A Final Response to David Wood (Part 3)

Since I have now posted my opening statement from the debate I had on October 7th with David Wood on the problem of evil here, readers can pretty much compare what I said with David's review of our debate seen here for themselves. I was initially going to go through his review in several more in-depth parts, but I've decided instead to respond to the objections he offered in his review in just one final Blog entry--this one--and be done with it. People seem to be tiring of this ongoing debate, and so am I. This means my response here will be much briefer and less in-depth than I had initially planned to write.

I'm looking at this world and asking whether or not God exists, while David already believes God exists and is trying to explain why there is intense suffering in this world given that prior belief. The God-hypothesis may be able to explain why this world is the way it is (with a lot or argumentation), but that's a far cry from this world being the one we would expect if there was a good God, and these two different perspectives make all the difference in the world.

The first thing to say about David's review is that he presented several arguments in his review that he never presented that night in our debate. That's why I'd like to deal with them here, along with the others he did mention that night.

Concerning the the armlessness of the Venus de Milo statue. David, tell me what sculpturer would create a woman and then chop off her arms? What realist sculpturer would create a statue without arms? Answer the question, my friend. What reasons can you offer me for this? It’s precisely because there are no arms that I do not see a sculpturer at all. To me it would be an unusual rock formation. That best explains what I see. [As far as the design argument itself goes, I'll pass on this for now, and as far as the supposed mythical fall of Adam and Eve goes, I'll pass on that too].

David Wood:
"To put the matter differently, a theist could say, “I have no clue why God allows evil, but I’m going to believe that he has his reasons anyway,” and he would be no worse off than the atheist when the latter says, “I have no clue how life could have formed on its own, but I’m going to believe it anyway.” Nevertheless, since theists can offer at least some plausible reasons for God to allow suffering, they are on much better ground than atheists."

John Loftus:
As I recently said, arguments for the existence of God, are not strictly relevant to our specific debate issue, since I already hypothetically granted you for the purpose of the debate that your God exists. Think about this. The question I was addressing can be accurately phrased like this: Given that your omni-God exists, then why is there intense suffering in this world? And my conclusion is that intense suffering in this world makes the existence of your omni-God implausible (or improbable), regardless of the arguments for the existence of God, which provides for you the Bayesian background factors leading you personally to believe despite the extent of intense suffering in this world. I was arguing from evil, not from the non-existence of your omni-God hypothesis. Just read Howard-Snyder's book called The Evidential Argument From Evil, to see this. The book does not contain one single argument for the existence of God, either pro or con, except as it relates to the problem of evil itself. I see no chapters in it on the design or cosmological or ontological arguments, for instance. The arguments were strictly dealing with how the omni-God hypothesis relates to the issue of suffering. If that hypothesis is true, then is this the kind of world we should expect? The debate was (and is) over whether the evidential argument from evil makes the omni-God hypothesis implausible (or improbable) on its own terms.

David Wood:
"I talked about an incident in which my oldest son, then a year old, needed four shots. I had to hold him down while the doctor stabbed him repeatedly with a needle. Could my son comprehend why I was apparently helping a person stab him? No. My reasons were beyond his comprehension."

John Loftus:
But where were you when your oldest son got sick? If you could keep him from being sick then wouldn't a good father would do it? Sure he would. God is like the father who allows a child to get sick in the first place. A more comparable case would be if a surgeon operates on a person in order to transplant a kidney to another person against the wishes of that involuntary donor. Or a dentist who extracts the teeth of someone without any anesthetic, or legislators who seek to raise the standard of living in an underdeveloped country by killing off half the population when their standard of living could‘ve been improved by using better agricultural methods.

David Wood:
(1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
(2) Objective moral values do exist.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

John Loftus:
1) There are both deontological and teleological views of objective morals that do not depend upon God. Besides, the divine command theory is in such disrepute today that no one defends it that I know of.
2) Michael Shermer makes an interesting argument in his book, The Science of Good and Evil (Henry Holt, 2004), that “morality exists outside the human mind in the sense of being not just a trait of individual humans, but a human trait; that is, a human universal.” According to him we “inherit” from our Paleolithic ancestors our morality and ethics, then we “fine-tune and tweak them according to our own cultural preferences, and apply them within our own unique historical circumstances.” As such, “moral principles, derived from the moral sense, are not absolute, where they apply to all people in all cultures under all circumstances all of the time. Neither are moral principles relative, entirely determined by circumstance, culture and history. Moral principles are provisionally true—that is, they apply to most people in most cultures in most circumstances most of the time.” [pp. 18-23].

David Wood:
"As it turns out, atheists who use the argument from evil do indeed appeal to objective moral values, and they do so on two different levels. One, by arguing that suffering is bad or evil, they’re appealing to some objective standard of good and evil. If the atheist replies here that suffering isn’t really evil, then how does what is not evil conflict with God’s goodness? Two, by saying what God must and must not do, atheists are claiming that there are moral laws that even God would have to follow. Hence, in both cases the atheist must appeal, directly or indirectly, to moral values that transcend humanity."

John Loftus:
This whole issue is a “pseudo-problem” when it comes to why your God allows intense suffering in our world. The word “evil” here is used both as a term describing suffering and at the same time it’s used to describe whether or not such suffering is bad, and that’s an equivocation in the word’s usage. The fact that there is suffering is undeniable. Whether it’s bad is the subject for debate. I'm talking about pain...the kind that turns our stomachs. Why is there so much of it when there is a good omnipotent God based on YOUR OWN BELIEFS ABOUT THE MORAL QUALITIES OF YOUR GOD? [Sometimes capitalizing things helps to emphasize them. ;-)]I’m arguing that it’s bad to have this amount of suffering from a theistic perspective, and I may be a relativist, a pantheist, or a witchdoctor and still ask about the internal consistency of what a theist believes. The dilemma for the theist is to reconcile senseless suffering in the world with his own beliefs (not mine) that all suffering is for a greater good and that this world reflects a perfectly good God. It’s an internal problem for the theist.

Just tell me this David...what moral attribute did your God exhibit when he did nothing to avert the 2004 Indonesian tsunami? You tell me! You do realize that the more power a person has to stop evil the more responsibility he has to stop evil. No one imprisoned in any gulag had the power to stop the gulag system itself, so they cannot be blamed for its existence, and I may not have the power to stop a gang of thugs from beating a person to death. But your God is omnipotent. With just a snap of his fingers he could have saved over a quarter of a million people, and not one of us would ever have known he stopped it, precisely because it didn't happen.

David Wood:
"(1) John argued that giving us free will is like giving a razor blade to a child. No it’s not. Nothing good is going to come from giving a razor blade to a child."

John Loftus:
Yes it is. Razor blades can be used for good purposes by people who know how to use them, like scraping off a sticker from a window, or in shaving. That’s because adults know how to use them properly. We could give an adult a razor blade. We cannot give a 2 year old one, for if we did we would be blamed if that child hurts himself. Just like a younger child should not be given a license to drive, or just like a younger child should not be left unattended at the mall, so also if God gives us responsibilities before we can handle them then he is to be blamed for giving them to us, as in the case of free will.

David Wood:
"(2) John argued that God should have given us stronger inclinations to do what’s right. I’m not sure how this would differ from taking away our free will."

John Loftus:
This is not an all or nothing proposition here. I argued that if God made us with an aversion against wrongdoing just like we have an aversion against drinking motor oil, then it would cut down on us drinking motor oil. We could still do it, of course. Still this is just an analogy. I offered many examples of what God could've done.

David Wood:
"(3) What John has in mind is that God should limit our ability to, say, harm one another. But what would this look like? God takes away our ability to build knives, so we can no longer cut each other. But now we can’t cut anything at all. Or perhaps God takes away my fists so that I can’t hit my neighbor. It seems, however, that he would need to remove my hands. How could I type a letter?"

John Loftus:
God has many other means at his disposal here, if we concede for the moment the existence of this present world: One childhood fatal disease or a heart attack could have killed Hitler and prevented WWII. Timothy McVeigh could have had a flat tire or engine failure while driving to Oklahoma City with that truck bomb. Several of the militants who were going to fly planes into the Twin Towers on 9/11 could’ve been robbed and beaten by New York thugs (there’s utilitarianism at its best). A poisonous snakebite could’ve sent Saddam Hussein to an early grave averting the Iraq war before it happened. The poison that Saddam Hussein threw on the Kurds, and the Zyklon-B pellets dropped down into the Auschwitz gas chambers could have simply “malfunctioned” by being miraculously neutralized (just like Jesus supposedly turned water into wine). Sure, it would puzzle them, but there are a great many things that take place in our world that are not explainable. Even if they concluded God performed a miracle here, what’s the harm? Doesn’t God want us to believe in him?

It does absolutely no good at all to have free will and not also have the ability to exercise it. Our free will is limited by our age, race, gender, mental capacity, financial ability, geographical placement, and historical location to do whatever we want. I could not be a world-class athlete even if I wanted to, for instance. Therefore, we do not have as much free will as people think. My point was that if free will explains some of the intense suffering in this world when we already have limited choices anyway, then there should be no objection to God further limiting our choices when we seek to cause intense suffering in this world, and doing so in the reasonable ways I’ve suggested. My point is that the theist believes God can do this just as he purportedly did when he hardened Pharaoh’s heart against Moses.

David Wood:
"Another inconsistency related to John’s position is that he seemed to be arguing (1) that humans are so bad that God shouldn’t have created us, and (2) that we’re so good that God shouldn’t let us suffer. I think he needs to pick one or the other and stick with it. Part of John’s argument needs to be jettisoned."

John Loftus:
No. I’m arguing that humans should not have to suffer so much if there is a good God, precisely because God is supposed to be good. If God created us to suffer so much, then he shouldn’t have created us. It’s a problem for God and how he should treat his creatures, and he should show more love than he does if he is perfectly good. It doesn’t have anything to do with human goodness. It has all to do with God’s goodness.

David Wood:
"Yet another inconsistency that emerged in the debate and in John’s review is that John demands that theists account for all the intense suffering in the world, and all of the various kinds of evil in the world. But would an atheist ever accept such a high burden of proof for his own position? Of course not."

