Christianity and Morality Don’t Work Very Well Together
“Sorry, I’m an atheist. I can’t pretend to have faith in such a misogynistic, homophobic, fear-inducing system.”
“I don’t want to think about that.”
“That’s why it works.”
This is his Chapter 13 from my anthology "The Christian Delusion." Enjoy.
Christianity Does Not Provide the Basis for Morality by Dr. David Eller.
Imagine someone said to you that English provided the only basis for grammar. After you overcame your shock, you would respond that English is certainly not the only language with a grammar. You would add that grammar is not limited to language: understood broadly as rules for combination and transformation, many phenomena have a grammar, from sports to baking. Nor is grammar the sole or essential component of language: language also includes sound systems, vocabularies, genres, and styles of speech. And you would remind the speaker that grammar does not depend on human language at all: some nonhuman species, including chimps and parrots, can produce grammatical—that is, orderly and rule-conforming—short sentences. Ultimately, you would want to explain that English does not “provide a basis” for grammar at all but rather represents one particular instance of grammar. English grammar is definitely not the only grammar in the world and even more definitely not the “real” grammar.
The person who utters a statement like “English provides the only basis for grammar” either understands very little about English (and language in general) or grammar, or the person is expressing his or her partisanship about language (i.e., pro-English)—or, more likely, the speaker is doing both. Thus, the person who utters a statement like “Christianity provides the only basis for morality” either understands very little about Christianity (or religion in general) or morality, or the person is expressing his or her partisanship about religion (i.e., pro-Christianity)—or, more likely, the speaker is doing both. But, as a savvy responder, you would answer that Christianity is certainly not the only religion with morality. You would add that morality is not limited to religion: understood broadly as standards for behavior, many phenomena have a morality, from philosophy to business. Nor is morality the sole or essential component of religion: religion also includes myths, rituals, roles, and institutions of behavior. And you would remind the speaker that morality does not depend on human religion at all: some nonhuman species demonstrate moral—that is, orderly and standard-conforming—behavior. Ultimately, you would want to explain that Christianity does not “provide a basis” for morality at all but rather represents one particular instance of morality. Christian morality is definitely not the only morality in the world and even more definitely not the “real” morality.
Once again cultural anthropologist Dr. David Eller has granted us access to a large amount of text, from his excellent book, Atheism Advanced: Further Thoughts of a Freethinker, pp. 365-390. If you want to learn about morality this is very good, as is the whole chapter 10, "Of Myths and Morals: Religion, Stories, and the Practice of Living."
On Morality and Religion by David Eller.
There is no doubt much more stress in Western/Christian
cultures on morality than on myth. Again,
Christians would insist that they do not have “myth” but that they definitely
have morality, or even that their religion is
morality above all else. Atheists, often
taking their lead from Christianity and literally “speaking Christian,” tend to
allow themselves to be swept along with Christian thinking on this
subject. Atheists do not much trouble
ourselves with myths (for us, all myths are false by definition, since myths
refer to supernatural/religious beings and we reject the very notion of such
being). But we trouble ourselves very
much with morality, down to trying to prove that we “have morality too” or that
we can “be good without god(s).”
Given the amount of time and energy that Christians and atheists alike—and not just them but philosophers, politicians, lawyers, and social scientists—have devoted to the problem of morality, it is remarkable that so little progress has been made. As the famous early 20th-century moral philosopher G. E. Moore wrote almost one hundred years ago, morality or ethics “is a subject about which there has been and still is an immense amount of difference of opinion…. Actions which some philosophers hold to be generally wrong, others hold to be generally right, and occurrences which some hold to be evils, others hold to be goods” (1963: 7). Surely any topic that has resisted progress and agreement for so long must be being approached in the wrong way.
In my previous blog post, Rapoport’s Rules Meet the Outsider Test, I mentioned the dispute over what counts as evidence:
When discussing religion with persons of faith, try to be aware of their tactic of framing the argument in terms of positive arguments for their particular faith, rather than in terms of negative arguments against all competing faiths. This was on display in the four-way debate video that John W. Loftus posted about the Virgin Birth. John’s Orthodox Christian interlocutors demanded that John clearly define what he would consider to be sufficient evidence for their religious claims. But they did not mention that they must think that no competing religion has met the same standard of evidence for them. So they must know what “evidence” is, well enough to conclude that no other religion has it. Perhaps they have just never thought this through before.
In this blog post I’ll dig deeper into this dispute about evidence. I include my own manual transcriptions of the dialogue from the video with time markers, but transcribing is hard so refer back to the video for each’s speakers statements in his own words.
I’ll start with a sort of mission statement from the senior opponent to John in the video:
12:26 Fr. Jonathan Ivanoff:
“And right now I’m just very very interested in bringing the knowledge of that [Orthodox] faith to a public that is hungry and thirsty for solid teaching, solid truth.”
This statement about audience demand sounds plausible enough. It stands to reason that if Fr. Ivanoff has a job, he must have found an audience that likes what he has to say. Good for him. A man’s gotta eat. But I have some questions about what he means by “solid teaching, solid truth.” Those are rather bold claims. Presumably Fr. Ivanoff is aware that there are other audiences who are equally hungry for other “solid” teachings, other “truths.” For example, Fr. Ivanoff seems to hail from the Orthodox side of the Great Schism of 1054. The folks on the other side, for the past 950+ years, are Roman Catholics (and by extension, the Protestants who later schismed off from them like so many proliferating species). I’m pretty sure the current Pope would say he has “solid teaching, solid truth” as well. Yet these two equally solid teachings have been in conflict for fully half of the Christian era. Thus I think it’s fair to ask (a) whether Fr. Ivanoff views his own teaching as more “solid” and “truthful” than the Pope’s teachings (I’m guessing he does!), and (b) how he knows this.
