Another Failed Christian Attempt to Explain Away Suffering: Mary Jo Sharp's Review of the 2nd Loftus/Wood Debate

I have debated David Wood in person on the problem of suffering for his belief in the Christian God. If you haven’t yet seen it you can do so by clicking here. (My PowerPoint presentation was not in sync for the first 3 ½ minutes). Later on January 12th 2007, I was on “The Debate Hour” with Mr. Wood once again debating the problem of evil, which was hosted by Reginald Finley (i.e. the Infidel Guy). It no longer seems to be available online. Mary Jo Sharp of Confident Christianity called this second debate "another failed argument from evil" so it’s time I comment on her criticisms, even if so late. I said I would write a response to her, so better late than never, especially since I now see she has a link to it on her blog.

The topic of the debate was expressed in a question: “Does the extent of suffering in the world make the existence of God implausible?” But it wasn’t a formal debate. In a formal debate each participant is given a certain amount of time for an opening statement; a rebuttal or two, or three; time for questions and answers; and then a final statement, or something like this. Our debate was one-on-one for about an hour and a half, if I remember the time correctly, with Finley commenting and interjecting a few questions during that time. If someone put a stop watch on it then Wood dominated with about 65% of the time, Findley with 10% of the time, and me with the remaining 25% of the time. Most always when I began speaking Wood interrupted me. Finley did not give me equal time. I was just not going to get in a shouting match, which would’ve been required several times to get a word in edge-wise.

I shall not rebut every point Sharp made. It’s not necessary, although I think I treat most everything she said in what follows. We just see things differently, no doubt. I did make a formal argument, too, which was earlier expressed clearly in our first debate in my opening statement, of which this second debate was a continuation of that one.

Sharp wrote:

Loftus claims that he is looking at this world and asking whether or not God exists while Wood already believes God exists and is trying to explain intense suffering “given that prior belief.” From the outset of his argument, Loftus assumes that only the theist has prior commitment to a belief. However, this idea is oblivious to the atheist’s own commitment to the non-existence of God, which is a governing worldview itself. Loftus takes the position of being the only one who is able to objectively argue due to his non-commitment to a religion, whereas Wood must “punt” to his worldview considering the reality of evil. I do not find a solid line of reasoning for Loftus’s statement; it is simply an attempt to discredit the ability of a theist to argue objectively. However, both the theist and the atheist come to the debate carrying their worldviews on their back.

Well, in the first place my worldview includes every belief I have about the world, but atheism, per se, is not a worldview. There are many kinds of atheism and many differences among people who call themselves atheists. Another thing Sharp should realize, but which most theists don't understand, is that the only thing I affirm is that Christians have not made their case. My atheism is a position of last regard. I came to it by the process of elimination. She herself is an atheist when it comes to Islam. I just reject her God with the same confidence she rejects the Muslim faith. I simply reject one more God than she does. I don’t think any believer in any religion has made her case. I don’t even have to make a case that there is no God, but I do. Furthermore, since the argument from evil is a serious problem for the believer, as admitted by everyone who has ever written about it (otherwise why write on a non-problem?), then if this is the only issue we had to deal with to settle the question of the omni-God's existence, it would be obvious that such a God does not exist. Christians retreat, or punt, to background beliefs to help settle this problem without which they would not believe in the first place. I mean really, if she looked at this present world and were asked whether or not an omni-God created it without reference to any other background belief of hers, I dare say she would conclude as I do.

Sharp wrote:

What kind of world should we expect an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good being to create? Wood handles the question by suggesting that a world in which human pleasure is maximized and human pain is minimized is not what would be expected of this type of Creator. He posits a two-world theodicy in which ‘good’ is maximized: this world with its goods, and the next world (heaven) with its goods. Neither world can contain all of the goods (since some of them are mutually exclusive) and therefore the best possible situation is one with both worlds, in which the world of greater goods is eternal and the world of lesser goods is a limited world.

The words "lesser goods" is a euphemism for things like gang rapes, genocide, witch hunts, brutal slavery, the Indonesian tsunami, cholera, hurricanes, the Brazilian Wandering Spider, and many parasites of which it's estimated that from them one person every ten seconds dies. Yeah, these are "lesser goods." Well if these things are "lesser goods," then what would it take for Wood or Sharp to call something evil? And what notion of a perfectly good God do they have anyway, that would allow for these "lesser goods"? The bottom line is that Wood is expressing a consequentialist ethic in his two world's theodicy, in which the ends (heavenly existence) justify the means (earthly existence). Conservative Christians reject such an ethic, so my challenge is for them to be consistent. Either acknowledge the argument from evil succeeds, or change your ethic.

Sharp wrote:

In order to maximize good, this world could not be by-passed, for there are goods in this world that cannot be achieved in the heavenly world in God’s full presence. Wood gives several examples of the goods of this world, including the choice of whether or not we will follow God, morality, and virtues such as courage and compassion. Morality in this world is only possible due to our free will to choose whether or not we will act morally. If God’s presence were fully known in this world, either His presence would overwhelm human will or humans would only be following God due to a fear of being “zapped” by this all-powerful watchman. By contrast, the goods of the heavenly realm include a lack of suffering and the full presence of God—the latter being the ultimate good.

With regard to the two world's theodicy, what possible good can come in this world that is important in the next one? Courage, generosity, and compassion are only needed in the face of poverty, suffering and pain, so how are these virtues even needed in heaven without pain and suffering? Besides, I truly think neither Wood nor Sharp understands the nature and value of free will.

I also find it very odd that in order to exonerate God they must explain the lack of his revealed goodness due to an "epistemic distance," otherwise known as divine hiddenness. I find no satisfactory understanding for why God created in the first place such that he wanted any creatures to love him. Theists ask if God is to be blamed for creating this world and for wanting people who freely love him. Yes, most definitely yes, until or unless she can tell me why a supposedly reasonable triune completely self-fulfilled God wanted this in the first place (“grace” is not an answer at all); why libertarian free-will is such an important value to God when compared to the sufferings that have resulted from this so-called gift; whether human beings actually have free-will if God created us with our specific DNA and placed us within a specific environment (an environment that actually obstructs many people from receiving the gospel because of the “accidents of birth”); why God suspends some people’s free choices (i.e. Pharaoh) but not others; why God even cares to have free-willed people who love him, knowing full well the consequences for the billions of people who wind up in hell (the collateral damage), and why God will allow sinners in hell to retain their freedom but take it away from the saints in heaven (and who subsequently completes the sanctification process for these saints without their own free choices doing it).

There are three attributes of God we're dealing with here, God's power, his love and his knowledge. God must reveal his love to us irregardless of whether he reveals his power to us. If a man courts a woman and tests her to see if she loves him by not showing her his true love, then that is quite simply a false test. If she doesn't see him as a loving person she will naturally reject him. So the woman would not actually be rejecting that man but only the man he showed himself to be. And so likewise, if God is all-knowing then he would know we only rejected a false caricature of him and not who he really is. So I find it wildly improbable to think this settles anything for Sharp or Wood or any Christian theist. Maybe Mary Jo should try this on her own children if she has any, and see how her own children react to it. See what that gets her as a mother and she'll understand the seriousness of the problem.

Sharp wrote:

At this point in the program, Reginald Finley, the host, asked how Satan could have been in God’s perfect presence and yet still rebelled. However, this is a misunderstanding of the theodicy. In Wood’s theodicy, this present world and the restored, future world are the two worlds. The “heavenly realm” from which Satan fell could not have been a place of God’s full presence or Loftus would be correct in stating that Satan would be “dumber than a box of rocks” for rebelling. More accurately, Satan would not have been able to rebel in the full presence of God. So this original heavenly realm is not the same as the restored heaven and earth to come. Loftus interjected, “So there’s a rule change then.”

Yes, I "interjected" because that's all I could do as Wood droned on.

Satan is a mythical figure derived mostly during the inter-testamental literature. He was not viewed as an evil being in the Old Testament itself. In the OT Satan was a fully credentialed member of the heavenly court who is best described as a prosecutor, the high ranking head of the ancient barbaric "thought police." Prosecutors are not evil because they are doing their jobs and we find him in God's heavenly court a few times in the history of Israel simply doing his job. As such he was not the serpent in the Garden of Eden earlier, otherwise God later allowed sin in his presence if he allowed Satan to be a member of his heavenly court. Christians deny God allows sin in his presence and they also claim sinners could not bear to be in God's presence. So why do we find Satan in God's presence doing God's will later in passages like Job 1-2; Numbers 22:22-32; II Samuel 24:1 (cf. I Chron. 21:1); and Zechariah 3:1-5?

But even if Wood's concocted view is correct, he has merely pushed back the problem of evil before the Fall of humankind. Why didn't God allow Satan into his direct immediate presence to see all of his power and love such that Satan would neither desire to rebel against him or think he could succeed? Because of this divine decision every person who suffers in this world and every person who will suffer for all eternity (along with Satan himself) will do so because God failed to show Satan his love and power. Apologists say God did this to show us his glory and grace, but then that's using people for his own ends. This is the ethic of consequentialism, again. Why does God hide his love from his creatures, for instance, knowing it would cause such intense suffering? This theodicy sounds much more like an excuse for what God should have done than it offers anything by way of a reasonable justification for a so-called perfectly good God.

Given the suffering that resulted from Satan's supposed rebellion, why didn't God simply deal with him and put him down immediately? That's what a good and reasonable ruler would do. Listen, does a perfectly good God want a peaceable kingdom, or not? A good ruler would not allow such an evil in his kingdom in the first place. Evil like that is to be eliminated as soon as possible by a good ruler. Too many innocents would be hurt if he didn't do this immediately.

Sharp wrote:

The argument Loftus presents, at its foundation, reasons that if God had foreknowledge of those who would choose Him and those who would not, He should have only made those who would choose Him. This argument essentially disregards free will, making it appear as practically useless in this world.

