They have become more relational, more story-driven. Josh McDowell would go on college campuses and describe why to trust the Bible. And people would come to faith in droves. Then they stopped coming to faith in so many numbers, and he didn't know why. And now he takes a story approach. "You know," he says, "I was the son of the town drunk. This is how it affected my life and my relationship with [my dad]. This is what prompted me to seek spiritually. This is the evidence I found. This is how my life was changed. This is how I reconciled with my father." So it becomes a story.If he's right then deconversion (deprogramming) stories are useful in counter-apologetics too. In my book I tell my story. I tell how I came to faith, what experiences I had in the church, what experiences led me away from that faith, and why I personally decided there was no God. It's a complete story about my past Christian life, some parts of which are ugly. I also produce what some people describe as a massive refutation of Christianity in it, but it contains a story, my story.
That's what my ministry is about. I tell my story: I was an atheist. I scoffed. My wife became a Christian. It prompted me to investigate. Here's the evidence I found, how I received Christ, the difference it's made. It's a story. And I found that in postmodern America, people often are willing to engage on the level of story.
Link.
June 12, 2009
The Changing Face of Apologetics: I Agree with Lee Strobel
Well, it looks like I agree with Christian apologist Lee Strobel. If he's right then I got it right in my book. In an interview for the evangelical magazine Christianity Today, he was asked this question: How have evangelism and apologetics changed? Here is his answer:
June 11, 2009
Well-Researched, Judicious, and Enlightening: A Review of Robert Wright's "The Evolution of God."
I just wrote a review of this book to be found at Amazon.com. See what you think. If it's a helpful review, please let them know.
Making the inference to the supernatural
The apologist needs to show that if Jesus rose from the dead, he probably rose supernaturally (i.e. there was divine involvement). But how can he do this? He can only do this by showing that Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally. In other words,
P1. Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally. [I'm granting - for purposes of argument - that Jesus really did rise from the dead].
C. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
When we ask the apologist how he will attempt to establish (1), his defense will be to appeal to current science and our knowledge about the possibility of people coming back from the dead. In other words,
P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
This route seems more promising, and if we grant (P1), as most do, then only one question remains: Is the inference from (P1) to (C1) valid? It would be if the apologist can demonstrate the following:
Assumption ~A: there probably could not have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.
Why is (~A) needed in order for the inference from (P1) to (C1) to be valid? To see that (~A) is needed, consider:
Assumption A: there probably could have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.
If (A) were true, then clearly the inference from (P1) to (C1) would fail, and if there were no good reason to believe that (~A) were true, the inference would also fail. Hence the apologist is forced to argue that (~A) is true, which I do not think he can do. Thus we finally come to:
P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally, and ~A.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
Now we see the problem: there's no good reason to accept (P1) because there's no good reason to believe (~A).
P1. Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally. [I'm granting - for purposes of argument - that Jesus really did rise from the dead].
C. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
When we ask the apologist how he will attempt to establish (1), his defense will be to appeal to current science and our knowledge about the possibility of people coming back from the dead. In other words,
P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
This route seems more promising, and if we grant (P1), as most do, then only one question remains: Is the inference from (P1) to (C1) valid? It would be if the apologist can demonstrate the following:
Assumption ~A: there probably could not have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.
Why is (~A) needed in order for the inference from (P1) to (C1) to be valid? To see that (~A) is needed, consider:
Assumption A: there probably could have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.
If (A) were true, then clearly the inference from (P1) to (C1) would fail, and if there were no good reason to believe that (~A) were true, the inference would also fail. Hence the apologist is forced to argue that (~A) is true, which I do not think he can do. Thus we finally come to:
P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally, and ~A.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.
Now we see the problem: there's no good reason to accept (P1) because there's no good reason to believe (~A).
My First "Flea"
Richard Dawkins labels any book written against his book as a "flea." I now have one too! Fred DeRuvo's book, The Anti-Supernatural Bias Of Ex-Christians: And Other Important Topics
, deals with mine in the 5th-7th chapters. Check out the back cover. Fred sent me a copy and I've read it. There is nothing there that seriously engages my arguments even though he tried to be fair with them. Of my book he says: "It is a fairly well written and certainly a thoughtful and insightful treatise..." (p. 60). He also admits: "John does not seem to be purposefully unfair in his assessment of Christianity, or of the Bible and or of God." (p. 84) Fred has a Masters in Biblical Studies from Tyndale Theological Seminary.
I know of at least one more flea coming.
, deals with mine in the 5th-7th chapters. Check out the back cover. Fred sent me a copy and I've read it. There is nothing there that seriously engages my arguments even though he tried to be fair with them. Of my book he says: "It is a fairly well written and certainly a thoughtful and insightful treatise..." (p. 60). He also admits: "John does not seem to be purposefully unfair in his assessment of Christianity, or of the Bible and or of God." (p. 84) Fred has a Masters in Biblical Studies from Tyndale Theological Seminary. I know of at least one more flea coming.
June 10, 2009
“Birds of a Feather, Flock Together!”
Asheville Priest Charged With Obstruction In Child Sex Case - Resigned Tuesday
A Western North Carolina Catholic priest has been charged with Obstruction Of Justice.
The Rev. John Schneider was arrested Monday and has since bailed out of jail.
This, after police say he deleted pornographic images off the home computer of his church’s music minister.
That man, Paul Lawrence Berrell, was under investigation and later arrested, last month, on multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor—statutory rape—and indecent liberties with a child.
He is currently being held at the Buncombe County Detention Center under a $1.5 million bond.
Rev. Schneider was pastor of St. Eugene Catholic Church since 2005. His bond was set at 10-thousand dollars.
The Diocese of Charlotte tells us he has resigned his position. A replacement will soon be assigned.
Video Here
A Western North Carolina Catholic priest has been charged with Obstruction Of Justice.
The Rev. John Schneider was arrested Monday and has since bailed out of jail.
This, after police say he deleted pornographic images off the home computer of his church’s music minister.
That man, Paul Lawrence Berrell, was under investigation and later arrested, last month, on multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor—statutory rape—and indecent liberties with a child.
He is currently being held at the Buncombe County Detention Center under a $1.5 million bond.
Rev. Schneider was pastor of St. Eugene Catholic Church since 2005. His bond was set at 10-thousand dollars.
The Diocese of Charlotte tells us he has resigned his position. A replacement will soon be assigned.