I’d also like to know how comfortable Fr. Ivanoff feels about worshipping in a Roman Catholic Church.
The clergy know that honesty about the Bible is risky
David Eller, as many of you know, is pretty much my favorite scholar/author at this point, next to just a very limited number of others. As a friend he's allowing me to publish the very best, next to none chapter, on what the words atheist and agnosticism mean. It comes from his most recent book, Liberatheism: On Freedom from God(s) [GCRR, 2024], one that I was honored to write the Forword. Enjoy!
“I |
do not believe in God and I am not an
atheist,” Albert Camus wrote in his Notebooks
1951–1959.[1]
What are we to make of that statement? Perhaps Camus was being wry and cryptic,
as French philosophers are often wont to be. Maybe “atheist” meant something
different to him or to 1950s-era France. Alternatively, it might have been too
dangerous to avow atheism in that time and place. Or maybe he was just confused
about the word.
If the latter
is the case, then Camus would not be the first or the last to labor under
misconceptions about atheism. Of course, theists are highly likely—and highly
motivated—to get atheism wrong. Since they are not atheists and possibly have
never spoken to one (at least not intentionally and civilly), they really do
not know what we think; they can only see us through their own theistic eyes
and assume that we are the reverse image, or, more perversely, some odd
variation, of their own theism. Then, as sworn and mortal enemies of atheism,
they are driven to portray us in the most unflattering light, to construct a
ridiculous straw man that they can summarily caricature and assassinate. We
need not take their (mis)characterizations of us seriously, except as a public
relations problem.
What about
atheists themselves? Surely they are accurately portraying their position.
Surprisingly and distressingly, too many professional atheist writers and
speakers commit a regular set of errors in describing the nature of atheism.
This is a tremendously damaging tendency, for two reasons. First, we mislead
current and future atheists, who are misinformed by the incautious
pronouncements of prominent atheists. Second, we empower theists and other
critics of atheism who use our words against us: “See, even atheists say that
atheism is X, so we are justified in our criticism and condemnation of the
idea.”
In this chapter, we will expose and free ourselves from recurring and systematic mistakes in the atheist literature. We will not repeat or critique “arguments for atheism,” which have been sufficiently covered, including by me[2] and are largely cogent and decisive; all but the most hard-headed theists and religious apologists (who still exist) concede that “the case for god(s)” is weak at best and lost at worst. Nor will we linger on the New Atheists, who have been thoroughly examined many times before, including in the previous chapter where we noted their unexpected and unfortunate turn toward reactionary social and political attitudes—ironically simultaneously debunking one of the pillars of Western civilization (i.e. Christianity) and defending Western civilizational traditions of sexism, racial thinking, and Islamophobia, among others. The New Atheists are broadly guilty of the common charge of scientism, not just of crediting science with the solution to all problems but of equating, as Richard Dawkins does, religion to science (albeit bad science). For instance, Dawkins wrote in his lauded The God Delusion that “‘the God Hypothesis’ is a scientific hypothesis about the universe,” and Victor Stenger actually put this “god hypothesis” business in the title of one of his books.[3] Finally, all of the New Atheists, who are quality scholars on their own turf, operate with limited (by which I mean Christianity-centric) notions of religion and god, in which “god” means the Christian or Abrahamic god and “religion” means Abrahamic monotheism. Any college freshman student of religion knows better.
According
to the English Wikipedia, Daniel Dennett
(March 28, 1942 – April 19, 2024) “was an American philosopher and
cognitive scientist. His research centered on the philosophy of
mind, the philosophy of
science, and the philosophy of
biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary
biology and cognitive
science.” Dennett was and remains well-known in
atheist/freethinking/skeptical circles as one of the so-called “Four
Horsemen” of New
Atheism, alongside Richard
Dawkins, Christopher
Hitchens, and Sam
Harris.
In this post I draw from Chapter 3 of Dennett’s book Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (2013). The particular intuition pump, or tool in that chapter is what Dennett called “Rapoport’s Rules for Debate”. The Rules are Dennett’s suggestion for how to disagree with someone productively. In this article I’ll explore the practicality of the rules, and how one might apply them to John W. Loftus’ Outsider Test for Faith.
Dennett’s version of Rapoport’s Rules attracted considerable commentary, as this DDG Web search shows. Quoting from Dennett’s original version:
Labels: Outsider Test
Anglican apologetic writer (undeserving of the designation “scholar”) Richard Bauckham in his Jesus and the Eyewitnesses perpetuated the faith-bolstering theory that since Papias and Justin Martyr described earliest gospel texts as ἀπομνημονεύματα, this term implicitly determined their mode and genre as “memoirs of the Apostles,” that is, recorded living memories of Jesus’ original students. Aimed at a predominantly faith-anxious public market, this book with its litany of absurd theories went on to sell countless copies and is to this day held up by pseudo-intellectual believers as grand justification for their indulgence in such tales as presenting reliable footage of first-century supernatural events.