Not so. If God has foreknowledge of future free-willed contingent actions then he could foreknow our free choices. We wouldn't have to actually choose anything since if God has this kind of foreknowledge he would already know who would.

Sharp wrote:

Loftus believes that it would be better for us to have no free will, but to live a utopian life in which peace, happiness, and health are maximized. Although I have seen this type of existence portrayed on Star Trek, I highly doubt this is the type of existence we really desire. In listening to Loftus, I wondered if he had spent any time formulating what that type of existence would actually look like.

I'm merely thinking of what the theist conceives heaven to be: a heavenly existence, is after all, the one Christians believe they will experience in the future, with an incorruptible body including eternal peace and happiness in a world of utter bliss.

Sharp wrote:

Loftus uses instances of immense suffering to bolster his argument, but he ignores the issues of “not-so-immense” suffering such as the girl who doesn’t feel ‘pretty enough’ who wants to commit suicide. How would this situation be remedied in Loftus’s utopia? Would God therefore have to make every person look alike so as to avoid even the smallest amount of suffering? (He does argue that God should have only created one race of people.)

Listen, the argument from evil is only as forceful as the suffering that exists in this present world. If there was no intense suffering the argument would lose most of its force. If there was no suffering at all then it would have no force at all. I have struggled in life, although I have not experienced any prolonged intense suffering. I've always had good health, with enough food and money and friends to get by. So if my kinds of struggles are good enough to test me then why couldn't everyone's struggles be no more than mine? Why do some suffer for years and years, and a few commit suicide because of their sufferings? Do they need this suffering whereas I don't? Not everyone suffers the same. Some people are born with a silver spoon in their mouths while others struggle with financial woes and health issues and the loss of loved ones throughout their whole short lives. Why?

Sharp wrote:

Loftus’s assessment of this life as a cruel game of hide and seek is, to quote him in another statement, “expecting way too little of God.” This judgment of God’s method of Divine expression oversimplifies the total issue. The atheist, as Wood explains later in the debate, has to explain why anything exists at all. The problem is amplified when we consider the origin of the universe, the fine-tuning of the cosmos for life, the design on earth that enables survival, and the astronomical odds that complex life would arise on this one planet, in order to even get to a brain that can ponder the problem of evil. The theist has a foundation for the existence of God rooted in all of these things to which he then adds theodicies to help make sense of suffering in the world. What evidence should we expect from a God-level intellect concerning His existence? The evidence He has provided in the cosmos, nature, human reasoning, and the written Word allow humankind to thoughtfully consider who we are and where we came from without being mindlessly forced into accepting God as our Creator.

Here is but another example of how Christians count the hits and ignore the misses. They do this with prayer too. If a prayer is answered they count that as a hit. If it's not, they ignore it. With regard to the universe and its form they simply ignore the vast amount of natural evil in it, as I mentioned earlier. One cannot look at this universe objectively and come away believing in the omni-God Sharp believes if she takes into consideration all of the evidence of unintelligent design. At best one should be agnostic about what the evidence can lead us to think. Even if one is to conclude some divine entity created a "quantum wave fluctuation" we don't have an explanation for where this divine being came from, nor whether he still exists, nor whether he is good, or all-powerful. For her to believe in God she must believe in a historically conditioned interpretation of a selected group of ancient anonymous superstitious writings. And we certainly cannot verify the claims of miracles by the historical method, especially as outsiders looking in. Those beliefs of hers are to be described simply as bizzaro! If she understood the full range of problems for the Christian faith, then as I argued with respect to William Lane Craig, she would never have believed in the first place!

Sharp wrote:

In the argument from evil, the atheist points out instances of intense suffering, especially undeserved suffering of innocents such as children and animals. In an attempt to make this the sole issue regarding God’s existence, the atheist skips over any good found in the world. The scales of good and evil thus tip to the evil side making it appear as though evil, all by itself, is enough to prove a godless world. The problem is that the scales are tipped and weighted on one side, not putting enough consideration on the good side. One of the differences in the perspectives on this issue is that Loftus and Finley view this world as bad and the (imaginary for them) future world as good, whereas Wood views this world as good and the future world as good.

This claim of hers is quite simply a red herring. For me personally life is good. That has nothing to do with the argument itself. My claim is that neither Sharp nor Wood can actually see the blood stained whip in the slave master's hand, nor smell the flesh of the witches burned at the stake, nor hear the screams of the woman whose child is eaten alive by a pack of wolves, because they are blinded by their faith. They cover their eyes their noses and their ears to the truth of this world in order to have the comforts of a delusional belief. Whether we think this present world is a good one over-all, probably depends on where we were born. If someone was born in the Gaza Strip, life right now would be terrible. Besides, we're not just talking about whether this world is merely good, anyway. We're talking about whether this world reflects a perfectly good God.

Sharp wrote:

Wood argued thus: Given our world, God can either put animals in it or not put animals in it. If He does put them here, then they are going to be a part of our world, which is governed by natural law. Animals are good-in-themselves. Wood suggests that Loftus’s question is spurious by giving an example of the tiger. Tigers are in danger of going extinct in the wild; however, no one says, “Hooray! Now all the animals the tiger hunts will no longer have to suffer.” In fact, the general feeling is that we should keep tigers from going extinct. Why do we react this way if tigers just cause a lot of pain and suffering? Returning to what Wood said, we must know on some level that animals are good-in-themselves. If we want a world with less animal suffering, then God offers us one—the heavenly world. If we reject that offer, then we still have this world, which is good.

Whether or not we are concerned if tigers go extinct is another red herring. We are concerned because of our delicate ecosystem and its ability to support all life. My question has to do with what God should be concerned about and that makes all the difference in the world. My question is whether or not a fine-tuned ecosystem is more important to God than one in which divine maintenance is needed to correct anything in an incomplete ecosystem, given the massive amount of intense suffering in it. I think God should care more about sentient beings than having a fine-tuned ecosystem that causes this much suffering. Is God lazy, or what? Can God do perpetual miracles by miraculously feeding human beings through the process of photosynthesis without any animals at all--animals who have viciously preyed upon one another for hundreds of thousands of years prior to our arrival on earth? Finally, when it comes to animals do all dogs go to heaven?

Sharp wrote:

...the theist could turn this argument around and ask what a universe should look like without a God and point out all the instances of good, concluding that there must be a God because there is immense good and incredible joy in the world.

Such a tactic undercuts the Christian claims, I think, for such arguments cancel each other out, leaving nothing but a blind indifferent world, which is actually what I'm arguing for.

Sharp wrote:

Nearing the end of the debate, Loftus and Finley agree that naturalism better explains immense suffering in the world. Wood responds by stating that naturalism cannot explain the standard by which the atheist views certain events as evil. Presupposed in the atheist argument is some sort of standard of goodness. Wood explains that though Loftus denies God’s existence, the morality he bases his argument on has as its foundation an absolute Moral Law Giver. Atheists may be able to say that naturalism explains suffering better than theism, but then they have to explain the concept of ‘right and wrong’ through naturalism as well. This is one area where atheism can be seen to lack the explanatory power of theism.

I have dealt with Wood's red herring extensively right here. I have briefly dealt with the problem of an atheistic ethic here. I adjure Wood and Sharp not to try to escape their problem by claiming I have one too. I've adequately deal with my difficulty. They need to adequately deal with theirs.

Sharp wrote:

At one point, Loftus was asking Wood to answer the question, “Was it good that God did not stop the earthquake which caused the Indonesian tsunami?” How would answering this one particular instance explain the universal problem of evil? It would not help. Wood is correct in consistently reminding Loftus that the argument itself needs to be dealt with in order to discern whether the argument is sound. Loftus can ask “why?” all day long, but as Wood has said, “why?” isn’t an argument.

Asking Wood to answer the massive amount of suffering in this world is, I think, an important strategy for a theodicy. My argument, since I couldn't fully express it given Wood's propensity to interrupt me, can certainly be expressed as a rhetorical question, for that's what it was. I say he cannot sufficiently explain why God did not stop that earthquake, for if he had stopped it no one would ever know he stopped it simply because it wouldn't have happend (and thus God would stay "hidden"). If that earthquake was needed for the ecosystem then I see no reason why God didn't wait a few years when better warning systems would be in place. Most importantly I see no reason why an omnipotent God who created the laws of nature could not have performed a perpetual miracle by stopping that earthquake from ever have taken place.

I think the more power a person has then the more of an ethical obligation he has to alleviate suffering. If, for instance, a woman is being gang raped, no one would fault me if I didn't physically try to stop them, for then I would be beaten up and perhaps killed along with her (although I would be held morally responsible if I didn't call the police). But if I was Superman and did nothing then everyone would rightly fault me if I didn't stop them. So since God supposedly has all power he is the most obligated to alleviate suffering in our world. Without a suffient explanation for these things I argue that it's probable such an omni-God doesn't exist. Wood has not made his case.

Sharp wrote:

In the end, Wood shows that the background information presupposed in the argument from evil itself points to theism....Loftus’s argument is that suffering provides enough evidence to lead us away from God. However, suffering itself is just not enough evidence in light of a comprehensive look at the world to move the theist away from a reasoned, evidenced belief in God.

With regard to Wood and Sharp's worldview background beliefs I have thoroughly debunked all of the important ones in my book, one after another. Given the demise of their background worldview beliefs they no longer have a leg to stand on in the face of the massive amount of intense suffering in this world, since it becomes quite obvious that without them they cannot sufficiently explain why a good God allows this suffering.

Sharp wrote:

The theistic worldview explains the conditions assumed in the argument from evil far better than atheism does. In fact, atheism does not satisfactorily account for any of the conditions presupposed in the argument. When the atheist points to suffering as his reason for rejecting the existence of God, he assumes all of these conditions, which atheism simply cannot account for. Hence, theism has far more explanatory power than atheism, and the argument from evil therefore does not make the existence of God implausible.

