. Paul says “each man’s work will become evident; for the day will show it because it is to be revealed with fire, and the fire itself will test the quality of each man’s work. If any man’s work which he has built on it remains, he will receive a reward. If any man’s work is burned up, he will suffer loss; but he himself will be saved, yet so as through fire.” (I Corinth. 3: 13 - 15).
Now, may the Virgin of Our Lady of Guadalupe be an example before Christ for us. Amen
To All Christian Apologists: I have issued a challenge to debate all of you, one at a time. You can read my challenge
directly below this post. I have recently decided to go on the offensive.
One reason is because I'm tired of some of the skeptical arguments I've seen. Another reason is because I'm getting more and more feedback almost every single day from Christian people who have read my book and say they cannot adequately deal with it. One seminary trained pastor said my book only leaves open the possibilty of some sort of religious mysticism. And today I learned that yet another well-read Christian has lost his faith from reading just one book, mine. He had read Michael Martin's book, The Case Against Christianity, and David Ramsay Steele's book, Atheism Explained (both great books), but his faith was not affected at all until he read mine. [Edit: This morning my book was ranked #1 on the blog titled Failing the Insider Test (check it out! This Blog seems to be a spin-off from my Outsider Test for Faith). He says my book is "Head and shoulders" above the rest.].
Still another reason is that many Christians hate me anyway. If you do, it's not my problem. I'm not here to win friends. I'm here to help you take back your brainwashed selves. I have Christian Blog terrorists at my feet sooner or later whenever I leave the door open for a free and respectful discussion of the ideas that separate us. And I've decided that I really don't care if other skeptics agree with how I argue. I am not writing for them! They are not my target audience. You are! Mine is an arrogance about the arguments. I have them. You don't. [Plenty of other skeptics have great arguments too, so don't get me wrong about this].
Just to be sure, there is no personal animosity toward Christians as the good people I think most of you are. I like most Christians. That's not the issue. My claim is that not a single one of you can effectively and honestly deal with every argument in my book, any one of which is fatal to your faith (and I mean conservative Christians). Call me arrogant if you will. I don't care. Bring it on. Every day you wait, another soul might be lost from reading my book.
I don't revel in knowing some Christian people will probably suffer pain as the result of agonizing over their faith along with the social repercussions from leaving it. I'm only interested in educating people about Christianity. It's a delusion. You are deluded. And I am here to help you get over it.
The punishments for rape are perhaps the most disturbing regulations in the Bible.
While God ensures that the authors list it as a crime under most circumstances, we must realize that there are two contrasting conditions to consider in the event that a Hebrew woman is sexually violated: whether the victim is married (or engaged) or a virgin. The fine for committing one of the most heinous acts imaginable against a virgin woman without God’s permission is a pound of silver paid to her father and a forced marriage to the victim. (Deut 22:28-29) Yes, God’s idea of justice for the raped woman is to be horrendously punished again by forcing her to marry the man who savagely attacked her. This disgusting rule is nowhere near what most people would consider an ethical resolution, and it’s certainly not a decision rendered by any court I would like to be facing. On the other hand, a man who rapes an engaged virgin or a married woman will be stoned to death, not because he committed a brutal atrocity against the woman, but because he “violated another man’s wife.” (Deut 22:24-25)
Note the shamefully sharp contrast in disciplinary action between raping a woman with a husband and raping a woman without a husband: death versus a pound of silver. Since being raped is certainly all the same to the woman, it now becomes clear that God feels the husband is the one who is the victim of the attack. Raping a woman of your choice who does not have a husband allows you to marry the woman of your choice, but raping a woman who already belongs to another man warrants the death sentence. I could talk for days without overstating the evil absurdity of these rules. I simply cannot have any respect for any Christian who reads these regulations, acknowledges them, and makes excuses for them because they are part of the Old Testament. At no time should this philosophy have been law.
It has been asserted by Christian apologists that Deut 22:28-29 speaks of consensual sex, and not rape. There are several reasons why I believe this is unfeasible. The argument that "to take (taphas) and lay with (shakab)" do not refer to rape is invalidated by Genesis 34:2, in which "to take (laqach) and lay with (shakab)" is long understood to be a case of rape. Strong's confirms that Taphas and Laqach (and Chazaq in Deut 22:25 for that matter) are closely related synonyms. The idea that this isn't rape because the author didn't reuse Chazaq (from 22:25) in Deut 22:29 also does not hold up because one could make the same argument that Chazaq doesn't imply rape because Laqach (from Gen 34) wsn't reused in Deut 22:25 and again in Deut 22:29. The clear meaning of taphas, laqach, and chazaq when used in conjunction with shakab is to take/handle/hold by force (granted that chazaq appears to be stronger than either taphas or laqach, but laqach (Gen 34) is no stronger than taphas (Deut 22). Cases of pure adultery in Deut 22 do not mention any sort of "taking" or "forcing," only "laying with." The only argument left for the apologist is to suggest that Dinah was not raped in Genesis 34:2, but the context from later in Genesis 34 casts doubt on this hypothesis. And we know women were possessions in the OT, so let's not pretend otherwise.
Comments appreciated but my time will be limited this week.
Link. Giberson wrote the book
Saving Darwin. Shermer wrote the book
Why Darwin Matters.
Amherst, New York (December 08, 2008)—Scholars gathered this past weekend, December 5-7, in Amherst, New York, for the inaugural meeting of The Jesus Project in a renewed quest for the historical Jesus. The project, sponsored by the secular think tank Center for Inquiry and its Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion (CSER), is an effort by historians, biblical scholars, and theologians to determine what can be reliably recovered about the historical figure of Jesus, his life, his teachings, and his activities, utilizing the highest standards of scientific and scholarly objectivity.
An earlier inquiry, "The Jesus Seminar," founded by Professor Robert Funk in 1985, concerned itself primarily with the sayings attributed to Jesus in the Gospels and related sources. Dr. R. Joseph Hoffmann, chair of the Project and CSER, said that the "The Jesus Seminar had difficulty separating itself from the faith commitments of its members. Its agenda was not exclusively, but in large measure theologically driven. Its conclusions and methods raised more questions than they answered."
The project has drawn together a diverse and rich group of scholars, including, among others Gerd Lüdemann, Paul Kurtz, Robert Price, James Tabor, Robert Eisenman, David Trobisch, Bruce Chilton, Dennis MacDonald, and R. Joseph Hoffmann.
At the session this past weekend, participants agreed that a rigorous scientific inquiry was needed, and that the Project would be committed to a position of neutrality towards the sources used as "evidence" for the Jesus tradition. Participants represent a wide variety of perspectives, ranging from Tabor's argument that there is substantial evidence that the tomb of the family of Jesus has been located, to the view that the evidence for the existence of Jesus as an historical figure is not persuasive. "Jesus remains after 2,000 years the most fascinating figure of Western civilization," said James Tabor, author of The Jesus Dynasty: A New Historical Investigation of Jesus, His Royal Family, and the Birth of Christianity. "Scholars now at the beginning of the twenty-first century are able to take advantage of a plethora of new texts, sources, and methods, including the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, various lost Gospels that are not in our New Testament, and a rich archaeological record." Tabor says that scholars today find themselves uniquely positioned to examine the issue of who Jesus was in new and challenging ways. During the closing conference round-table, Tabor was quick to emphasize that "the Jesus Project repudiates any theological agendas, special pleading, or dogmatic presuppositions." All members of the project share a common commitment to the importance of applying scientific methodologies to the sources used to construct the Jesus tradition.
The Project has outlined a set of priorities for its next meetings, including a "consistent" translation of the Gospels, an inquiry into the causes of the canonization of the existing New Testament documents, parallels between Islam and early Christianity in delineating its sacred books, and the need to carve a middle path between what Hoffmann describes as "Da Vinci Code sensationalism and the truly fascinating story that underlies the history of Christianity."
