Showing posts with label burden of proof. Show all posts
Showing posts with label burden of proof. Show all posts

Miracles and Burden of Proof: which side has it?

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As argued in my previous post, the apologist who wants to ascribe supernatural causation to the phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead (assuming it occurred) must demonstrate something like the following:

Assumption ~A: there probably could not have existed naturally relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain how Jesus would have been able to rise naturally.

In contrast,

Assumption A: there probably could have existed naturally relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain how Jesus would have been able to rise naturally.

Although each claim has a few variants, nevertheless, if the apologist's endeavor is to succeed, then something like (~A) must be established as true and something like (A) must be prevented from being established as true. In this post I will address two questions: (I) if Jesus really rose from the dead, should (~A) be presumed true or should the apologist have to argue for it?, and (II) If Jesus really rose from the dead, should (A) be presumed true or should the skeptic have to argue for it? I will supply two arguments for the following answers: to the first question, the apologist bears the burden of argument, and to the second, the skeptic can initially presume (A) without argument.


A1: (~A) cannot be presumed true without argument:

P1. Whenever we observe biological entity X with capabilities that biological entity O do not have, we should not assume these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of either: (a) relevant physiological differences between X and O, and/or (b) relevant technological differences between X and O, unless we have very good reasons to suppose otherwise.
P2. We observe Jesus with various supernormal capabilities that the rest of humanity do not have. [assumption]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of either: (a) relevant physiological differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity, and/or (b) relevant technological differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity, unless we have very good reasons to suppose otherwise.
C2. Therefore, ~A should not be presumed true until we have very good reasons to affirm ~A.


A2: (A) can be presumed true without argument:


P1'. Whenever we observe biological entity X with capabilities that biological entity O do not have, we should assume these capability differences probably can be explained, at least in part, in terms of either: (a) relevant physiological differences between X and O, and/or (b) relevant technological differences between X and O, unless we have very good reasons to suppose otherwise.
P2. We observe Jesus with various supernormal capabilities that the rest of humanity do not have. [assumption]
C1'. Therefore, we should assume these capability differences probably can be explained, at least in part, in terms of either: (a) relevant physiological differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity, and/or (b) relevant technological differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity, unless we have very good reasons to suppose otherwise.
C2'. Therefore, A should be presumed true until we have very good reasons to abandon this presumption.

Besides their conclusions, the only difference between arguments A1 and A2 is with their first premises, and both strike me as true because they are extraordinary well confirmed; thus, to reject either (P1) or (P1') is to reject induction. However, in order to reject their respective conclusions, (P1) and (P1') must be denied, which thereby puts the apologist into an interesting quandary: either he must accept conclusions (C2) and (C2'), which is clearly undesirable, or he must reject either (P1) and (P1') by rejecting induction, which is also (probably more) undesirable. It therefore appears to be a lose-lose situation for the apologist.