There is a great deal of discussion among Christian apologists over Bayesian “background factors,” which play a significant role in assessing the truth of Christianity in general, the likelihood of the resurrection of Jesus, the probability of miracles, and the problem of evil. But I want to take a good hard look at the most important background factor of all for cognitively assessing the truth of religious faiths—one’s sociological and cultural background.
I’ve investigated my faith from the inside as an insider with the presumption that it was true. Even from an insider’s perspective I couldn’t continue to believe. Now from the outside it makes no sense at all. Christians are on the inside. I am now on the outside. Christians see things from the inside. I see things from the outside. From the inside, it seems true. From the outside, it seems, well, bizarre.
There are many religious faiths from which to choose. How does one actually choose to be on the inside of any of them if from the outside none of them have any plausibility? Unless one is on the inside as an adherent of a particular religious faith one cannot see. But from the outside, the adherents of a different faith seem blind. This reminds me of what Mark Twain said: “The easy confidence with which I know another man’s religion is folly teaches me to suspect that my own is also.” Believers are truly atheists (i.e., nonbelievers) with regard to all other religions but their own. People known as “atheists” just reject one more religion for pretty much the same reasons they rejected the others.
This whole inside/outside perspective is quite a dilemma; it prompts me to propose and argue on behalf of the Outsider Test for Faith, the result of which makes the presumption of skepticism the preferred stance when examining a particular religious faith, including one’s own. My argument is as follows:
1) Rational people in distinct geographical locations around the globe overwhelmingly adopt and defend a wide diversity of religious faiths due to their upbringing and shared cultural heritage. This is the religious diversity thesis (RDVT). This is a sociological/demographic fact from which 2 follows.
2) It is highly likely that adopting one’s religious faith is not merely a matter of independent rational judgment. Rather, to an overwhelming degree, one’s religious faith is causally dependent on cultural conditions. This is the religious dependency thesis (RDPT).
3) Therefore it is highly likely that any given adopted religious faith is false. From 1 and 2.
Given these odds we need a test, or an objective standard, to help us determine if our inherited religious faith is true, so I propose that:
4) The best and probably the only way to test one’s adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism one uses to evaluate other religious faiths. This expresses the Outsider Test for Faith (OTF).
My argument echoes that of cultural relativists who have argued that because “moral practices and beliefs do in fact vary from culture to culture and at different times in history” that therefore “morality is not a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally dependent on cultural conditions,” All we have to do is insert the phrase “religious faith” in place of “morality, with one caveat. I’m not arguing that religious faiths are completely culturally relative and therefore all false because of religious diversity. I’m merely arguing that believers should be very skeptical of their faith because of these cultural factors. The OTF is based on the RDVT, which leads us to the RDPT, which in turn leads us to the presumption of skepticism when examining any religion, including one’s own inherited or culturally accepted faith.1
The Basis for the OTF
The basis for the OTF can be found in something that is obvious and noncontroversial. Philosopher of religion John Hick tells us that “it is evident that in some ninety-nine percent of the cases the religion which an individual professes and to which he or she adheres depends upon the accidents of birth. Someone born to Buddhist parents in Thailand is very likely to be a Buddhist, someone born to Muslim parents in Saudi Arabia to be a Muslim, someone born to Christian parents in Mexico to be a Christian, and so on.”2
Richard Dawkins said the same thing in a harsher tone: “Out of all of the sects in the world, we notice an uncanny coincidence: the overwhelming majority just happens to choose the one that their parents belong to. Not the sect that has the best evidence in its favour, the best miracles, the best moral code, the best cathedral, the best stained glass, the best music: when it comes to choosing from the smorgasbord of available religions, their potential virtues seem to count for nothing, compared to the matter of heredity. This is an unmistakable fact; nobody could seriously deny it. Yet people with full knowledge of the arbitrary nature of this heredity, somehow manage to go on believing in their religion, often with such fanaticism that they are prepared to murder people who follow a different one. . . . The religion we adopt is a matter of an accident of geography.”3
Two widely accepted books on persuasive psychology are Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini and Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches by Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo.4 Social psychologists refer to these two books to show how people believe and defend their beliefs. Petty and Cacioppo wrote: “Since most of the information that children have about the world comes directly from their parents, it is not surprising that children’s beliefs, and thus their attitudes, are initially very similar to their parents.”5 They claim that “social psychologists have well documented that children tend to share their parents’ racial prejudices, religious preferences, and political party affiliations.”6
If you were born in Saudi Arabia, you would be a Sunni Muslim right now. This is an almost undeniable cold, hard sociological and cultural fact. In today’s world, if you were born in Iran, you’d be a Shi’a Muslim. If you were born in India, you’d be a Hindu right now. If you were born in Japan, you’d be a Shintoist, and if you lived in Mongolia, you’d be a Buddhist. If you were born in the first century BCE in Israel, you’d adhere to the Jewish faith, and if you were born in Europe in 1200 CE, you’d be a Roman Catholic. These things are as close to being undeniable facts as we can get in the sociological world.