Atheism, as I understand it simply means one is a non-theist, or a non-believer in the particular religion being discussed. Christians, after all, were called "atheists" by the Romans. So the options are not between being an atheist (qua metaphysical naturalist) or a Christian theist. There are a host of other positions on this question, most notable panentheism, or process theology. My claim is that the more beliefs a person has that are essential to his worldview then the less likely the whole set of beliefs comprising his worldview are true. He must maintain not only that there is a three-in-one God, but that the collection of books in the canonized Bible are all inspired by God, and that God became incarnated through a virgin in Bethlehem, atoned for our sins, resurrected from the grave, and will return, for starters. These beliefs, along with a multifaceted number of others, all stand or fall together. If one is shown wrong then his whole worldview collapses. By contrast, as I said earlier, the only thing I affirm is that Christians have not made their case. My atheism is a position of last regard. I came to it by the process of elimination. I don’t think any believer in any religion has made his case. I don’t even have to make a case that there is no God, although I do.

The Problem of Evil and Moral Choice

Lately, there've been quite a few discussions about morality in the comments sections. With that in mind, I thought I'd re-post one or two old blog posts that deal with a moral topic.

The following is from 2016, before my first post here at DC:

According to most solutions of the problem of evil, bad things are allowed by God because in the long run — as Dr. Pangloss put it in Candide — “all is for the best.” In other words, each terrible event is justified as the means for bringing about a result that more than makes up for its badness. For example, one such view claims that evils are necessary in order to provide us with the opportunity for moral growth. Thus, the apologist Richard Swinburne, a proponent of this idea, maintains that if even “one less person had been burnt by the Hiroshima atomic bomb... there would have been less opportunity for courage and sympathy...” (The Existence of God, p. 264). The death of all those people — or of the millions killed by the black plague, for that matter — was, all things considered, a good thing. Otherwise, God wouldn't have allowed it to happen.

Read more »

Natural Disasters As Part Of The Problem Of Evil

(Resolved! God Caused The Problem of Evil/Needless Suffering.) This article briefly discusses Natural Disasters as Part Of The Problem Of Evil. I argue that the problem of Evil was caused by God and his process of Creation. While I suspect that almost no one will dispute that natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcano's, tsunami's, hurricanes, tornado's and such are caused by natural seismological and meteorological processes, I claim that if there is a God, the way he made the earth guarantees that they will happen.

Some argue that Natural Disasters are not Disasters unless they affect people. I think Bambi and Peter Singer would disagree with this definition, but it works for this article. The intersection in this to the problem of Evil is that mankind is supposed to have brought the PoE on himself by disobeying god in the early days of its interaction with him. I avoid saying Adam and Eve because I think most people accept that there were people on the earth before 6000 - 10000 years ago. If natural disasters affect people and cause suffering and is used by clergy as an example of Gods Judgment and punishment on humanity, then it doesn't seem to follow from the fact that it happened before humans were humans, Adam and Eve or not. And if one argues that Natural Disasters happen anyway but sometimes are directed by God, then I call into the question the moral principles of group punishment especially when some of the punished are undergoing treatments to keep them alive in hospitals, toddlers and babies. Maybe some of you don't know this but a group of doctors in a hospital are under suspicion of 'hastening nature' because a disproportionate number of their terminally ill patients died within a couple of hours during hurricane Katrina.

I suppose one could say that God knew that mankind would disobey God so he made the earth this way as a result of foreknowledge, but then I have to wonder why make man in a way that would guarantee that he would 'malfunction' and need to be kicked around by the environment. If god was omniscient, and he knew everything ahead of time, including what choices we would make throughout our life and who the saved would be, then we only have the appearance of free will. But that debate is not the point of this article or necessary as a premise.

So if God created the world he created in such a way that it is constantly changing, and these changes seem to be necessary for it to work properly. These changes affect one another sometimes to a frightening degree causing the events that HUMANS PERCEIVE as disasters and "Gods Judgment". These events are a result of and necessary for the ecology of the earth. They have nothing to do with Mankind. Mankind just happens to live in its path. They happened before mankind showed up, and will happen after he is gone, and in fact may cause mankind's extinction.

Yet Another Unpleasant Truth

Note: “Mrs. Jane Ortega” and “Michael Ortega” mentioned below are real people whom I have come to know and been corresponding—only their names have been changed to protect their identities. And, uh…well, the letter pretty much explains the rest…

“Dear Mrs. Ortega,

I hope this email finds you doing well. Being that we have been acquainted with each other for some time now, and being that we have had the opportunity to look at the academic side of the problem of evil, I wanted to offer a finishing piece to “drive home,” as it were, what has been discussed.

Please understand that the things I will mention are not intended to be insulting or hurtful, but are to make clear to you that you have not taken to heart what we are debating. The problem of evil is an emotional argument, as well as a logical argument, and that is why the best Christian apologists in the world keep coming back to reconsider it. When one seeks to avoid the logical force of the problem, they are confronted with the emotional discomfort created by it, and this makes them reconsider the logical force of it once again. This is always the situation when people say the problem of evil “doesn’t affect” (your words) them. Like a sleeping pill, the problem hasn’t affected you because you haven’t digested it yet!

As you know, I met your son Michael at the bus station. That put me in touch with you, which, of course, I deem a good thing. But the unfortunate circumstance of your son is not a good thing. It is a terrible thing.

Each time I see him I think to myself how hard it must have been for you to raise a kid like that, and for forty-two years straight, be reminded of the fact that he will never be a normal man, that he will never pay his own bills, and that his brain will never stop requiring a handful of special pills everyday just to keep him out of trouble with the law. He will never get married and bring you grandchildren. He will never hold down a normal job or live in so much as a budget-sized apartment by himself. He will never host a thanksgiving dinner for the family, will never tend to his share of the chores, or even clean his own clothes. I deeply feel for you, and although, right about now you’re probably preparing to tell me how much of a joy and a gift from God you consider your son to be, even with all the heartache that raising a severely bi-polar/schizophrenic can be, I’m here to tell you no less forcefully that you don’t deserve it.

You don’t deserve any of this. You are a good woman, a wonderful person, and you deserved to get a son who would carry on your legacy, who would take care of you in your older years. But you don’t have that. Instead, your son has given you a bruised lip and broken furniture on more than one occasion. Your son consumed Palmolive dish soap and thumbtacks as a means to end his life earlier this year. Someone clueless enough to try and kill himself in a manner such as this is worthy of the utmost pity. That alone is a fountain of sadness. Your son has been arrested a great many times, and each time, could not make a single coherent statement in his defense. These are monumentally sad facts that I know you are aware of, but there is a reason for why I am reminding you of them—and I think you know that reason.

I want to tell you what your boy said to me the other day. I was standing guard in the bus terminal as usual when he approached me and immediately began to carry on about how cruel you were to him as a child, throwing him in snake pits and whipping him with thorns from rose bushes. As he stood in my face, twitching madly, I gently moved him out of my personal space and began for the fourth time this week to assure him that you did none of those things to him, that it was all in his mind. Failing to get through to him, I tried to convince him that even if he still feels that way about you that he should try and just move on with his life, and not go around telling complete strangers about it and having them come to me and ask to have him removed from the facility because he won’t leave them alone.

I could tell by looking into his distant eyes that he comprehended not a word I said. He went right on accusing you and the government of poisoning him with bitter herbs and by putting deadly sound waves in the Rod Stewart songs he likes to listen to. It’s so sad to see him walking around like that, in a never-clearing fog of paranoia and disorientation. I had to ask him to leave the station again a few days ago (but I think I already told you that the other day).

I know you love him and try to hug him before he goes to pushing you back away from him at your weekly monitored meetings. In tears, you assure him you love him, but it does no good. You do love him, and you always will, and no one’s saying you shouldn’t, but I’ve seen how you break down every time you are around him. It crushes you to see him in such pain and not be able to do anything about it or get close to him. That must hurt in a way that only a mother can know. He’s such a handsome man too—if only he had a normal mind.

Frankly, if your son is a gift from God, then God doesn’t think much of you at all. If such a higher power exists, he hates you or else couldn’t care less about you; there’s simply no other way of putting it. Now I don’t find it sound to believe that a deity hates you or loves you. You deserve so much better, but unfortunately, there is no God who will do you better.

For the last four or five conversations, we have been discussing the problem of evil, and in that time, you have acquitted your God of all charges of cruelty and evil. I would ask that you keep deliberating on this, and when you are ready, look your son in the eyes the next time you see him and ask yourself: “Do I really and truly deserve this?” What does your heart of hearts tell you? The only way the problem of evil can be ignored is when the problem is someone else’s, but when the problem becomes your own, it is impossible to ignore.

You are a very strong person, Jane, so strong that you have been able to take in stride and accept what would be too much for some people. Maybe you will one day be strong enough to accept yet another unpleasant truth.

Best regards,

(JH)”

A Review of Antony Flew’s “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freewill”

Antony Flew shows the Freewill Defense theodicy fails since it is the case that existence of compatibilist free will is not a logical impossibility relative to what is generally thought of as Omnipotence in his essay “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freewill” featured in Peter Angeles' anthology, “Critiques of God”.


Flew begins by wrongfully, but inconsequentially so since many falsely think the following to be from Augustine’s “Confessions”, quoting [1] St Augustine : "Either God cannot abolish evil, or he will not; if he cannot, then he is not all-powerful; if he will not, then he is not all good." [2] An elegant summation nonetheless, Flew rightly pigeon holed the saying by noting that this is “Perhaps the most powerful of all skeptical arguments, this has appealed especially to the clearest and most direct minds, striking straight and decisively to the heart of the matter.” Actual EVIL, existing in contradistinction to actual moral goodness, is the substantive core of the question at issue. How can the God of classical theism exist when the world, and even more so the Universe (ie: all existence), is saturated with a cold indifference to life? Not only does observed empirical existence reveal man’s inhumanity to man, but the unimaginable sickening horror from natural disasters evidenced by an ever growing list of causalities dimly echoes within a grand canyon of animal suffering. The predator-prey and parasite-host relationships in a brutally uncaring, mechanistic, evolutionary context screams “Humans are not the point.”

