Weisberger Evaluates the Arguments in the Loftus-Wood Debate

Reason to Disbelieve: A Critical Reflection on the Loftus-Wood Debate
By A. M. Weisberger.

Some prefatory remarks should be made about the following discussion of the Loftus-Wood Debate. First, both sides continually refer to god as "he." Although this may be a cultural throwback, my comments will use what I believe to be the more accurate term: 'it.' God, as theologically construed, would be an incorporeal, genderless being, having neither the attributes of female nor male, but some wholly other constitution that transcends these physically-based categories. Alternatively, we might construe god as a combination of all genders [here we can bracket the question of whether gender categories are binary or not], and interpret god's perfect nature as incorporating all gender configurations. In this case, god would also be an 'it' since the combination of all genders would render attributions such as 'he' inappropriate. If there is difficulty in conceiving of god as an 'it' we should be reminded that we do have examples of creatures classified in such a way, namely the mule. Mules, offspring of donkeys and horses, are considered to be genderless beings, and referred to as 'it' rather than as a 'he' or a 'she.'

Secondly, the term 'god' is frequently capitalized as if it is a proper name. Being a non-theist (and here I lay my cards on the table), I lack faith in the existence of such a being, let alone such a being with a proper name. As a result, I find that the capitalization of 'God' begs the question for the theistic hypothesis, and prefer the more neutral reference to deity: god.

Terms of the debate
Framing the terms of the debate is helpful for clarificatory purposes. I found Mr. Wood's remarks in his review of the debate to be helpful in this respect, as he touches on some issues which were not laid out in the opening remarks of the debate itself.

In his critical review of the Loftus-Wood Debate, Mr. Wood lays out 5 possible debate propositions, and focuses on the distinction between implausibility and improbability. He claims:

Whereas a person could hold that the existence of God is improbable yet still plausible, to say that the existence of God is implausible means that we shouldn’t even take God’s existence seriously.

However, he seems to have it backwards here: if a proposition were to be labeled implausible, it would be difficult to believe, or have some quality that provokes disbelief. On the other hand, if a proposition were to be labeled improbable, that would mean it was unlikely to be true or occur. If something is unlikely, it would therefore be difficult to believe, and would in fact have some quality which would provoke disbelief. Therefore, if a proposition were improbable, it would be implausible as well, contrary to what Mr. Wood claims. For why would anyone accept that something is plausible when it is unlikely to be true? On the other hand, it does make sense to say that although a proposition seems implausible, it is still probable -- in other worlds something may be true even though people do not believe it is. It is much more difficult to provide evidence for the claim that although something is recognized to most likely be false, it still makes sense.

In short, it seems in Mr. Wood's listing of the 'weakest to strongest' debate propositions, he should reverse the places of 'improbable' and 'implausible' so that:

(1) The extent of suffering in our world poses an interesting problem for theists, since God is said to be all-powerful and wholly good.
(2) The extent of suffering in our world is at least some evidence against theism.
(3) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God improbable.
(4) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God implausible.
(5) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God impossible.

becomes:

(1) The extent of suffering in our world poses an interesting problem for theists, since God is said to be all-powerful and wholly good.
(2) The extent of suffering in our world is at least some evidence against theism.
(3) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God implausible.
(4) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God improbable.
(5) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God impossible.

That being said, the claim that the extent of suffering in the world serves to make the existence of god implausible seems to me to be too weak a position. I would opt for the stronger statement that the abundance or extent of suffering in the world serves to make the existence of god improbable. However, this debate focused on the weaker claim, namely that the extent of suffering in the world makes the existence of god difficult to believe. Implausibility refers to the belief-worthiness of a claim, while improbability references the chances that something is true or will occur. The belief in god might be argued to be plausible or implausible, whereas the debate over the existence of god should focus on issues which call probability and possibility into question.

Since this particular debate referenced the plausibility option, the focus is then on whether or not the god hypothesis is difficult to believe, given the constraints of so much suffering in the world. Perhaps framing the debate as: "Does the Extent of Suffering in Our World Make Belief in the Existence of God Implausible?” would clarify this ambiguity. [Again, it does seem, however, that the more interesting issue would focus on the stronger claim which could be rendered as: "Does the Extent of Suffering in Our World Make the Existence of God Improbable?”

Perhaps this ambiguity is responsible for Mr. Wood's understanding that the debate does not focus on the existence of god, but whether evil makes the existence of god implausible. It is unclear what this distinction really amounts to, for it is the existence of evil itself, in such great abundance and variety that abounds in the world, which is in need of justification in order for a deity so radically opposed to evil, and who admittedly has the ability to eradicate such evil, to be claimed to exist. In fact, it is the existence of wholly good, all-powerful god which the problem of evil calls into question.

Another issue to be addressed is the burden of proof which, Wood claims, lies with the skeptic. But his position here appears to rely on a misunderstanding. The entire terms of the debate rests on a response to the god hypothesis, initially offered by the theistic view. The problem of evil, which is the focus of the debate, could not even arise unless a particular theistic worldview were presented beforehand.

This worldview, as Dr. Hatab noted in his introductory comments to the debate, is peculiarly western: god is assumed to be all powerful, (inclusive of all knowing), as well as wholly good. If we round out what these terms mean in their most profound sense, we should conclude that we are referencing a deity which is as powerful as logical possibility would permit, and so perfectly good that this being would be opposed to evil in every respect. So this god, no matter what other attributes might be claimed of it, would be powerful enough to eradicate evil (provided it was not logically impossible to do so) and motivated to do so by absolute goodness, which we can suppose is the opposite of evil.

If we posit the existence of an omnipotent (and omniscient), and omnibenevolent deity, then one might wonder why there is such an abundance of suffering or evil in the world. It is only if we posit the existence of such a god that evil becomes a "problem." So we see that the questioning of the existence of god, or the plausibility of the god hypothesis, only occurs in response to the god hypothesis. As a result, the burden is on the proponent of the hypothesis or the presenter of the initial claim.

An analogy would be if someone were to claim that invisible, green gremlins power all microchips. Confronted with this hypothesis, one might ask how this is so, how it is known that these gremlins are green if they are invisible, and many similar questions. It is simply not convincing for the proponent of the invisible, green gremlin hypothesis to then claim, 'Well, since you question the gremlins' greenness, it is up to you to prove that they are not green!' This does little to persuade anyone of the viability or plausibility of the gremlin hypothesis. Similarly, anyone making claims about the existence of extraordinary phenomena, such as invisible, green gremlins, the burden of proof lies with the claimant. And the claim about the existence of a wholly good, all powerful being, in the face of such abundant and excruciating suffering in the world, appears to be an extraordinary claim! It is the proposer of the god hypothesis, no matter what the flavor (classical or personalist), who must bear the burden of making sense of the claim that an all good, all powerful being -- one who is powerful enough to eradicate at least some of the tremendous suffering that exists, and one who is opposed to such suffering by its very essence -- exists.

The Arguments
Mr. Loftus presents a summary list of evils in the world, from mental torture to animal suffering to the evils of slavery. Reflecting on these leads to the following questions:

• Why did god create any of this at all?
• If god had to create, why not just create a heavenly world with perfect existences (no evil)?
• If there was an initial heavenly world, but there was rebellion, then how can we explain how an angel would rebel when in the presence of an all-powerful, wholly good being?

Free will is frequently offered as an explanation, complete or partial, for numerous instances of suffering, mostly those having to do with moral choice. But the issue of free will provokes another set of questions. One of which is:

• Did god not know how free will would be abused?

Loftus reminds us that, If the answer is affirmative, then god is blameworthy for the subsequent suffering. If the theist maintains that free will is a ‘gift,’ then the giver of a gift, for which it is foreknown will be used to cause harm, is guilty of that harm. For example, a mother who gives a toddler a razor blade to play with is responsible for the resulting damage.

For Loftus, there are a number of moral concerns which arise from a posited relationship between an all-powerful god and creation. Some of these are:

1) We should not be permitted to create suffering by abusing free will (we should not be constructed so as to easily choose evil)
2) We should not be placed in a dangerous environment (we should not be subject to suffering from natural disasters)

• To claim there is a compensatory greater good for our troubles is problematic as a justifier. Such claims do not justify our torture of others, even if we were to reward them afterward. And, the purported greater good is not revealed.
• Creatures should not be subject to the horrors of predation, and pain is not necessary as a warning mechanism. God should not have created animals, if their only purpose was to suffer pointlessly. (There is no moral lesson animals are meant to learn.)
• If physical laws are responsible for suffering, then why could the laws be altered so as not to do so?

3) We should not be created as to be so physically vulnerable (why can’t our injuries be more easily healed?) Our configuration could have been different so as to minimize suffering, especially in light of god’s omniscience.

The resulting conclusion from Loftus’ argument is that this just cannot be the best of all possible worlds – an omniscient being should have been able to do better.

_____________________________________________________________


In his response to these concerns, Mr. Wood begins by stating that it is not the existence of god which is at issue, but whether the abundance of pain and suffering does damage to the god hypothesis. His claim is that the burden of proof lies with the atheist rather than the theist.