John Loftus:
I was merely asking David to account for one category of suffering, intensive suffering. Parasites kill one person every ten seconds, for instance. A theodicy is supposed to do what I ask, if it is to be considered a theodicy in the first place. It must explain why there is so much evil, and account for every category of evil. Since neither the theist nor the atheist can totally and rationally account for their respective brute facts (the theist cannot account for something that has always existed, and the atheist cannot fully account for why something popped into existence out of nothing) this is a wash. But the theist cannot believe in truly gratuitous evil—pointless evil. Therefore the theist must offer reasons that suggest there is no gratuitous evil, for if he admits there is one such evil, he no longer can believe in a perfectly good God. Therefore he must account for the most horrendus categories of evils in our world. Several major theists no longer even try to offer a theodicy. They admit it cannot be done.

David Wood;
"Loftus quotes Andrea Weisberger, who says that if free will is so important, we should possess it perfectly. But what can she mean here?"

John Loftus:
She means that if we did have the ability to do anything there would be much more evil, so even a theist doesn’t want us to have this kind of freedom. If free will is such a good thing, then why would the theist be the first one to say it isn’t?

David Wood:
"Thus, John blames God for racism. If God had only created one race, John says, then there would be no racism. But let’s keep going…..What does John’s view entail? A world without diversity, filled with men made by a single cookie-cutter. True, it would be a world without racism. But I’m not sure it would be a better world."

John Loftus:
Racism is a huge area of conflict among humans, and easily could’ve been eliminated if God made us all one color of skin, so he should have, even if we may have still had conflict because of other differences. There would have been no race based slavery in the South. No one suggested God should do away with all diversity. Just obvious cases of it. This is not an all or nothing proposition.

David Wood:
"(4) Now I do understand when someone asks, “Well, why didn’t God stop Hitler?” Even if free will is important, we’d be inclined to draw a line somewhere. So why doesn’t God intervene more than he does? Well, if we follow this mode of thinking through to its logical conclusion, we find that this sort of interference by God would destroy morality."

John Loftus:
No this would not! You’re making an inference that it’s an all or nothing. Either God stops all pain caused by free will or he does practically nothing. That’s a false dilemma. I think it’s obvious that he should’ve stopped the tsunami and the 9/11 attacks.

David Wood:
"If God brings things about through our free choices, without interfering, then God may allow horrible atrocities because they play an important role in future events. Think about the Holocaust. It was awful. But when it was over, the nation of Israel was reinstated in the Middle East."

John Loftus:
As Dr. Hatab asked, what about the Palestinians? “A perfectly good God would not wholly sacrifice the welfare of one of his intelligent creatures simply in order to achieve a good for others, or for himself. This would be incompatible with his concern for the welfare of each of his creatures.” [William P. Alston in The Evidential Argument From Evil, p. 111]. Therefore, the theist has the difficult task of showing how the very people who suffered and died in the Nazi concentration camps were better off for having suffered, since the hindsight lessons we’ve learned from the Holocaust cannot be used to justify the sufferings of the people involved.

David Wood:
"Second, I don’t see how an atheist can sincerely say that God should go around killing people. Why not kill anyone who’s going to do something wrong? Now John might say, “Well, God should draw the line exactly where I would draw it.” But if he says that, then he’s just saying that if God exists, he should be just like John Loftus, with John’s opinions and views."

John Loftus:
I’m not talking about an all or nothing proposition here. The fact that the giver of life does not protect innocent life by killing more evil people is what I question.

David Wood:
"Third, we shouldn’t forget that God has given us the ability to deal with people like Hitler. People like Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, and others arise, and we can either fight them and fix the situation, or we can sit back and do nothing. But God hasn’t left us helpless. When evil prevails, it’s our fault for letting it prevail."

John Loftus:
We cannot do it alone. How is a 10 year old going to keep Pol Pot’s men from raping and dismembering her?

David Wood:
"(5) John argued that suffering leads people away from God. He was responding to my Wizard of Oz theodicy. Christianity is spreading most rapidly in places where there has been tremendous suffering."

John Loftus:
This whole argument reminds me of Jeff Lowder’s comment: “It’s like saying in order to get my wife to love me I have to beat the crap out of her.” [Lowder/Fernandez debate on Theism vs Naturalism]. In an online article titled Human Suffering and the Acceptance of God by Michael Martin, Martin argues against such an idea. He questions their statistical facts, of course, but then continues to argue that: “1) If God's aim was to have the maximal number of people believe in God, as Craig has argued, He has not been successful. Billions of people have not come to believe in the theistic God. 2) There are many better ways God could have done to increase belief in Him. For example: God could have spoken from the Heavens in all known languages so no human could doubt His existence and His message. God could have implanted belief of God and His message in everyone's mind. In recent time God could have communicated with millions of people by interrupting prime time TV programs and giving His message. 3) Why is there not more suffering, especially in America, since unbelief is on the rise? 4) There is also the ethical issue. Why would an all good, all powerful God choose to bring about acceptance in this way since God could bring about belief in Him in many ways that do not cause suffering? Not only does suffering as a means to achieve acceptance conflict with God's moral character, it seem to conflict with His rationality. Whether or not suffering is a cause of acceptance is one thing. The crucial question is whether it is a good reason for acceptance.”

David Wood:
"(6) John says that soul-building is pointless, since virtue won’t play a role in heaven. I’m not sure that virtue won’t play a role in heaven, but even if it doesn’t, developing virtue certainly affects the soul, and this effect is positive. But besides all of this, it never occurs to John that some things are good in themselves. It is good to be patient, or courageous, or temperate, regardless of whether these things play a role in eternity."

John Loftus:
I do not accept a deontological ethic. I am a consequentialist standing firmly in the teleological traditon of ethics, not the duty centered traditon. David needs to show how these particular virtues affect the soul, and if he can do that then he can show that these virtues are intrinsically good. Until then, he cannot. He needs to offer some suggestions here, and I don’t see any, especially when he now claims there will be no morality in heaven. If there is no morality in heaven and no free will in heaven, then there is absolutely no reason why God couldn't have just created us all as amoral non-free creatures there in the first place.

And there is the additional problem of free will in hell. Theists typically claim that people in hell continue in their rebellion against God and so the "doors of hell are locked from the inside." Why this difference? Those who are saved are rewarded for their tortures here on earth by the removal of their free will to make moral choices, but if those who are damned have their free will taken away, then they too could be brought up to heaven. And if free will is such a good thing, as our debate clearly revealed the difference here with us, then why isn't it such a good thing in the end with believers in heaven?

David Wood:
"Suppose you’re walking down the street, and you find a purse full of money, but there’s a police officer standing there. Now all of us would do the right thing. We’d all return the purse. But we’d be returning it because there was a police officer standing there, not because it’s the moral thing to do."

John Loftus:
Even if this were always the case, which is not what I propose, if God was interested in our morality and he judges our hearts, then even if there is a police officer stopping us every time we want to do wrong, then God knows we wanted to do wrong, which is all that an omniscient being needs to see in order to judge us.

David Wood:
"(7) John said in his review that I never responded to the problem of animal suffering. I’ll admit that, given the extent of human suffering in the world, I’m far less concerned about animal suffering. However, I did give a brief response during the debate. Pain serves an important biological role. If the atheist thinks that God should take away an animal’s ability to feel pain, I hope he’s ready for the consequences. If cats didn’t feel pain, they would be extinct by now. When Fluffy jumps on a hot stove, pain tells her to get off the stove because the stove is harmful. As such, Fluffy should thank God for pain."

John Loftus:
I was talking specifically about the law of predation. The spider will wrap its victim up in a claustrophobic rope-like web and inject a fluid that will liquefy its insides so he can suck it out. The Mud wasp will grab spiders and stuff them into a mud tunnel while still alive, and then places its young larva inside so they can have something to eat when they hatch. The cat will play with its victims until they have no strength left, and then will eat them while still alive. The boa constrictor will squeeze the breath out of its victims crushing some of its bones before swallowing it. Killer whales run in packs and will isolate a calf and jump on it until it drowns in salt water, whereupon the bloody feeding frenzy begins. The crocodile will grab a deer by the antlers and go into a death spiral breaking its neck and/or drowning it before the feeding frenzy begins. Nature is indeed “red in tooth and claw.”

All creatures should be vegetarians. And in order to be sure there is enough vegetation for us all, God could’ve reduced our mating cycles and/or made edible vegetation like apples trees, corn stalks, blueberry bushes, wheat and tomato plants to grow as plenteous as wild weeds do today. Even if Christians believe we were originally created as vegetarians, why should animals suffer because of the sins in Noah’s day (Genesis 9:3)? What did animals do wrong?

God didn’t even have to create us such that we needed to eat anything at all! If God created the laws of nature then he could’ve done this. Even if not, since theists believe God can do miracles he could providentially sustain us all with miraculously created nutrients inside our biological systems throughout our lives, and we wouldn’t know anything could’ve been different.

David Wood:
"If I know John by now, I think he would respond that if animals must experience pain, then God shouldn’t have created them. This is one of the greatest differences between John and me. I think it’s better to exist, even if something is going to suffer."

John Loftus:
There is no good reason for God to have created animals at all, especially since theists do not consider them part of any eternal scheme, nor are there any moral lessons that animals need to learn from their sufferings. Does David really think it's better to exist with terrible suffering than never to exist at all? Childhood leukemia? Childhood rape? Spina bifida? The children who lost their lives during the Spanish Influenza of 1918? Better for whom? Some babies die shortly after they are born, while Jesus said that "many" will end up in hell. Is that better? More importantly, does this reflect well on the whole notion of a perfectly good God?

David thanks for the exchange. You have a very bright mind, and I wish you all of the very best in life.

My Argument From Evil

I have just posted my argument against the existence of God from evil here. Some atheists don't think the problem of evil is that big of a problem for theists. Maybe this will change their minds. I think it's a huge problem for theists. There is no good all-powerful God at all.

Any Comments From The Debate Hour?

Friday, January 12th, David Wood and I had a crossfire debate at The Debate Hour that discussed the issues surrounding our debate on God and Suffering.

Anyone who would like to comment on the program (pro or con), this is a good place to do so. That is, if anyone was listening. ;-) Thanks for your comments either way.

You can download this debate for $1.75 by clicking here.

Why is an atheist an atheist?

I dunno. I suggest asking the person.