In large measure, the history of human civilization has been recorded in step with efforts to understand our existence. By crafting myths, we encode ways we try to reconcile seeming contradictions between life and brutal reality. Such is the case of the world's oldest story. When Gilgamesh, the king, sends the woman Shamhat, a temple prostitute, to Enkidu, the wild-man, their sexual liaison civilizes Enkidu. After six days and seven nights of love making, he is no longer a wild beast who lives with animals. [3] Upon visiting the water hole, the animals flee from the sight of Enkidu, puzzled he asks Shamhat what it means. She wisely informs the anti-hero, “Behold Enkidu, you are become wise like unto a god.” [4] As the knowledge of sexual procreation transformed the wild Enkidu, we ordinary mortals, when we become aware of the absolute nature of existence and its identity, become transformed by recognizing that objective good arises from objective existence while evils anticipates a dearth of goodness. While these ethical qualities share a relationship like up and down or big and small, good and evil are nonetheless objective. And, even though, mutually required to make sense of the other, they can be understood in light of what is meant by values and why they are important to living beings. The Objectivist philosophers offer clear and cogent definitions.

“In ethics, one must begin by asking: What are values? Why does man need them?” Wrote Ayn Rand, and she continued: “Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. The concept “value” is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values are possible.

I quote from Galt’s speech: “There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action. Matter is indestructible, it changes its forms, but it cannot cease to exist. It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: the issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence. It is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of ‘Value’ possible. It is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil.” [5]

Even so, the broad scope of animal suffering, a vast ocean of pain and terror, is like the Great Barrier Reef of objective evil, for if anything diminishes the “process of self-sustaining and self-generated action”, it is the pain, suffering, and terror of being eaten or burned alive. “Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree,” wrote William L. Rowe in describing the problem of evil: “resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn;s suffering been prevented. Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have prevented the fawn's apparently pointless suffering? The answer is obvious, as even the theist will insist, An omnipotent, omniscient being could have easily prevented the fawn from being horribly burned, or, given the burning, could have spared the fawn the intense suffering by quickly ending its life, rather that allowing the fawn to lie in terrible agony for several days. Since the fawn's intense suffering was preventable and so far as we can see, pointless, doesn't it appear that premise one (See note 6.) of the argument is true, that there do exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse? [6]

There is a problem of evil, and we recognize it concurrently with our awareness of objective morality from absolute existence. Perhaps that may be why Flew found it useful to cite John S. Mill’s posthumously published “Three Essays on Religion” to further refine the problem and challenge theology by noting Mill did not imagine “the impossible problem of reconciling infinite benevolence and justice with infinite power in the Creator of such a world as this. The attempt to do so not only involves absolute contradiction in an intellectual point of view but exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle of a jesuitical defense of moral enormities.” [7] Amen! Mill’s bold words are, however, not conclusive, for the Christian believer has faith that ways to reconcile the existence of objective evil with their God’s omni-loving, omni-compassion attributes can be found.

For that purpose theodicies have been devised. Flew notes that: “Several determined efforts have been made to escape from the dilemma. One favorite – which might be dubbed the ‘Freewill Defense’ – runs like this. The first move is to point out ,via citing Thomas Aquinas, “Nothing which implies contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God.” [8] Flew elucidates, “even God cannot do what is logically impossible; that is, if you make up a self-contradictory, a nonsense sentence it won’t miraculously become sense just because you have put the word God as its subject.” Flew follows up on this by predicating that theologians find the third formulation superior because it pinpoints the essential quality of logical impossibility as being no restriction upon the Omnipotence of God. Antony rightly disagrees with Aquinas, however, that God’s Omnipotence is indeed limited by logical impossibility. Flew could have pointed out that the forth and fifth century superstars of Christian Theology, St. Augustine, [9] and St. Jerome [10] both disagreed with Aquinas and implicitly asserted that God being all powerful means God can do anything without regard to logic. How or why the Christian view of Omnipotence evolved in the centuries between Jerome and Aquinas Flew does not ask, but it would be an interesting study.

He could have followed that thread down a rabbit hole. Instead, and to his credit, he continued to state the position he argues against. “The second move in this defense is to claim, “God gave men free will”; and that this necessarily implies the possibility of doing evil as well as good, that is to say, that there would be a contradiction speaking, it would be nonsense to speak of creatures with freedom to choose good or evil but not able to choose evil. (Which, no blame to him, is what his creatures, men have done.)” [11] Generally, Christians will not seek to specify the nature of free will and will equivocate by assuming it is understood that they mean contra-causal libertarian free will.

Antony could have, but did not, include the scriptural proof texts Christians predicate as a basis for their contra-causal and libertarian view of free will. It is interesting that the Johannine writer’s midrash in John 10:34-35 “Jesus answered them, "Is it not written in your law, 'I said, you are gods'? If he called them gods to whom the word of God came (and scripture cannot be broken),” refers back to Psa 82:6 where is read: “I say, "You are gods, sons of the Most High, all of you;” . In the later passage, Elohiym is in the council of the elohiym and is exhorting his fellow gods to do justice and righteousness; and then in a fit of hissy, Elohiym condemns his fellow gods to mortality. Elohiym, in 82:6, is very clearly addressing his fellows in the council of the gods. The Johannine midrash tortures the text to make it apply to human beings (ie: the Jews). A truly brilliant man, Richard Carrier, explains what this means to Christianity. “...the Libertarian notion of free will assumes that one's own desires (among other things, like one's own reason and knowledge) also constrain one's will, rendering it unfree. In other words, our personality, knowledge, wishes, are themselves chains that bind our will. But your proximate, causing desire is your will. It therefore cannot be considered as something “outside” of the will that constrains it – your strongest desire and your will are one and the same.” [12] Later, as we will see, Flew’s argument hinges on the fact that human free will is not Libertarian.

The third premise of the free will defense listed by Flew is: “…certain good things, namely, certain virtues, logically presuppose not merely beings with freedom of choice (which alone are capable of either virtue or vice), and consequently the possibility of evil, but also the actual occurrence of certain evils. That what we might call the second-order goods of sympathetic feeling and action logically could not occur with out (at least the appearance of) the first-order evils of suffering or misfortune. And the moral good of forgiveness presupposes the prior occurrence of (at least the appearance of) some lower-order moral evil to be forgiven.” [13] Flew goes on to elaborate and explain this premise by noting the subjective nature of good and evil assumed by the F.W.D. Certain moral virtues “logically presuppose the possibility of correlative evils” [14] This leads to the conclusion that it “makes no sense to suppose that God “might have chosen to achieve these goods without the possibility in the one case, the actuality in the other of the correlative and presupposed evils.” [15] Flew's acceptance of subjective definitions of good and evil is contrary to Objectivism; that notwithstanding, his argument still has value to those humans who seek to live and thus make a conscious choice not to lie down and die. (It is beyond the scope to this brief essay, however, to show how Flew and Objectivism can be harmonized.)

Antony assesses the argument as disconcerting to the skeptic, and yet he excuses the usual counter arguments as lacking simplicity or a decisive presence compared to the original dilemma in that they allow the believer room to counter argue. Having set up a dissonance, in dialectical fashion, he then offers a penetrating foil towards coherent synthesis. His attack is directed at the central idea of the F.W.D.; it would be fatal to the notion of the Christian God that if it were not the case that a contradiction obtains such that God could not create a free will where people always choose to do the good. If it is logically possible for God to make a free will that is truly free and also determined so that people always freely choose to do good, then Omnipotence could have “made a world inhabited by wholly virtuous people.”[16] Then the F.W.D. collapses, and the problem of evil destroys any reasoned basis for God belief.

This idea is reinforced by Raymond D. Bradley, who argued from international criminal law: “according to the moral principles concerning Command Responsibility as recognized by Ping Fa around 500 B.C.E., principles that were eventually enshrined in the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1948, and the Nuremberg Charter of 1950 (Principles III and VI of which explicitly assign responsibility to Heads of State who have "planned" and "initiated" crimes against humanity). And, quoting from Article 7 (3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, they pointed out that the fact that a subordinate committed crimes does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts. This principle, they observed, is a particular instance of the more general moral truth:

If a person knows that evil of any kind (natural or moral) will occur or continue to occur unless they prevent it from occurring, and has the ability to prevent it from occurring, then that person is morally culpable for the occurrence of that evil. By virtue of his omnipotence and omniscience, God was found to be an accessory, before, during, and after, the fact of all evils.” [17]

This sets the stage for Flew's blitzkrieg. The first pincer entails defining what it means to act freely. He asks what is meant by “being free to choose”? His insight is that being free to choose does not necessarily mean the choice is unpredictable or uncaused. Paradigmatically, he spins a touching tale about two young lovers with nothing better to do than get married. Murdo exercised his freedom by asking his love, Mairi. Being madly in love with Murdo, she gladly acquiesced. Murdo's and Mairi's actions were not uncaused or in principle unpredictable, nor were they compelled. Yet even if in an all too near future, it becomes a predictable norm that such pairings or nascent behaviors are completely predictable , still Homo Sapiens will be able to choose to do what they want. They will still be able to choose between alternatives that are most appealing. Flew argues that “Unless they (advocates of hard determinism) produce evidence that there was obstruction or pressure or an absence of alternatives, their discoveries will not even be relevant to questions about his freedom of choice, much less a decisive disproof of the manifest fact that sometimes he has complete, sometimes restricted, and sometimes no freedom.” [18]

When we use expressions that characterize an action as either freely chosen or compelled in some fashion, we are not saying that what was done was in theory unpredictable and neither are we asserting that the action was contra-casual. But we are saying that there were viable alternatives. Pivoting on the phrase “could have helped it”, Flew explains that by examining simple “paradigm” cases where writers freely choose from a variety of lexical tools to craft their missives, we can find a wealth of examples of free actions. And if not, then they'll do till the real thing comes along.

