There Isn't a Bad Reason to Reject the Christian Faith, Part 3

To see what I've been arguing recently read Part 1, and if so desired read Part 2. Now for Part 3 where I'll attempt to deal with another objection, this time coming from Matt DeStefano, an atheist who is a philosophy student in a master's level program. I remember those days myself a long long time ago in a far away galaxy. I hope you're enjoying this period in your life Matt, because you will probably look back on it as the best time in your life, as I do. DeStefano presents a scenario that is supposed to be the exception to my blanket claim that there isn't a bad personal reason to reject Christianity. If an exception can be found then my blanket claim is false. So let me say first of all that if DeStefano's counter-example works then it doesn't undercut anything else I said, only that there is an exception or two or three. I can live with this if so. Nonetheless, I don't think his scenario works.

DeStefano initially suggested this scenario:
Here's a personal reason someone might have for rejecting Christianity:

"I know Christianity is true, but I reject it because I don't want to live my life like that. I want to live selfishly, focus on the accumulation of material possessions without worrying about the implications this sort of life will have on others or on my relationship with God. Frankly, I just don't WANT Christianity to be true, therefore I reject it."

This is not a good personal reason for rejecting Christianity, even given the DS.
DS, to refresh your memories, stands for this Doctrinal Statement:
There is an omniscient, omnibenelovent, omnipotent God who sent Jesus to atone for the sins of all who believe in him. This same God desires everyone should be saved and that no one should be lost (See 1 Timothy 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9).
Then upon further scrutiny by AdamHazzard, that such a person couldn't say he knows Christianity is true, DeStefano revised his scenario as follows:
If Christianity were true, I would be rationally obliged to significantly alter my lifestyle. I do not wish to significantly alter my lifestyle. Therefore, Christianity is not true. LINK.
Left unresolved is whether this change of lifestyle is for the good or bad, that is, whether it will require such a person to do harm or do good to oneself and others.

Presumably DeStefano is assuming that the lifestyle change required but rejected is to be a better person who does good rather than harm. But why is this to be presumed? There is nothing is his scenario that requires it. If the lifestyle change is to do harm to oneself and other people then I think this is most definitely a good personal reason to reject Christianity. Who, for instance, would not reject Yahweh's voice commanding us to kill and burn as a sacrifice our only son, as Abraham supposedly was commanded regarding Isaac? I would. I would not think the heavenly voice came from a loving God, that's for sure. I would sooner question my sanity than think it was really from a good God. And if I thought it was from an evil deity I would have no choice but to disobey him and take the consequences, since after all, a God who could command such a thing will eventually do whatever he wants to me anyway. So let's just get the pain and suffering of his punishment for disobeying started immediately, rather than doing what my conscience cannot allow.

So I think a good personal reason for rejecting Christianity, as I said, is to rebel against Yahweh for allowing, no demanding, child sacrifices, slavery, the denigration of women and homosexuals, and for rejecting the freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, something akin to the First Amendment of the American Constitution. My moral intuitions are such that I refuse to worship such a barbaric God. The objective evidence for the truth of Christianity must be overpowering to overcome these personal moral intuitions of mine.

So far so good?

DeStefano, without offering any reason at all, presumably assumes the lifestyle change required but rejected is to be a better person who does good rather than harm, and additionally that Christianity is a religion of peace, justice, brotherhood and good will toward all men(!). I'm tempted at this point to ask him for one good reason to suppose these two assumptions are warranted, and if he cannot produce one then I'm tempted dismiss the other half of his scenario. I strongly disagree with these two unwarranted assumptions. It is not the case that Christianity makes better people and it is not the case that Christianity is a religion of peace.

But let's grant them anyway. There is an additional question that needs answered. In DeStefano's scenario does such a person think there are strong objective reasons to embrace Christianity or not? If such a person does not think there are strong objective reasons for the Christian faith, that should settle the question. For the truth should not be settled by whether or not a given religion is personally considered to be a peaceful, good neighborly one. For if so, there are better religions to choose from. However, if such a person thinks there are strong objective reasons for embracing the Christian faith, then that person would be irrational not to believe. Objective evidence and reasons take precedence over subjective evidence and reasons, hands down, no ifs ands or buts about it. I never said otherwise.

So the person DeStefano supposes as the exception turns out to be an irrational person. What's a God represented in DS above to do about an irrational person? Does an irrational person have good personal reasons for rejecting Christianity? Why not? I see no reason to think that an irrational person can think rationally about such matters. So why is he not supposed to conclude whatever an irrational mind concludes? His cognitive faculties are not functioning properly and God should know this about him. Since God wants to save him (given DS) then God could snap his omnipotent fingers so that the person can logically connect the dots. It's not about forcing him to believe at all. Given this scenario it's merely about helping such a person think rationally, that's all.

So unless DeStefano can show why an irrational person does not have good personal reasons for thinking irrationality and that the God in DS is under no moral obligation to help him think rationally, his exception is not an exception to what I'm arguing at all.