But there’s more. Had we lived in ancient Egypt or Babylon, we would have been very superstitious and polytheistic to the core. We would have sought divine guidance through divination and sought to alter our circumstances through magic. If we’d been first-century Christians, we would probably have believed that God sent illnesses and disasters to discipline and punish people for their sins, and we would have believed in what has come to be called the ransom theory of Jesus’ atonement. Had we been Christians in Europe during the Middle Ages, we would probably have seen nothing wrong with killing witches, torturing heretics, and ruthlessly conquering Jerusalem in the Crusades. In short, we are overwhelmingly products of our times.
There is a whole range of issues that admit of diversity in the moral and political areas as well, based to an overwhelming degree on “accidents of birth.” Caucasian American men would’ve believed with President Andrew Jackson in manifest destiny, our God-given mandate to seize Native American territories in westward expansion. Up through the seventeenth century we would have believed that women were intellectually inferior to men, and consequently, we would not even have allowed them to become educated in the same subjects as men. Like Thomas Jefferson and most Americans, we would’ve thought this way about black people as well, that they were intellectually inferior to whites, while if we were born in the South, we would have justified slavery from the Bible.
If we were born black in America and were also football fans, we would probably have believed O. J. Simpson was not guilty of murder because of our distrust of white police officers, who have had a history of arresting us and railroading us in the legal system as scapegoats for crimes they cannot solve. If we were born in the Palestinian Gaza Strip, we would probably hate the Jews want to kill them all. If we were born in France, we would probably have opposed the war in Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein.
These kinds of moral, political, religious, and cultural beliefs, based upon specific cultural conditions, can be extended into a lengthy list of beliefs we would’ve had if we had been born in a different time and/or place. There is a whole range of issues like these, including how we dress, what foods we like, what music we listen to, and even somewhat the criteria for what kinds of people we consider beautiful. For someone to claim that he or she wouldn’t have shared these same beliefs is what I call chronological snobbery, which runs completely counter to the sociological and cultural facts. According to Voltaire, “Every man is a creature of the age in which he lives, and few are able to raise themselves above the ideas of the time.” These kinds of facts are undeniable.
The Perspective of the OTF
The outsider test is simply a challenge to examine one’s own adopted religious faith as an outsider, with the same presumption of skepticism we use when examining the other religious faiths we reject. To take the outsider test is to assume that one’s adopted faith has the burden of proof. Outsiders begin their journeys as disinterested investigators who do not think the religious faith in question is likely true because there are so many different religious faiths in the world. Outsiders are people who are only interested in the question of which religious faith is correct, if any; they do not have an intellectual affiliation with any one religion. Outsiders must assume that their own culturally inherited religious faith is probably false, since doing so is consistent with the skeptical stance they use when examining the other religious faiths they reject. To be an outsider means having nothing at stake in the outcome of this investigation.
Surely a believer will initially object that this is quite draconian in scope. Why take such a skeptical stance? It’s because that’s how people approach all other religious faiths, so why not do that with one’s own religious faith? Why is there this discrepancy in how people evaluate them? For any individual who objects that what I’m asking is unfair, he or she will have the burden of proof to show why his or her inconsistent approach to religious faith is justified in the first place. Why the double standard? The outsider test presents us with a consistent standard that helps us see the proper presumption we should take when evaluating the faith we were born into. It argues that the burden of proof lies squarely on the religious believer. Unlike former atheist Anthony Flew, who argued in favor of the presumption of atheism,7 I’m arguing in favor of the presumption of skepticism, or agnosticism. 8 Like the prince in the Cinderella story who must question forty-five thousand people to see which girl lost the glass slipper at the ball, the believer endeavoring to take the OTF must maintain a skeptical stance. After all, each of the forty-five thousand girls questioned by the prince claimed that she is the one who lost the slipper. Likewise, there are many religionists who all claim their faiths are the only ones that are true. Therefore, skepticism is definitely warranted.
No doubt many readers will further object that no one can approach any area of learning without some presuppositions, assumptions, or control beliefs, and this seems especially true when it comes to religious faiths. Thus, I’m arguing that the sociological and cultural facts strongly suggest that adherents of a particular religious faith should switch their presuppositions. I’m arguing that they should adopt the presumption (or presupposition) of skepticism. If they simply cannot do this, then let me suggest doing what RenĂ© Descartes did with a methodological (or hypothetical) doubt, although I’m not suggesting his type of extreme doubt. Hypothetically consider your faith from the skepticism of an outsider. At the very minimum, believers should be willing to subject their faith to rigorous scrutiny by reading many of the best-recognized critiques of it. For instance, Christians should be willing to read this book of mine and others I’ve published. What’s more, church groups and Christian colleges should be willing host study groups to discuss chapter by chapter the evidence presented in books like mine, which take a skeptical position regarding the Christian faith. After all, wouldn’t Christians want to know whether what they have been led to believe is true?