Papers delivered at the conference will be published under the title "Sources of the Jesus Tradition: An Inquiry," by Prometheus Books in 2009. The Project's next conference is scheduled tentatively for May 2009 in Chicago.
*Listen to Robert Price interview about The Jesus Project on WBFO, Buffalo's NPR affiliate.
I am writing this to discuss whether or not the evidence we have (the Bible and other historical documents) shows Jesus was a real person or a myth. To begin with, I want to note that no one piece of the evidence we have seems to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jesus existed, but when taken together it looks more likely than not that Jesus existed. In this post, I am going to begin with some arguments which I think support a historical Jesus, then move on to bad or feeble arguments for a historical Jesus (This is intended to a series of posts, each looking at different arguments concerning Jesus’ historicity.
Good Arguments for a historical Jesus:
1. In Mark 15 Jesus’ last words are recorded: “Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani”, which is Aramaic for “My God, My God, Why hast thou forsaken me?”
Why is this signifigant? Well, you have to remember that Mark was written in Greek even though first century Judeans spoke Aramaic. It would make sense for Jesus’ followers to want to preserve his exact words, untranslated and as he spoke them. Yet it would not make sense to record this if Jesus had been viewed as a cosmic, supernatural figure who never walked the earth.
2. Paul calls Jesus the “first fruits” of those who have fallen asleep (1 Corinthians 15:20). What Paul seems to be saying (reading the passage in context) is that Jesus was the first of the dead to be resurrected (It was thought that in the end times all the dead would be raised) and that the end times were now. This implies Jesus was a man of flesh and blood and lived recently.
Bad/Feeble Arguments for a Historical Jesus
The argument (or rather, arguments, as this involves many scriptures) we will consider is the argument from the Pauline epistles. This argument contends that
1. The letters of Paul were written in the 50’s (This is not doubted by even non-Christian scholars).
2. Paul Speaks of Jesus as a Historical Person (This is disputable, as we will see, many people misinterpret Paul as speaking literally when, read in context, he speaking figuratively. I know of only two Pauline passages which clearly point to a historical Jesus and I have mentioned them above).
3. No one would invent a figure who lived so recently (less than 20 years prior) in Judea and contended that they knew his siblings and had those who had known him during his life. (I have no truck with this conclusion so long as the premises are sound).
Let’s take a look at the passages John posted in one of his blog posts about the historical Jesus:
Jesus descended from Abraham (Gal. 3:16);
Let’s look at the passage:
“The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. The Scripture does not say "and to seeds," meaning many people, but "and to your seed," meaning one person, who is Christ. What I mean is this: The law, introduced 430 years later, does not set aside the covenant previously established by God and thus do away with the promise.”
We notice right off the bat that the connection between Jesus and Abraham is probably not a literal, flesh and blood relationship, at least in this context: There was something about Jesus which made him a successor to Abraham, something which was beyond DNA (Since the Jewish people were not also considered to be Abraham’s “seed” in the same sense that Jesus was). We also need to pay attention to the metaphor in use here, which I will discuss shortly: In Galatians 4 Paul also discusses how Sarah and Hagar, the wife and concubine of Abraham, should be thought of figuratively and how the Christians are the sons of Sarah, the free woman.
[Jesus] was born of a woman and lived under Jewish law (Gal. 4:4);
Allow to provide a lengthy excerpt from an essay by Rook Hawkins, who explains this passage much more clearly than I am able:
Those out to verify the historical Jesus are quick to jump on this verse without considering what Paul is actually saying here. This verse is taken for granted, presupposed to be about a person which Paul never knew. For Jesus was not born at all but made (genomenon), specifically, under the law. What is the law? Paul actually tells us what “the law” (tou nomou) means. “It was added because of transgressions, until the seed should come to whom the promise has been made. It was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator (mesitou).” (Gal. 3:19) Paul clarifies for us, “For we know that the law (ho nomos) is spiritual (pneumatikos), but I am of the flesh (sarkinos), sold under sin.” (Rom. 7:14) To Paul, what comes from the flesh is corruption and sinful. “For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh.” (Rom. 7:18) The law is the spiritual custodian (ephrouroumetha) of the flesh, a teacher by which Paul feels leads one to life. It is through this custodian, the spirit, per Paul, that we are also saved. There is also an underlining allegory to this passage that most scholars seem to ignore.[28] Do those who want to understand Paul so easily forget the allegory of the two women, Sarah and Hagar, for which we are all a part of?[29] This chapter (Galatians 4) is not about Jesus at all. It is entirely about the law and how to be saved under the law.[30]
“Tell me, you that desire to be under the law, don't you listen to the law? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the handmaid, and one by the free woman. However, the son by the handmaid was made according to the flesh, but the son by the free woman was made through promise. These things contain an allegory, for these are two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai, bearing children to bondage, which is Hagar. For this Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and answers to the Jerusalem that exists now, for she is in bondage with her children. But the Jerusalem that is above is free, which is the mother of us all. For it is written, "Rejoice, you barren who don't bear. Break forth and shout, you that don't travail. For more are the children of the desolate than of her who has a husband." Now we, brothers, as Isaac was, are children of promise. But as then, he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him who was born according to the Spirit, so also it is now. However what does the Scripture say? "Throw out the handmaid and her son, for the son of the handmaid will not inherit with the son of the free woman." So then, brothers, we are not children of a handmaid, but of the free woman.” – Paul, Galatians 4:21-31
The context is very important. Jesus is made under the law—the spiritual custodian—by a “woman” or specifically, “the Jerusalem above” (hê de anô Ierousalêm), which also happens to allegorically be the mother to everyone. Not everyone in a worldly sense, Paul makes this clear, “for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes, to the Jew first and also to the Greek.” (Rom. 1:16) But Paul was speaking specifically to everyone who is adopted into the death of Jesus Christ, “but you have received the Spirit of adoption as sons, by whom we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’” (Rom. 8:15) And here the understanding of the parable comes back around. We die, the same way Jesus dies. We call out to our father, allegorically, as we become kin with Jesus through the spirit. But through this death we are saved, from the flesh which is corrupt, through a rebirth. This rebirth is of this allegorical woman in the same way that Paul’s Jesus is born through the same allegorical woman. Indirectly we, like Jesus, are born again spiritually by way of the heavens, or directly, by God.
[Jesus] was the son of David (Romans 1:3);
In order to keep this article’s length to a minimum, I ask you to read the essay linked above as it also has the answer to this passage: It is an allegory intending to portray Jesus as one who treated Jews and Gentiles according to their deeds, just as David did.
[Jesus] had a brother named James (Gal. 1:19) and other brothers (I Cor. 9:5).
Both of these passages use the phrase “brother of the Lord” or “brothers of the Lord” which seems to me to indicate a spiritual relationship rather than a genetic one (Why not simply call James, ‘the brother of Jesus’). I also must note the words of early church father Origen:
"Now this James was he whom that genuine disciple of Jesus, Paul, said he had seen as the Lord’s brother; [Gal. i. 19.] which relation implies not so much nearness of blood, or the sameness of education, as it does the agreement of manners and preaching. If therefore he says the desolation of Jerusalem befell the Jews for the sake of James, with how much greater reason might he have said, that it happened for the sake of Jesus."
Of course, I also need to note that I have discussed this with Dr. James McGrath and he told me that by the third century some Christians believed Mary remained a virgin her whole life and thus they sought to explain away the references to Jesus’ siblings as symbolic. But think about this: Would it make more sense for the perpetual virgin dogma to spring up from a sect which believed (originally, at least) in a spiritual Christ, or would it make more sense to think that one day Christians decided Mary had to be a virgin and so they’d just explain away all the references to her other children? Of course, religious dogmas rarely make sense, so perhaps it is the latter.
Jesus instituted the Lord’s Supper (I Cor. 11:23-25); was betrayed (I Cor. 11;23);
It does not tell us where or when Jesus was killed, and so this does not affect the Jesus myth theory as I present it: Jesus may have appeared to Paul in a vision with a cup of wine and a loaf of bread and instituted the eucharist for all we know.