Video Here
Christian Belief Through the Lens of Cognitive Science: Part 3 of 6
I Know Because I Know
On a warm afternoon in June, two men have appointments with a psychiatrist. The first has been dragged to the office by his wife, much to his irritation. He is a biologist who suffers from schizophrenia, and the wife insists that his meds are not working. “No,” says the biologist, “I’m actually fine. It’s just that because of what I’m working on right now the CIA has been bugging my calls and reading my email.” Despite his wife’s skepticism and his understanding of his own illness, he insists calmly that he is sure, and he lines up evidence to support his claim. The other man has come on his own because he is feeling exhausted and desperate. He shows the psychiatrist his hands, which are raw to the point of bleeding. No matter how many times he washes them (up to a hundred in a day) or what he uses (soap, alcohol, bleach or scouring pads) he never feels confident that they are clean.
In both of these cases, after brain biochemistry is rebalanced, the patient’s sense of certainty falls back in line with the evidence. The first man becomes less sure about the CIA thing and gradually loses interest in the idea. The second man begins feeling confident that his hands are clean after a normal round of soap and water, and the cracks begin healing.
How do we know what is real? How do we know what we know? We don’t, entirely. Research on psychiatric disorders and brain injuries shows that humans have a feeling or sense of knowing that can get activated by reason and evidence but can get activated in other ways as well. Conversely, when certain brain malfunctions occur, it may be impossible to experience a sense of knowing no matter how much evidence piles up. V. S. Ramachandran describes a brain injured patient who sees his mother and says, “This looks like my mother in every way, but she is an imposter.” The connection between his visual cortex and his limbic system has been severed, and even though he sees his mother perfectly well, he has no sense of rightness or knowing so he offers the only explanation he can find (Capgras Delusion).
Neurologist Robert Burton explains it this way: “Despite how certainty feels, it is neither a conscious choice nor even a thought process. Certainty and similar states of knowing what we know arise out of involuntary brain mechanisms that, like love or anger, function independently of reason.” (On Being Certain, xi) This “knowing what we know” mechanism is good enough for getting around in the world, but not perfect. For the most part, it lets us explain, predict, and influence people or objects or events, and we use that knowledge to advantage. But as the above scenarios show, our ability to tell what is real also can get thrown off.
Burton says that the “feeling of knowing” (rightness, correctness, certainty, conviction) should be thought of as one of our primary emotions, like anger, pleasure, or fear. Like these other feelings, it can be triggered by a seizure or a drug or direct electrical stimulation of the brain. Research after the Korean War (e.g. R Lifton) suggested that the feeling of knowing or not knowing also can be produced by what are called brainwashing techniques: repetition, sleep deprivation, and social/emotional manipulation. Once triggered for any reason, the feeling that something is right or real can be incredibly powerful--so powerful that when it goes head to head with logic or evidence the feeling wins. Our brains make up reasons to justify our feeling of knowing, rather than following logic to its logical conclusion.
For many reasons, religious beliefs are usually undergirded by a strong “feeling of knowing.” Set aside for the moment the question of whether those beliefs tap underlying realities. Conversion experiences can be intense, hypnotic, and transformative. Worship practices, music and religious architecture have been optimized over time to evoke right brain sensations of transcendence and euphoria. Social insularity protects a community consensus. Repetition of ideas reinforces a sense of conviction or certainty. Religious systems like Christianity that emphasize right belief have built in safeguards against contrary evidence, doubt, and the assertions of other religions. Many a freethinker has sparred a smart, educated fundamentalist into a corner only to have the believer utter some form of “I just know.”
Does this mean that rational argumentation about religion is useless? The answer may be disappointing. Religious belief is not bound to regular standards of evidence and logic. It is not about logic and it is not obliged to follow logic. Arguments with believers start from a false premise—that the believer is bound by the rules of debate rather than being bound by the belief itself. The freethinker assumes that the believer is free to concede; but this is rarely true. At best the bits of logic or evidence put forth in an argument go into the hopper with a whole host of other factors. And yet each of us who is a former believer (we number in the millions) reached some point in our lives when we simply couldn’t sustain our old certainties. Our sense of knowing either eroded over time or abruptly disappeared. So sometimes those hoppers do fill up.
Given what I’ve said about knowing, how can anybody claim to know anything?
We can’t, with certainty. Those of us who are not religious could do with a little more humility on this point. We all see “through a glass darkly” and there is a realm in which all any of us can do is to make our own best guesses about what is real and important. This doesn’t imply that all ideas are created equal, or that our traditional understanding of “knowledge” is useless. As I said before, our sense of knowing allows us to navigate this world pretty well—to detect regularities, anticipate events and make things happen. In the concrete domain of everyday life, acting on what we think we know works pretty well for us. Nonetheless, it is a healthy mistrust for our sense of knowing that has allowed scientists to detect, predict, and produce desired outcomes with ever greater precision.
The scientific method has been called “institutionalized doubt” because it forces us to question our assumptions. Scientists stake their hopes not on a specific set of answers but on a specific way of asking questions. Core to this process is “falsification” – narrowing down what might be true by ruling out what can’t be true. And to date, that approach has had enormous pay-offs. It is what has made the difference between the nature of human life in the Middle Ages and the 21st Century. But knowledge in science is provisional; at any given point in time, the sum of scientific knowledge is really just a progress report.
When we overstate our ability to know, we play into the fundamentalist fallacy that certainty is possible. Burton calls this “the all-knowing rational mind myth.” As scientists learn more about how our brains work, certitude is coming to be seen as a vice rather than a virtue. Certainty is a confession of ignorance about our ability to be passionately mistaken. Humans will always argue passionately about things that we do not know and cannot know, but with a little more self-knowledge and humility we may get to the point that those arguments are less often lethal.
Essentials: Robert A. Burton, On Being Certain
V. S. Ramachandran (TED talk), A Journey to the Center of Your Mind
If you don’t want to miss any of this series, subscribe to Valerie Tarico at this blog or send email to valerietarico at hotmail.com and request to be added to her mailing list for weekly articles.
On a warm afternoon in June, two men have appointments with a psychiatrist. The first has been dragged to the office by his wife, much to his irritation. He is a biologist who suffers from schizophrenia, and the wife insists that his meds are not working. “No,” says the biologist, “I’m actually fine. It’s just that because of what I’m working on right now the CIA has been bugging my calls and reading my email.” Despite his wife’s skepticism and his understanding of his own illness, he insists calmly that he is sure, and he lines up evidence to support his claim. The other man has come on his own because he is feeling exhausted and desperate. He shows the psychiatrist his hands, which are raw to the point of bleeding. No matter how many times he washes them (up to a hundred in a day) or what he uses (soap, alcohol, bleach or scouring pads) he never feels confident that they are clean.