But that’s not enough, is it? Just asking the question is the easiest thing to do. Listening to the answer…ahhh, there’s the rub!

The other day my daughter was studying her French. She insisted she had sufficiently studied. Being the ever-gullible parents that we are; we thought a quiz might be in order to confirm our trust. She missed the first question. She missed the second question. It became apparent that she hadn’t studied at all.

I opened my mouth and actually heard these words coming out—“Why did you say you studied?”

Can you imagine a more unintelligent question? I knew why she had said it: she hoped just saying the words would persuade her parents and she could go off to do what she really wanted to do. I wasn’t asking “why” out of some inquisitive spirit, intrigued with discovering a whole new insight into the teenage mind. I was merely making an introductory statement, which was about to develop into a full-fledged dressing down. There was more rhetoric then interrogatory in the question.

Why is an atheist an atheist?

Too often that question is asked and the person has a pre-prepared solution stuck fast in their mind. Respond in a manner that does not conform to the answer key firmly lodged in that mind and you would be quite, quite wrong.

We meet a person in an interesting profession. We ask, “What made you enter that field?” We are genuinely waiting for a response. The person replies that their parent did it, or they learned of it in school, or worked as an intern for a summer…whatever they respond. We walk away with, “Huh. How fascinating. Just learned something new.” We don’t respond, “Naw. You went into it for the money. You are lying to yourself.”

But ask an atheist why they are an atheist, and most times the person is so ready to respond to why the atheist is incorrect in her reply; they literally cannot wait for the poor person to stop talking. They will interrupt them before they are finished! “No, you are wrong!”

We ask questions as to what people do and why they do it all day long. Why go out with him? Why did you buy that particular TV? What’s with the new hair style? Why did you get so angry over something so mundane? Why did you do this, do that, go here, go there?

And we take people at their face. What they say. If they indicate they fell in love because of the other person’s smile, while we may not see it, do we argue with the person they are wrong?

But get into this field, and I have people everywhere almost giddy with the joy of informing me why I am an atheist, regardless of what I say. Yes, sirree!

They tell me it is because I am mad at the church. Well…I am not mad at a particular building. However, I must confess I was pretty upset with a particular person in the church. Weren’t we all? I was acting up in Sunday School class, and my teacher, to my complete and utter embarrassment, took me to my father to “rat me out!” See, my father was ALSO a teacher, so this meant interrupting HIS class, and taking me out in the hall and disrupting TWO classes. I was mad at my teacher for a whole week! My deconversion process can clearly be traced back to a certain fourth-grade teacher.

They tell me it is because I am mad at God. For what? I have a lovely wife, very healthy children, a good home…aha! My garage door just broke. THAT must be it. I am angry at the very creator of life because I must go out and spend a whooping $6.97 and 1/2 an hour fixing a hinge. Surely you can see how God dealt me so wrongly, and I am justified in my anger!

They tell me it is because I want to sin. He he he. Don’t they want to sin? Are they losing God, too? Is it some big secret that every human in existence wants to do something that a Christian calls “sin”? O.K. I will confess it. There are times I would like to…sin. (gasp!) I have fleeting (and some not-so fleeting) moments in which I would prefer to let loose on some internet opponent with a few well-chosen epitaphs, swear words, colorful metaphors, and apt (in my opinion) descriptions. That must be why I am an atheist. Because I wanted to justify having those reactions, while not engaging in performing them. (Most times.)

They tell me I had the wrong Christianity, the wrong Bible, the wrong beliefs, the wrong interpretation, the wrong teachers, the wrong association, the wrong prayers, the wrong faith, the wrong Jesus, the wrong hymns, pews and parking lots. I wonder sometimes how I ever managed to be a Christian for so long, doing it so wrong!

You want to know why an atheist is an atheist. Ask him. BUT (and this is the key part) that part of your brain that is already assured of the answer? You must turn it off. That part of your background which has ingrained in you a reason in stone? Ignore it. Pretend, for a moment, that you are asking why they became a dentist. Or wear those shoes. Pretend, for a moment, that you actually care about the response for what it is, not for why it is wrong.

See, people become atheists for as many and varied reasons as people do just about anything else. Yes, some do because of an emotional reaction. Some are born in atheist homes. Some because of study of science. Some for study of philosophy. Some by way of study of religion. Perhaps their own.

Some are convinced there is no god because of the various human creations of god(s), some by the troubling Problem of Suffering, some by Euthyphro.

Some are more defensive, some more offensive, some are ambivalent. Some don’t even stay atheists.

Look, if you are interested in informing me why your belief system mandates that I became an atheist—fine. Have at it. Don’t start off the conversation with a pleasant “Why did you become an atheist?” A more honest, “This is why you are an atheist. I know because this is what my God says.” We can draw swords and duel.

But if you are interested—really interested—it may take the hard, hard work of setting aside a prejudice and genuinely listening to the response. Listening with the prejudice that the person is actually telling the truth instead.

A Response to David Wood, Part 2

In our debate on suffering David Wood mentioned that his “arguments are by no means the only arguments that theists would offer in response to evil." He said "There are entire categories of answers that I won’t be using.” Mr. Wood claimed that the classical theistic position has “probably the strongest response to the problem of evil.” According to Mr. Wood, classical theists (like Thomas Aquinas) didn’t think of God as a personal “moral agent.” When they said God is good, “they didn’t mean that God is an extremely well-behaved person.” In his review of the debate, David said this: “…for classical theists, God is not a person, nor does he have emotions like humans. God isn’t like us at all. A classical theist would reject a concept of God which views him as the sort of being who would come to our rescue when we’re in danger, for this wouldn’t be a changeless, eternal being (and, according to the classical theist, sheer anthropomorphism).”

In our debate, and in his review itself, Mr. Wood mentions this view without arguing for it, so there was nothing I had to respond to, even now. However, I still want to take a look at it.

I'll skip a critque of the classical concept of an eternally unchanging God, since Christians themselves are rejecting such a notion. Suffice it to say that the whole notion that God doesn’t change seems to imply that God never has a new thought, or idea, since everything is an eternal NOW, and there is nothing he can learn. This is woodenly static. God would not be person, of course. But he would end up being a block of ice, a thing. To say he does nothing NEW, thinks nothing NEW, feels nothing NEW, basically means he does nothing, thinks nothing, feels nothing, for it’s all been done. What would it mean for a such a being not to take risks (since the outcome is sure), not to plan (for it’s already been planned), or to think (thinking involves weighing temporal alternatives, does it not?). But if God cannot have a new thought then he cannot think--he is analogous to a block of ice.

The classical theist’s position is defended today by Brian Davies, in his book An Introduction the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press, 1993). Davies questions “whether the theist is bound to regard God as morally good,” and writes, “if the problem of evil depends on thinking of God as a morally good agent and if theists do not have to regard him as such, then the problem is not necessarily a problem for belief in God.”(p. 48) Davies is correct, I think, to say that if the classical theist’s God is not a morally good agent then the problem of evil is a “pseudo-problem,” in exactly the same way that Process theologians do away with the problem of evil by arguing that God is not omnipotent. That’s because in order for there to be a problem of evil theists must first believe that their God is morally good, omnipotent and omniscient in some sense. Lacking these characteristics in a God makes the problem of evil pretty much null and void, although, as I'll argue, there is a price to pay for this view.

Davies makes a distinction between God being known as “good” from God being known as “morally good.” He argues God can be known to be good without also being morally good. What does the word “good” mean when applied to God? Davies writes that “it is implausible to hold that moral goodness is the only goodness there is. There are good chairs, good radios, good dinners, good essays, good books, good poems, good maps, good all sort of things.” So the only way we can know whether or not God is morally good would be to understand the context of the word “good” when applied to God. Theists will typically claim God is a person, and like other persons he should at least be as good as we are when we act good. But Davies argues the phrase “God is a person” “does not occur anywhere in the Bible.” And neither does the Bible say that the Trinity being made up of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are “persons” or a “person” either. Even if theists still want to say “God is personal” Davies claims there is something “odd” in thinking God is morally good, “for if we are talking of the maker and sustainer of creatures, must it not, rather, be true that God can be neither morally good nor morally bad?” “To deem an agent to be morally good, we need positive grounds for attributing to that agent virtue or obedience to duty or obligation. And this, of course, means that if something is such that virtue or obedience to duty or obligation cannot be intelligibly attributed to it, we have no reason to think of it as either morally good or morally bad. (p. 49). Davies goes on to argue that God has no obligations or duties to his creature since he is the creator of them all. Only creatures have obligations and duties to their creator and to each other. God is not bound by any moral laws to his creatures. “If anything, it should be said that God must be the cause of duties and obligations, for, if God is the creator, he must be the cause of there being situations in which people have such things. (p. 52).

Roy F. Holland argues in a similar fashion in his article, “On the Form of the Problem of Evil” Against Empiricism: On Education, Epistemology, and Value (Barnes & Nobles Books, 1980). Holland claims that “God is not a member of a moral community, or any community for that matter,” and since moral obligations are only to be found within moral communities, God does not have any moral obligations.

What can be said about these responses to the problem of evil? In the first place, what must be understood about them are that they are all concessionary solutions, that is, they concede that the problem of evil is a powerful argument. So to escape the conclusion of the argument these theists must give up believing God has one or more of the characteristics traditionally ascribed to him, like moral agency, moral goodness, omnipotence and/or omniscience. That’s quite a concession. It’s a concession I’m very pleased to see them admit.

In the second place, the Christian theist has a new problem. It's one I expressed in the debate itself, and it comes from John Beversluis who has argued, that “If the word ‘good’ must mean approximately the same thing when we apply it to God as what it means when we apply it to human beings, then the fact of suffering provides a clear empirical refutation of the existence of a being who is both omnipotent and perfectly good. If on the other hand, we are prepared to give up the idea that ‘good’ in reference to God means anything like what it means when we refer to humans as good, then the problem of evil can be sidestepped, but any hope of a rational defense of the Christian God goes by the boards.” [C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Eerdmans, 1985)].

The reason why a rational defense of the Christian God goes by the boards is because of the kind of God they are left with by conceding the argument from evil. What kind of God are they left with? That’s the question. They have a non-personal God who is not a moral agent. As such this God has no moral obligations to his creatures. This non-personal God can almost be equated with the “Force” of the Star Wars movie (which is neither good nor evil), and as such IT is amoral in our sense of the word, which is the only sense of the word we can rationally know.

