Q #237 "Is Appeal to the Witness of the Holy Spirit Question-Begging?" A Primer On Plantinga's Religious Epistemology by William Lane Craig

Bill Craig answers questions on his website Reasonable Faith. This one was published on October 31, 2011: Q #237 "Is Appeal to the Witness of the Holy Spirit Question-Begging?"

This is an objection that, though understandable, is based on a failure to grasp correctly Alvin Plantinga’s project in religious epistemology. Plantinga distinguishes between what he calls de facto and de jure objections to Christian belief. A de facto objection is one aimed at the truth of the Christian faith; it attempts to show that Christian truth claims are false. By contrast a de jure objection attempts to undermine Christian belief even if Christianity is, in fact, true. Plantinga identifies three versions of the de jure objection: that Christian belief is unjustified, that it is irrational, and that it is unwarranted. Plantinga’s aim is to show that all such de jure objections to Christian belief are unsuccessful, or, in other words, that Christian belief can be shown to be unjustified, irrational, or unwarranted only if it is shown that Christian beliefs are false. There is thus no de jure objection to Christian belief independent of a de facto objection.

To show this Plantinga develops a model or theory of warranted Christian belief, that is to say, an account of how it is that we know the truth of various Christian truth claims. On behalf of his model Plantinga claims, not that it is true, but that

(i) it is epistemically possible, that is to say, for all we know, it may be true;
(ii) if Christianity is true, there are no philosophical objections to the model;
(iii) if Christianity is true, then something like the model is very likely to be true.

According to Plantinga’s model, God warrants to us the great truths of the Gospel by means of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. Such beliefs are for us properly basic beliefs grounded in (but not inferred from) the witness of the Holy Spirit.

Now the point is, such a model may, for all we know be true. Moreover, if Christianity is true, then there is no problem with the model. Finally, I think that Plantinga is right that if Christianity is true, then something like his model is very likely to be true. So there is no de jure objection to Christian belief. The unbeliever who wants to argue that Christian belief is unjustified, irrational, or unwarranted has to present objections to the truth of the Christian faith. For if he doesn’t, then for all he knows, Christianity may well be true, in which case there just is no problem with Christian belief.

None of this begs the question, I hope you can see. For the key claims are conditional. Neither of them assumes that Christianity actually is true.

Now, of course, a Muslim could make exactly similar claims about Islam, as Plantinga acknowledges. There is therefore no de jure objection to Muslim belief either.

So we’ll naturally want to know, “Well, then, is Christianity true?” The Christian will say, “Yes.” That raises a further question: “How do you know?” The Christian may answer, “Because I do experience the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.” There’s nothing circular here, anymore than in someone’s reporting that he does experience the reality of the external world or the presence of other minds. If some solipsist said to me that he doesn’t believe in the reality of the external world or other minds, that wouldn’t do anything to defeat my beliefs. Even if he claimed that God was warranting to him his solipsistic beliefs in a properly basic way, that wouldn’t do a thing to call my beliefs into question. He can claim what he wants; I know better.

Of course, the Muslim can say the same thing, and so we have a standoff. But here my distinction between knowing our faith to be true and showing it to be true becomes relevant. In order to show our Muslim friend that his beliefs are not properly basic, we can present de facto objections to the truth of Islam. Since he does not in fact have a genuine witness of the Holy Spirit to the truth of Islam, we can hope that his confidence will crack under the force of the evidence and that he will come to see that his experience was either non-veridical or misinterpreted.

Again, the Muslim can say the same thing and so engage in Muslim apologetics aimed at providing de facto objections to Christianity. Great! Bring on the debate! LINK

Craig argues that appealing to the witness of the Holy Spirit is not question-begging, for IF Christianity is true, then Christian belief is not unjustified, or irrational, or unwarranted, something Plantinga has spent a great deal of philosophical effort defending. Only if there are de facto objections showing Christianity is false can it be unjustified, or irrational, or unwarranted. Furthermore, IF Christianity is true, then it's possible that his god warrants the great truths of the Gospel to us by means of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. These beliefs are properly basic beliefs for us grounded in (but not inferred from) the witness of the Holy Spirit. After all, the Bible seems to tell us so. For his part Craig has spent a great deal of apologetical effort defending Christianity from de facto objections. So he goes on to argue that Christianity is not unjustified, or irrational, or unwarranted, OR FALSE.