[He] was killed by the Jews of Judea (I Thess. 2:14-15),
This is very likely an interpolation (See here). Although the link I give is to one of those “conservative Christian” sites, there is a reasonable discussion of why this is thought to be a later addition to the text. In the end, however, I must disagree with the author’s conclusion that we need a text without the offending passage to make up our minds about its authenticity. The earliest manuscripts of Paul’s letters date to well over 100 years after Paul wrote, and we know that scribes made alterations to Biblical texts they copied (See Misquoting Jesus by Bart Ehrman). So there may be a lot of interpolations which we will never be able to prove (using manuscriptural evidence) are interpolations. We are stuck looking for clues within the text.
[H]e was buried and seen as resurrecting (I Cor. 15:4-8).
Again, where and when? In the New Jerusalem or somewhere on earth 20 years ago?
-- AIGBusted
This is cute. While not real, churches do dispute such things.
I am now considered an "expert" over at
Opposing Views. This is an interesting site with decent rules of debate over many different issues.
In my book I explicitly state that some skeptics may not like the way I argue. One of the reasons is because I talk about presuppositions, assumptions, worldviews, and control beliefs. In one of my posts a discussion flared up about this starting with author
Jeffrey Mark’s comment. While he wasn’t responding directly to anything I had written let me respond.
I think scientifically minded and theologically or philosophical minded people go head to head over these ideas. As a philosophical minded person let me try to explain this to scientifically minded people, if I can.
The definitions of these words are similar but not exactly the same. They apply differently depending on the particular subject at hand. And they involve different things depending on whether the context is a discussion with someone else, or simply describing what we believe to be the case.
Let’s say we are discussing or debating an idea with someone else. When we engage in any argument we all have our presuppositions and assumptions. Those beliefs are the ones we presuppose and are assumed to be true. These beliefs are not presently on the table at the moment. They are presupposed for the sake of further conversation. If two Christians are debating over Arminianism and Calvinism they do not need to begin by arguing whether or not God exists or whether the Bible is God’s word. They are presupposing them in this context. If two philosophers are arguing about the existence of God they must presuppose that they are communicating with each other in a real material world, and that the discussion is an important one. If two scientists are arguing about something the same thing applies with regard to the importance of science, the reliability of induction and their senses.
Any presupposition or assumption can be laid on the table though, and discussed. A Christian Arminian would be frustrated in discussing Christian theology with someone who didn’t accept the Bible as the word of an existing God. A philosopher may be frustrated in having to continually revisit whether there is a material world before he can argue other things with other philosophers about other topics. A scientist would abhor having to go back and revisit the reliability of his senses with a pantheist who might require it, since the pantheist believes everything is maya, or an illusion. So some discussions between people who see things differently might be extremely frustrating, for they don’t agree on some basic common beliefs. That’s why Christian philosopher James Sire’s book is called, The Universe Next Door. Some of us see things so differently we live in different intellectual universes. There is even debate among theologians, philosophers and philosophers of science whether or not there is common ground between people who live in these different intellectual universes. Philosophers of science debate whether differing scientific paradigms are commensurable or incommensurable (ala Thomas Kuhn). Applied scientists are usually not informed about this kind of debate.
When it comes to what we believe, our problem is to try and isolate one of our particular assumptions for analysis. It’s extremely difficult if not impossible to do. For all assumptions and presuppositions we hold to are placed within the context of a whole worldview. We try to make consistent sense of our beliefs about God, the universe, ethics, politics, history, death, and so forth. A worldview is our particular way of making all of our beliefs cohere into a single consistent system of thought. Since it's impossible to lay our whole worldview on the table for analysis we can only isolate and analyze one or two particular beliefs at a time within it. But when we do so the other beliefs that form our worldview play a part in our analysis of that one particular belief we are trying to isolate for analysis. These other beliefs are called background beliefs. Our background beliefs consist of everything we have ever experienced and everything we have ever come to believe (minus that one particular belief we are trying to analyze). These background beliefs of ours control how we evaluate that particular belief in question, so I call them control beliefs. They control how we view that one particular belief in question. These control beliefs can actually explain away the evidence if they are strongly held ones. This is little different than the differing stories that a prosecutor and defense attorney might tell based upon the available evidence, one showing the defendant guilty and the other one showing that he is innocent. The evidence is the same. How do you decide?
An additional and telling problem is that no one has probably analyzed all of his beliefs. There are beliefs we have assumed are true based upon early childhood experiences that we have never placed on the table. Analyzing all of our beliefs is probably impossible otherwise we’d have to revisit every book we’ve ever read, every conversation, and every experience. So we all have unexamined beliefs we assume to be true, all of us. Some beliefs are more important and controlling than others, some have less evidence for them than others, and some are so well founded in our minds that we cannot question them, but we all have them. And they control how we see things, everything, for they are all placed within our own particular worldview. Furthermore, every belief we have is disputed by someone else in the world who can offer his reasons for doing so, even if we may disagree. Throughout history you will find this the case as well. No matter what you believe there has been a scholar, a philosopher, or a scientist who believed differently. That’s why philosopher/scientist A. N. Whitehead wrote, “Some assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know that they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them.”
I haven’t covered everything on this topic but for the record I do think we should follow the evidence and I do trust the reliability of our senses and the scientific method as the only possible way out of this quagmire of beliefs. And I think it is intellectual dishonesty to assume with any kind of certainty a whole worldview like the presuppositionalists do. To do that is to be impervious to all outside criticism. It is to lock oneself inside an ivory tower in the sky that never has to touch down on earth. I do not assume my whole worldview web of beliefs are all true with any degree of certainty. Some beliefs form the center of my web, like logic and my senses, while those in middle and on the periphery become less and less firmly held ones. And I must continually isolate one belief after another for analysis, even I cannot give up those that are closer and closer to the center of my web because I have solid reasons for trusting in them.
In any case I acknowledge the problem. So when it comes to my critique of the Christian theistic worldview I spend over half of my book arguing for my particular set of skeptical control beliefs. I do not assume them when crossing over into a different intellectual universe such as Christianity. As an outsider I shouldn’t do this if I want to be heard. I must first argue for them. To anyone who attempts to critique a different worldview he must argue for why he sees things differently. In the case of Christianity he must argue why he trusts science, rather than assuming it, and he must argue for why he adopts a skeptical set of control beliefs, rather than merely assuming a skeptical position. He must truly engage their worldview by understanding it. And he must start by critiquing their supernatural assumptions and their belief in the Bible as God's word.
Since DC readers have asked for more on this question,
here is the link. Bob is a friend of mine who wrote the book,
Deconstructing Jesus. With Paul Rhodes Eddy, Greg co-wrote the book,
The Jesus Legend.
Given the fact that skeptics are only making meager progress toward our common goals in society let's think together about a long term strategy. Do we have one? Does anyone? Care to discuss this?
As a former minister I know that Christians have several long term strategies with strong organizations. Maybe we can learn from them?
Their first strategy is to reach children. They target children in the home and the church. The younger the better. There is a group called Childhood Evangelism, which seeks to convert kids as young as they can. Richard Dawkins calls things like this "child abuse." There are bus ministries geared toward getting kids to church. Norman L. Geisler, who is considered the "dean of apologetics," was raised in an atheist home but was converted as the result of a bus ministry that brought him to church every Sunday for ten years!
Then there are college campus ministries like Bill Bright's Campus Crusade for Christ. William Lane Craig is involved with this group. There are even rich Christian benefactors who have bought up hundreds of thousands of copies of Josh McDowell's books which are distributed for free on college campuses!
Then on the cultural level there is the important Samaritan Strategy, where by doing good works in the name of Jesus they influence our society.
Christians have legal groups to protect their rights as well, like The Christian Legal Society.
There are other things Christians do to reach people and inflence society. Are we as skeptics interested in doing likewise? I know we don't have the numbers or means to do as much as Christians do, but are we serious about changing society and influencing minds, or not? I think most people who become skeptics simply get on with life, since after all, this is the only life they will ever have. Only a small minority of them become passionate to change minds and change society.