This God does not have moral obligations toward his creatures and therefore he can do whatever he wants to us for his own ends and his own glory. If I were to ask whether this God has any obligation to love us, then the answer would be “No.” If I were to ask whether this God has any obligation to tell us the truth, then the answer would be “No.” If I were to ask if this God is under any obligation to help us when we suffer, then the answer would be “No.” Why then does the believer think God loves us, or that he tells us the truth, or that he will help us when we suffer? The believer will answer that God freely chooses to do so. What reasons does the Christian believer have for answering this way? They will answer that God has shown us he loves us in Jesus Christ.

Now there are plenty of reasons for rejecting the claim that Jesus is God, or that his death atoned for our sins, and that he resurrected from the grave. But even if these superstitious claims can be accepted, which are implausible at best, what reason do we have for thinking that God tells us the truth in Jesus, or that Jesus’ death on the cross helps us, or that he will come to our aid when we are suffering? If God has no obligations toward us then what reason does anyone have for thinking Jesus helped us, or that the Bible is a true account of why his death helps us, or why God will help us in our suffering, or keep any of his promises to us? By this very logic God does not have any obligation toward us at all, so even if he did freely choose to show us he cared for us in the ancient past, what reason do we have for supposing he still cares for us? I see none. None based upon the logic of the classical theists viewpoint, that is.

In the third place, what sense can be made that God is not a person when Christians try to understand the incarnation of a purported God-man, Jesus? What sense can be made of such a God-man who both had no moral obligations as a non-moral divine agent, and at the same time had human obligations? How can this purported God-man represent one being, who is both personal and impersonal, who has no obligations and yet has obligations?

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, such a concept of God is also inadequate as an object of worship. I might fear him, but then I fear a bully with a baseball bat in his hands too. Such a being is untrustworthy. I cannot believe a single word he speaks. For all that Christians would know, the Bible is not true, the events never occurred, and we would be deceived by this God if we believed it. Nor do I have any guarantees such a being loves me and will help me when I suffer, no matter what I hear him say or see him do. As far as I know from this world, I am just a rat in a maze, or an ant in an ant farm, or a human guinea pig. That’s all, as far as I know, from the logic of the position espoused. I will never worship such a being. If I believed such a Being existed I would probably obey out of fear, but if such a Being could read my thoughts then he would also know I'm rebelling against him as I do.

There is one thing more about this classical view though. It admits what we actually find in the Bible. It admits what I see in the Bible, and the God in the Bible is barbaric.

No wonder then that Christian theologians beginning with Anselm have adopted what's called perfect being theology. Since a proper concept of God must entail he is "the greatest conceivable being," that means God must be omnibenelovent, omnipotent and omniscient. Anything less than this isn't a proper concept of God worthy of worship. However, as classical theology reminds us, maybe God's omnibenelovence cannot be found in the Bible after all! Therein lies the final problem for the Christian theist. Can he have it both ways?

RAISE YOUR HANDS...now keep them up!

The Bible is so completely full of superstitious claptrap, so astoundingly packed with incongruous garbage and superficial hogwash that freethinkers find themselves strapped to systematically dismantle the book. When we consider the erroneous information, the credulous stories, the long list of dangerous ideals taught therein, we conclude that the Bible is a well of perversion that never seems to run dry.

Some of these biblical falsehoods come in the form of gross scientific errors, mixed with inane hodgepodge that we’d expect to find only in third-world countries, or perhaps melting-pot city slums, where voodoo practices are carried out by gold-toothed gypsies with criminal records, held up in dilapidated, one-room houses with snakeskins and ceremonial beads garnishing the doors somewhere out in the bayous of Louisiana. Examples of these biblical butcherings of sensibility include cattle looking at striped rods to produce striped offspring (Gen. 30:37-39), stars that fall to earth (Rev. 6:13), curses that cause the thighs of adulterous women to rot (Num. 5:12-21), and this example of superficial hocus-pocus…

“10. So Joshua did as Moses had said to him, and fought with Amalek: and Moses, Aaron, and Hur went up to the top of the hill. 11. And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed: and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed. 12. But Moses' hands were heavy; and they took a stone, and put it under him, and he sat thereon; and Aaron and Hur stayed up his hands, the one on the one side, and the other on the other side; and his hands were steady until the going down of the sun.” (Exod. 17:10-12)

I think it is all too clear that this is not what Paul had in mind when he referred to “lifting up holy hands without wrath and doubting” (I Tim. 2:8)! All throughout the New Testament, we are given the message that it is faith that sets us free and gives us the victory (John 8:32; I John 5:4), that if we have faith as a grain of mustard seed, mountains will be moved (Matt. 17:20). Believers assure us that God is concerned with the spiritual, not the physical things of this world, yet here is a bizarre story where God’s chief representative of the Old Testament had to claim victory in battle by what amounted to a feat of physical endurance. God’s strength wasn’t enough. Moses’ faith wasn’t enough. God wanted good shoulder muscles, and in the absence of that, a stone to sit on so Aaron and Hur could hold up the arms of the beloved leader of the Exodus. God’s victory in us is dependant on our ability to hold our arms above our heads for an extended length of time; surely that is not the message God wants us to learn here, is it? If this is not vain, it is hard to say what would qualify as such.

I’m not even going to try and imagine theistic excuses to put a spiritual twist on this account and make it seem believable. The idea of some man having to hold up his hands and a rod to win a battle creates some chuckles as we begin to think of how God could have had more fun with Moses and demanded that he stand on his head or do cartwheels all night to defeat his foes!

Jesus commended the faithful centurion for having faith that Jesus could speak the word only and his servant would be healed (Matt. 5:5-10). I wonder why Moses couldn’t call upon the same faith to eradicate his enemies without making the effort a silly ordeal? Jesus told his followers not to pray like those who use vain repetitions in prayer, thinking they would be heard for their “much speaking” (Matt. 6:7). Apparently this principle does not apply to the use of our bodies!

I find this tale strangely similar to a psychic in my own city who took advantage of a gullible family member of mine who was convinced by this phony that she had to bury a certain keepsake item a foot underground with a jar of “holy water,” a scarlet handkerchief imported from Israel, a clipping of goat’s hair, and a feather from a bald eagle to “cleanse away evil energies.” I guess all gods want their people to carry out aimless rituals and “go through the motions” to some extent.

Humorous and inexcusably vain examples of ignorance such as these will always serve as a testament to a progressive society that there are many things in the past that we are glad to have seen perish in the abyss of time.

(JH)

Responding to David Wood (part 1)

I will respond to David Wood's review of our debate on evil in parts. David Wood points out that our debate proposition could’ve been different. We could’ve debated each other on any one of five propositions:

1)The extent of suffering in our world poses an interesting problem for theists, since God is said to be all-powerful and wholly good.

2)The extent of suffering in our world is at least some evidence against theism.

3)The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God improbable.

4)The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God implausible.

5)The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God impossible.

We debated proposition #4 above.

Just what the difference is between propositions #3 and #4 isn’t immediately clear to me, but David thinks there is a big difference between the two. What is the difference between the words “improbable” and “implausible?” Any thesaurus will show that a synonym for the word “improbable” is the word “implausible” and vice versa. I suspect he merely wants to use rhetoric in showing a bigger gap than is necessary between the first and the last potential debate propositions in order to show I had a bigger burden than I really had. Of this 4th proposition Mr. Wood claims that “the skeptic needs to show that the evidence drawn from the problem of evil not only outweighs the evidence for God’s existence, but that one side of the scale almost drops to the floor.” If that is what he thinks, then he should’ve stated this in the debate itself so we could discuss exactly what our respective claims were. But he didn’t.

I do think the problem of evil outweighs other nebulous philosophical arguments on behalf of the philosophers’ god, which is the very best view of God that such arguments can lead a person to accept anyway. And I do think the problem of evil outweighs the historical claims of miracles in the Bible coming from an ancient pre-scientific superstitious people. However, I do object to this burden of proof he’s now throwing upon me. He never stated this in the debate itself. Why does he do so now?

David is correct that I didn't throw the burden of proof in his lap, and I don’t now. We each share our own burden of proof. The particular burden of proof in any debate will always depend upon the wording of the debate proposition that we both agreed to. I would’ve agreed to this debate proposition: “The extent of suffering in our world does not make the existence of God implausible,” with me taking the negative side. To me these are equivalent propositions, and it puts into better light what each of us needed to show. The question was this: “Whether, given the extent of suffering in our world, it’s implausible that God exists.” The way the proposition is actually stated, David must give reasons why suffering does not make implausible the existence of God. What I did not have to show is that his side of the argument is outweighed by the problem of evil so much that his side “almost drops to the floor.” That is an unreasonable standard not only for the debate proposition itself, but also for nearly any inductive argument.

David states I am “claiming that a certain argument has the power to effectively refute theism.” Where does he get that out of the proposition itself? The proposition never said I must refute his position. I just don’t see it. He goes on to state that “if an inconsistency, or an unproven assumption, or a false premise is found somewhere in his (John’s) argument, then he must show that his argument can be modified so that it avoids this problem. Otherwise, he has not proven that we should answer the topic question in the affirmative.” But again, where in the debate proposition does he get the impression that if I have not “proven” my case that I lose the debate based upon the wording of the proposition itself? I would never have agree to that standard of proof. And he never argued for such a standard in the debate itself. So why does he do so now?

In David’s own words he claims that all he needed to show was that “the evidence gained from suffering isn’t so utterly strong that it removes all plausibility from the claim that God exists.” But why does he add the word “all” here, as in “removes all plausibility?” I don’t see it in the debate proposition itself, do you?

With that as a background, no wonder he claims he thinks he can show me wrong, “rather easily.” Again, in his words: “...in light of certain difficulties with the argument from evil, I don’t see how John could possibly demonstrate so lofty a conclusion.” But as we’ve just seen, I don’t see why I had to demonstrate such a conclusion at all.

The Loftus-Wood Debate Reviews Have Just Been Posted!