If I were to ask believers to critically examine their religious faith, most all of them would claim they have already done so. Just imagine asking the nineteen militant Muslims who flew planes into buildings on 9/11 whether they had critically examined their faith. Just imagine asking them if they were really sure that their faith was true. Once you think about this you’ll understand the need for the OTF, which does more than merely ask believers to critically examine their faith. It gives them a single, nonbiased, non-double standard to test their own inherited faith. It asks them to test their own faith the same way they test the other religious faiths they reject. Asking them to do so will get their attention like nothing else.
For the Christian theist the challenge of the OTF means there can be no more quoting of the Bible to defend the claim that Jesus’ death on the cross saves us from sins. The Christian theist must now try to rationally explain why this should be so. There can be no more quoting the Bible to show how it’s possible for Jesus to simultaneously be 100 percent God and 100 percent man. The Christian theist must now try to make sense of this claim, coming as it does from an ancient, superstitious people who didn’t have trouble believing this could happen (Acts 14:11, 28:6). Christian theists must not assume there is an answer to the problem of evil before approaching the evidence of suffering in our world. And they must be initially skeptical of believing in any of the miracles in the Bible, just as they would be skeptical of any contemporary claims of miracles that support other religious faiths. Why? Because they can no longer start out by believing that the Bible is true, nor can they trust the people close to them to know the truth (they are almost certainly Christian theists who do not share the skeptical stance needed for evaluating faith in an unbiased way), nor can they trust their own anecdotal religious experiences, since such experiences are had by people of all religious faiths who nonetheless differ about the cognitive content learned as the result of these experiences. Christian theists who accept the challenge of the OTF will not be satisfied by anything less than sufficient evidence for what they believe.The OTF challenges believers to examine the social and cultural conditions that influenced the adoption of their particular religious faith in the first place. In other words, it encourages believers to ask themselves who or what influenced them and what the actual reasons were for adopting their faith in its earliest stages. Nearly all believers in an overwhelming number of instances simply end up believing what they were taught to believe by their parents or the people they consider to be trustworthy, sometimes peers and other times authority figures. The reasons they adopted their faith in the first place can almost always be traced to social and cultural conditions. Christian, just ask yourself if your initial experiences could be explained by a different, skeptical hypothesis, and whether the initial reasons for your faith were strong ones. Do what I did in chapter 1. I really didn’t have good initial reasons to believe. Very few of us do, as a matter of fact. We just ended up believing what we were taught to believe.
The Psychology of Beliefs
Cultural and social conditions provide us with the control beliefs that we use to incorporate all known facts and experiences into our religious belief system. That’s why they’re called control beliefs. They are like blinders. From the moment you put them on, you only see what your blinders will let you see, because reason is mostly used to serve our control beliefs. Listen to Michael Shermer, a former Christian theist turned atheist, who has done an extensive study of why people believe in God and other “weird things.” He concludes:
Most of us most of the time come to our beliefs for a variety of reasons having little to do with empirical evidence and logical reasoning. Rather, such variables as genetic predispositions, parental predilections, sibling influences, peer pressures, educational experiences, and life impressions all shape the personality preferences and emotional inclinations that, in conjunction with numerous social and cultural influences, lead us to make certain belief choices. Rarely do any of us sit down before a table of facts, weigh them pro and con, and choose the most logical and rational belief, regardless of what we previously believed. Instead, the facts of the world come to us through the colored filters of the theories, hypotheses, hunches, biases, and prejudices we have accumulated through our lifetime. We then sort through the body of data and select those most confirming what we already believe, and ignore or rationalize away those that are disconfirming. All of us do this, of course, but smart people are better at it.9
According to Robert McKim, “We seem to have a remarkable capacity to find arguments that support positions which we antecedently hold. Reason is, to a great extent, the slave of prior commitments.”10 Hence the whole notion of “an independent rational judgment” is suspect, especially when there are no mutually agreed-upon reliable scientific tests to decide what to believe, even if Christian apologists, for instance, continue to defend their religious faith with reasons. These apologists, if they’re good at what they do, will be smart people. But according to Michael Shermer, “Smart people, because they are more intelligent and better educated, are able to give intellectual reasons justifying . . . beliefs that they arrived at for nonintelligent reasons.”11
Psychiatrist Valerie Tarico describes the process of defending unintelligent beliefs by smart people. She claims that “it doesn’t take very many false assumptions to send us on a long goose chase.”12 To illustrate this she tells us about the mental world of a paranoid schizophrenic. To such a person the perceived persecution by the CIA sounds real. “You can sit, as a psychiatrist, with a diagnostic manual next to you, and think: as bizarre as it sounds, the CIA really is bugging this guy. The arguments are tight, the logic persuasive, the evidence organized into neat files. All that is needed to build such an impressive house of illusion is a clear, well-organized mind and a few false assumptions. Paranoid individuals can be very credible.”13 This is what Christians do, and this is why it’s hard to shake the evangelical faith, in Tarico’s informed opinion.