As an agnostic, Robert G. Ingersol was probably the most powerful orator in the 19th century, speaking to standing room only crowds. He was rich and he was powerful. He could speak out as he desired, and he did. There are many books available that contain his speeches. As such, he could've financed a national atheist/agnostic organization to influence American society. Our movement could've been started much earlier if he had. But he didn't. Now we have several of these organizations. Are YOU involved in any of them?
Is there more we can do? Is there more YOU as a skeptic can do?
The biggest problem might just be fear, and some of this is justified. There is the fear of coming out of the so-called closet. If you have not yet done so, at least seriously consider doing this. There is power in numbers. You realize, don't you, that in numbers we may be the second largest denomination in America behind Catholics! One in four Americans may be either agnostic or atheist. The more of us who tell the people we know what we think, the better. Just think of it this way. There have been a great many people who went before us and suffered a great deal so that we have the freedom to speak out, some of whom were burned at the stake. Don't trample on their blood. If they did this for us then we should do it for those who come after us.
Any other thoughts?
In this article, I will revisit some thoughts I made last week about Dr. William Lane Craig's morality argument for the existence of God. The critique has been adjusted to answer the top two or three objections presented in the post, and also adds some additional thoughts I've had over the past week.
As you may recall, Bill's argument goes like this:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
First, some definitions.
Value def. "An idea by which one guides his or her life." (Craig 172)
Moral value def. "A value that can be identified as good or bad." (Craig 172)
Moral duty def. "A binding idea that one ought to do, in which doing so is 'right' and not doing so is 'wrong.'" (Craig 172)
Objective moral value def. "[A moral value] that is true independent of what people think or perceive." (Craig 173)
We assume objective moral duties, mentioned on page 175, are similarly defined, though Bill doesn't define that term himself.
To begin, one might note what the difference is between something that is "good" or "bad," and something that is "right" or "wrong." Craig seems to define the former (i.e. "objective moral value") as something nonbinding on a human being. For instance, Bill states that it is good for one to become a chemist, doctor, etc., but since one may choose only one profession, all of these professions, while good, are not binding on someone.
Bill then dives headlong into wondering whether "objective moral values" exist, slipping in the word "evil" for the word "bad," and including the Holocaust as an example. If a moral value, by Craig's definition, is not binding, how does this example relate to the thesis presented? If it isn't binding, it isn't objective by Craig's definition of the word. It directly depends on a human being, on the situation the human finds himself in, and so on; becoming a Nazi is not a choice one makes in the same sense as becoming a chemist or doctor.
Bill corrects himself without knowing it on page 173 by pointing out that being a Nazi is wrong, i.e. that it is something one ought not to do, i.e. that it is a moral *duty* under his terminology. So it seems to me, first of all, that there is a bit of equivocation going on between "moral value," and "moral duty." But no matter; Craig presents a similar argument on page 175 for objective moral duties, so we'll dismiss this for now and get straight to the heart of the matter, and take "objective moral values" to encompass both (although we will, as Bill does, mostly appeal to duty).
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." As I stated before, we are not presented with evidence to verify this statement. All we have is a parade of arch-materialists like Richard Dawkins and crew, who present men as some kind of DNA-propagating birdbrained cretins lacking any sort of identity they think they have, because we evolved from beings that did not have that identity. One wonders whether they will state that we are really underwater, because our ancestors were all underwater, but whatever. They deny the identity of man as a rational being, by means of their own (mistaken) behavior as rational beings. Besides, the only thing that can be reached here is, at most: "If evolution is true, objective moral values do not exist," not Premise (1).
In addition to this, a regiment of philosophers is brought before us, who, like Nietzsche, already buy Premise (1). This is simply an appeal to authority, and also can't substantiate the premise.
Continuing on, the objection made in my earlier post was that I presented a false alternative; that objective moral values proceed from the identity of God, not from God's decree or from some other means independent of man and God. Very well; objective moral values can be divided into these two possibilities:
(1) Proceeding from or coexistent with God (by whatever means)
(2) Not proceeding from nor coexistent with God (by whatever means).
Craig dispenses of (2) entirely on page 178 and 179.
We are now left with the following statement from this information:
"objective moral values exist if and only if God exists"
Of course in this case, Premise (1) is automatically valid: if God does not exist then objective moral values obviously do not exist.
The problem is now in Premise (2) for this consideration: "Objective moral values exist" is equivalent to "God exists."
So the argument turns from
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore, God exists.
into
1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore God exists.
The argument thus begs the question, and is invalid.
Someone wondered in the previous post why I said that the proof as Craig presents it does not prove that God is the moral lawgiver: Bill himself recognizes this difficulty on page 172 right after his introduction, but states that the conclusion that the morals come from God "tends to be implicit" in Premise (1). Bill leaves it at that, as he realizes the stove here is quite hot; that very point, i.e. the implicit direct relation between God and objective moral value as Bill defines it, is what makes the argument beg the question.
As an aside, I do believe in objective moral values, although my definition for objective is "that which is based in reality," which is not necessarily Craig's definition. Since men ultimately exist in reality and have situations ultimately based in reality, and since men have a solid identity and their situations have a solid identity, objective moral values proceed from this. This doesn't itself rule out God, for a God could have brought us about with this identity, but it doesn't demand the need for a God, either. In my own opinion, God must be proven by different means, and I have not seen an effective proof (if God is well-defined to begin with).
I am looking forward to another good discussion on this important topic! I enjoyed the civility and focus when I first brought this up, and I want to thank everyone on both sides for maintaining it. :)
-Darrin
This is the place to do so if you wish.
I had caught one or more Christians poisoning the well by coming in from several different anonymous proxy servers to vote negatively on the first poll. There were fifteen that came in from one of these servers during a short period of time. This made the poll completely unreliable. It still isn't anywhere near scientific, but I'm interested in hearing from our honest readers, so I'll try again.
You'll notice that the poll now doesn't allow a skeptic reader to say this site is bad. It may be. If so state your reasons here. I am of the opinion that honest readers wouldn't say this of us unless they were Christians. And I'm also of the opinion that even Christians, if they were honest, could say this is a good site even if they disagree. If I'm wrong about any of this then I only ask skeptics who think this is a poor site to state your reasons why here. And while you're at it please tell us why you visit us if the site is so poor. Why would you do that?
To anyone disappointed that there's no longer an option for a skeptic to say this site is a poor one then you only have a Christian or more who repeatedly voted negatively on the previous poll for this.
Cheers.
Christian apologists often complain about New Testament critics who bring an
a priori rejection of the supernatural to their studies of the New Testament. The underlying rationale, I take it, is that such a presupposition will determine a non-supernatural historical reconstruction of Jesus before they even begin their historical investigations. But if the historical Jesus turns out to be the miracle-working, resurrected Son of God that conservative Christians take him to be, such an assumption will lead them to construct a historically inaccurate conception of Jesus.
I agree with them in this regard: one shouldn't assume what can or can't be true on empirical matters before one even begins one's investigations. Although it's probably unavoidable that we bring assumptions about reality to all of our empirical inquiries, we should hold them tentatively, and allow them to be altered in light of our findings.
Of course, this assumes that supernatural events, if they occur, are capable of empricial detection, but I grant that they are detectable, at least in principle (I say this as someone who has read his Hume).
I also agree with them that there are some NT critics who do reject the supernatural a priori (e.g., the members of the Jesus Seminar, Gerd Ludemann, etc.). Having said that, however, I'd like to make three points with respect to naturalism, a priori commitments, and NT studies.