Wood lays out two options here. Either:

1) There is a reason for suffering
or
2) There is no reason for suffering

Wood argues that on intellectual grounds, but perhaps not emotional, there is a reason for suffering. He uses the example of the plot in the film Sophie’s choice. Sophie, while standing in line to the gas chambers with her two small children, must select one child over another to save -- under duress from a Nazi. If she fails to select one, all three will die. If she plays the Nazi’s cruel game, two of them live. She chooses her son and sends off her daughter to die. Wood claims that this was an acceptable intellectual choice, though emotionally devastating. In the film, Sophie eventually commits suicide.

However, is such a choice justified on intellectual moral grounds? Is it the case that we have some definitive framework for determining a morally correct choice here? And if so, is there obvious evidence for adopting an act utilitarianism over a rule utilitarian or even deontological approach -- which might claim that since all human lives are infinitely (or even equally valuable) one cannot then choose between them? To make this claim, and in light of the background of Nazi insanity, implies that there was a logically coherent and correct response to the Nazi proposition of choosing to save one of your children and condemn the other to death. This is not a rational proposition, and there is no rationally based correct response to such horror. There is not even a moral framework, let alone a meaningful language external to the incoherence of the Holocaust, to judge the actions of the film’s protagonist.

Undeterred, Wood argues that the concept of god’s goodness is not a claim about personal behavior, but about essential features. Despite a misplaced reference to Thomas Aquinas’ pronouncement that ‘god is good’ (since Aquinas was loathe to apply moral predicates in any meaningful sense to god) this concept is abandoned.

The claim that Wood wants to emphasize is that there are coherent reasons for why a god would permit the existence of suffering in the world. Wood briefly mentions 3 possible theodicies, and only discusses the last in any detail:

1) Free will theodicy:

• A world with free will is better than one without
• True freedom entails the choice to choose evil

Of course, both of these claims are highly questionable. Why is it the case that a world with free will is better than a world without? How is the value of free will quantified so as to make such a claim? What measurements would be used to determine that free will is so intrinsically valuable that without it our lives would somehow be diminished? Considering that god itself does not have free will, namely the ability to even choose to do evil since god is perfectly good, it does not seem that it is really such a boon to existence.

And, does true freedom really entail the choice to choose evil? If we had the choice between very good, good, and uneventful actions, would that not be a real choice? Is it not a real choice if I am only choosing between oatmeal and Frosted Flakes for breakfast? Could not free will also refer to the ability to choose to act, and not necessarily to commit the act? (As in choosing to create a plan to do evil, but not have the ability to carry out the plan?) If so, then is not having the ability to fly, no matter how hard we flap our arms, a limitation on free choice? In other words, is ‘true freedom’ the same as absolute freedom? If so, then we do not have that now.

2) Wizard of Oz theodicy

• The world is a place of wonder, and problems make us realize there is hope

I am not sure what to make of this claim. It is not really a theodicy at all since it does not offer any explanatory power regarding the existence of suffering. Is the existence of hope somehow the justifier for suffering? Was it just fine to torture people in concentration camps so long as they had hope of liberation? And is the take home message, for concentration camp survivors and others who were enslaved, that the world is a wondrous place? It seems to me that if god is relying on suffering to create a sense of wonder in humans, then god is inept, and really not the sharpest tool in the shed. A miracle now and then would seem to have a better chance of assuring the resulting sense of wonder in the face of the world than torture!

3) Soul-building theodicy

• Suffering builds character, god is a divine thermostat

Although this theodicy has a long history, Wood makes no reference to any of the literature on the topic. Instead, Wood constructs a very odd argument:

1) If god exists, we would not be permitted to feel pain (since it interferes with our happiness)
2) We experience pain
3) Therefore, god does not exist

But, Wood notes, what if premise one were not true? What if the purpose of existence were not to maximize happiness? Then the argument against soul-building fails.

Of course, the reasonable rejoinder is that even if premise one were false, and suffering serves some good purpose, there still does not need to be the abundance of suffering that exists in the world. And it is the great abundance of suffering, or gratuitous evil, which calls into question the existence of a wholly good, all-powerful deity.

Anticipating such a response, Wood argues that the world is not such a bad place as the non-theist makes it out to be. The non-theist makes it out that the world is just one giant cesspool of suffering, without focusing on the good that exists. The atheist, according to Wood, has ‘tunnel vision.’

This view, that the world is a happy place overall, is perfectly consistent with being a privileged, well fed, insulated person who has had the good fortune to be born into a first world country and who has all their immediate survival needs met. The facts speak quite differently, especially if one were to take a global perspective.

Just to take one example: 18,000 children a day die of starvation. 18,000 children: innocent people who have never done anything to deserve such a horrible death. These are children who have had the misfortune of being born into a country in which there are not enough resources to feed them – either due to natural occurrences such as drought, or due to the misuse of freewill by political leaders aiming to torture their own people and/or accrue wealth to satisfy their own desires. To take one example, the death rate for starvation in North Korea is monumentally higher than that of South Korea. Here, being born in one geographical location considerably impacts on quality of life and life expectancy. According to James Morris, outgoing director of the UN World Food Program:

"The average 7-year-old North Korean boy is eight inches shorter, 20 pounds lighter and has a 10-year-shorter life expectancy than his 7-year-old counterpart in South Korea. And to have this much disparity by age 7 — it's a terrible thing."1

Moreover, death by starvation is not even a remotely pleasant experience. And, having to watch one’s own children die of starvation adds an additional layer of agony, one which is incomprehensible to the majority of us living in the privileged environment of the US.

So, the attribution of ‘tunnel vision’ by Wood in this case seems to be self-referential. What possible justification could there be for subjecting 18,000 children per day to death by starvation? And notice, this number does not include adults into the equation. Estimates are that 40,000 people per day die of starvation worldwide.

The point Wood wants to make is that the claim about the abundance of evil outweighing the good needs substantiation in order for the argument from evil to succeed. But this is a factual issue that must rely on some type of quantification, both in the amount and quality of suffering versus incidents of pleasure in the world. And who is willing to make the case that the joy of an American child receiving a Playstation 3 for Christmas outweighs the excruciating pain a North Korean child experiences while suffering from starvation?

The important issue is that the suffering of the North Korean child is unnecessary and gratuitous. If one North Korean child could be prevented from starvation without that occurrence impacting any of god’s ‘plans’ in some negative fashion, then that suffering is gratuitous. If it is reasonable to think that the entire course of the universe is not dependent upon the suffering of one North Korean child, then not all suffering is necessary. If not all suffering is necessary, then there is no reason for some suffering, and it is gratuitous. If there is gratuitous suffering in the world, then we can imagine a better world than this, one in which there is at the very least, no gratuitous suffering.

So, to clarify:

1) If an instance of suffering could be prevented without compromising a greater good, that suffering is unnecessary for that greater good
2) If an instance of suffering is unnecessary, then there is gratuitous suffering in the world
3) If there is gratuitous suffering in this world, then we can imagine a better world than this

Contrary to what Wood believes -- that the burden is on the atheist to show how the suffering outweighs the happiness, the burden is on the theist to show why this particular worldly configuration, one in which gratuitous suffering seems to exist, is the best of all possible worlds.

Because if this is not the best god could have created, even with the 18,000 children a day dying of starvation, then there is a problem.

4) If god could have done better but chose not to, god is not wholly good
5) If god wanted to do better than this but could not, then god is not all powerful
Assenting to either one of these propositions supports the conclusion that the argument from evil offers.

It is the original claim that is what is really at issue – it is the theist who makes the initial claim that god is wholly good and all powerful. And a wholly good being would be opposed to suffering in such a way as to desire to eradicate it. An all-powerful being would have the ability to do so. The stubborn fact of suffering in the world, and especially apparently gratuitous suffering, is what calls the theist’s claim into question.

Ignoring the entire issue of god’s allege omnipotence, and the ability to eradicate suffering in the world, leads to a consideration of the other primary attribute called into question by the argument from evil: god’s perfect goodness. Wood finds difficulty with the concept that there are moral laws that god must follow. In other words, god may be above the moral law, in other worlds, god is the source of moral law.

He presents an argument:

1) If god does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist
2) Objective moral values do exist
3) Therefore, god exists

Wood comments that the logic is valid. This may be so, but this is far from a sound argument. As first year logic students are taught, an argument’s validity says nothing about truth, it is merely a statement about the relationship between the premises and the conclusion. Valid arguments are not necessarily sound.

Wood notes that the second premise might be called into question in an effort to defeat the conclusion. But not only might the second premise be challenged, namely, whether there are such things as objective moral values existing independently of moral creatures in a vacuum, but the first premise is itself highly questionable. What, exactly, is the connection between god and morality? It seems that Wood is making the assumption that there is such a connection, an assumption that would beg the question in favor of his position.

If we hearken back to Socrates’ question in the Euthryphro, the difficulty is immediately obvious. In Socrates’ version the question is framed in the following terms: ‘Do the gods love what is holy, or is what is holy whatever the gods love?’ In terms relevant to this debate, the question could be framed as: ‘Is what is ‘objectively morally valid’ whatever god determines it to be, or is god itself subject to moral laws?’