In both of these cases, after brain biochemistry is rebalanced, the patient’s sense of certainty falls back in line with the evidence. The first man becomes less sure about the CIA thing and gradually loses interest in the idea. The second man begins feeling confident that his hands are clean after a normal round of soap and water, and the cracks begin healing.
How do we know what is real? How do we know what we know? We don’t, entirely. Research on psychiatric disorders and brain injuries shows that humans have a feeling or sense of knowing that can get activated by reason and evidence but can get activated in other ways as well. Conversely, when certain brain malfunctions occur, it may be impossible to experience a sense of knowing no matter how much evidence piles up. V. S. Ramachandran describes a brain injured patient who sees his mother and says, “This looks like my mother in every way, but she is an imposter.” The connection between his visual cortex and his limbic system has been severed, and even though he sees his mother perfectly well, he has no sense of rightness or knowing so he offers the only explanation he can find (Capgras Delusion).
Neurologist Robert Burton explains it this way: “Despite how certainty feels, it is neither a conscious choice nor even a thought process. Certainty and similar states of knowing what we know arise out of involuntary brain mechanisms that, like love or anger, function independently of reason.” (On Being Certain, xi) This “knowing what we know” mechanism is good enough for getting around in the world, but not perfect. For the most part, it lets us explain, predict, and influence people or objects or events, and we use that knowledge to advantage. But as the above scenarios show, our ability to tell what is real also can get thrown off.
Burton says that the “feeling of knowing” (rightness, correctness, certainty, conviction) should be thought of as one of our primary emotions, like anger, pleasure, or fear. Like these other feelings, it can be triggered by a seizure or a drug or direct electrical stimulation of the brain. Research after the Korean War (e.g. R Lifton) suggested that the feeling of knowing or not knowing also can be produced by what are called brainwashing techniques: repetition, sleep deprivation, and social/emotional manipulation. Once triggered for any reason, the feeling that something is right or real can be incredibly powerful--so powerful that when it goes head to head with logic or evidence the feeling wins. Our brains make up reasons to justify our feeling of knowing, rather than following logic to its logical conclusion.
For many reasons, religious beliefs are usually undergirded by a strong “feeling of knowing.” Set aside for the moment the question of whether those beliefs tap underlying realities. Conversion experiences can be intense, hypnotic, and transformative. Worship practices, music and religious architecture have been optimized over time to evoke right brain sensations of transcendence and euphoria. Social insularity protects a community consensus. Repetition of ideas reinforces a sense of conviction or certainty. Religious systems like Christianity that emphasize right belief have built in safeguards against contrary evidence, doubt, and the assertions of other religions. Many a freethinker has sparred a smart, educated fundamentalist into a corner only to have the believer utter some form of “I just know.”
Does this mean that rational argumentation about religion is useless? The answer may be disappointing. Religious belief is not bound to regular standards of evidence and logic. It is not about logic and it is not obliged to follow logic. Arguments with believers start from a false premise—that the believer is bound by the rules of debate rather than being bound by the belief itself. The freethinker assumes that the believer is free to concede; but this is rarely true. At best the bits of logic or evidence put forth in an argument go into the hopper with a whole host of other factors. And yet each of us who is a former believer (we number in the millions) reached some point in our lives when we simply couldn’t sustain our old certainties. Our sense of knowing either eroded over time or abruptly disappeared. So sometimes those hoppers do fill up.
Given what I’ve said about knowing, how can anybody claim to know anything?
We can’t, with certainty. Those of us who are not religious could do with a little more humility on this point. We all see “through a glass darkly” and there is a realm in which all any of us can do is to make our own best guesses about what is real and important. This doesn’t imply that all ideas are created equal, or that our traditional understanding of “knowledge” is useless. As I said before, our sense of knowing allows us to navigate this world pretty well—to detect regularities, anticipate events and make things happen. In the concrete domain of everyday life, acting on what we think we know works pretty well for us. Nonetheless, it is a healthy mistrust for our sense of knowing that has allowed scientists to detect, predict, and produce desired outcomes with ever greater precision.
The scientific method has been called “institutionalized doubt” because it forces us to question our assumptions. Scientists stake their hopes not on a specific set of answers but on a specific way of asking questions. Core to this process is “falsification” – narrowing down what might be true by ruling out what can’t be true. And to date, that approach has had enormous pay-offs. It is what has made the difference between the nature of human life in the Middle Ages and the 21st Century. But knowledge in science is provisional; at any given point in time, the sum of scientific knowledge is really just a progress report.
When we overstate our ability to know, we play into the fundamentalist fallacy that certainty is possible. Burton calls this “the all-knowing rational mind myth.” As scientists learn more about how our brains work, certitude is coming to be seen as a vice rather than a virtue. Certainty is a confession of ignorance about our ability to be passionately mistaken. Humans will always argue passionately about things that we do not know and cannot know, but with a little more self-knowledge and humility we may get to the point that those arguments are less often lethal.
Essentials: Robert A. Burton, On Being Certain
V. S. Ramachandran (TED talk), A Journey to the Center of Your Mind
If you don’t want to miss any of this series, subscribe to Valerie Tarico at this blog or send email to valerietarico at hotmail.com and request to be added to her mailing list for weekly articles.
MSBH vs. DBH
1. If H1 and H2 can potentially explain all the observed physical events they are intended to explain, and H1 is not initially less probable than H2, then, if H1 makes far less causal assumptions than H2, H1 is preferable to H2.
2. MSBH and DBH can potentially explain all the observed physical events they are intended to explain (e.g. resurrection, postmortem appearances, etc), and MSBH is not initially less probable than DBH.
3. MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the observed physical events.
4. Therefore, MSBH is preferable to DBH.
MSBH = Jesus was a merely superpowerful being who rose from the dead.
DBH = Jesus was a divine being who rose from the dead.
In this post I will only attempt to defend (3). Why do I say MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the physical events intended to be explained? Consider what William Lane Craig says about the resurrection event:
"Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated returns only to this early life and will die again."
In contrast,
"Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. In this new mode of existence he was not bound by the physical limitations of this existence, but possessed superhuman powers." (Knowing the Truth About the Resurrection, p 15)
Clearly, then, DBH ascribes far more - infinitely more - causal powers to Jesus than MSBH, and therefore MSBH is the simpler of the two.