First, many New Testament critics do not assume that supernatural events do not or cannot occur; rather, they have principled reasons for thinking that, even if they do occur, the evidence for such events is never sufficient to establish their occurence. There are two ways to construe the 'never' here: never in practice and never in principle (both construals go back, of course, to Hume's famous essay "Of Miracles" in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding). Now one may disagree with their arguments on these matters (I tend to think that Hume's "in principle" argument is too strong, although I think his "in practice" argument has considerable force), but that's not the point. Rather, the point is that apologists too often attack straw men here, viz., by attributing to NT scholars a metaphysical basis for their conclusions, when in fact they're often based on epistemological considerations.
Second, although some NT critics do base their non-conservative conclusions about Jesus in particular or the New Testament in general on an a priori rejection of the supernatural, they need not do so. In fact, many don't. Indeed, there are plenty of NT scholars who are also serious Christians, yet who nonetheless reject the doctrine of inerrancy, based on their research.[1] In other words, non-conservative views of Jesus and/or the New Testament are supportable merely from applying ordinary historical methodology. For example, one can see how the geneologies and pre-birth narratives in Matthew and Luke contradict both each other and established historical fact in order to make theological points. The same goes with John versus the synoptic gospels on the day and time of Jesus' crucifixion: John changes it in order to fit his theological theme of Jesus as the Passover "Lamb of God" (I know that inerrantists argue against these discrepancies. I have no desire to argue with them in vain. I merely ask them to read a sufficiently representative sampling of NT scholarship outside of their conservative circles). Also, once one does their source-critical homework, they can see how, e.g., Matthew and Luke modified the portrait of Jesus they inherited from Mark and Q, and how John went even further. Thus, a non-conservative account of Jesus in particular and the New Testament in general often results from ordinary, non-controversial use of source criticism, redaction criticism, and the criteria of authenticity -- it need not be based on an a priori rejection of the supernatural.
Finally, if some NT critics are guilty of an a priori commitment to naturalism, many conservative NT scholars are guilty of an a priori commitment to inerrancy. Yet many apologists don't seem to mind when the latter determines the conclusions of conservative NT scholars. This leads one to question the sincerity of apologists in their criticisms of a priori commitments creeping into NT scholarship. For again, the basis of their criticism appears to be that such a priori commitments are liable to result in an inaccurate historical reconstruction of Jesus, should the person of Jesus turn out to be in conflict with those commitments. But if that is the basis of their criticism, then they should be equally diligent in their criticisms of conservative scholars who have an a priori commitment to inerrancy -- and to a conservative view of Jesus in particular and the New Testament in general. In other words, the potential danger here is not naturalistic a priori commitments, but a priori commitments per se.
But it's hard to deny that there is an a priori commitment to inerrancy among the majority of conservative NT scholars. For one thing, many of them work at conservative seminaries, where one must subscribe to and even sign extremely conservative doctrinal statments in order to obtain and keep one's job. Such scholars can't let an admission of errancy through the door, no matter what the relevant data should turn out to be, and no matter how convoluted and implausible the stories may be that are required to reconcile a given set of biblical texts.[2] Thus, it's a bit odd to hear apologists complain about a priori committments determining one's portrait of Jesus, when their own a priori commitments often determine, or significantly influence, their own portrait of Jesus.
To sum up: Christian apologists have a point worth hearing when they criticize certain NT critics for bringing an a priori commitment to naturalism to their studies. For one should let the empirical data about Jesus and the NT materials speak for themselves, lest one's conclusions be determined from the get-go, quite possibly distorting the data in the process. However, the apologists have failed to see that the point about a priori assumptions is a perfectly general one, and can't be limited to naturalism. And this entails that conservative NT scholars need to abandon a priori assumptions about inerrancy and orthodoxy when they come to their study of the empirical data, lest they, likewise, allow their assumptions to determine their conclusions from the get-go, quite possibly distorting the data along the way. The lesson is that all sides of the debate should hold their theoretical commitments tentatively, not forcing the pieces of evidence to fit within them when the fit is unnatural. Rather, one's assumptions should be malleable, and even disposable, thereby allowing the data to speak to us clearly, unmuffled.
-----------------------
[1] Examples include Raymond Brown, Dale Allison, James D.G. Dunn, John Meier, and Luke Timothy Johnson.
[2] For many examples of such reconciling stories, see, e.g., Craig Blomberg's The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, Norman Geisler's When Critics Ask, and Gleason Archer's Encyclopedia of Bible Difficulties. I leave it to the reader to decide whether these reconciliations are more plausible than not (more plausible, that is, to someone who doesn't already accept inerrancy).
If you want to see an index to either of my two books they can be found on Amazon:
1.
Why I Became an Atheist.
2.
The Christian Delusion.
Click on the links above and do a search "inside the book" for any name or subject you want to find.
“And I will bless those who bless you, And the one who curses you I will curse. And in you all the families of the earth will be blessed." Genesis 12:3
This past Sunday night, the National Geographic Channel aired a program based on the documented facts that there were 42 failed attempts to kill Hitler in: 42 Ways to Kill Hitler.
While attempting these 42 failed assassinations to kill this monster; six millions Jews, Jehovah Witnesses and other “undesirables” died in Nazi concentration camps along with millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
When I was a student at Columbia Theological Seminary, the bottom floor of the school’s library housed stacks of books (many written by Jews) trying to explain or deal with the crimes against humanity of Hitler and the Nazi forces in World War II.
If there is a God seated on his Royal Throne in Heaven, why did he not let at least 38 of these assassination attempts succeed since the death of Hitler could have stopped the Nazi machine or the latter of the 38 attempts would have ended the war?
In fact, the documentary noted Hitler consider himself immortal and protect by God. Plus, after 42 failed attempts on his life, Hitler was allow to end his life on his own terms and when he was ready to.
Here are a few basic questions:
If there is really some God of love watching over his creation, why did this God leave millions of his chosen / Covenanted people to suffer and die horrible deaths?
Why did thousands of Christian Jehovah Witnesses also died in Nazi concentration camps?
If God is “teaching us a lesson” what is it? He does not exist? He is now dead? He dose not / can not answer prayers? He wants his believers to prop him up theologically? Is he is doing some sort of religious test on believers?
And just what the Hell was Jesus doing as hundreds of millions of Christians cried out to him for help daily?
Christians, you have your work cut out for you now. It’s time to create
some major theological excuse!
...so argued Jeffery Jay Lowder, co-founder of the
Secular Web. I think people who deny the existence of a mere man named Jesus who was the founder of the Jesus cult have to explain away too many things to think the way they do. They could likewise claim Paul never existed by the same standards of reasoning that they do with Jesus. Where is Paul's existence independently confirmed outside of the New Testament?
Historical studies can be used to deny almost anything in history. Historical studies are like that, so we must exercise caution. There must be a limit to how skeptical a historian can be about historical conclusions simply by virtue of the fact that someone could be skeptical of almost all of them. As evidence for this, people today even deny the Holocaust happened.
Lowder makes the case that independent confirmation of a man named Jesus is not necessary, and I agree. He writes:.There simply is nothing epistemically improbable about the mere existence of a man named Jesus. (Just because Jesus existed does not mean that he was born of a virgin, that he rose from the dead, etc.). I think that the New Testament does provide prima facie evidence for the historicity of Jesus. It is clear, then, that if we are going to apply to the New Testament ‘the same sort of criteria as we should apply to other ancient writings containing historical material,’ we should not require independent confirmation of the New Testament's claim that Jesus existed.”
Again, the standards for accepting historical conclusions cannot be as rigorous as the standards for scientific conclusions; otherwise we could not believe anything happened in the historical past. But something did happen in the past. So we cannot demand such high and rigorous standards. This is basic Philosophy of History.
What I do know is that charismatic leaders start religious cults, not committees and not authors. I also know that end time prophets have a higher than normal likelihood for starting religious cults. I also believe the best understanding of the Jesus in the New Testament is that he was a doomsday prophet, and that there is a likelihood the Jews of that era were expecting a Messiah, especially since they were under an oppressive Roman rule. Without a better explanation for how the Jesus cult started, I have good solid reasons for thinking it started with an end time prophet like the one described in the New Testament named Jesus.