In the first interpretation, god is the source of objective moral values. Therefore, whatever god tells one to do must be the right thing to do. So, if god spoke to you and told you to murder your infant daughter while she slept, than that would be morally the correct thing to do. If god had really commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, without the ‘just kidding’ part at the last minute, then according to the first interpretation [what is ‘objectively morally valid’ is whatever god determines it to be], human sacrifice would be morally correct. Note, this is the view that the first premise of the argument assumes. We should also note that the concept here of ‘objectively morally valid’ really means ‘subject to god’s whim at the moment’ – not very objective at all really.

If, on the other hand, we reason that there are actions which are right or wrong, independent of what god decides at the moment, than god itself must be subject to moral laws. If so, then the existence of ‘objective moral laws’ has no bearing on the existence of god, since god itself is subject to these laws. If god is subject to these laws, there is a complication with imagining that god is also the source of these laws.

After parsing out the first premise of the argument Wood offers, we can see that it is incoherent. If God is the source of moral law, it is hardly ‘objectively valid.’ On the other hand, if there is such a thing as an objective moral law, then it would not be dependent upon the existence of god. In fact, the theist is better off arguing that there is no such thing as an objective moral law (denying premise #2) in its most absolute sense, since that claim would then negate the concept of god as the creator of everything.

In sum, either premise 1 is false (that morality is dependent upon god) or premise 2 is false (that morality is independent of god). Objective moral values cannot be both dependent upon god (in which case they would be subjective to god) and truly objective (independent of a subjective viewpoint) at one and the same time. Such an argument, as Wood constructs, falls under its own weight, without even so much as a whisper from the atheist.

Perhaps it might be better to construe moral values as inter-subjectively determined by moral creatures who are attempting to make the world a better place than they found it. The issue of why we find so much suffering in the world, suffering that we moral creatures should be attempting to eradicate, still remains unanswerable.

Any coherent attempt on the theist’s part to offer an explanation will need to go beyond the hollow repetition that god has reasons for everything. Ultimately, the belief in such a deity in the face of the horrendous suffering that currently exists, coupled with the reliance on the hope that it will all one day make sense, requires a leap of faith beyond the boundaries of rationality.

1 Departing U.N. Food Chief Reflects on World Hunger Michele Keleman, National Public Radio:

Weisberger Evaluates the Loftus-Wood Debate on Evil

This is the last post I'll republish from the other blog I deleted.

Reason to Disbelieve: A Critical Reflection on the Loftus-Wood Debate. By A. M. Weisberger:

Some prefatory remarks should be made about the following discussion of the Loftus-Wood Debate

First, both sides continually refer to god as "he." Although this may be a cultural throwback, my comments will use what I believe to be the more accurate term: 'it.' God, as theologically construed, would be an incorporeal, genderless being, having neither the attributes of female nor male, but some wholly other constitution that transcends these physically-based categories. Alternatively, we might construe god as a combination of all genders [here we can bracket the question of whether gender categories are binary or not], and interpret god's perfect nature as incorporating all gender configurations. In this case, god would also be an 'it' since the combination of all genders would render attributions such as 'he' inappropriate. If there is difficulty in conceiving of god as an 'it' we should be reminded that we do have examples of creatures classified in such a way, namely the mule. Mules, offspring of donkeys and horses, are considered to be genderless beings, and referred to as 'it' rather than as a 'he' or a 'she.'

Secondly, the term 'god' is frequently capitalized as if it is a proper name. Being a non-theist (and here I lay my cards on the table), I lack faith in the existence of such a being, let alone such a being with a proper name. As a result, I find that the capitalization of 'God' begs the question for the theistic hypothesis, and prefer the more neutral reference to deity: god.

Terms of the debate
Framing the terms of the debate is helpful for clarificatory purposes. I found Mr. Wood's remarks in his review of the debate to be helpful in this respect, as he touches on some issues which were not laid out in the opening remarks of the debate itself.

In his critical review of the Loftus-Wood Debate, Mr. Wood lays out 5 possible debate propositions, and focuses on the distinction between implausibility and improbability. He claims:

Whereas a person could hold that the existence of God is improbable yet still plausible, to say that the existence of God is implausible means that we shouldn’t even take God’s existence seriously.

However, he seems to have it backwards here: if a proposition were to be labeled implausible, it would be difficult to believe, or have some quality that provokes disbelief. On the other hand, if a proposition were to be labeled improbable, that would mean it was unlikely to be true or occur. If something is unlikely, it would therefore be difficult to believe, and would in fact have some quality which would provoke disbelief. Therefore, if a proposition were improbable, it would be implausible as well, contrary to what Mr. Wood claims. For why would anyone accept that something is plausible when it is unlikely to be true? On the other hand, it does make sense to say that although a proposition seems implausible, it is still probable -- in other worlds something may be true even though people do not believe it is. It is much more difficult to provide evidence for the claim that although something is recognized to most likely be false, it still makes sense.

In short, it seems in Mr. Wood's listing of the 'weakest to strongest' debate propositions, he should reverse the places of 'improbable' and 'implausible' so that:

(1) The extent of suffering in our world poses an interesting problem for theists, since God is said to be all-powerful and wholly good.
(2) The extent of suffering in our world is at least some evidence against theism.
(3) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God improbable.
(4) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God implausible.
(5) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God impossible.

becomes:

(1) The extent of suffering in our world poses an interesting problem for theists, since God is said to be all-powerful and wholly good.
(2) The extent of suffering in our world is at least some evidence against theism.
(3) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God implausible.
(4) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God improbable.
(5) The extent of suffering in our world makes the existence of God impossible.

That being said, the claim that the extent of suffering in the world serves to make the existence of god implausible seems to me to be too weak a position. I would opt for the stronger statement that the abundance or extent of suffering in the world serves to make the existence of god improbable. However, this debate focused on the weaker claim, namely that the extent of suffering in the world makes the existence of god difficult to believe. Implausibility refers to the belief-worthiness of a claim, while improbability references the chances that something is true or will occur. The belief in god might be argued to be plausible or implausible, whereas the debate over the existence of god should focus on issues which call probability and possibility into question.

Since this particular debate referenced the plausibility option, the focus is then on whether or not the god hypothesis is difficult to believe, given the constraints of so much suffering in the world. Perhaps framing the debate as: "Does the Extent of Suffering in Our World Make Belief in the Existence of God Implausible?” would clarify this ambiguity. [Again, it does seem, however, that the more interesting issue would focus on the stronger claim which could be rendered as: "Does the Extent of Suffering in Our World Make the Existence of God Improbable?”

Perhaps this ambiguity is responsible for Mr. Wood's understanding that the debate does not focus on the existence of god, but whether evil makes the existence of god implausible. It is unclear what this distinction really amounts to, for it is the existence of evil itself, in such great abundance and variety that abounds in the world, which is in need of justification in order for a deity so radically opposed to evil, and who admittedly has the ability to eradicate such evil, to be claimed to exist. In fact, it is the existence of wholly good, all-powerful god which the problem of evil calls into question.

Another issue to be addressed is the burden of proof which, Wood claims, lies with the skeptic. But his position here appears to rely on a misunderstanding. The entire terms of the debate rests on a response to the god hypothesis, initially offered by the theistic view. The problem of evil, which is the focus of the debate, could not even arise unless a particular theistic worldview were presented beforehand.

This worldview, as Dr. Hatab noted in his introductory comments to the debate, is peculiarly western: god is assumed to be all powerful, (inclusive of all knowing), as well as wholly good. If we round out what these terms mean in their most profound sense, we should conclude that we are referencing a deity which is as powerful as logical possibility would permit, and so perfectly good that this being would be opposed to evil in every respect. So this god, no matter what other attributes might be claimed of it, would be powerful enough to eradicate evil (provided it was not logically impossible to do so) and motivated to do so by absolute goodness, which we can suppose is the opposite of evil.

If we posit the existence of an omnipotent (and omniscient), and omnibenevolent deity, then one might wonder why there is such an abundance of suffering or evil in the world. It is only if we posit the existence of such a god that evil becomes a "problem." So we see that the questioning of the existence of god, or the plausibility of the god hypothesis, only occurs in response to the god hypothesis. As a result, the burden is on the proponent of the hypothesis or the presenter of the initial claim.

An analogy would be if someone were to claim that invisible, green gremlins power all microchips. Confronted with this hypothesis, one might ask how this is so, how it is known that these gremlins are green if they are invisible, and many similar questions. It is simply not convincing for the proponent of the invisible, green gremlin hypothesis to then claim, 'Well, since you question the gremlins' greenness, it is up to you to prove that they are not green!' This does little to persuade anyone of the viability or plausibility of the gremlin hypothesis. Similarly, anyone making claims about the existence of extraordinary phenomena, such as invisible, green gremlins, the burden of proof lies with the claimant. And the claim about the existence of a wholly good, all powerful being, in the face of such abundant and excruciating suffering in the world, appears to be an extraordinary claim! It is the proposer of the god hypothesis, no matter what the flavor (classical or personalist), who must bear the burden of making sense of the claim that an all good, all powerful being -- one who is powerful enough to eradicate at least some of the tremendous suffering that exists, and one who is opposed to such suffering by its very essence -- exists.