Flew's prophecy was fulfilled. Behold - brilliance. “Even if my choices are entirely determined in advance,” expounded Dr. Richard Carrier regarding what free will actually means: “I still make decisions, and my decisions are still caused by who I am and what I know – my thoughts and desires and personality - just as they must be if I am to be “free” in any sense that matters. And because I am still their cause, I can still be praised or blamed for them. This is why compatibilism makes more sense: free will is doing what you want – nothing more, nothing less. And being responsible is being the cause - nothing more, nothing less.”[19]]

Plop-plop-fizz-fizz goes the cathode! After such crafty word smithy, for Flew to just pour his premise like Alka-Seltzer is almost anti-climatic, yet soothing. “...there is no contradiction involved in saying that a particular action or choice was: both free, and could have been helped, and so on; and predictable, or even foreknown, and explicable in terms of caused causes.” He admits that he cannot here demonstrate the premise sound, but he does note that Hume, Hobbes and even Aristotle took a similar line of reasoning. Meanwhile back at the anode, the Catholic Church predicates that it's God has foreknowledge that is not incompatible with human freedom. Raising the bet, he turns the kicker and amusingly observes that, if compatibilism is error, then human free will hitch hikes on God of the Gaps arguments and like God hides in human ignorance. Flew's spartan rhetorical question polishes the first pincer. “... if it is wrong, then it is hard to see what meaning those expressions (“could have helped it”) have and how if at all they could ever be taught, understood, or correctly used.”

Having saved his Panzer divisions, he now deploys them into the other pincer and closes on the salient. “... not only is there no necessary conflict between acting freely and behaving predictably and/or as a result of caused causes; but also Omnipotence might have, could without contradiction be said to have, created only people who would have already as a matter of fact freely have chosen to do the right thing.” [20] Observing that a person's endocrine glands are not the same as a person, and that whatever physiological cause may be accorded responsible for a person's action, it is not contradictory to say that if people can sometimes help doing what they do, they still act freely. He argues against the objection that physiological causes of actions exclude the possibility of doing what is desired. Emphasizing that the absence of proposed physiological causation would imply absence of effect, he contra-distinguishes mental motives to accent a disconnect between the two. By way of analogy he points out that “... if I think as I do because of such and such physiological causes or because of such and such motives; then it cannot also be the case that there are, and I have sufficient reasons, arguments, grounds for thinking as I do.” This hinges on how “because” equivocates multiple ambiguities. There are many explanations which do not exclude one another.

Carrier speaks to the fallacy here identified by Flew when he argues in defense of compatibilism against J.P. Moreland. “Moreland says, for example, that on compatibilism “a reason for acting turns out to be a certain type of state in the agent, a belief-desire state, that is a real efficient cause of the action”. He (Moreland) argues this excludes the possibility of final causes. But since a belief-desire state is an intention, and an intention is a final cause, it follows that final causes can and do exist under compatibilism. A final cause is simply a thought process: a prior calculation form ends to means, which in turn participates in the causal chain that ends in acting. The visualized 'end' is caused by a desire (“I want the second ball to land in the corner pocket”), and the conceptualization of the 'means' is caused by an application of reason and knowledge to that desired end (“If I collide the first ball into the second just so, then I will achieve what I want”). That is all a final cause is, a thought process, and that's an efficient cause: without the final cause (the desired end) there would be no act. So Moreland is attempting to state a tautology (A is B) as if it were a distinction (A is not B), a fundamental violation of basic logic.” [21] The same fallacy was committed by those determinists Flew argued against who claimed physiological causes precluded mental motives. If it is objected that Murdo and Mairi were influence by their glands, again it is pointed out that glands are not people. Murdo and Mairi made their own decision. Despite this it is also true that we can do what we want but that we cannot want whatever we want.

At this point in his essay, Flew serves the 800 pound Gorilla. What becomes of the keystone of the Freewill Defense, if there does not exist a contradiction in thinking that God could have arranged things so that human beings always freely choose the good? If it really is possible for a person's action to be freely chosen and fully determined by caused causes, then doesn't the theodicy collapse? All goods of whatever order presuppose not only corresponding lower order evils but also freedom. Even virtues like honesty and intellectual integrity while not parasitic upon antecedent evils are still contingent to freedom. If there is no contradiction, then there is no need for any soul making theodicy either. The resultant people, no matter the challenge, would always choose the right without the evils of those who choose damnation or that required for higher order goods and virtues. The deity could have evolved humans trustworthy in all situations without need for acquiring trustworthiness via fortitude, suffering, or pain. However, in that case it would be senseless to suggest that God would still be required to forgive or display fortitude.
Nonetheless, subtly reworded versions of Predestination or Determinism could be hurled at the argument. “...but that there is not contradiction in speaking of a world in which there are always antecedent conditions of all human action sufficient to ensure that agents always will as a matter of fact freely chose the right.” [22] The distinction turns on crucial differences in the character of the deity. If the former is asserted, then God's character would be that of a quasi-personal being that has fixed everything that everyone will do, choose, and suffer. If the latter, then the deity is not thought of a puppet master or master hypnotist, rather it just happens to be the case that antecedent conditions predisposing humans to act in a particular, instead of some other, fashion always have, do, and will always obtain. The counter thesis would specify that determinism is perhaps compatible with human freedom and responsibility, but that predestination is assuredly not.

The error here is that predestination alleviates all human responsibility no matter what. Flew wrote: “The first reaction to the idea of God, the Great Hypnotist, is that this would mean that no one ever was or had been or would be really responsible, that none of the people who we should otherwise have been certain could have helped doing things really could. ... But this is very misleading. Certainly it would be monstrous to suggest that anyone, however truly responsible to and in the eyes of men, could fairly be called to account and be punished by the 'God who had rigged his every move. All the bitter words which have ever been written against the wickedness of the God of predestinationism – especially when he is also thought of as filling Hell with all but the elect – are amply justified.” [23] By reminding the reader that the paradigmatic cases defining key phrases exemplifying human liberty are impervious to the predestination doctrine as no theological information can alter their meaning, Flew counters the objection.

Refining the position: “...there is no contradiction in speaking of God as so arranging the laws of nature that all men always as a matter of fact freely choose to do the right.” What infuriates is still the idea that providence punishes anyone for freely choosing the wrong in the case that omnipotence had arraigned the antecedent conditions so that his victim would so act. Flew concludes: “...the Calvinist picture – the Great Hypnotist – is appropriate in its appreciation of the implications of Omnipotence; it is morally obnoxious insofar as it presents human creatures justly accountable to that Omnipotence.” [24]

Flew couldn't resist his sense of symmetry. Although his free choice was likely determined, still he wrote what he wanted, and that's compatibilist free will. As it was in the beginning, so he closes. "Either God cannot abolish evil, or he will not; if he cannot, then he is not all-powerful; if he will not, then he is not all good."

[1] Anthony Flew, ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, p.227, in “Critiques of God: A major statement of the case against belief in God”, edited by Peter Angeles, copyright 1976.

[2] Flew acknowledged his error in wrongly attributing the given quotation to St. Augustine, and he thanked Dr. John Burnaby of St. John’s College for pointing out that St. Augustine did not write the line. The author of the present essay was unsuccessful in finding the actual source of the quote.

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epic_of_Gilgamesh

[4] Dr. Robert Price makes this point in his Bilbegeek Genesis #2 podcast.

[5] Ayn Rand, 'The Objectivist Ethics,' p.15, in “The Virtue of Selfishness”

[6] William L. Rowe, 'The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism', p.253, in “The Improbability of God”, edited by Michael Martin and Ricki Monnier

(Premise 1. “There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”

Premise 2. “An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”) - quoted from Rowe, ibid., p.251

[7] John S. Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, p.186-87 as quoted by Flew, ibid. p.228

[8] Flew, ibid. p.228 citing Aquinas from “Summa Theologica”, IA XXV, Art. 4.

[9] St. Augustine, “…for certainly He is called Almighty only because He is mighty to do all He will…”; “City of God”, Book XXI, p.458, “NPNF1-02. St. Augustin's City of God and Christian Doctrine” - http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102/Page_458.html

[10] St. Jerome, “But I do not presume to limit God's omnipotence…”; “EPISTLE 58: TO PAULINUS”, Art. 3, - http://www.voskrese.info/spl/jerome058.html

[11] Flew, ibid. p.228

[12] Richard Carrier, “Sense and Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism”, p.109

[13] Flew, ibid. p.228

[14] ibid. p.229

[15] ibid. p.229

[16] ibid. p.229

[17] http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/raymond_bradley/fwd-refuted.html#failure

[18] Flew, ibid. p.230

[19] Carrier, ibid., p.109

[20] Flew, ibid., p.231

[21] Carrier, ibid., p.107

[22] Flew, ibid., p.233

[23] ibid., p.235; “The recognition, for example, of the object of highest worship in a being who could make a Hell; and who could create countless generations of human being with the certain foreknowledge that he was creating them for this fate ... Any other of the outrages to the most ordinary justice and humanity involved in the common Christian conception of the moral character of God sinks into insignificance beside this dreadful idealization of wickedness.” (quoted from Mills, “Three Essays On Religion”, p.113-14)

[24] ibid., p.235

Background Beliefs and an Internal Criticism of Christianity Based on the Problem of Evil

I'm having a discussion with a Christian named Drew, who has a B.S. in philosophy, which can be read here. Let me summarize some of the main arguments so far concerning what I've previously called The Most Asinine Christian Argument I've Probably Ever Heard...