Look at it this way. Since we can deny almost anything in the historical past, then when we read in an ancient text where a person existed and where it’s also said he did something, the burden of proof is on those who would deny this, under normal non-miraculous circumstances which have the burden of proof. This applies to characters like Adam, Noah, and Moses as well as for Jesus. We must take what the text says as a given in a prima facie sense, until shown otherwise. If, on the other hand, the burden of proof is on the person who accepts this textual testimony, then she could probably never meet that burden simply because historians cannot meet that burden in the first place.
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This is Part 3 of my case for the existence of the end-time prophet named Jesus described in the New Testament. Other parts can be found here: Part 1, and Part 2
In this installment, I complete the series on Draper's critique of Behe's design argument from irreducible complexity.
I. Review and Setup
To review, recall that the article focuses on stage one of Behe's two-stage design argument, which argues that certain biochemical structures cannot have arisen via gradualistic Darwinian processes. The argument of this stage crucially relies on his notion of irreducible complexity, where this is defined as a system "composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein removal of any of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning".[1] With this notion in hand, Behe argues that there are irreducibly very complex biochemical systems (e.g., the bacterial flagellum), and that these systems can't plausibly be explained in terms of gradualistic evolutionary processes. And the reason is that evolution can only create systems via direct and indirect evolutionary pathways.[2] But evolution can create no irreducibly complex system via a direct evolutionary pathway.[3] And while evolution can create simple irreducibly complex systems via indirect pathways, and reducibly complex systems via direct and indirect evolutionary pathways, the odds are overwhelmingly against creating irreducibly very complex systems via indirect pathways.[4]
Given Behe's argument, there are at least three ways to criticize his argument directly:
(1) Undercut or rebut the claim that his example systems are irreducibly complex (or at least irreducibly very complex)
(2) Undercut or rebut the claim that irreducibly (very) complex systems can't be created via indirect evolutionary pathways
(3) Undercut or rebut the claim that irreducibly complex systems can't be created via direct evolutionary pathways
In previous installments, we saw that Draper has offered criticisms of type (1) and type (2). Each of these criticisms is sufficient by itself to defeat Behe's argument. However, Draper doesn't stop there. In this installment, we'll look at one of Draper's criticisms of type (3).
II. Behe's Argument Against Direct Evolutionary Pathways to Irreducible Complexity
Now as mentioned above, Behe argues that direct routes to irreducibly complex structures are impossible. But why think that? His argument can be stated as follows: consider some irreducibly complex system S composed of parts A and B, which together perform function F. Now since S is irreducibly complex, neither A nor B can perform F by itself. Therefore, if we assume that neither A nor B served some other useful function in the interim[5], then if either A or B came into existence before the other, it would've been eliminated before the second part came into being to interact with the first part to perform F. Therefore, direct routes to irreducibly complex systems are impossible.[6]
III. Draper's Reply
What to make of this argument? To set up Draper's critique, recall that Behe distinguishes between two sorts of evolutionary pathways for creating biological systems: direct and indirect. A gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to a function F of a biological system is direct if it produces F by continuously improving it without changing F itself, and without changing the system's mechanism. And a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to F is indirect if it does so by changing the system's function or mechanism.[7] But as Draper points out, this account of evolutionary pathways is too coarse-grained, as it fails to distinguish different kinds of direct and indirect evolutionary pathways. And it turns out that these further distinctions have a bearing on whether Behe's argument succeeds.
Thus, to redress this shortcoming, Draper distinguishes between two sorts of direct routes to irreducible complexity: simple and complicated. A simple direct route amounts to adding parts to a system without changing the function or the mechanism. By contrast, a complicated direct route can involve both adding and subtracting parts (again, without changing the mechanism or the function).
Thus, Behe fails to distinguish between simple and complicated direct evolutionary pathways. But the problem is that Behe wrongly assumes that all direct pathways are of the simple variety. For as it turns out, it's possible for complicated direct routes to generate irreducibly complex systems. Draper states his criticism as follows:
"The possibility of an irreducibly complex system's being produced by a complicated direct path is fairly obvious. For example, an irreducibly complex two-part system AB that performs function F could evolve directly as follows. Originally, Z performs F, though perhaps not very well. (This is possible because, from the fact that AB cannot perform F without A or B, it doesn't follow that Z cannot perform F by itself.) Then A is added to Z, because it improves the function, though it is not necessary. B is also added for this reason. One now has a reducibly complex system composed of three parts, Z, A and B. Then Z drops out, leaving only A and B. And without Z, both A and B are required for the system to function."[8]
Thus, Draper shows the logical possibility of a complicated direct path to an irreducibly complex system in four stages:
Stage 1: A system S is composed of Z, which performs function F. (simple system)
Stage 2: Part A is added to Z in S, leading to an improvement in F. (reducibly complex system)
Stage 3: Part B is added to Z and A in S, leading to an improvement in F. (reducibly complex system)
Stage 4: Part Z drops out of S, and without Z, BOTH A and B are required for S to continue performing F. (irreducibly complex system)
Draper's criticism surfaces an illicit assumption implicit in Behe's reasoning about what follows from his definition of irreducible complexity: that the irreducible complexity of a system is insensitive to the parts that make it up. But as Draper's counterexample shows, this isn't so: whether a system is irreducibly complex is relative to the constituents of which it's composed. Thus, while a system S may be irreducibly complex if composed of A and B, it may well be reducibly complex if it's composed of C and D. In short, irreducible complexity is parts-relative. And this leaves open the possibility of creating an irreducibly complex system directly by (e.g.) first starting with a reducibly complex system composed of CD, then successively adding parts A and B to improve its function, and finally losing CD, resulting in an irreducibly complex system composed of AB. And given this possibility, Behe's argument against the possibility of direct routes to irreducible complexity is defeated.
IV. Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier, Draper raises a number of other criticisms of Behe's design argument from irreducible complexity, but I think enough of his criticisms have been discussed to indicate that Behe's argument is a failure. For his key clams -- that some biochemical structures are irreducibly complex; that irreducibly complex systems can't be produced by indirect evolutionary pathways; and that irreducibly very complex systems can't be produced by direct evolutionary pathways -- are defeated.
--------
[1] Behe, Michael J. Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996), p. 39.
[2] Recall that a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to a function F of a biological system is direct if it produces F by continuously improving it without changing F itself, and without changing the system's mechanism. And a gradualistic evolutionary pathway leading to F is indirect if it does so by changing the system's function or mechanism. Draper, Paul. "Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism: A Reply to Michael J. Behe", Faith and Philosophy 19:1 (2002), p. 5
[3] Irreducibly complex systems "cannot be produced directly, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing even a single part is by definition nonfunctional." Darwin's Black Box, P. 39.
[4] "Even if a system is irreducibly complex (and thus cannot have been produced directly), however, one can not definitively rule out the possibility of an indirect, circuitous route. As the complexity of an interacting system increases, though, the likelihood of such an indirect route drops precipitously." Behe, Darwin's Black Box, P. 40.
[5] As many -- including Draper -- have noted (e.g., Kenneth Miller), this assumption is fatal to the argument. For from the fact that neither A nor B can perform a particular function F without other parts, it doesn't follow that neither part can perform some other funtion(s). And in fact, there are plausible evolutionary pathways where Behe's paradigm case of an irreducibly complex system -- the bacterial flagellum -- has evolutionary precursors that performed different functions. (See the following YouTube clip of a talk by Kenneth Miller for a helpful example of such a criticism.). However, that sort of criticism is one demonstrating the possibility of indirect pathways to irreducible complexity. I therefore relegate the criticism to a footnote, not because it isn't important, but because it falls outside the scope of the current topic, which focuses on direct evolutionary pathways to irreducible complexity.
[6] This statement of Behe's argument is a paraphrase of Draper's. See Draper. Irreducible Complexity and Darwinian Gradualism: A Reply to Michael J. Behe", Faith and Philosophy 19:1 (2002), p. 15.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
The acknowledged authority on the life and works of Josephus is Louis H. Feldman of Yeshiva University.