The Arguments
Mr. Loftus presents a summary list of evils in the world, from mental torture to animal suffering to the evils of slavery. Reflecting on these leads to the following questions:

• Why did god create any of this at all?
• If god had to create, why not just create a heavenly world with perfect existences (no evil)?
• If there was an initial heavenly world, but there was rebellion, then how can we explain how an angel would rebel when in the presence of an all-powerful, wholly good being?

Free will is frequently offered as an explanation, complete or partial, for numerous instances of suffering, mostly those having to do with moral choice. But the issue of free will provokes another set of questions. One of which is:

• Did god not know how free will would be abused?

Loftus reminds us that, If the answer is affirmative, then god is blameworthy for the subsequent suffering. If the theist maintains that free will is a ‘gift,’ then the giver of a gift, for which it is foreknown will be used to cause harm, is guilty of that harm. For example, a mother who gives a toddler a razor blade to play with is responsible for the resulting damage.

For Loftus, there are a number of moral concerns which arise from a posited relationship between an all-powerful god and creation. Some of these are:

1) We should not be permitted to create suffering by abusing free will (we should not be constructed so as to easily choose evil)
2) We should not be placed in a dangerous environment (we should not be subject to suffering from natural disasters)

• To claim there is a compensatory greater good for our troubles is problematic as a justifier. Such claims do not justify our torture of others, even if we were to reward them afterward. And, the purported greater good is not revealed.
• Creatures should not be subject to the horrors of predation, and pain is not necessary as a warning mechanism. God should not have created animals, if their only purpose was to suffer pointlessly. (There is no moral lesson animals are meant to learn.)
• If physical laws are responsible for suffering, then why could the laws be altered so as not to do so?

3) We should not be created as to be so physically vulnerable (why can’t our injuries be more easily healed?) Our configuration could have been different so as to minimize suffering, especially in light of god’s omniscience.

The resulting conclusion from Loftus’ argument is that this just cannot be the best of all possible worlds – an omniscient being should have been able to do better.

_____________________________________________________________


In his response to these concerns, Mr. Wood begins by stating that it is not the existence of god which is at issue, but whether the abundance of pain and suffering does damage to the god hypothesis. His claim is that the burden of proof lies with the atheist rather than the theist.

Wood lays out two options here. Either:

1) There is a reason for suffering
or
2) There is no reason for suffering

Wood argues that on intellectual grounds, but perhaps not emotional, there is a reason for suffering. He uses the example of the plot in the film Sophie’s choice. Sophie, while standing in line to the gas chambers with her two small children, must select one child over another to save -- under duress from a Nazi. If she fails to select one, all three will die. If she plays the Nazi’s cruel game, two of them live. She chooses her son and sends off her daughter to die. Wood claims that this was an acceptable intellectual choice, though emotionally devastating. In the film, Sophie eventually commits suicide.

However, is such a choice justified on intellectual moral grounds? Is it the case that we have some definitive framework for determining a morally correct choice here? And if so, is there obvious evidence for adopting an act utilitarianism over a rule utilitarian or even deontological approach -- which might claim that since all human lives are infinitely (or even equally valuable) one cannot then choose between them? To make this claim, and in light of the background of Nazi insanity, implies that there was a logically coherent and correct response to the Nazi proposition of choosing to save one of your children and condemn the other to death. This is not a rational proposition, and there is no rationally based correct response to such horror. There is not even a moral framework, let alone a meaningful language external to the incoherence of the Holocaust, to judge the actions of the film’s protagonist.

Undeterred, Wood argues that the concept of god’s goodness is not a claim about personal behavior, but about essential features. Despite a misplaced reference to Thomas Aquinas’ pronouncement that ‘god is good’ (since Aquinas was loathe to apply moral predicates in any meaningful sense to god) this concept is abandoned.

The claim that Wood wants to emphasize is that there are coherent reasons for why a god would permit the existence of suffering in the world. Wood briefly mentions 3 possible theodicies, and only discusses the last in any detail:

1) Free will theodicy:

• A world with free will is better than one without
• True freedom entails the choice to choose evil

Of course, both of these claims are highly questionable. Why is it the case that a world with free will is better than a world without? How is the value of free will quantified so as to make such a claim? What measurements would be used to determine that free will is so intrinsically valuable that without it our lives would somehow be diminished? Considering that god itself does not have free will, namely the ability to even choose to do evil since god is perfectly good, it does not seem that it is really such a boon to existence.

And, does true freedom really entail the choice to choose evil? If we had the choice between very good, good, and uneventful actions, would that not be a real choice? Is it not a real choice if I am only choosing between oatmeal and Frosted Flakes for breakfast? Could not free will also refer to the ability to choose to act, and not necessarily to commit the act? (As in choosing to create a plan to do evil, but not have the ability to carry out the plan?) If so, then is not having the ability to fly, no matter how hard we flap our arms, a limitation on free choice? In other words, is ‘true freedom’ the same as absolute freedom? If so, then we do not have that now.

2) Wizard of Oz theodicy

• The world is a place of wonder, and problems make us realize there is hope

I am not sure what to make of this claim. It is not really a theodicy at all since it does not offer any explanatory power regarding the existence of suffering. Is the existence of hope somehow the justifier for suffering? Was it just fine to torture people in concentration camps so long as they had hope of liberation? And is the take home message, for concentration camp survivors and others who were enslaved, that the world is a wondrous place? It seems to me that if god is relying on suffering to create a sense of wonder in humans, then god is inept, and really not the sharpest tool in the shed. A miracle now and then would seem to have a better chance of assuring the resulting sense of wonder in the face of the world than torture!

3) Soul-building theodicy

• Suffering builds character, god is a divine thermostat

Although this theodicy has a long history, Wood makes no reference to any of the literature on the topic. Instead, Wood constructs a very odd argument:

1) If god exists, we would not be permitted to feel pain (since it interferes with our happiness)
2) We experience pain
3) Therefore, god does not exist

But, Wood notes, what if premise one were not true? What if the purpose of existence were not to maximize happiness? Then the argument against soul-building fails.

Of course, the reasonable rejoinder is that even if premise one were false, and suffering serves some good purpose, there still does not need to be the abundance of suffering that exists in the world. And it is the great abundance of suffering, or gratuitous evil, which calls into question the existence of a wholly good, all-powerful deity.

Anticipating such a response, Wood argues that the world is not such a bad place as the non-theist makes it out to be. The non-theist makes it out that the world is just one giant cesspool of suffering, without focusing on the good that exists. The atheist, according to Wood, has ‘tunnel vision.’

This view, that the world is a happy place overall, is perfectly consistent with being a privileged, well fed, insulated person who has had the good fortune to be born into a first world country and who has all their immediate survival needs met. The facts speak quite differently, especially if one were to take a global perspective.

Just to take one example: 18,000 children a day die of starvation. 18,000 children: innocent people who have never done anything to deserve such a horrible death. These are children who have had the misfortune of being born into a country in which there are not enough resources to feed them – either due to natural occurrences such as drought, or due to the misuse of freewill by political leaders aiming to torture their own people and/or accrue wealth to satisfy their own desires. To take one example, the death rate for starvation in North Korea is monumentally higher than that of South Korea. Here, being born in one geographical location considerably impacts on quality of life and life expectancy. According to James Morris, outgoing director of the UN World Food Program:

"The average 7-year-old North Korean boy is eight inches shorter, 20 pounds lighter and has a 10-year-shorter life expectancy than his 7-year-old counterpart in South Korea. And to have this much disparity by age 7 — it's a terrible thing."1

Moreover, death by starvation is not even a remotely pleasant experience. And, having to watch one’s own children die of starvation adds an additional layer of agony, one which is incomprehensible to the majority of us living in the privileged environment of the US.

So, the attribution of ‘tunnel vision’ by Wood in this case seems to be self-referential. What possible justification could there be for subjecting 18,000 children per day to death by starvation? And notice, this number does not include adults into the equation. Estimates are that 40,000 people per day die of starvation worldwide.

The point Wood wants to make is that the claim about the abundance of evil outweighing the good needs substantiation in order for the argument from evil to succeed. But this is a factual issue that must rely on some type of quantification, both in the amount and quality of suffering versus incidents of pleasure in the world. And who is willing to make the case that the joy of an American child receiving a Playstation 3 for Christmas outweighs the excruciating pain a North Korean child experiences while suffering from starvation?

The important issue is that the suffering of the North Korean child is unnecessary and gratuitous. If one North Korean child could be prevented from starvation without that occurrence impacting any of god’s ‘plans’ in some negative fashion, then that suffering is gratuitous. If it is reasonable to think that the entire course of the universe is not dependent upon the suffering of one North Korean child, then not all suffering is necessary. If not all suffering is necessary, then there is no reason for some suffering, and it is gratuitous. If there is gratuitous suffering in the world, then we can imagine a better world than this, one in which there is at the very least, no gratuitous suffering.