*Edit*
DBH makes far more causal assumptions primarily because of the following: according to this theory, after Jesus rose from the dead, he was: (a) no longer able to die; (b) no longer able to get injured; (c) no longer able to get sick; (d) no longer able to age; and (e) able to teleport without regard to spatial distances. These assumptions are unnecessary in order to account for the physical facts; and therefore, since MSBH does not ascribe these (infinite) properties to Jesus, it is far simpler.
2. MSBH and DBH can potentially explain all the observed physical events they are intended to explain (e.g. resurrection, postmortem appearances, etc), and MSBH is not initially less probable than DBH.
3. MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the observed physical events.
4. Therefore, MSBH is preferable to DBH.
MSBH = Jesus was a merely superpowerful being who rose from the dead.
DBH = Jesus was a divine being who rose from the dead.
In this post I will only attempt to defend (3). Why do I say MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the physical events intended to be explained? Consider what William Lane Craig says about the resurrection event:
"Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated returns only to this early life and will die again."
In contrast,
"Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. In this new mode of existence he was not bound by the physical limitations of this existence, but possessed superhuman powers." (Knowing the Truth About the Resurrection, p 15)
Clearly, then, DBH ascribes far more - infinitely more - causal powers to Jesus than MSBH, and therefore MSBH is the simpler of the two.
*Edit*
DBH makes far more causal assumptions primarily because of the following: according to this theory, after Jesus rose from the dead, he was: (a) no longer able to die; (b) no longer able to get injured; (c) no longer able to get sick; (d) no longer able to age; and (e) able to teleport without regard to spatial distances. These assumptions are unnecessary in order to account for the physical facts; and therefore, since MSBH does not ascribe these (infinite) properties to Jesus, it is far simpler.
June 09, 2009
Resurrection Debate: A New Approach
John W. Loftus has generously extended his invitation to me to become a member of this blog, and for that I am grateful. In the upcoming months I hope to contribute regularly on topics related to Christianity and its weaknesses, as well as the continuing debate between its prominent defenders and their critics. For those curious about my religious background, here is a little info:
I was not raised in a Christian home or religious environment, but nevertheless found my way into a Christian church, through a friend, prior to entering high school. It was in that church my friend attended that I became a Christian, and remained so until the end of my high school career, right before I left for college. Like many others, the doctrine of hell did not sit comfortably with me -- both on an intuitive and intellectual level -- and was thus the main reason for my departure from the Christian faith. Since then, after completing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy (I stopped at the MA level), I found many other compelling reasons which justified my abandonment of Christianity, which I hope to share and elaborate here.
In this entry, I will outline a new approach skeptics can and should take in the resurrection debate. As almost everyone agrees, skeptics and apologists alike, the ability for the apologist to establish a good case for the resurrection is vital to a successful defense of the Christian faith, and so, unsurprisingly, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent devoted to this one area. A testament to the latter is the fact that anyone new (or old) to the scene will often observe the following: the debate can get really really complicated, especially among scholars. Why? A natural reason one might draw from this is that the case for the resurrection is not as terrible as one might think -- after all, if even the scholarly critics have to present elaborate and sophisticated arguments to answer their opponents, then the apologist's case can't be that bad. In actuality, the case for the resurrection can be very weak, despite the sophisticated nature of the debate, but it sure doesn't seem that way to those lost in the minutia of the historical details. I admit to being among the perplexed.
Hence I advocate a new approach to the debate, one that will cut through all the smoke and thus expose how weak the case for the resurrection truly is. To begin, one should pay close attention to the claim that the apologist wants -- needs -- to establish when he argues for the resurrection: it is the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead. And thus from this we can observe what the claim is not: it is not, merely, that Jesus was raised from the dead, which is obviously insufficient if the causal agent responsible for the resuscitation were not supernatural, but natural. The apologist undoubtedly needs to first establish the latter assertion in order to establish the former, but the two are clearly not equivalent -- in fact, the two are worlds apart. Here we come to my new approach: we should challenge the apologist to see if he can demonstrate (with probability, of course) that, if Jesus was really raised from the dead, it was God who did it. For, even if it were a historical fact that Jesus was raised from the dead, if it cannot be shown that God was the cause of the event, then what is the worth of historical apologetics to the rational defense of Christianity? None.
Below are arguments detailing why the inference from "Jesus was raised from the dead" to "it was probably God who raised Jesus from the dead" cannot be made nonfallaciously.
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally. [premise, supported by C1 and c2 below]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally.
[premise, supported by the claim that Jesus may not have been not fully biologically human if we assume the virgin birth story]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
Edit: I realize premise (1) needs some explaining.
Consider Mike, a body-builder builder who works out 15 hours a day, and suppose one claims: Mike probably can't bench press 500 lbs, and this is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench press 500 lbs. This inference is clearly fallacious, but why? According to condition (b) of premise (1), the inference is fallacious not only because Mike and the other body-builders don't belong in the same category, but also because we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to 500 lbs, Mike is just like everyone else. If we had good reason for assuming that Mike was just like all the other body-builders (say, for instance, he has a muscular disorder which makes his 15 hours equivalent to a normal 2 hour work-out), then the inference would be nonfallacious. Hence: if X does not fall within the category of Z, the burden falls on the one making the inference to supply good reason for why we should assume the absence of any relevant difference between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
To illustrate with another example, consider Dejohn the daily steroid-taker who works out less than 2 hours a day. Claim: Dejohn *probably* can't bench 500 lbs. Premise (data): All body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs. Is this inference fallacious? Suppose we know that all the body-builders in our data don't take steroids, and Dejohn has been taking them for the past 8 years on a daily basis (let's assume they don't cause him any harm). Hence, even though Dejohn and everyone else works out the same amount of hours, there is a clear (possibly relevant) difference between the two that justifies an initial category distinction: we can separate Dejohn and the other body-builders -- since none of them take the drug -- into two classes (steroid taker vs. non-steroid takers). If we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to bench 500 lbs, Dejohn and everyone else are the same, then we must conclude that the inference is fallacious. Stated another way, given the justified category distinction, the inference is fallacious unless the one making the inference can supply good reason to suppose the distinction to be irrelevant -- like if we knew, for instance, that the steroids Dejohn takes only affects his lower legs and not his chest or upper body.