Plantinga argues that it’s reasonable to believe in his kind of god, if his kind of god exists. Craig completes Plantinga's case by arguing that Christianity is true against the de facto objections.

There is something significant hidden from plain sight in this response by Craig, and in the books and papers written by him and Plantinga. There are lots of "ifs" to be found. If this, if that. Possibly this, possibly that. For my part I disagree with all of these possibilities and/or I disagree with their relevance to the case for Christianity. I describe this Jedi mind trick of apologists in chapter 8 of my book, How to Defend the Christian Faith: Advice from an Atheist, titled, "You Must Punt to Possibilities":

In this chapter I intend to show how many times Christian apologists punt to the mere possibility that their faith is true rather than consider the probabilities. My claim is that the more often Christian apologists resort to this defense, the less likely their faith is true. For the more often they use it, the more often they’re admitting the evidence is not on their side. If the evidence were on their side they would not have to defend their faith by repeatedly suggesting it is still possible their faith is true despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. I will go farther to suggest that at several crucial points in the defense of their faith, some of the best Christian apologists have resorted to punting to the possibilities. The problem with this defense is obvious. When we are assessing the truth claims of the Christian faith (or any other religious faith), probabilities are all that matter. We should think exclusively in terms of them.

Possibility arguments are not necessarily wrong to use in defense of a claim, since there are many cases where anomalies persist and need to be explained. My claim is that the crucial arguments on behalf of Christianity are based on possibilities not probabilities. They are based on ad hoc hypotheses utterly unrelated to the strength of the evidence. To be a Christian is to believe against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Because of this I must show the Christian faith is nearly impossible before Christians will consider it to be improbable, which is a reversal of how reasonable people should evaluate their faith. However, that being said, if you want to be an apologist you must punt to possibilities since so many of the best apologists do. If you want to be a good apologist, you shouldn’t do this at all. But then if you didn’t do it at all, you wouldn’t be an apologist at all. [pp. 137-38]

Both Plantinga and Craig utilize possibility arguments in crucial junctures to defend their faith. The inner witness of the Holy Spirit is the crucial belief for Craig, along with most every major Christian theologian down through the centuries--from Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, Barth and others. This then is the primary, chief, or supreme example of using possibilities rather than probabilities. It is an elaborate mega fallacy of possibiliter ergo probabiliter (“possibly, therefore probably”), i.e. arguing that mega doctrinal belief x is possibly true, then assuming later that mega doctrinal belief x is probably true, when the latter does not follow from the former. Or more precisely, the Christian philosopher/apologist builds an intellectual castle of possibilities in the air, one that is not grounded in evidence, then ends up claiming the interconnectedness of all these possibilities make Christianity to be more probable than not over-all. They unjustifiably add up more and more possibilities to make the inner witness of a noninferential belief in the Holy Spirit veridical (i.e. veracious, verified, truthful, accurate). But the unrecognized elephant in the room is that these possibilities emphatically do not lead to the conclusion that Christianity is probable.

There is nothing probable about Christianity. Apologetics is a sham, a ruse, intended to provide reasons for believing unreasonable unevidenced claims. It's all empty sophist rhetoric without substance.

This is a very sophisticated level of begging the question, but it's begging the question just the same. I cannot begin to go into great detail about how bad this apologetic strategy is, but I'll try, later. Oh, FYI, don't kid yourselves. This is not about knowing Christianity is true, it's all about showing it is true, in just the same manner as apologists think there is a separate problem of evil they don't have to deal with, the emotional problem (Hint: that alleged problem is not a separate one from the general one.

--------------

John W. Loftus is a philosopher and counter-apologist credited with 12 critically acclaimed books, including The Case against Miracles, God and Horrendous Suffering, and Varieties of Jesus Mythicism. Please support DC by sharing our posts, or by subscribing, donating, or buying our books at Amazon. Thank you so much!