So, to clarify:

1) If an instance of suffering could be prevented without compromising a greater good, that suffering is unnecessary for that greater good
2) If an instance of suffering is unnecessary, then there is gratuitous suffering in the world
3) If there is gratuitous suffering in this world, then we can imagine a better world than this

Contrary to what Wood believes -- that the burden is on the atheist to show how the suffering outweighs the happiness, the burden is on the theist to show why this particular worldly configuration, one in which gratuitous suffering seems to exist, is the best of all possible worlds.

Because if this is not the best god could have created, even with the 18,000 children a day dying of starvation, then there is a problem.

4) If god could have done better but chose not to, god is not wholly good
5) If god wanted to do better than this but could not, then god is not all powerful
Assenting to either one of these propositions supports the conclusion that the argument from evil offers.

It is the original claim that is what is really at issue – it is the theist who makes the initial claim that god is wholly good and all powerful. And a wholly good being would be opposed to suffering in such a way as to desire to eradicate it. An all-powerful being would have the ability to do so. The stubborn fact of suffering in the world, and especially apparently gratuitous suffering, is what calls the theist’s claim into question.

Ignoring the entire issue of god’s allege omnipotence, and the ability to eradicate suffering in the world, leads to a consideration of the other primary attribute called into question by the argument from evil: god’s perfect goodness. Wood finds difficulty with the concept that there are moral laws that god must follow. In other words, god may be above the moral law, in other worlds, god is the source of moral law.

He presents an argument:

1) If god does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist
2) Objective moral values do exist
3) Therefore, god exists

Wood comments that the logic is valid. This may be so, but this is far from a sound argument. As first year logic students are taught, an argument’s validity says nothing about truth, it is merely a statement about the relationship between the premises and the conclusion. Valid arguments are not necessarily sound.

Wood notes that the second premise might be called into question in an effort to defeat the conclusion. But not only might the second premise be challenged, namely, whether there are such things as objective moral values existing independently of moral creatures in a vacuum, but the first premise is itself highly questionable. What, exactly, is the connection between god and morality? It seems that Wood is making the assumption that there is such a connection, an assumption that would beg the question in favor of his position.

If we hearken back to Socrates’ question in the Euthryphro, the difficulty is immediately obvious. In Socrates’ version the question is framed in the following terms: ‘Do the gods love what is holy, or is what is holy whatever the gods love?’ In terms relevant to this debate, the question could be framed as: ‘Is what is ‘objectively morally valid’ whatever god determines it to be, or is god itself subject to moral laws?’

In the first interpretation, god is the source of objective moral values. Therefore, whatever god tells one to do must be the right thing to do. So, if god spoke to you and told you to murder your infant daughter while she slept, than that would be morally the correct thing to do. If god had really commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, without the ‘just kidding’ part at the last minute, then according to the first interpretation [what is ‘objectively morally valid’ is whatever god determines it to be], human sacrifice would be morally correct. Note, this is the view that the first premise of the argument assumes. We should also note that the concept here of ‘objectively morally valid’ really means ‘subject to god’s whim at the moment’ – not very objective at all really.

If, on the other hand, we reason that there are actions which are right or wrong, independent of what god decides at the moment, than god itself must be subject to moral laws. If so, then the existence of ‘objective moral laws’ has no bearing on the existence of god, since god itself is subject to these laws. If god is subject to these laws, there is a complication with imagining that god is also the source of these laws.

After parsing out the first premise of the argument Wood offers, we can see that it is incoherent. If God is the source of moral law, it is hardly ‘objectively valid.’ On the other hand, if there is such a thing as an objective moral law, then it would not be dependent upon the existence of god. In fact, the theist is better off arguing that there is no such thing as an objective moral law (denying premise #2) in its most absolute sense, since that claim would then negate the concept of god as the creator of everything.

In sum, either premise 1 is false (that morality is dependent upon god) or premise 2 is false (that morality is independent of god). Objective moral values cannot be both dependent upon god (in which case they would be subjective to god) and truly objective (independent of a subjective viewpoint) at one and the same time. Such an argument, as Wood constructs, falls under its own weight, without even so much as a whisper from the atheist.

Perhaps it might be better to construe moral values as inter-subjectively determined by moral creatures who are attempting to make the world a better place than they found it. The issue of why we find so much suffering in the world, suffering that we moral creatures should be attempting to eradicate, still remains unanswerable.

Any coherent attempt on the theist’s part to offer an explanation will need to go beyond the hollow repetition that god has reasons for everything. Ultimately, the belief in such a deity in the face of the horrendous suffering that currently exists, coupled with the reliance on the hope that it will all one day make sense, requires a leap of faith beyond the boundaries of rationality.

1 Departing U.N. Food Chief Reflects on World Hunger Michele Keleman, National Public Radio.

Published: Don McIntosh's Article In Response to Mine On "God and Horrendous Suffering."

Volume 2, Issue 1 (Spring 2024) of the Trinity Journal of Natural & Philosophical Theology has just been published. Included is the response by Editor-in-Chief Don McIntosh, titled, “Horrendous Evil and Christian Theism: A Reply to John Loftus” (pp. 25-44). 

With his permission I'm publishing it in its entirety below. This isn't the first time I've published a paper by a Christian philosopher, or apologist. Just click on the Tag "Christian Scholars" below to see some others. Comment as you will. Don will be reading and may respond.

If you remember, my previous article was published in an earlier issue in the TJNPT, and can be read at The Secular Web, along with a video of it on YouTube.  

I will write a response to his response which will be published at The Secular Web. 

 

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The Fallibility of First Principles

The Fallibility of First Principles, by Gunther Laird (gunther.laird@gmail.com)

The late Norman Geisler was one of the most popular proponents of Evangelical Christianity, wedding Calvinistic argumentation with technical concepts drawn from the Catholic philosopher Thomas Aquinas.[1] His son David Geisler continues his work, and recently contacted John W. Loftus with a syllogism for God’s existence Norman had made in the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. David asked my editor if he had “any atheistic friends that would be willing to critique this more comprehensive argument for God’s existence and explain what’s wrong with it,” and I was one such friend, so John contacted me. 

What follows is a brief critique of the entry “First Principles” in the Encyclopedia, which David copied verbatim in his email to John. The entry is quite substantive, as Norman Geisler provided very detailed descriptions of a variety of first principles, such as the Principle of Noncontradiction, the Principle of Causality, and the Principle of Contingency, and explains why they cannot be coherently denied under any circumstances.

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The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

The deductive cosmological argument from contingency has a long and illustrious history. It’s been exposited and defended by the likes of, e.g., G.W. Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, and recently (e.g.) Stephen T. Davis, Ronald Nash, Robert Koons, and Alexander Pruss. However, a number of contemporary theists seem to shy away from defending it, such as J.P. Moreland, Peter Van Inwagen, and William Lane Craig (although Craig seems to have warmed up to it slightly in recent years, given his more-positive-than-usual assessment of it in his essay in The Rationality of Theism). In this post, I will exposit the Leibnizian cosmological argument from contingency. Then, I will discuss some common objections to the argument that don't seem to work. Finally, I will discuss several decisive criticisms of the argument. In the appendix, I exposit and critique a recent defense of PSR.




I: Exposition
This version of the cosmological argument has been given a number of construals, depending on how its proponents spell out the notions of a contingent being and the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). One common way to spell out these notions is as follows:

A contingent being or state of affairs is a being or state of affairs that exists, but doesn’t have to – its nonexistence is logically (or metaphysically) possible. So, for example, rocks, trees, and you and I are contingent beings, and George W. Bush being the current U.S. President is a contingent state of affairs. By contrast, a necessary being or state of affairs is a being or state of affairs that exists or obtains of logical (or metaphysical) necessity – to use possible worlds talk, one that exists or obtains in all possible worlds. So, for example, if Anselm’s God exists, then it is a necessary being.

Finally, PSR states that (a) for every being that exists, there is a sufficient reason for why it exists, and (b) for every state of affairs, there is a sufficient reason for why it obtains. PSR has prima facie plausibility, and is often defended by offering one or more of the following three considerations. First, it seems to make sense of our intuitions when we reflect on sample cases. So, for example, suppose there is a ball on the lawn in your front yard. No one would say that there is no sufficient reason for why the ball exists, or why it’s there on the lawn. Obviously, the ball has an explanation for its origin (in a toy factory), its continued existence (in terms of, e.g., the properties of the particles that constitute the ball), and its being on the lawn now (your daughter left it there). The same sorts of explanations seem to generalize to any case we can think of. Therefore, we have some support for PSR based on reflection on cases. Second, some have argued that PSR is self-evident. Self-evident propositions are those that can be seen to be true merely by coming to understand what they assert. That is, once you understand what they mean, you can see that they’re true. So, for example, consider the proposition, “all triangles have three angles”. Once I understand the constituent concepts of this proposition, I can see that it’s true. Similarly for “nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time.” And similarly, say some proponents of the contingency argument, for PSR. Third, even if one remains unpersuaded by the previous two considerations, one may think that it’s a presupposition of rational thought. Compare: Although it's notoriously difficult to justiify the existence of material objects, and the existence of a past, it nonetheless seems pathological to deny that material objects exist, or to deny that the universe has existed for more than ten minutes (as opposed to thinking that it was created ten minutes ago, with an appearance of age, and with false memories of a longer past). All sane people accept these propositions, and -- say some proponents of the argument from contingency -- the same is true of PSR. Thus, even if you think we can’t prove it, you must accept it to be a rational agent. Given these notions, we may now state the argument.