Condition (a) of premise (1) can be shown with the following illustration. Suppose one claims: Jane probably can't put her bare hand over a hot flame for 10 minutes without it be severely burned. Premise (data): over 100 million people can't put their bare hands over a hot flame for 10 minutes without their hands being severely burned. Is the inference fallacious? Not at all, until we find out the following fact: for over 10 years of her life, Jane has been a subject in numerous super-secret government experiments involving resistance to pyrogenic substances. Does this mean there are in fact relevant differences between Jane and everyone else (assuming those in the latter group were never involved in such experiments)? Not at all, because for all we know, those experiments might have been utter failures, or their scope very limited, and so forth. Nevertheless, because we are in the dark, and because there is some plausible reason to suppose there *might* indeed be relevant differences between Jane and everyone else, as a result of those experiments, the original inference would therefore be fallacious given this new information.
Argument 2: defense of premise (4)
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O. [premise]
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)
Argument 3: defense of premise (4)
p1. If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.
p2. Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. [let's suppose]
p3. There are no very good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
c1. Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from p3, p2, and p1)
p4. If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise supernaturally from the dead.
p5. Either (a) or (b). (from p4, c1)
p6. If there are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.
p7. There are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false.
c2. Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p7, p6)
I was not raised in a Christian home or religious environment, but nevertheless found my way into a Christian church, through a friend, prior to entering high school. It was in that church my friend attended that I became a Christian, and remained so until the end of my high school career, right before I left for college. Like many others, the doctrine of hell did not sit comfortably with me -- both on an intuitive and intellectual level -- and was thus the main reason for my departure from the Christian faith. Since then, after completing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy (I stopped at the MA level), I found many other compelling reasons which justified my abandonment of Christianity, which I hope to share and elaborate here.
In this entry, I will outline a new approach skeptics can and should take in the resurrection debate. As almost everyone agrees, skeptics and apologists alike, the ability for the apologist to establish a good case for the resurrection is vital to a successful defense of the Christian faith, and so, unsurprisingly, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent devoted to this one area. A testament to the latter is the fact that anyone new (or old) to the scene will often observe the following: the debate can get really really complicated, especially among scholars. Why? A natural reason one might draw from this is that the case for the resurrection is not as terrible as one might think -- after all, if even the scholarly critics have to present elaborate and sophisticated arguments to answer their opponents, then the apologist's case can't be that bad. In actuality, the case for the resurrection can be very weak, despite the sophisticated nature of the debate, but it sure doesn't seem that way to those lost in the minutia of the historical details. I admit to being among the perplexed.
Hence I advocate a new approach to the debate, one that will cut through all the smoke and thus expose how weak the case for the resurrection truly is. To begin, one should pay close attention to the claim that the apologist wants -- needs -- to establish when he argues for the resurrection: it is the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead. And thus from this we can observe what the claim is not: it is not, merely, that Jesus was raised from the dead, which is obviously insufficient if the causal agent responsible for the resuscitation were not supernatural, but natural. The apologist undoubtedly needs to first establish the latter assertion in order to establish the former, but the two are clearly not equivalent -- in fact, the two are worlds apart. Here we come to my new approach: we should challenge the apologist to see if he can demonstrate (with probability, of course) that, if Jesus was really raised from the dead, it was God who did it. For, even if it were a historical fact that Jesus was raised from the dead, if it cannot be shown that God was the cause of the event, then what is the worth of historical apologetics to the rational defense of Christianity? None.
Below are arguments detailing why the inference from "Jesus was raised from the dead" to "it was probably God who raised Jesus from the dead" cannot be made nonfallaciously.
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally. [premise, supported by C1 and c2 below]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally.
[premise, supported by the claim that Jesus may not have been not fully biologically human if we assume the virgin birth story]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).
Edit: I realize premise (1) needs some explaining.
Consider Mike, a body-builder builder who works out 15 hours a day, and suppose one claims: Mike probably can't bench press 500 lbs, and this is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench press 500 lbs. This inference is clearly fallacious, but why? According to condition (b) of premise (1), the inference is fallacious not only because Mike and the other body-builders don't belong in the same category, but also because we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to 500 lbs, Mike is just like everyone else. If we had good reason for assuming that Mike was just like all the other body-builders (say, for instance, he has a muscular disorder which makes his 15 hours equivalent to a normal 2 hour work-out), then the inference would be nonfallacious. Hence: if X does not fall within the category of Z, the burden falls on the one making the inference to supply good reason for why we should assume the absence of any relevant difference between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
To illustrate with another example, consider Dejohn the daily steroid-taker who works out less than 2 hours a day. Claim: Dejohn *probably* can't bench 500 lbs. Premise (data): All body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs. Is this inference fallacious? Suppose we know that all the body-builders in our data don't take steroids, and Dejohn has been taking them for the past 8 years on a daily basis (let's assume they don't cause him any harm). Hence, even though Dejohn and everyone else works out the same amount of hours, there is a clear (possibly relevant) difference between the two that justifies an initial category distinction: we can separate Dejohn and the other body-builders -- since none of them take the drug -- into two classes (steroid taker vs. non-steroid takers). If we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to bench 500 lbs, Dejohn and everyone else are the same, then we must conclude that the inference is fallacious. Stated another way, given the justified category distinction, the inference is fallacious unless the one making the inference can supply good reason to suppose the distinction to be irrelevant -- like if we knew, for instance, that the steroids Dejohn takes only affects his lower legs and not his chest or upper body.
Condition (a) of premise (1) can be shown with the following illustration. Suppose one claims: Jane probably can't put her bare hand over a hot flame for 10 minutes without it be severely burned. Premise (data): over 100 million people can't put their bare hands over a hot flame for 10 minutes without their hands being severely burned. Is the inference fallacious? Not at all, until we find out the following fact: for over 10 years of her life, Jane has been a subject in numerous super-secret government experiments involving resistance to pyrogenic substances. Does this mean there are in fact relevant differences between Jane and everyone else (assuming those in the latter group were never involved in such experiments)? Not at all, because for all we know, those experiments might have been utter failures, or their scope very limited, and so forth. Nevertheless, because we are in the dark, and because there is some plausible reason to suppose there *might* indeed be relevant differences between Jane and everyone else, as a result of those experiments, the original inference would therefore be fallacious given this new information.
Argument 2: defense of premise (4)
P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O. [premise]
P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]
P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]
C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)
Argument 3: defense of premise (4)
p1. If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.
p2. Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. [let's suppose]
p3. There are no very good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.
c1. Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from p3, p2, and p1)
p4. If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise supernaturally from the dead.
p5. Either (a) or (b). (from p4, c1)
p6. If there are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.
p7. There are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false.
c2. Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p7, p6)
My Comment on the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology
As of this posting it has received 0 out of 11 votes, my worst record ever. What do you think?