Gary Marcus, professor of psychology at New York University wrote a book titled Kluge: The Haphazard Evolution of the Human Mind.14 It performs a double service to us by showing how the evolution of our brain accounts for why we think so poorly, and in so doing it goes a long way toward showing that religious belief is a product of this poor thinking. He argues that “if mankind were the product of some intelligent, compassionate designer, our thoughts would be rational, our logic impeccable. Our memory would be robust, our recollections reliable.”15 Instead, our brains evolved as a kluge. A kluge “is a clumsy or inelegant—yet surprisingly effective solution—to a problem.”16 Just picture a house constructed in stages by different contractors at later times and you can get the picture. The structure of our brains, with three brains built on top of one another, the hindbrain (or reptilian brain), the midbrain (the limbic system) and the forebrain (the neocortex), affects our memories, beliefs, choices, language, and pleasure.
When it comes to our beliefs, Marcus argues we are not objective machines even though most people think they have arrived at the logical truth with a capital “T.” Instead, “our capacity for belief is haphazard, scarred by evolution and contaminated by emotions, moods, desires, goals, and simple self-interest.”17 “Because evolution built belief mainly out of off-the-shelf components that evolved for other purposes, we often lose track of where our beliefs come from—if we ever knew—and even worse, we are often completely unaware of how much we are influenced by irrelevant information.”18 “We feel as if our beliefs are based on cold, hard facts, but often they are shaped by our ancestral system in subtle ways that we are not even aware of.”19 Marcus proceeds to inform us of how we gain and maintain our beliefs, many of which are illogical. We believe what is familiar. We seek to confirm what we believe. We cling to our beliefs despite evidence to the contrary. We fail to consider disconfirming evidence. “Once we decide something is true (for whatever reason), we often make up reasons for believing it.”20 We scrutinize ideas more carefully if we don’t like them than if we are familiar with them. This is because evolved creatures “were often forced to act rather than think.”21 Marcus’s closing warning is that “the truth is that without special training, our species is inherently gullible.”22
As I said in the introduction, scientific studies in this area of research have concluded that we believe what we prefer to be true. Once our minds are made up it is very hard to change them. We seek to justify our decisions, especially decisions that are costly in terms of commitment, money, effort, time, and inconvenience. Almost shockingly these studies have shown us that reading information that goes against what we believe can actually make us convinced we are right. We will even take a lack of evidence for what we believe as evidence for our belief. Social psychologists Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson document these phenomena. They tell us: “Most people, when directly confronted with proof that they are wrong, do not change their point of view or course of action but justify it even more tenaciously.”23
What does this imply? That we’re all in the same epistemological boat. Again for emphasis, we are all in the same boat. The sciences conclusively show that, for the most part, we are all equally susceptible to the same types of errors when it comes to selecting and maintaining our beliefs. Except that there are people who are better critical thinkers than others because they are aware that they are susceptible to the mental phenomena described by Marcus, Tavris, Aronson, and others and can therefore apply tools, such as the OTF, to identify and correct for erroneous control beliefs, biases, and presuppositions. Once we understand what the sciences tell us we become much more likely to question what we believe. We become more demanding of sufficient evidence before concluding much of anything. Take the OTF and find out if your religious faith can pass that test. Be skeptical about your faith.
If after you have investigated your religious faith with the presumption of skepticism you find that it passes intellectual muster, then you can have your religious faith. It’s that simple. If not, abandon it. Any loving God who requires us to believe correctly in spite of our extremely strong tendency to accept the beliefs we are born into, especially if he’ll punish us in hell if we end up being wrong, should surely make it so the correct religious faith is capable of passing the outsider test. If God did not do this, then rational people who are born in different religious cultures as outsiders cannot reasonably be converted to the Christian faith and be saved. They would be condemned to hell simply because they were born as outsiders. If your faith doesn’t stand after taking the OTF then the God of your faith is not worthy of being worshiped. If a god exists and he doesn’t care which religion we accept, then that god might survive the outsider test, but we would end up believing in a nebulous God with no definable characteristics, perhaps a deist God or the “god of the philosophers.” However, such a god is nothing like the god of Christianity or any other specific religion. Such a god would be a distant one, indistinguishable from none at all.
Since it’s overwhelmingly true that the presumption you begin with will be the one you will end up with, I suspect that if Christians are willing to take the challenge of the OTF, their religious faith will be found defective and they will abandon it. I also suspect that such a challenge could very well lead them to agnosticism and then onward to denial of any religious faith.