It’s undeniable that contingent beings exist. After all, we came into existence, and could go out of existence without much trouble. The same is true of rocks, trees, our planet, and in fact every object in the universe. In fact, the universe itself seems to be just one big contingent being. If so, then by PSR, it has a sufficient reason for its existence. Now since it’s a contingent being, it can’t account for it’s own existence in terms of its own nature, even if it has existed forever. For even if the contingent universe existed forever, the following contingent state of affairs would obtain:

(CF1) There being an eternally existent contingent universe.

But if so, then by PSR, there is a sufficient reason for why CF1 obtains, in which case we must look for a reason beyond our contingent universe.

Now whatever that “something” is, it can’t just be more contingent beings. For even our universe is explained in terms of an infinite series of contingent beings, the following contingent state of affairs would obtain:

(CF2) There being an infinite series of contingent beings.

But if so, then by PSR, there is a sufficient reason for why the infinite series of contingent beings exists or why CF2 obtains. In short, no matter how many contingent beings we throw into the explanatory “pot”, the existence of our contingent universe – or any contingent being whatever, for that matter – cannot be sufficiently accounted for purely in terms of contingent beings. But if not, then the sufficient reason for the existence of our contingent universe must be in terms of at least one necessary being. And, as Aquinas would say, “this we all call ‘God’.



II: Giving the Argument its Due: A Defense Against Common Objections
In this section, I continue the task of giving the contingency argument its due. To that end, I briefly discuss three criticisms of the deductive argument from contingency that don’t seem to work. Here I’m just summarizing William Rowe’s points from his Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, Ca: Wadsworth, 1978), pp. 16-30.

1. Dependence and the fallacy of composition:

1.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of beings within the universe is dependent, that therefore the whole collection of such beings is itself dependent. But this doesn’t follow.

1.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR alone – i.e., without the need to rely on an inference from dependence of the parts to dependence of the whole -- that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection exists.

2. Causation and the fallacy of composition:

2.1 The argument fallaciously assumes that because each member of the collection of dependent beings has a cause, that therefore the whole collection of dependent beings has a cause. But this doesn’t follow.

2.2 Reply: It would be fallacious to assume this, but the defender of the cosmological argument need not assume it for the argument to work. Rather, since the existence of the collection of dependent beings is a positive fact, then it follows from PSR alone – i.e., without the need to rely on an inference from the need for a cause of the parts to a need from a cause of the whole -- that there must be a sufficient reason for why the collection exists.

3. Nothing’s left to explain

3.1 The defender of the cosmological argument fails to see that once the existence of each member of a collection of dependent beings is explained, the existence of the whole collection is thereby explained.

3.2 Reply: It’s not true that explaining why each member of *any* collection of dependent beings exists entails an explanation for why the whole collection exists – why there are dependent beings at all. True, there are cases *of certain sorts* in which explaining the former entails explaining the latter. For example, if a necessary being were the direct cause of each dependent being in the universe, then it would be true that explaining why each dependent being exists would thereby entail an explanation for why the whole collection exists, and why there are dependent beings at all. However, there are cases in which it wouldn’t; just take the necessary being out the previous case, and imagine each dependent being as caused by one of the others. In such a case, explaining why each dependent being exists wouldn’t explain why there are dependent beings at all.



III: Why the Argument Ultimately Fails
This section completes my discussion of the deductive cosmological argument from contingency. In the previous section, I considered a set of objections to the argument that didn't seem to be persuasive. The moral of that discussion seemed to be that the argument stands or falls with the viability of PSR.

Here, I offer objections to PSR that seem to have some force. These criticisms aren’t original with me, but rather are standard objections (except perhaps the last one, although it's based on ideas of other authors). Furthermore, I don’t mean to imply that there aren’t other versions of the argument from contingency that may avoid these criticisms. However, they do seem to apply to the variants of the argument that one finds in standard “intermediate-level” apologetics books. The criticisms can be divided into two broad categories: (i) those that undercut the reasons offered for accepting PSR, and (ii) those that indicate that PSR is positively false or unreasonable.

1. Type-(i) Criticisms:

1.1 Contrary to what its proponents often assert, PSR does not seem to be supported by reflection on cases. Rather what such reflections support is the weaker principle that objects and events are explained in terms of antecedent causes and conditions. In actual practice, ordinary individuals and scientists explain the existence of objects and events in terms of antecedent causes and conditions, provisionally taking the latter things to be brute facts unless or until they, too, can be further explained. But the prinicple implicit in this sort of search for explanations isn't sufficient to generate the need for an explanation of the universe as a whole in terms of a necessary being.[i]

1.2 Contrary to what some of its proponents assert, PSR does not seem to be self-evident. For what makes a proposition self-evident is that grasping its meaning is sufficient for seeing that it’s true. Consider the two standard categories of self-evident propositions: analytic a priori propositions and synthetic a priori propositions. Both sorts of propositions are knowable independently of empirical investigation of the world. But they differ in that the former (analytic a priori propositions) are tautologous and uninformative, while the latter are not. So, for example, "All bachelors are unmarried" is an analytic a priori proposition, while "Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time" is arguably a synthetic a priori proposition.

Now consider PSR: (a) For every object, there is a sufficient reason for why it exists; (b) for every positive state of affairs, there is a sufficient reason for why it obtains. This isn't a tautology; so it's not analytic a priori. Furthermore, although it's a substantive claim, its truth or falsity is not evident merely by reflecting on its constituent conceps. Thus, it doesn't seem to be synthetic a priori, either. Perhaps there is another category of self-evident propositions, but if so, PSR seems not to belong to it. For what makes a proposition self-evident is that one can see that it's true merely be reflecting on its contituent concepts, and we have seen that PSR doesn't safisfy this condition.

1.3 Even if PSR were a presupposition of reason, it wouldn’t follow that it would then be true. But in any case, PSR does not seem to be a presupposition of reason. Rather, again, reason only seems to demand that the existence of each object or fact is explained in terms of antecedent causes and conditions, which are provisionally taken as brute facts unless or until they, in turn, can be explained. Reason does not seem to require anything beyond this.[ii]

2. Type-(ii) Criticisms:

2.1 PSR absurdly entails that everything obtains of necessity. The argument for this can be stated as follows. Consider the conjunction of all contingent facts (CCF). By PSR, there is a sufficient reason for CCF. Now the sufficient reason for CCF is itself either contingent or necessary. But it can’t be contingent, because then it would represent a contingent fact, in which case it would itself be a part of the CCF. But contingent facts don’t contain within themselves the sufficient reason for why they obtain – let alone the sufficient reason for why the CCF obtains. Thus, the sufficient reason for CCF must be necessary. But whatever is entailed by a necessary truth is itself necessary, in which case all truths would be necessary truths, and the referents they represent would obtain of necessity. But this is absurd. Therefore, PSR is false. [iii]

2.2 The following scenario is prima facie possible: there are just two kinds of beings that exist: contingent-and-dependent beings (e.g., rocks, trees, planets, galaxies, you and me) and contingent-yet-independent, “free-standing” beings, out of which all contingent-and-dependent beings are made (perhaps matter-energy is like this). If so, then even though there are possible worlds at which the contingent-yet-independent beings don’t exist, they are eternal and indestructible at all possible worlds in which they *do* exist (interestingly, some theists -- e.g., Richard Swinburne -- take God to be just such a being). On this account, then, there are contingent beings that come to be and pass away – viz., the contingent-and-dependent beings. But the beings out of which they’re made – i.e., the contingent-yet-independent beings -- do not; nor can they [iv]. This scenario seems possible. But if so, then since PSR entails that such a state of affairs is impossible, then so much the worse for PSR.

The basic point here is that PSR assumes that dependent beings must have their ultimate explanation in terms of *necessarily existent* independent beings (beings who exist in all possible worlds), when in fact *essentially* independent beings (beings that are independent at all possible worlds *in which they exist*) are all that are needed to do the requisite explanatory work. PSR entails that this isn't enough: if there are any essentially independent, indestructible, free-standing beings, then these must be *further* explained in terms of a *necessarily existent* being. But surely this is explanatory overkill, and since PSR entails that such further explanations are required, this implication undercuts any prima facie plausibility PSR may seem to have had.