David Wood has just posted both his and my reviews of our debate on evil as featured articles here.
As I read David's review it seems he went beyond merely assessing the debate itself by attempting to answer arguments of mine that he didn't answer that night. I look forward to dealing with these additional arguments of his sometime in the future. For the most part I merely reviewed the arguments that were offered during the debate itself. In neither of our reviews will anyone get a sense of my whole argument as laid out in my opening statement, since I didn't think I needed to repeat it, and David is mainly concentrating on defending his arguments in his review. But for now he has the last word.

For anyone who wants to purchase a copy of the debate itself I have been putting a few on ebay. You can also e-mail me, or contact David to buy it. I can bill you via Paypal. To order through either of us the cost will be $19.95 and we'll pay for 1st Class mail within the US (Otherwise you'll pay the difference).

David and I will also appear next Friday (January 12th) at 8PM ET on The Debate Hour to discuss the ideas involved in our debate.

Other reviewers of our debate will be Richard Carrier, Andrea Weisberger, and Jim Lazarus, as they get a chance. These are all atheists, I know, but any Christian theist who would like to review the debate please contact either David or myself. My friend and Christian philosopher Paul Copan was given a copy of it by David, so I'll let you know if and when he may want to write something up about it. Christian philosopher Victor Reppert may do one as well, but I don't think he has a copy yet.

Christians Do Not Have a Superior Foundation for Morality!

Christians claim that atheists have no foundation for morality, and that they do. Christians claim atheists have no motivation for being good people, and that they do. Christians claim they have moral superiority because of these two beliefs..

What can we make of this? It’s difficult to convince them otherwise, and I’ve tried here, and I’ve tried there. At the risk of beating my head against the wall, let me try one more time.

Statistics show that atheists make up the lowest number of people in prison per percentage of the population. Statistics also show that atheists have the lowest divorce rate per percentage of the population, especially when compared to conservative Christians. Moreover, it cannot be shown that Christians are more charitable than atheists when we look closely at the data.

Ddisregarding this data Christians think they live better lives because they alone have the Holy Spirit living in them. If this claim were true we should expect then to live better lives. But I believe Christians are deluded about this, since the evidence doesn’t show their claim to be true. It’s no different than the Christians who visit us here at DC who cannot bring themselves to believe we are former Christians. What gives? They reject ordinary evidence and personal testimonies to the contrary even though they turn around and accept extraordinary ancient personal testimonies of miracles in the Bible. They need to come to grips with the fact that these ancient Biblical testimonies are reported through the poor medium of history, which must cross over Lessing’s broad ugly ditch.

Christians always have an out. They claim that the above statistics do not represent true Christians. But when I ask them who the true Christians are, they are all divided into denominational groups which are intellectually supported by scholars who claim their particular group represents true Christianity. If you look at the above link on divorce rates it’s all broken down into denominations. Which one represents yours? None of them are significantly better than atheists with regard to divorce rates.

Conservative Christians will claim that it’s not denominational standing but whether or not someone believes the Bible. But I still find people who believe the Bible is inerrant who disagree with each other. Come on now!? Even Jehovah’s Witnesses claim the Bible is inerrant.

The truth is that it was Bible believing Christians who defended slavery in the South! This is a historical fact! The issue of slavery in the South was clearly the easiest moral question for the Christian God to condemn, if he exists and if he truly is the author of the Bible!

Furthermore, if Christians really believed the Bible they wouldn’t let women speak in their churches (I Cor, 14:34), for the man would be the domineering patriarchal head of the house in which a wife is to “obey” her husband just like Sarah obeyed Abraham (I Peter 3: 6), even to the point of lying to save his life by having sex with another man (Genesis 12: 10-16) and by letting him sleep with another woman so he could have a child (Genesis 16). [I am old enough to remember when women had to say the words “to love and to obey” at their weddings!]

Christians have just learned to interpret these kinds of things differently down through the ages, that’s all. According to Sam Harris they cherry-pick their morals from the Bible, and I think that’s true. They claim they wouldn’t do what previous generations of Christians did. Take for instance the great Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas, who taught that heretics should be killed because they are a leavening influence in society. So Christians did that in the Spanish Inquisition and witch trials. Today's Christians think that past Christians got it wrong. Christians today claim they wouldn’t have done that. But this is what I call chronological snobbery. We are all children of our times, as Voltaire said…all of us. And our morals have all developed together over time with the advancement of a better understanding of who we are as human beings in a society.

Christians will retreat to the claim that the whole reason atheists and skeptics are not mass murderers is because they don't live consistently with their beliefs. Christians will claim that the morality of atheists is a borrowed one from the Christian society they were all raised in that taught them what is right and what is wrong. But this is the most ridiculous claim of all.

Michael Shermer asks the Christian one simple question: “What would you do if there were no God? Would you commit robbery, rape, and murder, or would you continue being a good and moral person? Either way the question is a debate stopper. If the answer is that you would soon turn to robbery, rape, or murder, then this is a moral indictment of your character, indicating you are not to be trusted because if, for any reason, you were to turn away from your belief in God, your true immoral nature would emerge…If the answer is that you would continue being good and moral, then apparently you can be good without God. QED.” [Michael Shermer, The Science of Good and Evil, pp. 154-155].

Let me say that anyone who tries to show that no society can be a good society without Christianity needs a history lesson. Such a person needs to study some of the great societies of the past, like Greece during the golden ages, or the Roman Empire, or several of the dynasties in ancient China, or the Islamic Empire under Muhammad, or the historic Japanese culture. None of these societies were Christian ones, but they were great societies by all standards of history. It won't prove anything to argue that there was corruption in every one of these societies to some degree, for this is true of any ancient or modern society, even Biblical Judaism and Christian America.

If Christians want to maintain that a Christian society is a better society, then just let them volunteer to go back in time to medieval Christianity and see if they like it. Probably all Christians today would be branded as heretics and persecuted or burned to death. And if today’s Christians will say that medieval Christianity doesn’t represent true Christianity, which Christian society does truly represent true Christianity? Even in the first few years of the early church there was corruption. There was sin in the camp (Acts 5); grumbling about food (Acts 6); and a major dispute that threatened to split the church (Acts 10-11, 15; Galatians 2). Then there were the constant disputes among these Christians over a very wide assortment of issues (I & II Corinthians). I could go on and talk of Calvin’s Geneva, the Crusades, or any period in the history of America too, including black slavery, the Salem witchcraft trials, Manifest Destiny, and our treatment of women and minorities, to mention just a few.

Christian inclusivist scholar, Charles Kimball, argues that certain tendencies within religions cause evil. “Religious structures and doctrines can be used almost like weapons.” (p. 32). Religion becomes evil, according to Kimball, whenever religion: 1) has absolute truth claims; 2) demands blind obedience; 3) tries to establish the ideal society; 4) utilizes the end justifies any means when defending their group identity; or 5) when they see themselves in a holy war. He says, “A strong case can be made that the history of Christianity contains considerably more violence and destruction than that of most other major religions.” (p. 27) [When Religion Becomes Evil (Harper, 2002)].

I just don’t see where a Christian society is a better one. And even if Christianity was the main motivator in starting most all early American universities, most all of our hospitals and many food kitchens, and the like, these things still would have been started anyway, if for no reason other than necessity. It just so happened to be that Christianity is the dominant religion in America for a couple of centuries, that’s all. Besides, these things were probably not started by Christian churches out of altruism, or any desire for a better society, but as a way for those churches to convert people. After all, who are most vulnerable to the Christian message? They are the sick (hospitals), the poor (food kitchens) and young people leaving home for the first time to enter universities, which were mostly started to train preachers.

Christians will retort that atheists have their Lenin's and Stalin's. Yes that's correct. But what point does that prove? It doesn't prove anything to me. Why? Because I don't believe it was their atheism which caused them to kill millions of people. Most dictators who fear for their lives will kill people in order to make their subjects fearful of them. Besides, there are power hungry people and killers out there no matter what a person believes. The history of the church proves this.

The real question is whether Christians have a superior foundation for morality and I've just briefly shown they don't. I mean, really now, what good does it do for Christians to claim they have a foundation for morality when they cannot tell us how we should behave and they cannot live better lives than the rest of us? What good does it mean to claim they have a superior foundation for morality when they don't actually follow the Bible as was originally intended by the writers of the Bible? It means nothing at all. Such a claim as theirs is completely empty.

Christians will finally retort that atheists cannot say anything is evil. They will claim that whatever happens is part of the evolutionary process of things where the fittest survive, and as such skeptics have no right to denounce any evil behavior. But this is a separate question from the one I've just dealt with. It's a red herring from this particular discussion. What does this have to do with whether Christians have a superior foundation for morality? If they don't have a superior morality, then they don't. And until they accept this fact we cannot go forward to discuss the next question about the nature of good and evil in our society and how we actually determine good and evil. I've already argued that today's Christians don't get their morality from the Bible. That's my major point here. Do they or don't they? That is the question. And the answer is that they do not. They gain their moral notions just like the rest of us do, except that they are hamstrung by having to fit that morality inside the pages of the Bible, and they have an ill-founded confidence in what they think is moral that can lead them to do great harm to others in the name of their God.

But if the answer is that Christians don't get their morality from the Bible and that their moral foundations are not superior ones, then the very next question is to understand where we actually get our moral notions from, and at that point I'd just recommend to them Michael Shermer's book. The short answer to this specific question is that since we are part of nature we have a right to say what kind of society we want live in, and it's a better society when people get along and treat one another with dignity and respect in a democratic form of government where eveyone has the right to speak their mind and to work toward goals that produce a better social environment for our familes and for our future children. It's better for us. It's better for our children. It's better for our nation. It's better financially. It's better socially. It's better for people as a whole. This is obvious! What other reasons are needed?

Twelve Men and a Truck

Have you noticed how in stories, the characters can “pop in” at convenient times, and convenient places, at the will of the author? If they need Aunt Maude to appear at Sunday dinner, in order to propel the story along, she is written in. We don’t question as to how she got there, or why, as we understand that this character is necessary to the story and therefore at this moment, she will appear.

In fact, we chuckle a bit at Star Trek fans (such as myself) who argue over incongruous events in differing installments. “In Episode #27 they turned left from the Captain’s office to go to the engine room, but in Episode #83 they turned right. Which is it?” The reason we laugh, is that we know it is just a story. These aren’t factual events. These are television shows, penned by Hollywood writers who have no intention of keeping the facts congruent, as they aren’t facts—they are stories. To argue over the validity of the “facts” of these fictions would be silly.