I have argued that the more often Christians have to resort to background beliefs—the more often they have to resort to their overall religious worldview to defend a particular tenet of faith—then the less likely their faith is true. I realize we all retreat to background beliefs here and there to support a weak plank in our worldviews, an anomaly, so to speak. But the more one has to do this then the weaker his whole position is. And I claim that on any given issue I wrote about in my book, one after another, a Christian cannot defend that issue on its own terms. Instead he must resort to his background beliefs to do so, time after time, after time. THAT'S why I say my case should be judged as a whole. It's because it will become crystal clear that the Christian cannot fall back on any background belief since I attack each and every major background belief he has, one after another, from the existence of God, to miracles, to the resurrection of Jesus.

When it comes to the problem of evil I made an argument that a Christian must deal with based upon what he believes, not upon what I believe. Based upon what he believes about God and this world he must reconcile the two on its own terms. It’s an internal problem to his belief (not mine) about the existence of a perfectly good God given the massive amount of suffering there is in this world.

Here is my argument:

If God is perfectly good, all knowing, and all powerful, then the issue of why there is so much suffering in the world requires an explanation. The reason is that a perfectly good God would be opposed to it, an all-powerful God would be capable of eliminating it, and an all-knowing God would know what to do about it. So the extent of intense suffering in the world means for the theist that either God is not powerful enough to eliminate it, or God does not care enough to eliminate it, or God is just not smart enough to know what to do about it. The stubborn fact of intense suffering in the world means that something is wrong with God’s ability, or his goodness, or his knowledge. I consider this as close to an empirical refutation of Christianity as is possible.

Is this a logical argument? Yes, even though it's written for the average college student and not for the professional philosopher. Is it an evidential argument? Yes, since I'm looking at the evidence in this world. This whole distinction between a logical and evidential argument is blurred.

The way Drew describes an "internal critique" means I must show his beliefs to be logically impossible by use of deductive logic based solely on the things he believes. And he maintains that an "external critique" depends on my having ultimate standard for objective morals (a separate problem I have dealt with head-on without skirting the issue). So Drew thinks he has me choosing between two horns of a dilemma where I reject BOTH horns. It's a false dilemma. On the one hand, I reject the claim that my logical argument (above) must show his beliefs to be logically contradictory. That's a near impossible standard that isn't required of most ideas we reject. On the other hand, I reject his notion that by offering a so-called "external critique" of his present beliefs means I must have some sort of ultimate standard for objective morals to do so as an atheist, since my argument is not an atheist argument at all; it doesn’t led to atheism. It's an argument that Drew needs to consider in reconciling all that he believes, since he believes God is the author of all truth. Regardless of whether as an atheist I press this argument against him or not, and regardless of whether he agrees with me or not, he must still consider my argument to reconcile his beliefs. This is evidenced by Christian thinkers who have become process thinkers.

This stuff is elementary to me. I think he's been informed by ignorant people who feel the need to justify ignorant beliefs.

Drew said: While both approaches can be affirmed by a single atheist, they are separate critiques and cannot logically be combined into one argument.

Yes they can! I use a cumulative case argument that uses both approaches to come to the same conclusion. As I said, it’s one argument, a comprehensive one, utilizing many other arguments, both logical and inductive. Yes, each one is separate argument. That’s correct. But since no single argument can topple your whole worldview, or anyone’s for that matter, these separate arguments, while seemingly defective on their own terms, present a comprehensive and cumulative whole case.

Drew said: Note: If the atheist says of the Christian’s definitions, “Those definitions are just wrong. Christians have defined God (evil/gratuitous/greater good) incorrectly,” then the atheist has entered evidence outside the Christian worldview, and has therefore switched to an external critique.

What you must remember, is that the argument from intensive suffering is not an atheist argument. An atheist uses it, of course. But since it does not lead to atheism, it’s not an atheist argument at all. Process theologians, deists and pantheists can look at that argument, agree with it, and conclude that the Christian conception of an Omni-God is improbable while retaining some belief in God.

And it's just false to say that as an atheist I’ve entered into an external criticism of your faith by arguing with you about the correct definitions of God and evil. Because every single argument I offer has been considered by a thoughtful Christian who wants to reconcile his own conception of God based on the evidence of suffering. Some of these thinkers will remain Christians after having thought through this, while others have become process thinkers and/or atheists.

As I’ve argued on page 58 in my book, it is a solid Christian principle that “all truth is God’s truth.” Experience, for instance, has always been a check on Biblical exegesis and theology, whether it comes to Wesleyan perfectionism, perseverance of the saints, second coming predictions, Pentecostal miracle workers, and so on. While experience is not the test for truth, the Christian understanding of the truth must be able to explain personal experience. The whole science/religion discussion is an attempt to harmonize the Bible with what scientists have experienced through empirical observations of the universe. My contention is that other disciplines of learning, including experience itself, continually forces the believer to reinterpret the Bible and his notion of God, until there is nothing left to believe with regard to either of them. Is this external? It cannot be. For according to a Christian “all truth is God’s truth.” He's supposedly the creator, so he must be the author of all truth! No Christian can possibly say that all truth—all truth—is found in the Bible. Is rocket science found in the Bible? So my argument is neither an external one, nor is it an atheist argument.

What exactly is an external argument given the Christian view of truth? If an external argument is merely one that the Christian doesn't accept at the present time then that’s irrelevant, for Christian theology has adjusted itself numerous times by arguments and evidence that the previous generation did not accept. Christians should adjust their views here too, just like they’ve done with a rigorously literal view of the Genesis creation accounts in the light of modern science. They should adjust, just like they've adjusted to liberal views on women when compared to Christians of earlier centuries. They should adjust, just like they've done by condemning racism and slavery, unlike Christians who justified these things in the American South. They should adjust, just like they do with their liberal views of hell when compared to the Middle Ages. They should adjust, just like they do with regard to their liberal and heretical ideas of a free democracy when compared to earlier times of the divine rights of kings. They should adjust, just like Christians have done who no longer think the Bible justifies killing people who disagree. If these previous Christians replied to the evidence, as you do now, that such arguments are external to their faith, you'll see my point. Since Christians have historically changed their views based on this so-called “external evidence,” what they believe is now considered to be internal to their faith.

Drew said: If the atheist is making an external-evidential critique, then the atheist’s worldview must account for that evidence.

At some point, yes, and I think I have. But I do not need to make that argument before I make my case based upon the suffering in this world.

Drew said: Overall, it looks like the internal critique, but he refers to the “extent of intense suffering”.

If I cannot force the believer to look at what we find in the world itself to show his beliefs wrong, then that believer lives in la la land. You might as well be a solipsist. You MUST look at the world that exists and reconcile it with your beliefs about God. This problem, even though I point to the world that exists, is still an internal one for your beliefs.

I am distinguishing what I think about evil from what a Christian thinks. I’m claiming intensive suffering is a problem for the Christian theist. This is not my problem. It’s yours. I’m arguing that this kind of suffering is what you should consider an “evil.” That’s what this debate is all about at this point. I’m trying to argue that it is an evil from YOUR perspective. What counts as a moral evil from MY perspective can and is much different. For instance, the law of predation is not considered by me to be a moral “evil” at all. This is what I expect given evolutionary biology. But I’m arguing that it is an evil from your perspective. I think it’s you who is confused here about that which I’m arguing about.

If I cannot convince you that your faith is improbable then that does not matter. I claim it is. I use your standards to do so. Why you don’t see it is strange to me. As I former Christian I became persuaded of these things, so why is it impossible for you to do so? The answer is that it is not impossible for you to see that you’re wrong, just like I did. That’s how we change our minds, and we all do. Who knows, you might end up a panentheist after further considerations of these arguments. Who knows, right? THEN what will you say about my arguments? You will say they helped you to see the improbability of your prior beliefs.

You cannot answer YOUR problem by skirting the issue. You cannot say “you too” when you must answer an argument that you must deal with even if NO ONE pressed it against you! You must think about this problem for your faith on your own. The beliefs of a person who makes this or any argument are absolutely and completely irrelevant to the problem you yourself face. Again, if you believe all things can be reconciled by your faith then you and you alone must do the reconciling. You can say you have done so all you want to, but since human beings have an overwhelming tendency to intellectually defend those beliefs they have been brought up in, and since they treat those things they believe with an insider perspective, they must come to grips with the arguments of outsiders just to test what they believe.

I’ll have to admit Drew is tenacious, something that’s both annoying and at the same time rewarding. It’s annoying that I have written so much about the internal/external problem without any success with you. It’s rewarding because it forces me to go deeper and deeper with him.

Drew responds by saying…

An internal argument assumes the truth of the worldview, position, or argument in question in order to derive a contradiction from that assumption. Loftus is completely incapable of supporting [his arguments] with anything other than either (1) evidence of evil that is external, or (2) some other evidence against God that is unrelated to the problem of evil. If Loftus chooses option (1), then he must account for that evidence on his own worldview. If he chooses option (2), then he’s making a tacit admission that his position is weak [per what I, John, argued above with regard to retreating to background beliefs supporting a weak plank in what we believe]. The point is, explanation of how the Christian worldview accounts for certain facts is not in any way “presupposing” what one is trying to prove. If it is, then Loftus is guilty of the same thing every time he explains some feature of his worldview in order to defend it.

Loftus then argues against hell, attempting again to do it internally. His basic argument is that the “punishments don’t fit the crimes”. (p. 256) He also says that the reality of the majority of people suffering in hell is “incompatible with the theistic conception of a good God.” (p. 256)

I had to read that statement a couple times. The Christian theistic conception of God holds that He does condemn some people to hell. What “theistic conception of a good God” is Loftus talking about here? It’s not the Christian one. If the Christian conception of a good God conflicts with Loftus’ conception of a good God, or anyone else’s for that matter, so what? I know he’s trying to make it an internal argument by claiming there’s an incompatibility, but he keeps jumping outside the Christian worldview when he says things like, “the punishment doesn’t fit the crimes.” I have to ask, “by what standard?” Not the Christian one, so which one? And why is that standard true?