June 08, 2009
Welcome To the New Face of Christianity
Philip Jenkins, professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University, has argued that the Christianity of the future will be the one found in the Southern Hemisphere and Asia, since it's growing phenomenally in these places. In his newest book The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South
, he shows us that Christianity is largely defined by that which it opposes. In the Northern Hemisphere Christianity opposes secularism and has developed responses to it by adopting liberalism. But in the Southern Hemisphere it opposes shamans, witch doctors, and animists--those who already believe in demonic forces. This video series below shows us how some evangelical Christians act on their beliefs. Welcome to the new face of Christianity folks! We're returning to the witch trials of the late Middle Ages, this time by evangelicals who believe the Bible, not Catholics. Doesn't it just warm your hearts?
There are seven parts to this video series all found by following the links in the sidebar at You Tube. Enjoy the first part below:
Related posts can be found by clicking here.
, he shows us that Christianity is largely defined by that which it opposes. In the Northern Hemisphere Christianity opposes secularism and has developed responses to it by adopting liberalism. But in the Southern Hemisphere it opposes shamans, witch doctors, and animists--those who already believe in demonic forces. This video series below shows us how some evangelical Christians act on their beliefs. Welcome to the new face of Christianity folks! We're returning to the witch trials of the late Middle Ages, this time by evangelicals who believe the Bible, not Catholics. Doesn't it just warm your hearts?There are seven parts to this video series all found by following the links in the sidebar at You Tube. Enjoy the first part below:
Related posts can be found by clicking here.
Hell: 20,000 Degrees Fahrenheit And Not A Drop of Water!
Back in 1974,while I was a licensed Southern Baptist Preacher and College Bible Major, the movie The Burning Hell was then being shown at many Bible Believing Churches throughout the Southeast. I was able to attend one such showing at a Pentecostal church in Seneca, SC.
While this video looks cheaply made by today’s high tech cinematography standareds, its affects were on par with such horror flicks of the era as The Night of the Living Dead and The Texas Chain Saw Massacre.
Many Christians who saw it were said to have had nightmares of Hell.
This film looks dumb today, but it’s horrors of the mid-seventies was claimed to have saved many over the reality of an eternal torment in Satan’s Hell.
If you can stomach it, all 8 section are here on Youtube.
Sleep well sinner!
While this video looks cheaply made by today’s high tech cinematography standareds, its affects were on par with such horror flicks of the era as The Night of the Living Dead and The Texas Chain Saw Massacre.
Many Christians who saw it were said to have had nightmares of Hell.
This film looks dumb today, but it’s horrors of the mid-seventies was claimed to have saved many over the reality of an eternal torment in Satan’s Hell.
If you can stomach it, all 8 section are here on Youtube.
Sleep well sinner!
On Cultural Relativism and Rape
Christian philosopher Victor Reppert offered up an argument against condemning rape if cultural relativism is the case. He wrote:
Let's say morals evolve in the same way as species do. Grant me that, okay?
Then I don't see a problem. The caveman who clubbed a woman and drug her into his cave did nothing wrong just as a chimpanzee who exhibits homosexual activity, or a dominant lion who demands sex with all of the females, or a cat who shows no mercy to a mouse.
We humans adopt codes of conduct in order to have the benefits that our higher species need, like friendship, family ties, and so on. That best explains why our moral codes are similar around the world on the major, basic issues, and why they are diverse on the moderate, lesser issues.
So, in a caveman culture rape is considered right. But in ours it is not. Our culture is different. Is it better? I would argue so, at least from our evolutionary standpoint. It's because we have continued to evolve. Because we do our morals have evolved in tandum.
Besides, it's not relativists who argue for rape, anyway, it's religious people, like what we find in Muslim and Old Testament texts.
I had a teacher at Arizona State who told me that in one culture rape is considered perfectly OK, so long as you do it at the right time. In the morning, it's forbidden. In the afternoon, it is frowned upon. At night, it is perfectly OK, since a woman who is away from the protection of her husband is asking for it. (He never said which campus fraternity he was referring to).This is my brief response:
If cultural relativism is true, the rules of that culture, with respect to rape, are justified. There is no "court of appeal" that is over and above that culture and out culture that would permit us to say that their views on rape are wrong and ours are right. For us to suggest that they are "really" wrong in permitting rape is to elevate the rules of our culture to a kind of cosmic status they cannot have. It is to be intolerant.
Let's say morals evolve in the same way as species do. Grant me that, okay?
Then I don't see a problem. The caveman who clubbed a woman and drug her into his cave did nothing wrong just as a chimpanzee who exhibits homosexual activity, or a dominant lion who demands sex with all of the females, or a cat who shows no mercy to a mouse.
We humans adopt codes of conduct in order to have the benefits that our higher species need, like friendship, family ties, and so on. That best explains why our moral codes are similar around the world on the major, basic issues, and why they are diverse on the moderate, lesser issues.
So, in a caveman culture rape is considered right. But in ours it is not. Our culture is different. Is it better? I would argue so, at least from our evolutionary standpoint. It's because we have continued to evolve. Because we do our morals have evolved in tandum.
Besides, it's not relativists who argue for rape, anyway, it's religious people, like what we find in Muslim and Old Testament texts.
June 07, 2009
I Highly Recommend The New Book by Christian Scholar Kenton Sparks.
Christians do not trust the scholarship of atheists. They think we have an agenda and that we misrepresent the facts because we’re God haters. Okay, I guess. But Christian scholars are saying many of the same things we're saying while trying to maintain their faith. If you doubt what we say then try your hand at what your own scholars are saying.
Dr. Richard Knopp (pictured left) is using my book in his Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion classes at Lincoln Christian College and Seminary. He’s also attempting to answer my criticisms by requiring his students to read and evaluate Kenton L. Sparks book, God's Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship.
I’m reading Sparks’s book right now and it’s excellent. Sparks is a Christian scholar who affirms inerrancy. If someone is concerned about his commitment to Christianity or whether he has some God hating agenda, Sparks has no such agenda.
I like how his argument progresses. He begins with Galileo in which Christians learned to re-read the Bible in light of the heliocentric universe. He argued that it wouldn’t do any good to ignore what was learned through science so Christian scholars began looking at the Bible differently. Sparks wrote: “Just as Galileo invited us to turn a critical eye toward the cosmos, so modern biblical scholars bid us to reflect critically upon our assumptions about the nature of Scripture and about how it should be read.” (p. 18) If Christians ignored the findings of Galileo it would discredit their faith. From this Sparks says there is a parallel tragic paradox, in that “the church’s wholesale rejection of historical criticism has begotten the irreverent use of Scripture by skeptics, thus destroying the faith of some believers while keeping unbelievers away from the faith.” (p. 21). His purpose in this book is to render the results of higher biblical criticism “theologically safe” just as Christian scholars did by admitting the results of modern science beginning with Galileo. (p. 23).