These criticisms have varying degrees of force. However, it seems to me that criticism 2.2 is an undercutting defeater for PSR, and that criticism 2.1 is a rebutting defeater of PSR. But if these things are so, then the argument from contingency is defeated.
==================
APPENDIX: A Recent Defense of PSR

(Note: some things I say here are of a technical nature, and thus will probably only be of interest to those with some background in philosophy)

A number of philosophers have attempted to revive the Leibnizian cosmological argument in recent years by advancing a weaker version of PSR. According to their version of PSR, every contingent being has a *possible* explanation in terms of something else. That is, every contingent being is such that there is at least one possible world at which it has an explanation for why it exists. Call this version of PSR, 'Modal PSR'.

Now some authors -- in particular, Garrett DeWeese and Joshua Rasmussen[v] -- offer an argument for Modal PSR . Now I think their argument has a couple of problems, but here I just want to mention one that I think is decisive: The argument uses Modal PSR as a premise to derive the standard version of PSR we discussed above. But this premise is implausible at best, and outright false at worst. For unless they just beg the question and assume that there are no possible beings that lack a sufficient reason, then they must be claiming that, even if there *are* possible worlds at which a given contingent beings lacks a sufficient reason, there are *other* possible worlds at which it does. But this is implausible, For It seems to me that the only way to accept Modal PSR is to reject origin essentialism. Allow me to me unpack and explain this criticism below:

Suppose origin essentialism is true, and suppose we've got our hands on a universe, and we give it a Kripkean baptism: (pointing to the universe) "Let *that* be called 'Uni'. 'Uni' is now a Kripkean rigid designator -- it refers to *that* universe in all possible worlds in which it exists.

So now we have a way to hold Uni fixed, so we can start considering modal claims about *it*. Well, there are two relevant possibilities for us to consider here: (i) Uni has its origin in the causal power of a divine being,and (ii) Uni has no origin. If (i), then, by origin essentialism, this is an essential property of Uni, in which case there is no possible world in which Uni lacks such an origin.

If (ii), then Uni lacks an origin in the causal activity of a divine being, and so *this* fact about Uni is essential to it, in which case there is no possible world in which it has an origin in the causal activity of a divine being.

The moral, then, is that if we accept origin essentialism like good Kripkeans, then whether a universe has an explanation in terms of a divine being doesn't vary from world to world. But if so, then Modal PSR is of no help unless we know *beforehand* whether our universe has its origin in the causal activity of a divine being. But if we already knew *that*, then the contingency argument would be superfluous.

Of course, one could always reject origin essentialism, or restrict its scope in a way favorable to the argument, but then the audience for the argument shrinks considerably.

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Notes
i. This is a rough paraphrase of one of J.L. Mackie’s objections in The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983), pp. 84-87.

ii. See ibid.

iii. This objection is a rough paraphrase of one of Peter Van Inwagen’s objections in his textbook, Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 119-122.

iv .Another way to see how this could be: contingent-yet-independent beings have indestructibility as an essential property: they are indestructible and everlasting at all possible worlds in which they exist. However, there are possible worlds at which they don’t exist.

v. See their chapter of the recent apologetics book, In Defense of Natural Theology (InterVarsity Press, 2005).

Religion—Either Amoral or Immoral

In my opinion, one of the most popular arguments that religion has in modern, secular America is the perception (factual or not) that religion is a basis (perhaps THE basis) for morality. As time goes on and modern scientific research continues to pry intrusively at nature’s great secrets, religions that are unwilling to repudiate reason in the manner of Young Earth Creationists have found great comfort in Gould’s “non-overlapping magesteria”; the idea that religion holds sway into the meaning of existence, and as a basis of morality. But where does religion comment on morality that philosophy does not?

Since its beginnings in time, philosophy has sought through reason, argument, and appeal to offer systems for humans to morally interact with humans and other creatures. Religion has done the same, but with one essential difference; it has claimed the mandate of Heaven, becoming “fossilized philosophies” in the words of Simon Blackburn that would brook no argument regarding its central tenets. Would a Christian theologian dare say that Jesus was flat-out wrong when he instructed his followers “If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.” Of course not! He may debate as to the details of Jesus’ meaning, but he could not say “I’m afraid Jesus was off his rocker in this instance.” By claiming the mandate of Heaven, the underlying moral philosophy is stultified, without prospects for improvement.

If, and only if, one is to grant that the source of the philosophy is divinely inspired, then this may be seen as a reasonable trade-off (although I am wont to agree with Lessing that “the true value of a man is not determined by his posession, supposed or real, of Truth, but rather by his sincere exertion to get to the Truth.”) However, this grant of divine revelation cannot be stipulated when applied to a subject as important as how a person should treat another. A person outside of the revelation does not only have the right, but the duty to demand justification from the believer of the authenticity of the revelation, bound as humans are in our ancient and continually updated social contract. Of course, such justification is impossible; the core of revealed religion is the revelation, and that cannot be shared or evidenced, only “witnessed”.

So the skepticism of the outsider is justified; what of the belief of the theist? The theist has the dubious benefit of the revelation; experiential evidence that is of little worth to an outsider, but of enormous visceral worth to the theist himself. While quite a number of people resist the draw of experiential evidence of the supernatural, many others heed it as valid evidence and deny all argument to the contrary. However, the concern of society is not the belief of its members, but rather their actions. As such, do believers owe justification to society for the basis of their morality?

It depends, and this contingency is the heart of the matter. Does the believer’s religion force them to perform an action which society would consider immoral? If not, then the believer owes society no explanation; it really is not anyone else’s business what goes on in the heart of a man (or woman). However, if the religion demands an action that society considers immoral, then the theist is required to evidentially justify his behavior to society. For example, if an Aztec lives in an Aztec society, then no justification is required for the practice of human sacrifice; his society does not find the practice immoral (even though I do). However, were this Aztec transported to modern Switzerland, he would be expected to justify his religious morality without appealing to the authority of his religion, which he would be hard pressed to do. To apply this principle to modern pluralistic American society, I would encourage a Christian seeking to compel a moral action to argue outside of his religion; just as no amount of appeal to Huitzilopochtli would justify human sacrifice outside of Aztec society, no amount of appeal to Christ will justify an action in secular, pluralistic America that is currently considered evidentially immoral.

However, this line of reasoning prompts a question, which I find foundational and utterly intriguing. I have argued why religion cannot justify an action considered immoral by society. Now we approach the question of the role of the believer in evaluating religious moral teachings. Is it moral for a person to commit an evil act at God’s command? The Old Testament is filled with instances in which believers commited incredibly evil acts at God’s command. Much of the Old Testament is written like a loving ode to genocide; Abraham would have killed his son as a sacrifice; an old man offers up two young women (including his own daughter) for a mob to rape to death. Is it morally right for a believer to commit what his inherent morality states is an evil act (genocide, murder, etc.) because his God told him to? While “just following orders” may in some very limited cases be a legal defense, is it a moral one? In a totalitarian system, is only the head despot morally responsible? Of course not; a person is responsible for his or her actions. Religion is certainly the ideal totalitarian system with God as the despot. Why should a theist not be morally responsible for all outrageous acts against his morality, whether commanded by God or not?

The theist may take refuge in self-preservation; knowingly defying God’s will leads directly to hellfire and damnation. A theist can legitimately claim that he must follow God’s will for his own preservation. But is this a moral act? No; the moral act is self-sacrifice to preserve the lives and well-being of others. Medals are not given to those who run from a live grenade; they are given for knowingly sacrificing one’s own well-being for the well-being of his comrades. Self-preservation is an amoral act, neither to be condemned nor praised. If the theist takes refuge behind the vindictiveness of God, he resigns himself to an amoral life, following the will of God solely for ultimate self-preservation. And the addition of Heavenly profit for the immoral act only makes it more tawdry and reprehensible, although strictly amoral.

On the other hand, the theist may take pleasure and pride in following God’s commands, believing that to be the highest form of morality. However, atheists, secularists, and many intellectually honest theists admit that humans have an inborn morality that is independent of religious belief, whether they think this morality is from God, evolution, or another source. I, for one, also think humans have this inherent morality that can usually only be overcome with some difficulty. If one agrees that humans have an inherent morality, then one agrees that it is conceivable that God could command them to do an act against their inherent morality. I would hope that every theist here would agree that genocide is immoral, rape is immoral, and human sacrifice is immoral; and yet God ordered all three from his human subjects. I ask again: is it moral to follow an immoral command, regardless of the source of the command? No, of course not; at best, despotic religion turns any action, moral or immoral, into an amoral act of self-preservation. At worst, the follower takes pleasure in violating his own morals, relishing an immoral act.

Now there is, of a necessity, two kinds of religions: those in which God admittedly commands immoral actions of His followers, and those in which He does not. In cases where God commands immoral actions of His followers, I have argued (I hope convincingly) that the resulting actions are immoral or amoral, and therefore the religion itself is not a suitable basis for moral action. In cases where God never commands an action that outrages human morality, then religion suddenly becomes unnecessary; it never commands us to perform an action other than that which our morality would allow without religion. Perhaps it can be said that religion encourages us to perform actions that we already consider moral, but the primary way in which it does this is by carrot and stick, which again turns moral actions into amoral self-promotion and preservation.