Here’s the problem Drew.

My particular argument in chapter 12 is not directed at the Calvinistic conception of God, per se. As I’ve already admitted, I dismiss such a Calvinistic conception of God. And it’s not supposed to be a defeater of the whole Christian worldview, since my case is a cumulative case, even if I say it’s an “empirical refutation” of such a God (which is rhetoric, although I believe it). Nor is it a logical disproof of the theistic God, although it is a logical argument. Therefore, your criticisms of my arguments are not aimed properly against that which I am arguing against. In that sense there should be several occasions where you would be found saying: “Yes, John is absolutely correct, given the nature of that which he’s arguing against.”

Even at that, I take a swipe at your conception of God when I shared John Beversluis’s argument:

“If the word ‘good’ must mean approximately the same thing when we apply it to God as what it means when we apply it to human beings, then the fact of suffering provides a clear empirical refutation of the existence of a being who is both omnipotent and perfectly good. If on the other hand, we are prepared to give up the idea that ‘good’ in reference to God means anything like what it means when we refer to humans as good, then the problem of evil can be sidestepped, but any hope of a rational defense of the Christian God goes by the boards.”

As I said, there is no real distinction between an internal and external criticism given that you believe all truth is God’s, for you must still account for the external evidence of intense suffering in this world. Besides, in any deductive argument ABOUT THE WORLD (in contrast with abstract entities) there is always an appeal to induction from the evidence found in the world, while in any inductive argument there is always some deduction that must be concluded from the evidence.

Reductio ad absurdum arguments can either be used to show what you believe is logically impossible or they can be used to show that your beliefs commit you an improbabilities. I’m saying something like this, “Let’s suppose you are right. If so, these are the absurd consequences. My argument is that your beliefs commit you to accept improbably absurd consequences. I’m not arguing that your beliefs are internally contradictory. Now let’s say you deny or reject the consequences that I point out. Okay. Fine. That does not mean I haven’t used a reductio ad absurdum argument. It’s clear that I have. But in order to reject my arguments you must retreat into other background beliefs to do so, and that’s when I say “the more you retreat into background beliefs the less likely your faith is true.” When it comes to the problem of intense suffering I maintain this is just another example of you retreating to these background beliefs. Once I make this point let’s move on to the next chapter, and the next and the next, until I make my whole case that you have no probable background beliefs from which to fall back on.

And so I find it completely ignorant for you to still maintain that the force of a particular argument depends on the beliefs of the one making it. Just show me one other argument that depends on the beliefs of the one making it. There is a widely accepted strategy called “the Devil’s Advocate” in which the arguer merely argues for the sake of seeing how someone responds. It would do absolutely no good once it’s realized that someone was playing the devil’s advocate to dismiss his objections at that point, for his arguments must still be met and dealt with.

Finally, as I have said, no single argument can debunk a whole Christian worldview. Yet you claim that “an internal critique must assume one's worldview at the outset for the sake of argument.” The argument I’m making in my chapters about suffering is narrowed to this problem alone. I am not taking on your whole worldview at this point. Given the nature of worldviews I can’t do that…no one can. I’m dealing strictly with one aspect of your worldview. Other chapters, such as the arguments for the existence of God, are dealt with elsewhere. If I had to abide by your rule and assume your whole worldview with everything in it, then you have given me an impossible task when dealing with any single belief in your worldview.

Worldviews, anyway, are almost but not quite incommensurable, if you know what I mean. They are elusive to an outsider’s criticisms. They account for nearly everything within it as insiders. That’s why I also argue for the “Outsider Test for Faith.” To use the insider language of a whole worldview would make it near impossible to offer any outsider criticisms of that worldview. Have you ever tried to critique pantheism as an insider? Try it. In the meantime read what Christian philosopher James Sire said about it in his book The Universe Next Door. Here’s a snippet:

“What can Westerners say? If they point to its irrationality, the Easterner rejects reason as a category. If they point to the disappearance of morality, the Easterner scorns the duality that is required for the distinction. If they point to the inconsistency between Easterner’s moral action and amoral theory, the Easterner says, ‘Well, consistency is not virtue except by reason, which I’ve already rejected.’…If the Westerner says, ‘But if you don’t eat, you’ll die,’ the Easterner responds, ‘So what? Atman is Brahman. Brahman is eternal. A death to be wished.’ It is, I think, no wonder Western missionaries have made so little headway with committed Hindus and Buddhists. They don’t speak the same language, for they hold almost nothing in common.”

That’s exactly how I feel with you. We live in different worldviews. I cannot critique your whole worldview by criticizing one issue, and we don’t speak the same language. You must simply “See” things differently. If I cannot help you to see things differently then I’ve still done the best I can. I do the best I can to bridge the worldview gap between us that I think is possible, despite your insistence that my arguments are not consistently internal (or inside) to that which you believe. I maintain they are the best that an outsider can do (they are the best I can do anyway).

Let me put this into perspective, Drew. You say God is sovereign and can do whatever he wants to with us as human beings because we’re sinners deserving of hell. This does not make him less than perfectly good, you maintain. He’s perfectly good. We deserve what he sends our way as punishment. We have done this to ourselves.

That, in brief, if I understand it properly, is your Calvinistic position…your theodicy. Granted there is much more to it, okay?

I have already argued that since we cannot behave differently, or desire to do to differently, or even believe differently than what we do, this defeats the whole notion of the God you believe. But leaving that insurmountable problem to the gerrymanderers, since it seems perfectly clear we do not deserve the treatment God punishes us with, there's more to say about this.

How then can I make you see the improbability of your beliefs? It reminds me of James Sire’s discussion above with a pantheist. You see the problem now? We see things differently. To assume this whole explanation of yours as a basis for my argument about intense suffering in this world is to assume too much for one argument. I dispute these other assumptions of yours in other parts of my book. I dispute the existence of God. I dispute the claim that we alone are responsible for our sins because God supposedly created us. And I dispute the whole notion that our sins deserve punishment in such draconian ways as we experience on earth and later in hell. I dispute the concept of hell. I dispute the concept of Satan. I even argue that you should approach your faith as an outsider.

All of these arguments converge against you when attempting to dispute my rejection of Christianity, plus more.

It’s the best anyone can do. It is certainly the best I can do.

So it’s simply false that I must assume your whole worldview (an impossible task) when disputing any single tenet insider your worldview. Such a task cannot be done when looking at any single tenet inside your worldview. But I have examined each major tenet you believe in the many other chapters in my book, all which converge to make the over-all case that your faith is delusionary.

As I said, you must continually retreat, over and over, on each and every issue I write about, to background beliefs to defend a weak plank in your worldview. You must do it for each chapter I write about. You’re doing this here on the problem of suffering. You will do it when it comes to the resurrection (since you will say miracles are not impossible if God exists). You will do it when it comes to the existence of God (since I cannot prove God does not exist). You will do it with regard to my chapter on miracles (since if God exists this would not be impossible for him). And so on and so on.

Have I made my case about the problem of suffering and the existence of God? I think so, as an outsider. But whether you think so will depend on what you think of my whole over-all case against Christianity. As I said, you must deal with my book as a whole. Maybe you’ll do that, I don’t know. But what I’ll look for is how many times you must retreat to background beliefs to support the each and every chapter in my book, beliefs which I debunk in subsequent chapters, one after another. The more you do this then the more circular your approach becomes and the less likely it has explanatory power in defending what you believe.

The Problem of Goodness and Hume's Hypothesis of Indifference.

David Hume offered us four choices about the moral nature of "the first causes of the universe." Either they are 1) perfectly good, 2) perfectly evil, 3) they are opposites and have both goodness and malice, or 4) they have neither goodness nor malice. Paul Draper calls the last choice the Hypothesis of Indifference, or HI.

Hume (through Philo) argues for HI in these words: "Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far more probable." [Dialogues, part XI].

When it comes to the opposite claims that "the first causes of the universe" are either, 1) perfectly good or 2) perfectly evil, it seems implausible to accept either of these extremes given the fact that we see both goodness and suffering in our world. This is what Hume calls "mixed phenomena," in that we see both goodness and malice in our world.

Those who argue that these causes are "perfectly good" have to explain why there is so much evil in this world, known as the problem of evil. Those who argue that these causes are "perfectly evil" have to explain why there is so much goodness in this world, known as the problem of goodness.

Let's consider the problem of goodness for Hume's second choice, placed in the context of a Supreme Being.

Why is there goodness, we might ask, in a world created by a malicious being? The answers provided would be the same ones that theists who believe in a perfectly good God use to explain the problem of evil, such as: 1) Goodness is the result of truly free actions. 2) Goodness is necessary for evil to exist. 3) Rather than this world being a place for “soul making,” it is designed for “soul breaking.” 4) Any good in the world will produce greater evils. 4) We may not know why this malicious Supreme Being allows goodness, but he knows what he’s doing.

But since the same arguments produce two opposite and contradictory conclusions, both conclusions are implausible…they cancel each other out.

To see this argued in greater depth, Stephen Law, the editor of Think, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Journal, has a dialogue called The God of Eth, which I recommend. He defends his argument from a further objection here, but I highly recommend you read his response to Richard Swinburne's objections here.

Religion and Falsifiability

Atheists have for a long time pointed out that evil makes the existence of a perfect God at least less likely, and theists of course have attempted to explain why that is not the case. One interesting aspect of this debate is that, given the way theists argue, there cannot possibly be any amount of evil that would make their God less likely. Their answers to the problem of evil aren’t designed to account for a particular amount of pain and suffering, but for whatever pain and suffering there happens to be.