Sparks shows how that with the rise of philology we can date ancient writings because language changes throughout time and place. There is, after all, an Old- Middle- and Modern English, as well as British, Australian, South African and American dialects. This discipline began with the discovery that the “Donation of Constantine was a Christian forgery,” which was purportedly written in the 4th century whereby Constantine donated all of the Western Roman Empire to the authority of the Pope.
Sparks then takes us through three periods of hermeneutics, pre-modern, modern and post-modern, and shows us that people have not always treated texts in the same manner. He shows us how difficult it is for people who think they can understand a given text to do so, especially one in the ancient past. But since we must try anyway he proceeds.
The next part of his argument is where it gets good. He shows how historical criticism works with regard to the Assyrian Annals, which contains a lot of propaganda, and Babylonian Chronicles which are more accurate records, and why we know this. He shows how there are many texts in the ancient world which were psuedoprophetic, purportedly to be prophetic about the future but which were not, like the Uruk Prophecy. He also argues that “narrative stories that have the appearance of history may be fictional,” that these texts "can be the product of a very long literary process,” “sometimes written by different authors, and written in different historical periods, than the texts claim or imply.” (p. 71). From these parallels found in the literature of the ancient near eastern world he argues that “the evidence adduced above challenges the common evangelical charge that critical scholars approach the biblical texts with more skepticism than other ancient texts.” (p. 72). Right that.
Then in chapters three and four he shows why the Biblical critics are correct about the Bible, “in many instances,” especially with the Pentateuch, also called the Torah, or the first five books of the Bible. The Bible itself, if taken seriously, leads these scholars to think they were written by the same standards of other ancient near eastern literature in many places. It’s clear that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, if we take what it says seriously. There are problems of chronology, diverse narratives, legal diversity, and religious institutional progression, all reflecting a lengthy written process complete with anachronisms. Then there is the problem of Deuteronomy and the Exodus story itself. The normal evangelical “traditional” answers to these problems do not solve these issues, he argues.
This book is like a good novel. The reader wants to know how he solves these problems for his Christian faith and how he can maintain an inerrant Bible, so I won’t spoil his conclusions. I really like the fact that he’s being honest about what we can know about the Bible. I do not agree with his conclusions at all. In the end I think he undermines the basis for believing. See for yourselves. See if you can maintain your faith once you get done reading this book. I doubt you can.
Dr. Richard Knopp (pictured left) is using my book in his Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion classes at Lincoln Christian College and Seminary. He’s also attempting to answer my criticisms by requiring his students to read and evaluate Kenton L. Sparks book, God's Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship.
I’m reading Sparks’s book right now and it’s excellent. Sparks is a Christian scholar who affirms inerrancy. If someone is concerned about his commitment to Christianity or whether he has some God hating agenda, Sparks has no such agenda.I like how his argument progresses. He begins with Galileo in which Christians learned to re-read the Bible in light of the heliocentric universe. He argued that it wouldn’t do any good to ignore what was learned through science so Christian scholars began looking at the Bible differently. Sparks wrote: “Just as Galileo invited us to turn a critical eye toward the cosmos, so modern biblical scholars bid us to reflect critically upon our assumptions about the nature of Scripture and about how it should be read.” (p. 18) If Christians ignored the findings of Galileo it would discredit their faith. From this Sparks says there is a parallel tragic paradox, in that “the church’s wholesale rejection of historical criticism has begotten the irreverent use of Scripture by skeptics, thus destroying the faith of some believers while keeping unbelievers away from the faith.” (p. 21). His purpose in this book is to render the results of higher biblical criticism “theologically safe” just as Christian scholars did by admitting the results of modern science beginning with Galileo. (p. 23).
Sparks shows how that with the rise of philology we can date ancient writings because language changes throughout time and place. There is, after all, an Old- Middle- and Modern English, as well as British, Australian, South African and American dialects. This discipline began with the discovery that the “Donation of Constantine was a Christian forgery,” which was purportedly written in the 4th century whereby Constantine donated all of the Western Roman Empire to the authority of the Pope.
Sparks then takes us through three periods of hermeneutics, pre-modern, modern and post-modern, and shows us that people have not always treated texts in the same manner. He shows us how difficult it is for people who think they can understand a given text to do so, especially one in the ancient past. But since we must try anyway he proceeds.
The next part of his argument is where it gets good. He shows how historical criticism works with regard to the Assyrian Annals, which contains a lot of propaganda, and Babylonian Chronicles which are more accurate records, and why we know this. He shows how there are many texts in the ancient world which were psuedoprophetic, purportedly to be prophetic about the future but which were not, like the Uruk Prophecy. He also argues that “narrative stories that have the appearance of history may be fictional,” that these texts "can be the product of a very long literary process,” “sometimes written by different authors, and written in different historical periods, than the texts claim or imply.” (p. 71). From these parallels found in the literature of the ancient near eastern world he argues that “the evidence adduced above challenges the common evangelical charge that critical scholars approach the biblical texts with more skepticism than other ancient texts.” (p. 72). Right that.
Then in chapters three and four he shows why the Biblical critics are correct about the Bible, “in many instances,” especially with the Pentateuch, also called the Torah, or the first five books of the Bible. The Bible itself, if taken seriously, leads these scholars to think they were written by the same standards of other ancient near eastern literature in many places. It’s clear that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, if we take what it says seriously. There are problems of chronology, diverse narratives, legal diversity, and religious institutional progression, all reflecting a lengthy written process complete with anachronisms. Then there is the problem of Deuteronomy and the Exodus story itself. The normal evangelical “traditional” answers to these problems do not solve these issues, he argues.
This book is like a good novel. The reader wants to know how he solves these problems for his Christian faith and how he can maintain an inerrant Bible, so I won’t spoil his conclusions. I really like the fact that he’s being honest about what we can know about the Bible. I do not agree with his conclusions at all. In the end I think he undermines the basis for believing. See for yourselves. See if you can maintain your faith once you get done reading this book. I doubt you can.
I WANT IT TO BE TRUE DAMMIT IT! I DO!
I received an email from a Christian well-wisher who sent me the video below. The video produced a tear in my eye (just one). Maybe it's because my dad is dead and then maybe because in these hard economic times I'm hurting financially and might need some heavenly help. There's a huge emotional pull to the Christian message (on one level) that draws me back to that story. But I just can't believe. It's not true at all.