Answering Five Initial Objections
One. It’s objected that there are small minorities of people who choose to be Christian theists despite having been born and raised in Muslim countries, which demonstrates that people can escape their culturally adopted faith. But these are the exceptions. Christian theists respond by asking me to explain the exceptions. I am asking them to explain the rule. Why do religious beliefs dominate in specific geographical areas? Why is that? The exceptions are simply that there are people who think for themselves and in so doing decide to own a particular religious faith rather than adopt what was taught to them. Then too, there are several social reasons for leaving the faith that one was born into. If believers had some bad experiences at the hands of someone who taught them what to believe (Catholics who have been molested by priests, for instance, or abusive fathers, or senseless suffering of any unbearable kind), they may leave that faith for another. These kinds of bad experiences cause them to do what they should have been doing all along: critically examining the faith they were taught. If believers think through their faith and just cannot reconcile it with everything they’ve learned and experienced in life, then they may leave their adopted faith. When believers do decide to leave their faith, and choose another one, many times that different faith (or sect) will be one they were already exposed to in their culture. By contrast, a former believer can adopt atheism without ever having been exposed to it since it’s simply the denial of one more god in addition to all the other gods that have already been denied.
Two. Someone may argue that even if religious faiths were 100 percent correlated with the “accidents of birth,” this wouldn’t invalidate any particular one of them, for it could still be possible that theirs is the correct one after all. I agree that this is possible. After all, someone can be right for no other reason than simple luck. However, one cannot punt to a mere possibility when probability is all that matters. The questions is how a believer can rationally justify such luck? This is why I’ve developed the challenge of the outsider test in the first place, to test religious faiths against such luck. If the test between religious faiths is based entirely on luck, then what are the chances, based on luck alone, that the particular sect within Christian theism that one adheres to is correct? This still favors the presumption of skepticism.
Three. Someone may ask if my argument is self-defeating. “Do my cultural conditions overwhelmingly ‘determine’ my presumption of skepticism? If so, then others don’t have much of a reason to adopt the skeptical stance. If not, then why do I think I can transcend culture but a Christian theist can’t transcend her culture?” In answer I say that if it’s the case that “accidents of birth” overwhelmingly determine our religious beliefs, especially in those areas where there is no mutually agreed-upon reliable scientific test to decide between them, then that’s a sociological fact everyone must wrestle with when thinking about such matters. Let’s say this is the case; that is, whatever we believe about the origin of this universe and existence are overwhelmingly determined by when and where we are born. I am much more willing to accept the consequences of this than a great majority of people who have religious faith and are so dogmatic about their faith. If this is the case, then we agree that what we believe is based upon when and where we’re born. And so we should be skeptical of what we were taught to believe on our Mama’s knees about our inherited faith, at least until we have fact checked that faith for ourselves. And the sciences offer the only reasonable method for conducting this fact checking.
Besides, I’m arguing that cultural conditions strongly influence us to believe what we were taught to believe. Such an admission doesn’t undercut the reason for the OTF and the skeptical presumption that goes with it based on the RDVT and the RDPT. If cultural factors overwhelmingly cause us to believe what we believe, then we should all become skeptics, which is something I can be quite comfortable with. Skeptical agnosticism becomes the default position.
J. L. Schellenberg deals with the objection that his argument for religious skepticism is self-defeating in these words: “Now this objection can be sound only if my arguments do indeed apply to themselves, and it will not take much to see that they do not.”24 He distinguishes between “bold, ambitious, and risky metaphysical beliefs,” on the one hand, which tell us that “active investigation should cease,” since “the truth has been discovered,” and “the belief that some such bold, ambitious, and risky metaphysical belief is unjustified.”25 The latter belief merely claims that such bold and ambitious metaphysical beliefs “have not successfully made their case; it bides us to continue investigation . . . because skepticism is always a position of last resort in truth seeking contexts.”26
Four. In arguing that one’s religious faith is overwhelmingly adopted by “when and where” someone is born, have I committed the informal genetic fallacy of irrelevance? This fallacy is committed whenever it’s argued that a belief is false because of the origination of the belief. Applying this to my arguments, it would be objected that just because a particular religious faith is learned from one’s culture does not make that faith false, for how one first adopts faith is irrelevant to whether said faith is true.
But I deny that this is what I’m arguing. There is no such fallacy here at all. How people adopt their religious faith is indeed relevant to the probability that one’s faith is the correct one out of the thousands available because faith-based reasoning doesn’t produce a sound way to decide between them. Sure, it’s possible there are people born into the correct religion, if we grant there is one. But possibility doesn’t count. Probability is all that matters. I’m not saying religious faiths are false because of how people first adopted them. I’m only saying the odds are that any given one of them is probably false because of this. I’m arguing only that believers should be skeptical of their religious faith because of how they first adopted it.