One of the questions that continually perpetuates throughout discussions of the events of the First Century in Palestine, as recorded in the Bible, is how much is fact, and how much is fiction. Now, one may take the position that if it is recorded, it is absolutely positively, no questions asked a historical event. But is this argument convincing? If someone was coming across the events, as written, for the first time, would they be persuaded that it is a story, or that it actually happened that way?

One of the events that has all the elements of a story and not an actual happening, is the moving of all eleven disciples, and Jesus’ entire family from Galilee to Jerusalem overnight. It was done to make the story convenient, out of a desire to move the story along, rather than out of any historical basis.

First of all, it is to be noted that Jesus’ base of operations was in Galilee. (Mr. 1:28) It was here that he did miracles, preached, traveled and talked to crowds. But most importantly, it was from here that he chose his Disciples.

Every disciple (as far as what was recorded) was from Galilee. (Acts 2:7) They had wives (Mr. 1:30), jobs (Mr. 1:18), families (Mr. 1:19) and even homes (Mr. 2:15). In a word—roots. This is where, if things went wrong, they would go first.

For a year (or three,) they travel with Jesus, both in Galilee, and out, and we can fast forward to the night of the Last Supper. After eating, all but Judas (off betraying), go to the Mount of Olives. Jesus explains that he is about to die, and says that after He is resurrected, he will “Go before you to Galilee.” Mt. 26:32. This is most natural. Jesus recognizes that they are about to be scattered, and their most natural retreat would be home—Galilee.

Jesus’ mother and two of the Disciples mother still live in Galilee at this time, because it is noted they came from there to see Jesus die. Mr. 15:41. When the women go to visit the tomb, they find a young man there, who again confirms exactly what we expect, exactly what was said, “Go tell the disciples Jesus will meet you in Galilee.” (Mr. 16:8)

Exactly as they were told, exactly as suspected, Jesus meets the disciples in Galilee. Mt. 28:16. According to John, the Disciples hung around the room for eight days (John 20:26) but after that, met Jesus right where we expected—Galilee. (John 21:1)

At this point we see what we would humanly, naturally expect. Jesus and his Disciples’ base is in Galilee. The crowd is unfriendly, to say the least, in Jerusalem. The obvious point of retreat is Galilee. Or look at it this way. Assuming the Jesus movement is dead. Kaput. Jesus died and wasn’t resurrected, where do the disciples go? Back to their jobs. Back to their families and homes. Back to the lives they had before. Sure, one or two may try to drum up a resurrgence of a belief in Jesus, but not all eleven. They would go home.

Or, if they are convinced by seeing a resurrected Jesus, both in Jerusalem, but later in Galilee, what better place to start the movement than at home? These are the people that saw Jesus’ miracles, heard his preaching, know the disciples personally. Even today, when people are converted, who are the first they attempt to win over? Their friends and family! The most natural place in the world for the disciples to start this church movement is in Galilee. Home.

Up until now, everything seems fine. There is only one catch. Luke wants to be a historian. And what Luke knows about the history of the church is that it started in Jerusalem. (Acts 2:1-7) If Luke read or was familiar with Paul, he would know Paul indicated Peter was from Jerusalem (Gal. 1:18) and Jesus’ brother is from Jerusalem. (Gal. 1:19) Luke records that all of the apostles were staying in Jerusalem. (Acts 1:13)

The Church grows in Jerusalem. (Acts 6:7). Every indication Luke has before him is that the church’s earliest leaders are from Jerusalem. How in the blue blazes can he rectify the problem that the legends say these were people from Galilee, yet the church clearly began in Jerusalem?

Just like any storyteller, Luke moves the entire group to a place he wants them without necessity of providing a reason. All eleven disciples and Jesus family (Acts 1:14), move, en masse to Jerusalem, in less than a month, with nary a thought of Galilee again. But does it make sense?

To give an idea of the complete abandonment of Galilee, the word “Galilee” or “Galilean” is mentioned 60 times in the four Gospels. True, some are descriptions of persons, such as Herod being tetrarch of Galilee (Lk. 31:1), but most of these are mentions of people from Galilee, or persons active in Galilee. In the whole rest of the New Testament, “Galilee” or “Galilean” is only mentioned another 9 times. It is as if it dropped off the face of the earth!

Or, perhaps another way of looking at it. Luke has the initial preaching, and growth of the Church in Jerusalem. (Acts 6:7) One of the most obvious initial outreaches would be Galilee, for all of the reasons stated—friends, family and familiarity. So is this where they go? Nope, instead, as the persecution began they start sending Christians out to Judea and Samaria. The apostles stay in Jerusalem. Acts 8:1. Not a single apostle is concerned about his family back home in Galilee? No one says, “Hey, why don’t I go back to Galilee and ride this thing out?”

They send Christians everywhere but Galilee! In fact, when Samaria gets the Word, the disciples are more than happy to send Peter and John to them. (Acts 8:14) Peter and John have no problem preaching throughout Samaria, but somehow their own region is completely missed. (Acts 8:25)

Finally, Paul becomes a Christian, and begins contending with Hellenists. It is only after Paul is converted, and begins his missionary work, that we finally learn of churches in Galilee. (Acts 9:31) Paul is more interested in converting the disciples’ family than the disciples were!

Paul, in his writing, has no notion of a Galilee, or teaching there. He talks of meeting the church the church leaders in Jerusalem, and ministering to the saints in Jerusalem. (Romans 15). Mark, writing the first Gospel, leaves us hanging with Jesus intending to be in Galilee, but the disciples never getting the word. Matthew, following Mark, leaves the disciples in Galilee. As well as John.

Luke is conflicted by the legend that places everyone from Galilee, and the history (as he knows it) that they were from Jerusalem. Simple solution—have them move. But why? Shouldn’t there be some continuity for the move? And Luke creates one.

As John did, immediately after the death of Jesus, Luke leaves the disciples in the city of Jerusalem. (Lk. 24:33) When Jesus makes his starling appearance, he adds a phrase that isn’t found in any of the other gospels: “Stay in the city of Jerusalem until you receive the power from on high.” (Lk 24:29) There. He did it. Like a masterful weaving of tales, Luke has forced the move from Galilee to Jerusalem. Luke assumes Jesus family will only naturally follow the disciples.

In a story, this works very, very well. In reality, this raises questions. How easy would it be for Eleven men, as well as Mary and her other sons to ALL move? Not most. Not some. But every single one. First Century Palestine was primarily an agricultural society, with the farmers making only enough to live on. They were taxed/tithed at about a third. This would include wages, produce, spices, everything.

The cities lived off of these lands, the wealthy landowners being absentee landlords, had what excess was available shipped to the city. A situation where the cities were parasitically living off the country. Any disciples that were fisherman would be out of a job. At best, they could hope to find labor work, but such work was primarily in farms—back in the country. How could they manage to obtain food to eat? Or rent a room for shelter?

Did they institute offerings as payment for their services? There are subtle hints to that effect at Acts 4:37 and Acts 6:3-4. This opens Pandora’s box, though, as it could remove the motivation factor of “Did they die for a lie?” No, they died because they needed the income, and were too much competition for the temple cult.

And how does Luke’s phrase “stay in the city” work in connection with the other gospels? It was said, while they were still startled to see Jesus. So, presumably, it was done before they saw him again (and again) in Galilee. Jesus says, “I will see you in Galilee” so, according to Luke, they stay in Jerusalem. Jesus says, “Stay in the city” so they go running off to Galilee. Jesus says, “You will be witnesses in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria” so they stay in Jerusalem, sending everyone else to Judea and Samaria. It is like “opposite world”—whatever Jesus says, they do the exact opposite!

There is no reason for the church to begin in Jerusalem. Jesus drew crowds out to Galilee. There is no temple requirement in Jesus’ religion. (Although curiously enough, they continued to go to the temple.) It was intended to be a missionary work, and its base of operations could be anywhere. In fact, where better than Jesus’ childhood home?

Jesus’ tomb was not venerated. The location of his death not visited. There was nothing keeping the disciples in Jerusalem. Just the pesky fact that Luke had to work with—that the church started with people in Jerusalem, and Luke had to move ‘em there.

How plausible is it that the disciples and Jesus’ family moved its entire base of operations from home and kin to Jerusalem almost overnight? How did the disciples survive? Where did they derive income to the point of buying homes?

[Note. I wrote this earlier this year, but it fit so nicely after my last discussion of the disciples’ calling I figured I would revive it with a few minor alterations.]

An Excerpt of Julia Sweeney's "Letting Go of God."

Here's an interesting site called One Good Move that contains an interview with Julia Sweeney, formerly Pat at Saturday Night Live, which contains a 30 minute excerpt of her brilliantly funny monologue Letting Go of God. I ordered the CD.

Was Jesus God Incarnate?

Since historical questions are easily disputed, let's lay them aside for the most part and see if we can we make any sense of the belief that Jesus was an incarnate God.

One modern attempt to defend the notion that Jesus was God incarnate has been made by Thomas Morris, in The Logic of God Incarnate (Cornwell Univ. Press, 1986), in which he defends the proposition that “Jesus of Nazareth was one and the same person as God the Son, the second person of the Trinity.” (p. 13).

Initially, such a view raises certain questions. Christians like Morris have three successive beings to reconcile with each other: 1) The 2nd Person of the Trinity who existed before time; 2) Jesus, who is God-in-the-flesh--a unique and new being in history; and, 3) The resurrected and glorified Jesus who now is purportedly “sitting at the right hand of God.”

Now keep in mind that the God-man Jesus was a fully human being, so any resurrected God-man must have a body in keeping with his humanity, otherwise the human part of the God-man ceased to exist, died, or his was simply discarded. But it can't be that God would destroy a sinless man, the man Jesus. Therefore, the resurrected Jesus, being a God-man, is a new and unique being, and this dual natured being is unlike the previous 2nd person of the Trinity.