Religion offers fossilized moral systems that debase human moral action with tawdry rewards and outrageous threats. Philosophy allows for self-analyzing systems of morality that encourages moral action without inducements outside of the pleasure of doing right, and the natural rewards of morality (ordered society, approval of peers, etc.) Religion is at best amoral, and at worst encourages moral outrages for the glory of the ultimate totalitarian regime. If I cannot appeal to reason against the theists’ personal experiences, then can I not appeal to your human dignity? Do not debase yourself by requiring a heavenly secret police to induce your moral actions; do not defile yourself by allowing the usage of your human faculties to outrage your basic human decency in the name of the ultimate despot. Take your morality from your love of yourself and your fellow man, which I as an atheist share.

An Example of the Absurd Logic of Christian Apologist, JW Wartick

This post is an illustration of the absurdity of the Christian apologist, JW Wartick's argument concerning The Morality of God: Christ at the Center

Wartick claims that:

"They (New Atheists) accuse the God of the Old Testament (Hebrew Scriptures) of being an evil, sadistic being (to put it nicely). They defame God’s name and delight in calling Him unjust. In all of this, however, they betray their complete lack of knowledge about Scripture, God, and the universe. ...there are (among many others) two primary ways that the New Atheists are in error when they attack God in such a way. These two ways are:

1) They forget that if God does indeed exist, then they are in no position to judge God.
2) They ignore Christology, which is of utmost importance in any discussion of God.

Wartick then provides the following argument:
1. If the God of classical theism exists, then He is sovereign (i.e. the ultimate authority in the universe)
2. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the God of classical theism exists.
3. Therefore, God is the ultimate authority in the universe."

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Philosophical Gerrymandering and Cumulative Case Arguments For Theism

I've argued that no argument for God, taken by itself, demonstrates theism -- or even makes theism more probable than not. However, this leaves open the possibility that, when taken together, these arguments do demonstrate the truth of theism, or at least make theism more probable than not.

Richard Swinburne is one famous philosopher of religion who takes this approach to arguments for theism[1]. He uses a formula from the probability calculus known as Bayes' Theorem to argue in this way. He calls an argument that raises the probability of a hypothesis a good C-inductive argument, and he calls an argument that makes a hypothesis more probable than not a good P-inductive argument. He then considers a large variety of arguments for theism, and admits that none of them, when construed as a deductive argument, constitutes a sound argument for God's existence. However, he argues that a number of them, when reformulated as inductive arguments, each raise the probability of theism at least a little bit. Thus, he thinks that a number of them are good C-inductive arguments for theism. And when taken together, they make theism at least a little bit more probable than not, making the set of arguments taken together a good P-inductive argument for theism.[2]

To illustrate Swinburne's ideas about C-inductive arguments, P-inductive arguments, and cumulative case arguments, consider a simpler example. Suppose we're detectives investigating a murder, and that we know that either Smith committed the murder or that Jones did it. Then we have two hypotheses:

H1: Smith committed the murder
H2: Jones committed the murder

Suppose further that the following constitutes all our evidence, or data:

D1: Smith's fingerprints are on the murder weapon (a gun)
D2: Jones's fingerprints are on the murder weapon
D3: Smith had a strong grudge against the victim for sleeping with his wife
D4: Jones disliked the victim
D5: Jones is a terrible shot
D6: A somewhat reliable acquaintance of Jones said they talked to Jones at his house at 8pm, which was only 10 minutes before the time of the murder.
D7: Jones lives about 15 minutes from the victim's house.
D8: Smith lives 5 minutes away from the victim's house.

Notice that no single piece of evidence makes either hypothesis even slightly more probable than not -- i.e., not one of D1-D8, when considered individually, is a good P-inductive argument for either hypothesis as to who killed the victim. However, each one (or at least most of them), when taken individually, raises the probability of the relevant hypothesis at least a little bit, in which case each one (or at least most of each one) is a good C-inductive argument. And when taken together, they do make H1 a bit more probable than H2. In fact, D1-D8, taken together, constitutes a good P-inductive argument for H1. Similarly, even if none of the arguments for God establish the truth or the probability of theism, perhaps they do when taken together. Well, do they?

I've already mentioned that Swinburne thinks they do. Some other examples include J.P., Moreland[3], WIlliam Lane Craig, and Basil MItchell.

So, for example, suppose our hypotheses are:

H1: theism
H2: naturalism

And suppose our data are:

D1: the apparent contingency of the universe
D2: the apparent fine-tuning of the universe
D3: the apparent irreducibility of consciousness to the physical
D4: religious experiences of various sorts
D5: the existence of morality[4]

What's the probability of H1 on D1-D5? Of course, as everyone in this debate admits, there's probably no way to assign precise numerical values to the pieces of evidence here, whether taken individually or collectively[5]. To be charitable, though, let's say that each of D1-D5 raises the probability of theism at least a bit, and thus each is a good C-inductive argument for theism. Furthermore, let's be charitable and say that, when taken together, the probability of H1 on D1-D5 is a very strong P-inductive argument, raising the probability of H1 to .9 (i.e. 90%)[6]. Do we now have a cumulative case argument based on D1-D5 that makes the posterior probability of H1 higher than that of H2?

No, we don't. For to truly assess the posterior probability of a hypothesis, one has to include in the data pool *all* of the evidence that has a bearing on the hypotheses in question; to ignore the other evidence is tantamount to philosophical gerrymandering: artificially limiting the range of relevant evidence in order to ensure the conclusion you want. It would be analogous to arguing above that Jones probably committed the murder by just presenting D2, D4, and D6 of the data presented there, and suppressing all the rest.

But it turns out that there is a lot of data that appears to conflict with theism that needs to be added to the data pool before we can properly assess the hypotheses. Some of this evidence includes:

D6: massive amounts of apparently random and pointless suffering
D7: massive religious diversity
D8: empirical studies on the ineffectiveness of prayer
D9: the apparent hiddenness of God
D10: evolution

But once we throw in this data, it's no longer clear whether H1 (i.e., theism) is more probable than H2 (i.e., naturalism): even if the probability of H1 was about .9 on D1-D5, it sinks down to about .5 (i.e., 50%) when we evaluate it on D1-D10. At worst, H1 is lower than .5 on the total evidence.

So it seems to me that cumulative case arguments for theism fare no better than the same arguments taken singly.
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Footnotes:

1. See especially his classic book, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). In this post, I refer to the revised edition (1991). An extensively revised edition was released in 2004. A popular-level presentation of the main ideas in that book can be found in his book, Is there a God? (Oxford: OUP, 1996).

2. While this is roughly correct, technically it isn't quite right. In at least the original edition, Swinburne argues for the weaker claim that, taken together, the arguments for theism he endorses give theism a probability of at least .5 (50%), or thereabouts. He then argues that (what he dubs) the Principle of Credulity applies to religious experience -- i.e., like ordinary perceptual and memory experience, religious experience enjoys prima facie justification (it's "innocent until proven guilty"). But since he thinks he's shown that theism isn't improbable on the evidence (i.e., it's not less than 50% probable), then the prima facie justification of religious experience isn't undercut, and thus religious experience of God justifies theism. In an appendix in the 1991 version of the book, he considers the new "fine-tuning" version of the design argument, and concludes that with this new piece of data, theism is indeed more probable than not, in which case there is a decent P-inductive, cumulative case argument for theism. I haven't read the newest edition of Swinburne's book, but I believe he is even more optimistic about the cumulative case for theism is if anything even stronger than he thought in his 1991 version.

3. Moreland's views here are a bit more optimistic than Swinburne's. He thinks that there are a lot of sound deductive arguments for theism, and that several versions of the design argument are good P-inductive arguments all by themselves. Thus, the function of a cumulative case for theism isn't primarily to make theism more probable than not, but rather to (i) provide a finer-grained conception of the identity of the God established by the arguments (e.g., to rule out deism), and (ii) to strengthen a theistic case already made strong by most of the arguments taken by themselves. See his "rope" analogy of theistic arguments in his debate with Kai Neilsen (Does God Exist? The Great Debate), as well as his remarks in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (co-authored with William Lane Craig). William Lane Craig seems to endorse this view as well. This comes out especially in his discussion of the arguments of natural theology in his popular-level debates, as well as the book on the Christian Worldview just mentioned.

4. It should be pointed out that although at least some theists take moral arguments to support theism, Swinburne does not -- indeed, he doesn't even think they make good C-inductive arguments for theism. For he takes moral truths to be necessary truths, akin to mathematical truths (e.g., 1+1=2), in which case they would exist even if God did not. See his discussion of this in his chapter on moral arguments in his The Existence of God (1991).

5. For example, Swinburne says this explicitly in the final chapter (not the appendix) of The Existence of God (1991). Plantinga says this in Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: OUP, 2000).

6. This is of course extremely generous. For not even Swinburne thinks the probability is this high even when you add more theism-friendly pieces of data (see footnote 2, where I mention that Swinburne thinks the data give theism a posterior probability of around .5). Plantinga more-or-less agrees with Swinburne's assessment. See Plantinga's section on the Problem of Dwindling Probabilities in Warranted Christian Belief, where he argues that inductive arguments for theism aren't sufficiently strong to render religious belief epistemically appropriate..