Five. One final similar objection asks whether this is all circular. Have I merely chosen a different metaphysical belief system based upon different cultural factors? No, I deny this. My skepticism goes against the grain of what I was led to believe. I have some very good grounds for starting out with skepticism in the first place, given the RDVT and the RDPT. Methodological procedures are those procedures we use to investigate something. How we go about investigating something is a separate issue that must be justified on its own terms, and I have done so here. Someone cannot say of the OTF that I ought to be just as skeptical of it as I am about the conclusion(s) I arrive at when I apply the test, since I have justified this test from the available sociological, psychological, cultural, and scientific data. Any conclusions derived from taking the OTF are independent of the reasons given for proposing the test in the first place. So it’s not the fault of the outsider test if no organized religion can pass it; the OTF has not been shown to be unfair of faulty in any way.
Christians Still Have a Few Options at Their Disposal
One option for the Christian might be to make the argument, reminiscent of David Hume, who pointed out that he never sees one billiard ball “causing” another one to move just because they do so after making contact, that there is no direct causal relationship between the RDPT and the RDVT. Is it possible that despite the fact that religious faiths are separated neatly into distinct geographical locations on our planet, when and where people are born have little to do with what they believe? My answer is that this is possible, but it is an exceedingly small possibility. Do Christians really want to hang their faith on such a slender reed as this? I’ve shown from sociological, geographical, and psychological studies that what we believe is strongly influenced by “the accidents of history.” That’s all anyone can ask me to show. Any believer who argues for this is a prime example of what I mean when I say that Christians demand that I prove their faith is nearly impossible before they will consider it to be improbable.
Some Christians simply make a “universalist” argument; that everyone in the world will be saved in the end, and so religious diversity presents no serious problem. But such a view goes against the weight of several Bible passages, and it undermines both the need for people to accept the Christian faith and the need for evangelism to convince people to do so.27
William Lane Craig’s explanation for religious diversity might be used to circumvent the test since he claims that “it is possible that God has created a world having an optimal balance between saved and lost and that God has so providentially ordered the world that those who fail to hear the gospel and be saved would not have freely responded affirmatively to it even if they had heard it.”28 Craig argues that if this scenario is even possible, “it proves that it is entirely consistent to affirm that God is all-powerful and all-loving and yet that some people never hear the gospel and are lost.”29 However, there are many things that might be possible, and apologists like Craig seem to resort to that standard way too many times, in my opinion. This is another example of what I mean when I say Christians demand that I prove their faith is impossible before they will consider it improbable. The probability that not one of the billions of people who have never heard the gospel would respond if they did hear it can probably be calculated, if missionaries kept records of their efforts. To claim what he does against the overwhelming evidence of missionary efforts belies the facts. When we look at the billions of people who have never been given a chance to be “saved” because of “when and where they were born,” Craig’s scenario seems extremely implausible, to say the least, and depends not only upon God having foreknowledge of future free-willed contingent human actions, but also his knowing what the future would’ve been like if every single free choice had been different throughout history (something I dispute in chapter 16).30 No wonder Craig only wants to talk about what is possible. He argues that God has “Middle Knowledge” such that he knows “what every possible creature would do under any possible circumstances . . . prior to any determination of the divine will.”31 So, despite his protests to the contrary, isn’t it obvious that if Craig’s God has this kind of foreknowledge he could simply foreknow who would not accept his offered salvation before they were even created? He could then have avoided the trouble of creating them in the first place. If he had done that, “hotel hell” would never have had even one occupant.
Christians also try to offer other reasons why there is such a geographically situated religious diversity. They will argue that those who don’t accept their particular religion are ignorant of the truth (or willfully ignorant), unenlightened, or deceived by Satan. Or they’ll argue that God has unknown good reasons for permitting this state of affairs. Cultural factors are either downplayed or ignored, even though I have shown they play an overwhelming role in what a person believes. But the adherents of the various other religions all have their explanations for religious diversity too. And their explanations are similar in kind, if not exactly the same.
When religious believers actually do grapple with the cultural basis of religious faith, they will all respond in the same manner against what I have been arguing for here. Whether they are Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, Jew, or Christian, they will all argue that my demonstration of the overwhelming sociological fact that we believe based upon when and where we were born does not show their particular religious faith is false. William Lane Craig responds, just as most every defender of a different religion might do, when he asks, “Why could not the Christian worldview be objectively true? How does the mere presence of religious worldviews incompatible with Christianity show that distinctively Christian claims are not true? Logically, the existence of multiple, incompatible truth claims only implies that all of them cannot be (objectively) true; but it would be obviously fallacious to infer that not one of them is (objectively) true.”32 Craig is correct about this. But defenders of every other religion could argue the same exact thing, just by echoing Craig’s words in defense of their own particular religion. Then after making such a statement, other believers could proceed all over again to argue that they have the true faith, just like Craig does. Whether or not people accept these arguments will depend upon whether or not they are insiders to that particular faith in the first place. Is this not circular? The bottom line is that there is a huge difference between having the evidence of religious diversity separated into separate geographical locations on my side and trying to explain away the evidence, which is what Dr. Craig is forced to do. When Christians, or any other believers, have to explain away the evidence, they are admitting that the evidence is not on their side. They’re arguing that it’s merely possible their faith is true and can be known to be so rationally. Again, probability is what matters.