Education: B.A. (Phi Beta Kappa, Valedictorian), Trinity College, Hartford, 1946; M.A. (in classics), Trinity College, 1947; Ph.D. (in classical philology), Harvard University, 1951 (diss.: "Cicero's Conception of Historiography"); L.H.D. (honorary), Trinity College, 1998.
Teaching Positions: Ford Foundation Teaching Fellow in Classics, Trinity College, 1951-52; Instructor in New Testament Greek, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1951-52; Instructor in Classics, Trinity College, 1952-53; Instructor in Classics, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 1953-55; Instructor in Humanities and History, Yeshiva and Stern Colleges, 1955-56; Assistant Professor of Classical Civilization, Yeshiva College, 1955-61; Associate Professor of Classical Civilization, Yeshiva College, 1961-66; Professor of Classics, Yeshiva University, 1966-present; Abraham Wouk Family Professor of Classics and Literature, Yeshiva University, 1993-present.
Fellowships and Awards: Guggenheim Foundation, Fellow; American Council of Learned Societies, Senior Fellow; Selected to conducted seminar for college teachers, National Endowment for the Humanities, "The Greek Encounter with Judaism in the Hellenistic Period," at Yeshiva University, Summers of 1980, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1992; "Classical and Christian Roots of Anti-Semitism," Summer of 1987; Award for excellence in teaching the classics, American Philological Association, 1981; Judaica Reference Book Award, Association of Jewish Libraries, 1985; Fellow, Annenberg Research Institute for Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, Philadelphia, PA, 1988-89; Elected Fellow, American Academy for Jewish Research, 1993; Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1994.
Of his fifteen books on Josephus and 138 articles on Josephus and Judaism, I would like to quote what this Josephian scholar says about the Testimonium Flavaianum taken from "Josephus (CE 37-c.100)," in William Harbury et al., ed., The Cambridge History of Judaism vol. 3 (1999) pp. 911 - 912.
“We may remark here on the passage in Josephus which has occasioned by far more comment than any other, the so-called Testimonium Flavianum (Ant. XVIII. 63 - 4) concerning Jesus. The passage appears in all our manuscripts; but a considerable number of Christian writers - Pseudo-Justin and Theophilus in the second century, Minucius Felix, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Julius Africanus, Tertullian, Hippolytus and Orgen in the third century, and Methodius and Pseudo-Eustathius in the early fourth century - who knew Jeosphus and cited from his works do not refer to this passage, though one would imagine that it would be the first passage that a Christian apologist would cite. In particular, Origen (Contra Celsum 1.47 and Commentary on Matthew 10.17), who certainly knew Book 18 of the Antiquities and cites five passages from it, explicitly states that Josephus did not believe in Jesus as Christ. The first to cite the Testimonium is Eusebius (c. 324); and even after him, we may note, there are eleven Christian writers who cite Josephus but not the Testimonium. In fact, it is not until Jerome in the early fifth century that we have another reference o it.
The principal internal argument against the genuineness of the Testimonium is that it says that Jesus was the Christ, whereas Josephus, as a loyal Pharisaic Jew, could hardly have written this. To be sure, there was several claimants to the status of Messiah in this era, and those who followed them were not read out of the Jewish fold; but in view of the fact that Josephus nowhere else uses the word Christos (except in referring to James, the brother of Jesus, Ant. XX.200) and that he repeatedly suppresses the Messianic aspects of the revolt against Rome because of the association of the Messiah with political revolt and independence, it would seem hard to believe that he would openly call Jesus a Messiah and speak of him in awe. The fact that Jerome (De viris illustrious 13) read that ’he was believed to be the Christ (credebatur esse Christus) would suggest that his text differed from ours. Another objection to the authenticity of the passage is that it breaks the continuity of the narrative, which tells of a series of riots. Those, such as Eisler, who regard the passage as interpolated, suggest that the original spoke of the Christian movement as a riot.
Pines (An Arabic Version of the Testimonium Flavianum and Its Implications (Jeruslame 1971))has created a considerable stir by bringing to the scholarly world’s attention two hitherto almost completely neglected works containing the Testimonium, one a tenth-century history of the world in Arabic by a Christian named Agapius and the other a twelfth-century chronicle in Syriac by Michael the Syrian. There are a number of differences between Agapuius and our Testimonium, notably in the omission of the statement ‘if one ought to call him a man’ and of Jesus’ miracles and of the role of the Jewish leaders in accusing Jesus, and, above all, in the assertion that Jesus was perhaps the Messiah (‘was thought to be’ in Michael). Since Agapius declares that ‘This is what is said by Josephus and his companions’ and indeed includes a number of other details not found in Josephus, we may conjecture that he used other sources as well. Inasmuch as there are changes in the order of the statements of the Testimonium in Agapius and Michael, we are apparently dealing not with a translation but with a paraphrase.”
So, by the account given by Louis Feldman, Christians are not above forgery and lies to give credence to Christianity!
I believe there are some identifiable fables and mythic tales in the Bible, such as the Genesis creation accounts, the sons of God producing children from the daughters of men in Genesis 6, the Exodus, wilderness wanderings and Canaanite conquest in the Old Testament. In the New Testament there are some other identifiable fables and mythic tales, like the virgin birth story about Jesus, several miracle stories, the existence of Judas Iscariot, Joseph of Arimathea, and the resurrection story about Jesus. There are others. Given these things it becomes an important task to try to figure out if Jesus himself really existed.
I do not intend to revisit this question very often, because while it is an interesting one it’s not essential to debunking the Christian faith, nor are Christians likely to even consider the question unless they are first convinced that the other things I just mentioned are mythic tales. That’s why I focus on these other fables and myths. Getting them to recognize these things as myths is hard enough. Why focus on that which is harder when there is an easier route?
I’ll be excited to hear the conclusions that will come from next weekend's seminar on the Sources of the Jesus Tradition: An Inquiry, which includes participants Hector Avalos, Robert Price and Richard Carrier, all friends of mine
In any case let me once again delineate the problems for someone wishing to deny that a man named Jesus existed and further argue that he did. If you haven’t read my first foray into this field you must stop reading and begin reading what I have previously wrote about this issue right here. Again, stop reading and go there.
Let me elaborate in this post and further make my case.
That there are myths in the Bible doesn’t automatically lead to the conclusion that it is all mythic in nature. It may be, as I admit, but what reason is there for throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Let’s say Benny Hinn’s followers are called Hinnites and carry on after he dies. Does the mere fact that they claimed he did miracles, something we would call myths and fables since we don’t believe he actually did any miracles, automatically mean he didn’t exist? No.
Furthermore, what good reason can be given for demanding that there must be independent confirmation outside the NT before believing anything inside of its pages? That there is some need to do this I don’t doubt, given the nature of the stories, but why must we discount anything in the NT unless it is independently attested? What if there was no independent attestation to the existence of the Pharisees outside the NT? Why must we doubt they existed merely because of this? That’s one of my questions.
There are plenty of details in the NT that have been confirmed, most notably the historical setting of the gospels and the book of Acts. It hasn’t all been confirmed, of course, like the fabricated Roman census at the time of Jesus’ birth for instance, but much of it has. Sir William Ramsay has documented that the setting of the book of Acts, the places mentioned, the people who ruled, and other details are remarkably historical in his classic book, St. Paul, the Traveler and Roman Citizen, as has A.N. Sherwin-White, in his book, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament. The setting of the Gospel of John has a remarkably historical setting as well, when it comes to its description of buildings, people groupings, and geographical landscape at the time, like Jacob’s well, the Samaritans, Solomon’s porch, the pool of Siloam, and so forth. According to Christian apologist Paul Barnett, “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the fourth evangelist was quite familiar with the topography and buildings of southern Palestine.” (p. 64).
Sure this isn’t enough, but it is something. It leads us to think the authors (or the sources they draw from) lived at that time, although it doesn’t prove this.