When I asked about this problem of the glorified Jesus, my former professor, Dr. Ron Feenstra, had no trouble accepting the conclusion that the 2nd person of the Trinity took on a human form and now must keep it for all of eternity. [He edited, along with Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1989)]. I just find this whole belief extremely troublesome and implausible. If the human nature of Jesus is forever linked to the 2nd Person of the Trinity, then the full Trinity now includes a man, that is, the human side of Jesus. In heaven the 2nd Person of the Trinity must now forever live encapsulated within a human body (a glorious body, nonetheless, but a body). We now have an embodied God, forever! This whole thing seems contrived and is the result of believing, along with ancient superstitious people, that human beings could be gods (see Acts 14:11; 28:6).

The other possibility is that after the resurrection and ascension events of Jesus there are now two beings rather than one. In heaven there is the human Jesus, and then there is the 2nd person of the Trinity. There are now two beings who exist and arose out of one being, one person, here on earth. That is, the 2nd person of the Trinity discarded his human form to live for the rest of eternity unhindered, letting the human part of him to exist as a separate person in heaven with him. But incoherence sets in at this point, because the Chalcedon creed speaks of there being a “union” of the God-man such that the result is “but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ.” How can such a metaphysical union be separated into two beings? The traditional orthodox doctrine is that Jesus is one person!

But this God-man union is exactly what Morris is trying to defend. To do this he proposes a two-minds theory: “In the case of God Incarnate, we must recognize something like two distinct ranges of consciousness. There is first what we can call the eternal mind of God the Son with its distinctively divine consciousness… And in addition there is a distinctively earthly consciousness that came into existence and grew and developed as the boy Jesus grew and developed.” (p. 102). In this way the second person of the trinity could know what was going on in both the conscious and unconscious mind of Jesus although Jesus could be totally unaware that he is even there.

Morris has some major difficulties when he tries to work out this theory involving two minds, even though he uses the results of modern psychology. If there are two separate minds, each with its own separate consciousness, then a major question is this: Was the earthly Jesus conscious of the second person of the trinity, or not? If he wasn't conscious of the divine mind, then this accurately describes all human beings who are likewise unaware of a divine mind. Jesus would act and think like a human being in every respect. There would be no guarantee that his behavior is to be a model for us, nor would there be any guarantee that he spoke the very words of God to us. The only possible guarantee that he did so would be to claim the divine mind directed the human mind of Jesus to act and say the things he purportedly did. But at that point it's not really possible to say that this accurately descibes a human being "like us in every respect." For if God directed our human minds in the same way, then we too would be sinless and we too would speak the very words of God.

If the human side of the God-man was conscious of the the divine mind, then why didn’t he exhibit the attributes of deity, like omniscience (Mt. 24:36, Lk. 8:45-46), and omnipotence (Mt. 14:3-13; 26:53)? The reason Stephen T. Davis suggests is that Jesus couldn't do this and still be fully human: “At any point in his earthly ministry, I suspect, Jesus could have called on his omniscience (or omnipotence, for that matter), but had he done so, it would have been tantamount to his no longer being truly human.” [Logic and the Nature of God (Eerdmans, 1983), p. 126]. For having these attributes of divine consciousness would also eliminate the possibility that he was fully human, and as such he would not be "like us in every respect."

So on the one hand, if the human side of the God-man was not conscious of the divine mind, then how can his actions be guaranteed to be Godlike? But on the other hand, if he was conscious of the divine mind, or if the divine mind infallibly directed the human side of the God-man, then we no longer have a true human being who was "just like us in every respect."

This whole problem can be seen most forcefully when trying to understand what took place if and when the human and divine minds of Jesus ever came into conflict, as in the case of temptation. Which mind made the final decision in what to say or in how to act? How can one person have two minds but one will? Does the “divine will” over-ride the “human will”? Jesus himself said that human beings could sin in their thoughts alone (Matt. 5:22,28). Was Jesus able to fully act as a human being, or was his will to sin always restrained? Morris suggests that Jesus had free will, but that if he ever acted to sin the second person of the trinity would have stopped him from doing so. But if Jesus’ will was restrained in this way, then how can it be said Jesus was truly like us? He would have a divine consciousness that we don't have, and as such he didn't have the same choices and freedoms we have as human beings. Being restrained from sinning is not praiseworthy at all, because being praiseworthy demands that we acted on our own accord and we thought and did good things, not bad things. But apparently Jesus couldn’t totally act freely, so there’s nothing praiseworthy about what he thought and did as a human being.

We’re told that Jesus was temped (Matt. 4:1; Heb, 4:15). To be temped would entail having thoughts about sinning. One cannot be tempted to do something if there is no desire to do it. If someone tries to tempt me to rob a bank it cannot be done, because I do not have that desire, and never will. This is no temptation for me at all. Theologians have been trying to make sense of this whole idea of the distinction between temptation and the sinful thoughts that Jesus condemns, I think, unsuccessfully. But since Jesus was tempted to sin there seems to be some small imperfections in him, since to be tempted means to have desires that do not accord with the nature of God, especially when we take seriously the whole idea that there are no imperfections in the Godhead at all. John Hick: “Even unfulfilled beginnings of evil must themselves count as imperfections; for in order for the divine mind to overrule them there must have been something there that required to be overruled.” [1) Jesus exhibited what we’d now call a racist attitude toward a woman (Mark 7:27); 2) Jesus said, “Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone” (Mark 10:18); 3) he didn’t respect his parents like the law would demand (Mark 3:31-5; Luke 14:26), and 4) he used violence in the temple when he cast out the money changers (Matt. 21:12).[The Metaphor of God Incarnate].

Paul Copan understands the seriousness of this problem, but to solve it he introduces an ad hoc theory. Without any Biblical support, he claims Jesus was voluntarily ignorant of the fact that “he was necessarily good,” and as such he really was tempted to sin but couldn’t, because of his divine nature. [“That’s Just Your Interpretation,” (2001), pp. 138-143]. Just how Jesus could be divine and still lack the recognition that as a divine being he was necessarily good, Copan doesn't explain. Copan offers an analogy to explain himself. He answers by saying this is the same problem with how Jesus could know he was divine and yet not know the time of his purported second coming (Matt. 24:36). However, this doesn’t solve either problem. One bad analogy doesn’t solve another one. For he still hasn't answered how Jesus could be divine and yet not have divine knowledge.

“What we are left with is…God incarnate in the sense that God singled the human Jesus out for a special role—namely by not allowing him to go wrong. It follows that if God, in addition to being omnisciently aware of the full contents of someone’s mind, were to prevent her from making any wrong choices, that person would be another instance of God incarnate.” “Those who talked with Jesus were talking to a man whom God the Son was invisibly monitoring and preventing from going astray.” This, according to Hick, is the specific problem “that proved fatal for Morris’ theory: was Jesus free to commit sin?” [John Hick in The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p, 58, 60).

In light of these things we can see why E. P. Sanders wrote: “It lies beyond my meager abilities as an interpreter of dogmatic theology to explain how it is possible for one person to be 100 per cent human and 100 per cent divine, without either interfering with the other.” [The Historical Figure of Jesus (p. 134)].

Merry Christmas!

I just received an iPod from my wife for Christmas, and I'm listening to Michael Bolton's rendition of "Silent Night." I could just listen to it over and over again. It's beautiful. There are other Christmas songs I like very much too. I like Christmas music. Why? Because it helps me to remember what I was doing and thinking when I heard it in years past, and because it's just, well, beautiful. It also makes me want to believe again. That's right. All the arguments in the world don't phase me in the least. But music!? Ahhh. Music. Christmas music. Hymnal music. Chorus music. I love it! Sometimes it just makes me want to believe again. Sometimes I miss the Christian relationships I had developed in over 25 years. I miss it all the most at Christmas time. But even listening to this music I cannot bring myself to believe. I just cannot do it, even in these moments when I wish I could.

I hope that those who hate me and what I'm doing can see fit to forgive me even though I cannot repent of what I'm doing. I'm just doing what I think is best and true and right. I just cannot see things otherwise, given what I believe now. I can't do it.

I know we have our debates, and sometimes there are hard feelings between those of us who debate the issues surrounding Christianity. But we are all flesh and blood people, with feelings, hopes, and aspirations. We all have family and friends we can count on, and who can count on us. Most of us have pets that we love as well, and who love us. We all try to make a living the best that we know how. And it's a struggle for us all, no matter what we believe.

But at this Christmas season I wish every person who visits here a Merry Christmas, especially every team member at DC both past and present! I wish we all weren't separated by our beliefs, but even though we are, I still wish upon you the very best in life.

The Origins of Christmas

To learn about the pagan origns of Christmas See here, and see this 45 minute video here.

Dan Barker's Radio podcast at Freethought is really good...click on "Reason's Greetings". In that podcast he interviews Tom Flynn, author of The Trouble with Christmas. The unexpected highlight in this whole program is listening to an excerpt of Julia Sweeney's award winning monologue called Letting go of God . She is amazing! You've got to hear this. She's both brilliant and funny!

The Blasphemy Challenge: Is It What Jesus Meant?

[Written by John Loftus] There is at the present time something called The Blasphemy Challenge put out by an atheist group calling themselves the Rational Response Squad. See also Ed Babinski's Blog on this. Some Christians are responding on You Tube and also claiming that those who made this challenge don’t understand what the sin of blaspheming the Holy Spirit really is about.

I find this an interesting topic just because it’s another example to me of how Christians interpret their Bible. What is this particular sin? Christians claim that this sin isn't necessarily a speaking sin. With one voice using different words to express it, they argue that this sin is “the willful and wicked rejection of God’s saving power and grace.” Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. [“Blasphemy”].

In the The Anchor Bible Dictionary [ABD, “Unforgiveable Sin”] we read: “Those who are so spiritually perverse as to call Jesus’ healing ministry evil, are in danger of completely rejecting the spirit of God and with it any possibility of forgiveness. Such persons place themselves out of reach of God’s forgiveness, not because God’s forgiveness is limited, but because they would refuse it as evil.”

Notice that according to the ABD such people are in danger of any possibility of forgiveness.

The Bible Knowledge Commentary [Mark 3:28-30]: “In light of the context this refers to an attitude (not an isolated act or utterance) of defiant hostility toward God that rejects His saving power toward man, expressed in the Spirit-empowered person and work of Jesus."

Harper's Bible Commentary (Mk 3:20): “Though Jesus himself has been charged with blasphemy, his accusers commit the unforgivable sin of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which, in context, is the attribution to evil of a power given by God. Though all sins can be forgiven by God, the inability to distinguish good from evil makes one impervious to the presence of God.”