Another Argument by Spencer Lo for Input
See what you thinks about this:
1. If person P is fully human in the biological sense, then P possesses human DNA from both a human female and a human male.
2. If P did not acquire human DNA from a human male, then P does not possess human DNA from a human male.
3. Jesus had no biological human father. [Christian assumption]
4. Therefore, Jesus did not acquire human DNA from a human male. (from 3)
5. Therefore, Jesus does not possess human DNA from a human male. (from 4, 2)
6. Therefore, Jesus was not fully human in the biological sense. (from 5, 1).
June 04, 2009
A New Book Just Released That Will Redefine the Debate
The Evolution of God by Robert Wright is being released this week. Newsweek's religion editor Lisa Miller claims that it "redefines the faith debate." The description on Amazon reads:
In this sweeping narrative that takes us from the Stone Age to the Information Age, Robert Wright unveils an astonishing discovery: there is a hidden pattern that the great monotheistic faiths have followed as they have evolved. Through the prisms of archaeology, theology, and evolutionary psychology, Wright's findings overturn basic assumptions about Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and are sure to cause controversy. He explains why spirituality has a role today, and why science, contrary to conventional wisdom, affirms the validity of the religious quest. And this previously unrecognized evolutionary logic points not toward continued religious extremism, but future harmony.This sounds very interesting. Take a look for yourselves, click here: The Evolution of God
Nearly a decade in the making, The Evolution of God is a breathtaking re-examination of the past, and a visionary look forward.
Feedback on Two Arguments Requested
Spencer Lo is looking to get some feedback on the following two arguments, and was wondering if I would post them so people can comment. Yes I will:
Argument 1
1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [Let's suppose]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities). [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead
Argument 2
1. Whenever we encounter a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon has a supernatural cause.
2. The phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead is a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories. [Let's assume for argument's sake that Jesus was raised from the dead.]
3. Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead has a supernatural cause.
June 03, 2009
Pascal's Wager and the Annihilation View of Hell
Any attempted defense of Pascal's Wager has shown a complete and utter lack of knowledge about anthropological studies of the religious cultures around the world. There are literally a myriad number of gods and supernatural forces believed by the peoples of the world. This is called the "many gods" objection. But there are other things to consider.
When it comes to Pascal's Wager the evidence is simply below the threshold for it to be worth considering. The threat is more like someone crying out that the sky is failing. We've heard too many people make this claim too many times to take any of them seriously.
But in recent decades the "conditional immortality" annihilation view of hell seems to be the wave of future Christianity (ala, Clark Pinnock and Jonathan Kvanvig). With it the eternal threat has been significantly reduced and even completely neutralized. What would Pascal's Wager look like now, calculated with the annihilation view of hell in mind? Christians themselves are taking the bite out of the wager.
When it comes to Pascal's Wager the evidence is simply below the threshold for it to be worth considering. The threat is more like someone crying out that the sky is failing. We've heard too many people make this claim too many times to take any of them seriously.
But in recent decades the "conditional immortality" annihilation view of hell seems to be the wave of future Christianity (ala, Clark Pinnock and Jonathan Kvanvig). With it the eternal threat has been significantly reduced and even completely neutralized. What would Pascal's Wager look like now, calculated with the annihilation view of hell in mind? Christians themselves are taking the bite out of the wager.
June 02, 2009
The Problem of Miscommunication
I'm writing a chapter for a new book to be published by Prometheus Books. In this chapter I'm describing what I consider to be a very serious problem for Christianity that needs to be highlighted and emphasized around the internet. I call it the Problem of Miscommunication.
Christians argue how that Christianity helped abolish slavery. Big deal, even if this is true. Who are you trying to kid here? If God had condemned slavery from the very beginning there would be nothing to reform, no beatings, no killings, no institutional slavery justified from the Bible. If God had repeatedly said, "Thou shalt not buy beat or own slaves," and never sent any vibes the other way, then Christians could never justify it as an institution.
There are so many other examples. Did you know that 8 million Christians killed each other during the French Wars of Religion and during the Thirty Years War over the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and who was the legitimate authority to administer it? Again, 8 million Christians. All Jesus had to do was to say he was speaking "metaphorically" about his body and blood, if that's what he meant. And all Jesus had to do was to clear up whether Peter was the rock or his confession was the rock in Matt 16.
To say these Christians (both Catholics and Protestants) should've known better is sheer ignorance, for they still disagree about this today. Whenever there is miscommunication both parties are to blame, especially if there is an omniscient God who could've known in advance how his followers would misinterpret what he said. Do you understand this? All attempts at answering this particular problem utterly fail to take it seriously.
For Christians to claim atheism was the cause of many deaths in modern wars misses the point for three reasons: 1) Atheism per se was not the cause of the killings; 2) It's a red herring, since whether or not this was the case with atheism does nothing to solve the Christian Problem of Miscommunication; 3) If the Christians in that era had modern weapons of war, including nuclear weapons, then we would've seen many more deaths, possibly genocide.
Christians argue how that Christianity helped abolish slavery. Big deal, even if this is true. Who are you trying to kid here? If God had condemned slavery from the very beginning there would be nothing to reform, no beatings, no killings, no institutional slavery justified from the Bible. If God had repeatedly said, "Thou shalt not buy beat or own slaves," and never sent any vibes the other way, then Christians could never justify it as an institution.
There are so many other examples. Did you know that 8 million Christians killed each other during the French Wars of Religion and during the Thirty Years War over the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and who was the legitimate authority to administer it? Again, 8 million Christians. All Jesus had to do was to say he was speaking "metaphorically" about his body and blood, if that's what he meant. And all Jesus had to do was to clear up whether Peter was the rock or his confession was the rock in Matt 16.
To say these Christians (both Catholics and Protestants) should've known better is sheer ignorance, for they still disagree about this today. Whenever there is miscommunication both parties are to blame, especially if there is an omniscient God who could've known in advance how his followers would misinterpret what he said. Do you understand this? All attempts at answering this particular problem utterly fail to take it seriously.
For Christians to claim atheism was the cause of many deaths in modern wars misses the point for three reasons: 1) Atheism per se was not the cause of the killings; 2) It's a red herring, since whether or not this was the case with atheism does nothing to solve the Christian Problem of Miscommunication; 3) If the Christians in that era had modern weapons of war, including nuclear weapons, then we would've seen many more deaths, possibly genocide.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)