Skeptical agnosticism becomes the default position as a result of the initial presumption—a presumption that is justified by the religious diversity around the globe, the results of the sciences, and the fact that as human beings we’re not all that rational. I believe skepticism of all religious faiths leads us inexorably to nonbelief or atheism. Atheism, in the end, is a denial of all supernatural beings and forces. If nothing else, religious faiths are unnecessary hypotheses that can simply be ignored.
Christian Responses to the OTF So Far
There are other things to be said on behalf of the OTF, especially since believers continue to gerrymander around it by coming up with some really odd ways of denying what is obvious. To see some further objections and my responses to them you’ll need to read chapters 1 through 4 in The Christian Delusion (2010) and my introduction to The End of Christianity (2011). In a post on my blog titled “Debating Critics On The Outsider Test for Faith (OTF)” I link to some further online discussions and debates I’ve had about the OTF. Let me give you a sampling of the reactions from some Christian scholars. Norman Geisler and Mark M. Hanna both claim that the OTF is self-defeating. They do this despite my previous arguments to the contrary, just as if they didn’t even read what I wrote! Matthew Flannagan, Randal Rauser, and Thomas Talbott, following the lead of Victor Reppert, argue that if the OTF is a fair way to examine religious faiths then I should be skeptical of my own ethical/political beliefs using the same standard as the OTF. Thomas Talbott, following the lead of Victor Reppert, argues that if the OTF is a fair way to examine religious faiths then I should be skeptical of my belief that there is a material world. Matthew Flannagan and Randal Rauser go so far as to argue that if the OTF is a fair way to examine religious faiths then I should be skeptical of the results of empirical science. You can read my full responses at my blog, but for now it is sufficient to point out that these particular objections are all red herrings that lead us off the beaten path in our pursuit of the truth.
Let’s just respond to these objections this way: Either the OTF is a fair way to assess the truth of religious faiths or it is not. If it is not a fair test, per the above objections, then why do believers use it to examine the religious faiths of others? That they do is clearly evident. When believers criticize the faiths they reject, they use reason and science to do so. They assume these other religions have the burden of proof when it comes to their extraordinary claims of miracles. They assume that their holy book(s) are written by human not divine authors. They assume a human not a divine origin of their faiths. Believers do this when rejecting other faiths. So this dispenses with all of the red herrings about ethics, politics, science, and a material universe, for the OTF simply asks believers to do unto their own faith what they already do unto other faiths. All it asks of them is to be consistent. If there is any inconsistency at all, it is in how they assess truth claims. But if instead the OTF is a fair test after all, why do believers have a double standard, one for their own religious faith and a different standard for the religious faiths they reject? Let them use reason and science to examine their own faith. Let them assume their own faith has the burden of proof when it comes to their extraordinary claims of miracles. Let them assume human rather than divine authors of their holy book(s).
There is therefore something clearly wrong with these Christian objections to the OTF. Here’s what I think. The OTF is the name of an argument. The name I gave to this argument is not the argument itself. The word “outsider” in the argument is an example that illustrates something that describes someone who is a skeptic, a doubter, a nonbeliever. Such a person is an outsider because he or she is not an insider. An insider is a believer and an outsider is a nonbeliever. I think this is clear in my opening few paragraphs in this chapter. So one could just as easily substitute the word “skeptical” and call it the “Skeptical Test for Faith.” For that matter, it could just as well be called “The Scientific Test for Faith” or “The Consistent Test for Faith” or “The Golden Rule Test for Faith” or “The Objective Test for Faith” or “The Burden of Proof Test for Faith” or even simply “A Test for Faith.” That’s what is meant by the word “outsider.” But because of this misunderstanding, Christian defenders have constructed all kinds of wildly improbable outsider type scenarios. They think of an outsider as a person who has a radical skepticism. Hey, why not be an outsider to love, too, or life, they might add! Who has that kind of radical skepticism? Not me, that’s for sure. And I doubt very much anyone does. So they end up rejecting the OTF because they falsely attribute to it a radical skepticism and then use that as an excuse for not being skeptical at all, which is laughable to me (sorry but it is!) and one reason why I think Christianity is a delusion. It is surely not being fair to the OTF, that’s for sure.