So even though we see that the scribes have committed such a sin, the real sin is the "inability to distinguish good from evil"?

Self proclaimed apologist JP Holding states: "the 'unpardonable sin' is this and nothing more: UNBELIEF." [Update: Holding updated his entry after I wrote this, but he clearly doesn't understand Greek, as I will explain later. When this former librarian actually takes a Greek class he will understand what the texts mean. Suffice it to say that the Greek in the Matthean passage has nothing to do with whether a particular speech act is finished. It has everything to do with what was said. Even if it was believed that what a person said reflected his heart, Christians today still believe this based upon passages like Matthew 15:7-9].

I usually don’t comment on what Christian are supposed to believe. I tell them to figure that out for themselves and get back to me when they all agree. But on this one issue most all Christians today agree that the blasphemy of the Holy Spirit is not about one act of denying the Holy Spirit. So I decided to take another look. I wanted to see why most all Christians are in agreement on at least one issue. That cannot be, I thought. ;-)

Take a look at the texts themselves [NIV]:

Mark 3:28-30

“I tell you the truth, all the sins and blasphemies of men will be forgiven them. But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will never be forgiven; he is guilty of an eternal sin." He said this because they were saying, "He has an evil spirit."

Now the context here is stated in the last verse. Jesus said what he did because the scribes said what they said. That’s the immediate context. What was it about what they said that provoked Jesus to say what he did? They spoke against the Holy Spirit. Yep. That’s what they did when they said of Jesus that “He has an evil spirit.” Therefore, the immediate context tells us that Jesus responded to a speaking type of sin, and this is also indicated by the other gospels in various ways as well:

Luke 12:10

"And everyone who speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but anyone who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven."

The contrast here is obvious. Speaking against the Son of Man is contrasted with blaspheming (or speaking against) the Holy Spirit. Just see Matthew's text below and this will be clearer if it isn't here. [If Jesus is God in the flesh, why would he distinguish between the offenses committed here? I see no reason, do you?]

Matthew 12:31-32

"And so I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. Anyone who speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but anyone who speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come."

The second sentence is key here. The contrast is crystral clear. It's a speaking sin. The two Greek words for the word "speaks" in this passage are both in the aorist mood. The aorist mood means that "the kind of action is punctiliar. The aorist indicates finished action." Essentials of New Testament Greek Ray Summers (Broadman Press, 1950, p. 66]. This is not a continual rejection of the Holy Spirit or even a continual speaking against the Holy Spirit. It's a speaking sin. Once spoken a person has committed it.

John’s gospel omits the sin against the Holy Spirit, even though it seems he talks the most about the Spirit of God. Why is that? Was there something John just didn’t like about this particular saying of Jesus'? Who knows. But in John’s gospel we do read something interesting about what the “Jews” thought blasphemy is:

John 10:30-33:

Jesus said, “ I and the Father are one.”

Again the Jews picked up stones to stone him, but Jesus said to them, “I have shown you many great miracles from the Father. For which of these do you stone me?”

“We are not stoning you for any of these,” replied the Jews, “but for blasphemy, because you, a mere man, claim to be God.”

That’s what blasphemy was to the Jews; it’s a speaking sin against God. It didn’t have anything to do with what Jesus did, like his miracles. They were going to kill Jesus for claiming to be God. I don’t think this is any different for Muslims who think blasphemy against Allah or his prophet is something that is said (or done) against them. Muslims will want to kill people who speak and do acts that defame their God and prophet. One act will suffice to be a cause for death. Just ask Salmon Rushdie, or the Danish cartoonists who depicted Muhammad in unflattering ways.

Another way to see this same understanding is to just do a Greek word study on blasphemy:

Theological Dictionary of the New Testament[TDNT]:

A. blasphēmía in Greek Literature. The word means a. “abusive speech,” b. “personal mockery,” c. “blasphemy.”

According to the TDNT the early church had a great deal of difficulty with this particular saying of Jesus'. For them, “The exposition of Mt. 12:32 (for which see above) causes considerable difficulty.” I haven’t done the research on this but I would be interested in these early church debates, for they may tell us more about this particular sin than anything else. It seems that the early church settled this issue for all time, although it seems to me they settled it because of the harshness of Jesus’ actual words, and not because of what the text actually says.

Vine's Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words:

BLASPHĒMIA (βλασφημία , (988)), either from blax, sluggish, stupid, or, probably, from blaptō, to injure, and phēmē, speech, Eng. “blasphemy,” is so translated thirteen times in the R.V., but “railing” in Matt. 15:19; Mark 7:22; Eph. 4:31; Col. 3:8; 1 Tim. 6:4; Jude 9. The word “blasphemy” is practically confined to speech defamatory of the Divine Majesty.

B. Verb.

BLASPHĒMEŌ (βλασφημέω , (987)), to blaspheme, rail at or revile, is used (a) in a general way, of any contumelious speech, reviling, calumniating, railing at etc., as of those who railed at Christ, e.g., Matt. 27:39; Mark 15:29; Luke 22:65 (R.V., “reviling”); 23:39; (b) of those who speak contemptuously of God or of sacred things, e.g., Matt. 9:3; Mark 3:28; Rom. 2:24; 1 Tim. 1:20; 6:1; Rev. 13:6; 16:9, 11, 21; “hath spoken blasphemy,” Matt. 26:65; “rail at,” 2 Pet. 2:10; Jude 8, Jude 10; “railing,” 2 Pet. 2:12; “slanderously reported,” Rom. 3:8; “be evil spoken of,” Rom. 14:16; 1 Cor. 10:30; 2 Pet. 2:2; “speak evil of,” Tit. 3:2; 1 Pet. 4:4; “being defamed,” 1 Cor. 4:13. The verb (in the present participial form) is translated “blasphemers” in Acts 19:37; in Mark 2:7, “blasphemeth,” R.V., for A.V., “speaketh blasphemies.”

C. Adjective.

BLASPHĒMOS (βλάσφημος , (989)), abusive, speaking evil, is translated “blasphemous,” in Acts 6:11, 13; “a blasphemer,” 1 Tim. 1:13; “railers,” 2 Tim. 3:2, R.V.; “railing,” 2 Pet. 2:11.

The Greek word for blasphemy (lit. a transliteration) means "abusive speech" in the usage of that day. The context indicates Jesus is talking about a spoken word against the Holy Spirit that the scribes were in danger of committing. The Jews of Jesus' day believed it was speaking against their God. The Muslims have practically the same idea as Jesus expressed. The early church had “considerable difficulty” with what Jesus said. What’s there not to understand?

I deny that there is a Holy Spirit.

Hallq's Review of my Book

Chris Hallquist wrote a review of my book and it can be found here.

It takes some time to get self-published books noticed and reviewed, but more are on the way.

These Are The Rules!

Enlarge it here. Link

If this happened wouldn't it be horrible? But this is indeed possible since a Calvinist doesn't have access to God's secretive will. After all, if we here at DC were never Christians in the first place, then how does any Calvinist know he is among the elect? And how can a Calvinist truly praise such a terrible God as this?

Where is the "Mind" Located?

According to Victor Reppert, William Hasker has argued that The mind, even though it is caused to exist by matter, exists independently of matter and can, for example, exercise free will in the agency libertarian sense. An entire chapter is devoted to this claim.

This is an interesting claim, of course. How is it that the mind is caused to exist by matter, and yet is independent of it? Independent, yet caused? Does Hasker tell us where the mind resides? Is it in the knee, or the heart, or the brain? Why should it be connected to the brain at all? And if it isn't located anywhere in particular, then can I borrow someone else's for a while? Can our minds visit China for a month? ;-)

Sam Harris had argued that we really don't even need brains at all if there is a mind. Why should we have a brain at all if we have a mind that makes decisons for us and provides us with consciousness? God doesn't need a brain to be conscious or to think, according to theistic beliefs. So why should we? And while having a brain is something that can be explained by the God-hypothesis, it isn't what we would expect at all. This difference makes all of the difference. The question we need to ask isn't whether the God hypothesis can explain something with a few added premises. The question rather, is whether this is what we would expect if there is a God!

Because we have a brain in the first place, we can have strokes which affect our "minds." Because we have a brain, someone with a crowbar can affect how we think forever by taking it across our heads. Why is that if we have minds? This is a serious problem that leads people to say we have no minds at all, since there is obvious causation in one direction.

While I personally cannot fully explain how the brain works, or even how it evolved, the above problems seem insurmountable to me when it comes to believing we have immaterial minds.

Genesis Never Claims God Created the Earth!

We see prefatory comments before several different accounts in Genesis: 1:1; 2:4; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1; 11:10; 11:27. [read them now]. The prefatory comment introduces (and sometimes briefly summarizes) what the author is about to give a detailed account of following that comment. What follows the prefatory comment is a detailed description of the comment itself. These prefatory comments keep getting smaller and smaller until we simply read, "This is the account of Terah." (11:27).

With this context in mind, Genesis 1:1 is basically saying, "The following is an account of when God created the heavens and the earth," and then beginning in verse 2 we read the account of when God created the heavens (sky) and the earth. The Hebrew words in Genesis 1:1 could be interpreted to say God created the heavens and the earth, or they could be interpreted as a prefatory comment, like we see later contextually. The reason the prefatory comment translation is better isn't necessarily because of the Hebrew words in Genesis 1:1, but because of the later context. [Again read those I listed].

What I find amazing though, is that if we take the contextual translation we have an already existing but unformed and even chaotic earth, even though Christians claim God created the earth "out of nothing." [a belief that was adopted later in history among the Hebrews as their views of God developed into the highest form of monotheism in 2nd Isaiah]. An already existing earth parallels ancient polytheistic beliefs where the gods merely formed the earth as well. They did not create the earth out of nothing, either.

Contextually, in Genesis, we do not find God creating the earth at all, at least not out of nothing. Contextually speaking, when it says God created the earth it means God formed an already existing planet. It just exists. And even more amazing it exists prior to the universe of stars and planets which were all created on the fourth day. This goes contrary to astronomy and the findings of science so clearly that scholars who adopt the more natural contextual reading of the first verse in Genesis usually see the whole account as mythical in nature.