What would prove that Jesus existed? Nothing. Nothing in the historical past can be proved anyway. Almost anything can be denied in history even if it happened. So what can show us Jesus existed? No single piece of evidence can do this, since no single piece of evidence ever led people to believe he did in the first place. It's the convergence of evidence that leads people to think he existed.
In the first place, there is no testimony in the ancient world that denies he existed. There may be some significant silences about his existence, but arguing from these silences doesn’t show he never existed. They are merely silent about it. One cannot conclude from silence that the author didn’t know of a Jesus or an early Jesus sect. That’s an informal fallacy, especially when we have NT documents maintaining he did, including Paul who was the earliest writer of the NT.
What did Paul claim? He claimed he received what he knew about Jesus from revelation of course, which makes us suspect his knowledge, but he also claims he met with the early leaders in Jerusalem and that he had received information directly from them in I Corinthians 15:3-8. What he received from them he passed on to the Corinthians a few years earlier expressed in that creed. He also says he spent fifteen days with Peter three years after his conversion (Galatians 1:18-19), where one could conclude he first learned the creed he repeats to the Corinthians. Paul gives us several details about Jesus, depending on how we date his letters and whether we think he wrote them. Jesus descended from Abraham (Gal. 3:16); was the son of David (Romans 1:3); was born of a woman and lived under Jewish law (Gal. 4:4); had a brother named James (Gal. 1:19) and other brothers (I Cor. 9:5). Paul tells us Peter was married (I Cor. 9:5), and that Jesus instituted the Lord’s Supper (I Cor. 11:23-25); was betrayed (I Cor. 11;23); was killed by the Jews of Judea (I Thess. 2:14-15), and that he was buried and seen as resurrecting (I Cor. 15:4-8).
This is evidence that shouldn’t just be ignored simply because mythic elements to the life of Jesus were added in the telling of his story. Did Jesus think his last supper was his last one? I don’t know. It might be reasonably concluded that he did, since he would certainly know that people wanted him dead. In any case, such a story and the subsequent weekly practice of communion is evidence he ate the Passover meal at least one time with some men he called his disciples. It might even be thought Jesus did this on the night of his crucifixion, regardless of whether he predicted his death or not. Cultic leaders have been known to be paranoid and to think the authorities will kill them for their teachings, anyway. Some have called upon their followers to die with them, like David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite, and Jim Jones.
I have proposed that the best explanation for the rise of the Jesus cult is that Jesus was an apocalyptic doomsday prophet who called for the end of the world. There have been a lot of charismatic doomsday prophets who have gathered a following. Such an explanation fits the facts of what we read in the NT itself and has been the dominant view of Jesus since the time of Albert Schweitzer, as I said. There are other alternative suggestions, but this one makes the most sense to me. That there are ancient pagan parallels to some of the elements in the life of Jesus is interesting to me. Certainly the life of Jesus as told by the early believers took on some of those characteristics. Whether they completely explain the rise of the Jesus cult is something I doubt. Again, I could be wrong since historical studies are fraught with problems like this. It just makes better sense to me personally, even if I might be shown wrong at a later date.
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To read my next installment on this see Part 3.
(I am a new blogger. For my introduction, please see below and ask me a question there. I am doing a rare double-post to provide the blog and its readers with an example of my own mode of analysis, so if you have a question about the Moral Argument specifically, ask here). Dr. William Lane Craig's moral argument for God goes as follows:
1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) Objective moral values exist.
3) Therefore, God exists.
Although the argument itself is (deductively) valid, we will discuss how Bill's definition of "objective moral value" given in Reasonable Faith leads to the logical impossibility of Premise (1) and at least a shaky ground for Premise (2), thereby literally closing the book on this version of the moral argument for good. The argument is presented within a letter I sent my friend Dr. Paul Copan, who spoke with me personally at the same time I was addressing Bill at the conference.
Paul,
One point of interest that needs to be brought up: we got distracted on Calvinism in the middle of what I was supposed to say for the Moral Argument.
Premise (1) states that "If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist." My friend Marques, the fan of Bill's whom I mentioned during our session, informed me that Bill defines an objective moral value as essentially "a moral assertion that remains true independent of human consciousness." I think this is the notion you and he defined during our talk and that which is given in RF.
The problem with Premise (1), as I mentioned, is that Bill only uses Existentialists in his lectures and similar notions in RF to provide an argument from authority - but we already discussed the "argument from authority" problem when we spoke, so I'll move on.
The further problem, which I did not get to address due to my unfortunate forgetfulness of how much gas the Calvinism subject empties out on a room (honestly sorry!!!), is that Premise (1) is logically equivalent to "If objective moral values exist, God exists,"; to prove this statement logically without appeal under Bill's definition, one must show that either:
(a) Objective moral values are present as an inherent property of reality qua reality independently of any consciousness, including God's, not unlike a Platonic "form" or Aristotelean "essence";
(b) Objective moral values exist because God delivered them by Divine Command, Divine Decree, creating Platonic forms to house them, etc., or in the hearts of men as Paul states.
No other means of morals being objective is at all possible. With what Bill says,
Option (a) is immediately an invalid option to prove Premise (1), for if morals existed as an inherent quality of reality, then either God created them in reality, leading to my objection for Option (b), or they exist in reality apart from God, making Premise (1) automatically invalid prima facie due to the fact that it presents either a possibility for objective moral values under atheism or objective moral values under a nonlawgiver God.
Option (b) renders any proof of Premise (1) automatically invalid by improper deduction. Premise (1) states that "if objective moral values exists, then God exists." But if we assert that objective moral values rest on God's existence due to either Divine Command/Decree, His creation of independent Platonic "moral vats" in reality, etc., as pressed forth in option (b), then Premise (1)'s logical proof fails deduction, to wit:
(1a) Assume objective moral values exist.
(1b) If a Moral Lawgiving God exists, then objective moral values exist due to His Divine Decree/Command, creation of independent "Platonic Morality Vats," etc.
(1c) Therefore, God exists.
(1d) Therefore, the statement "if objective moral values exist, then God exists" is true. Premise (1) is proven.
This argument is wrong from deduction.
Additionally, Bill's definition for an "objective moral value" drops the context of the identity of man, i.e. the context of a **finite** rational being. Indeed, Bill said both that these values would exist if God did not decide to create mankind, and that these values are nonbinding on a God of infinite nature. You might be interested to know that I assert that objective moral values *do* exist, but in a different sense than Craig; they are only possible if men exist, but they are *not* subjective because men exist *in reality.*
objective moral value != "a moral assertion that remains identically true for any rational being within this assertion's context."
If evolution arrived at another humanlike creature, then this objective morality would be the exact same assuming this, um, hypothetical "frog man" is rational; it depends on the identity of a rational being, not just on man qua man. It is objective because rational beings exist in reality, and the contexts of such moral actions exist in reality (i.e. outside of "Sophie's Dilemma" type extremes, all logically demonstrable). I will not go into this morality here, but it is much like Rand's morality that you provide a critique of in your God goes to Starbucks book - however, you'd be surprised that you have some incorrect notions, and that the morality - especially the neo-Ayn Rand version without the harshness she added to it - *isn't* as horrible as it sounds, and *is* objective (i.e. pertaining to reality above subjective consciousness), and *does* bridge "is-ought." I will describe it further if it is of interest to you.
Note that none of this disproves God, or even a moral lawgiver. But it shows that Premise (1) is invalid and that Premise (2) is on shaky ground given Bill's definitions, rendering his standard presentation invalid. Bill would do better to not use it as an isolated argument, but instead depend on Kalam and the Teleological Argument to first establish a God, and then to rule out atheistic "Platonic moral vats" or potential "Moral Lawgiving Gods" separate from a creator and designer of the Universe (as Bill does in his book on both counts, but not as well-developed by method) to then leave God the property of being the moral lawgiver. This is the most that is left for the moral argument given that my critique stands.
Best,
Darrin