If they wish to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, Christians cannot reject the OTF while continuing to use it. They must admit either that they have a double standard for examining religious faiths, one for their own faith and a different one for others, or that their God did not make their faith to pass the OTF in the first place. In either case all of these arguments against the OTF are based on red herrings, special pleading, begging the question, or denigrating science (which is typical of believers), and this reveals their ignorance despite their advanced degrees.
The bottom line is that given the facts that form the basis of the OTF doubt is the adult attitude. One cannot subject this doubt to further testing. It is what makes testing our ideas possible in the first place. Doubt is a filter that strains out the wheat of what’s true from the chaff of what’s false. By contrast all religions have the same faith-based foundation. When faith is the foundation anything can be believed. Science is the only antidote to an unexamined faith.
The OTF does not just apply to Christians. It applies to anyone with faith. I am pleased to note that Thomas Riskas utilizes the OTF quite heavily in his book, Deconstructing Mormonism: An Analysis and Assessment of the Mormon Faith. 33 I’d like to see more books like this written to critically examine other religious faiths just as I have done so with Christianity. Believers around the world should use it to see if what they have been led to believe has any merit. To believers who still demur let me ask them a few questions:
1) Do you agree that other religionists shoulder the burden of proof for their faith since they are making positive claims which requires a skeptical presumption? Do you examine Islam, Orthodox Judaism, Hinduism, Scientology, Mormonism, Shintoism, Jainism, Haitian Voodoo, the John Frum Cargo Cult, Satanism, or the many African or Chinese tribal religions with that in mind? If so, do you agree with the OTF that a fairer method is to assume your own faith shoulders that same burden of proof?
2) Do you agree that a consistent standard invoking fairness is the best way to objectively come to know the correct religious faith, if there is one?
3) Do you agree that if one particular religious faith is true then it should be judged by the sciences to exclude false religious faiths, such that science has the last word? If it doesn’t have the last word then what does?
4) Do you agree that if your faith is true then people born into different religious cultures as skeptical outsiders should be able to become insiders to your faith despite their initial skepticism—a skepticism against your faith that they were born into? If you agree, then do you also agree that the OTF is a fair test of faith after all?
5) If you still think you shouldn’t take the OTF, be honest, is it because you think your faith cannot withstand this test? If you reject the test for this reason, would you agree that your faith was not made by your God to pass it? If your God did not make your faith such that people who were born as outsiders in different cultures can reasonably come to believe then they will be condemned to hell by virtue of when and where they were born. Since this is the case, why wouldn’t God have done this?
6) Do you or do you not have a better method for reasonably settling which religious faith is true, if there is one? If so, what is it? What’s the alternative?
CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES
[THESE ENDNOTES NEED FIXING. I'LL TRY FIXING THEM LATER]
1. There are other things to be said on behalf of the OTF, especially since believers continue to gerrymander around it by coming up with some really odd ways of denying what is obvious. To see the objections and my responses to them, you’ll need to read chapters 1 through 4 in John W. Loftus, ed., The Christian Delusion (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010) and my introduction to John W. Loftus, ed. The End of Christianity (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011), although I cover most of that territory here. In a post on my blog Debunking Christianity (http://www.debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/) titled “Debating the Outsider Test for Faith (OTF),” I link to the online discussions and debates I’ve had about the OTF.
2. Norman L. Geisler and Ronald M. Brooks, Come, Let Us Reason: An Introduction to Logical Thinking (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Books, 1990).
3. Norman L. Geisler, “From Apologist to Atheist: A Critical Review,” Christian Apologetics Journal 6, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 105.
4. Alvin Plantinga, “In Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader, ed. James F. Sennett (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 206.
5. Victor Reppert, “Steve Lovell Comments on the Outsider Test for Faith,” Dangerous Idea, http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2010/06/steve-lovell-comments-on-outsider-test.html (accessed November 26, 2012).
6. Sam Harris, Free Will (New York: Free Press, 2012), p. 5. See also Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 2010).
7. Harris, Free Will, pp. 8–9.
8. David Eller “Is Religion Compatible with Science?” in The End of Christianity, ed. John W. Loftus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2011), pp. 257–78.
9. Geisler, “From Apologist to Atheist,” p. 105.
10. Valerie Tarico, “Christian Belief through the Lens of Cognitive Science,” in Loftus, Christian Delusion, pp. 47–64.
11. Jerry Coyne, Why Evolution Is True (New York: Viking, 2009), pp. 222–23. See also Richard Dawkins, The Greatest Show on Earth: The Evidence for Evolution (New York: Free Press, 2009).
12. John R. Shook, The God Debates: A 21st Century Guide for Atheists and Believers (and Everyone in Between) (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
13. Edward Babinski, “Things Christians Have Been Against,” Edward T. Babinski, http://edward-t-babinski.blogspot.com/2012/03/list-of-things-christians
-have-been.html (accessed November 26, 2012).
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