The free will defense, for example, says that evil is the result of the choices made by fallen human beings (and angels), and that is meant to explain away terrible things no matter how bad they are. The Holocaust, the Black Plague, cancer, atheism — all of these things and more can be blamed on us rather than on the all-powerful being in charge. (The buck has to stop somewhere.) Or consider soul-making theodicies, which argue that what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger (and, come to think of it, that even what does kill you makes you stronger). Or the view that it is simply a mystery why God allows pain and suffering, but that there must be some reason which we puny humans are too dumb to understand. None of these explanations attempts to account only for a certain amount of evil, but rather for any amount we might encounter. No matter what evil may befall us, we should remain confident that there is an all-loving God who has a reason for allowing it.

Read more »

David Wood Is No Longer Worth My Time

This Blog Entry has been reposted because some people still think it's a mutual misunderstanding that Mr. Wood and I have with each other. Some of that is undoubtedly true, but I have just responded to this in comments 58-61 (beware, harsh language at one point).

I still want to stress that I like David Wood very much, and apart from our disputes I would consider him a friend of mine. What I am strictly dealing with are his arguments. Nothing personal is implied, even if I have been frustrated with him at times. He's a good man.

I do commend him for dealing with the problem of evil. My claim is that he is not dealing with this problem head on. I think he ought to take the advice of Adam in the comments below and just say he believes in the goodness of God despite the suffering in this world as a sort of Kierkegaardian leap of faith, and leave it at that. For as long as he wants to figure this out, he won't be able to do so.

Dr. Weisberger told me I'm wasting my time with David Wood of Answering Infidels and The Problem of Evil Blog. Like many others before her, I think she's right. She also advised me to argue with him on my blog, so I am now. I want people to see how he argues. So here we go...

Mr Wood claims that the argument from the problem of evil is an atheist argument. I responded that the problem of evil would have to be dealt with by him even if no atheist argued for it, since it flows out of that which he believes about an omni-God. He responded by distinguishing between the "problem of evil" and the "argument from evil," and the "argument from evil" is indeed an atheist argument. If successful as an atheist, he argues I'm trying to show that "God doesn't exist." But that is High School level thinking. A process theologian could press the argument, as could a pantheist. The conclusion of the argument isn't that God doesn't exist, only that if God exists he either isn't omnibenelovent, omniscient, or omnipotent. So why is it an atheist argument when it may not lead to atheism? A Deist could use it. I think it does show the Christian God doesn't exist, but it most emphatically doesn't lead to atheism. The amazing thing to me is that David does not back down, so far, and I don't expect him to here either.

After disagreeing with Dr. Weisberger's discussion of the burdern of proof , which I in turn agreed with her, Mr. Wood claims something wildly fanciful about that "method" (which isn't a method at all). He wrote:

"So the question arises, "Why would John cling to such an absurd method?" The answer: "Because he can't handle having to support his arguments with evidence." I see no other explanation.

Really now? Is it really true he can see no other explanation? Come on now David, think a little more deeply than that. What other explanations are there for why we argue you have the burden of proof here? Could it be that we think you do, irrespective of anything else? The burden of proof is not on the person who is disputing a claim, especially an extraordinary claim about an omni-God (or that there are invisible gremlins), but on the claimant. The person who makes a claim always has the burden of proof. Furthermore, if what he says is true, that I cannot support my arguments with evidence, then why is it that I am stressing the evidence, and arguing that that evidence is overwhelmingly against him? It's obvious that's what I've argued.

Besides Dr. Weisberger, Dr. Jeffry's also has commented on our debate. After reading both of their comments here's what David Wood said:

I've noticed something interesting, however. Both atheist reviewers (Weisberger and Jeffrys) seem to imply that John's arguments didn't work. That is, Jeffrys's response was "It would have been good to bring X up, and you shouldn't have let him get away with Y." Weisberger, apart from outlining [John's]arguments, responded by showing what she would have said in response to my claims. That is, at no point does either reviewer say "David said so and so, but John proved that wrong when he said such and such." Instead, both reviewers try to explain to readers what John should have said.

David claims that what they both wrote seems to imply my arguments "didn't work." Really? That is so slipshod by way of evaluating what their intent was, that I didn't think it needed mentioning that this is a completely ignorant thing to say. [The reason I mention this now, is because I'm seeing quite a pattern here coming from Mr. Wood and I want to lay a few examples on the table]. They were entering the debate. They were offering their own take on the arguments in the debate. There is no way anyone should ever conclude that because they had their own arguments on the issue that this implies they thought my arguments were ineffective at all! This is a non-sequitur.

But there is more. There was a post at Triablogue about a book called, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence by David Benatar, where the author discusses whether or not parents should bring children into existence given the harms that life might bring upon them, and that parents should give it serious thought before bringing another child into this world. According to the editorial review, "David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm. He argues for the 'anti-natal' view---that it is always wrong to have children. Anti-natalism also implies that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Although counter-intuitive for many, that implication is defended, not least by showing that it solves many conundrums of moral theory about population." You can see the book and the reviews for yourselves here

Okay so far?

Now in comes David Wood, who wrote:

This guy sounds like John Loftus with a PhD.

Really? Is that what I am saying? We'll get to that later.

Then Jim Pemberton wrote:

Let's see a show of hands: who is glad they were born - despite any discomfort? I'm raising mine.

Then David Wood wrote:

THIS JUST IN FROM JOHN LOFTUS:

Jim,

You said that you're raising your hand because you'd rather live. But what about all the people who can't raise their hands because their hands have been chopped off in an accident? What about them? Huh?!! What about people who were born without hands! It must be easy for you to raise your hand, since you've got one. But other people don't have them, and they all understand that it would be better to die. Yeah, they understand. They can't play Nintendo like you. Cause they don't have hands. So think about that, Mr. Handman. Think about people with no hands. And you'll see that we'd all be better off not existing. That's why I don't like God, you know. Cause he made me exist and all. And he doesn't give me everything I want. That's just not right.

Now check out my response:

John W. Loftus said (with corrected typos)...

Okay, funny guys.

Have you ever heard of the phrase, "you'll wish you were never born?" That usually refers to someone who is about to be beaten or tortured to a bloody pulp. There have been such people you know. There have been people born who never had a pleasurable day, due to sickness, starvation, and torture. There are teenagers who have merely spoken their minds only to spend the rest of their lives in a gulag and to die, never seeing their parents again. I could go on and on and on, of course.

This is what I'm referring to, and all you can do is to joke about it. But I understand why you must do so. Because you can't face the problem head on for what it really is.

But there is more. After these people die, according to Christian theology some of them, maybe most of them, will suffer eternal conscious torment forever in hell. This is where the other shoe drops.

Face the problem head on. There are people according to YOUR own theology who wish they had never been born.

Stop joking about this real situation from the standpoint of the silver spoons in your mouths.

You actually make me sick.

I do think it's sick to so glibly treat a serious issue of why GOD, not parents, brings people into existence. And I think it's ignorant to even hint that my argument is anywhere close to what David Wood says it is here. He even thinks I wish I never existed! He has even argued that, if I enjoy life, I "shouldn't constantly describe the world as if it's nothing but a cesspool of death, disease, and bloodshed." But that again, is nothing like what I'm saying. He just doesn't understand for some reason. There is good in the world. I enjoy life very much. My questions are about why so many people (other than me) have to suffer so much if there is a good God, and why this God created such a world when he knew in advance that these people will suffer like they do.

Speaking of my questions, that's all he thinks I'm doing, asking questions. He summarized my 20 minute opening statement by placing the following words in my mouth: "I asked 'why this?' and 'why that?' for twenty minutes without making a serious argument." If anyone can read my opening statement and come away thinking I never made a serious argument, he is intellectually challenged.

I have repeatedly asked Mr. Wood to state my argument in his own words, and the two times he tried to do so, he failed miserably. So I challenge him to do so again, if he responds here. For he cannot seriously interact with my argument until he can effectively state it. That's what scholars do before they argue against someone. First they lay out the other person's argument, so that everyone can see for themselves if he did so fairly, with no strawmen. And scholars must do so charitably too, giving it the most charitable interpretation. I suspect he refuses to do so because he cannot effectively argue against it. Whether that's the case or not is to be seen. Maybe I'm wrong on this. But because he misunderstands and misrepresents so much of what I'm saying, I doubt it.

David Wood responded:

"You actually make me sick."

MORE FROM LOFTUS:

If God exists, why would he make so many people who make me sick? A good God would have put us on different planets, so I wouldn't get sick thinking about you disgusting people and your logic and all that. If I had the choice between living in a world with you people, and not living at all, I'd rather not exist. But here again, God hasn't given me what I want. So I will fight against him with all my might, and I will teach him that no one denies John Loftus! No one!

My concern here is that David Wood is in a Ph.D program at Fordham University in Philosophy where he must logically evaluate arguments. When it comes to the problem of evil he shows little evidence that he can do this. I wonder what his professors would think of this? It does not speak well for Fordham University, in my opinion. What Mr. Wood is saying is filled with many strawmen arguments, including the informal fallacy of "horse laughter."

Then I responded one final time:

John Loftus said...
David, I guess your response either means 1) my questions are silly and have already been answered by you so the only fitting response is to laugh at me, even though my questions about existing are sincere ones, and even though I have never seen you even attempt to answer them, ever, or 2) you refuse to face head on what your theology commits you to, so you refuse to deal with it. If there are other options please let me know what they are.

Bottom tier buddy. Sorry. But that conclusion is inescapable.

Carry on then. Bring on more ridicule. When you actually want to deal with this problem, let me know.

When I referred to "bottom tier," here, I meant that he is in the bottom third tier of those who defend the Christian faith, which parallels his placing the Rational Response Squad in the bottom third tier of those who defend atheism.

There are probably about ten types of things Mr. Wood continues to argue that shows me he's not really dealing with the problem of evil head on, and which shows me he is in the bottom third tier of those Christians who defend the Christian faith.

Now is he worth my time or not? I've just spend some time here, haven't I? Well, then yes, and no. Maybe I'm still hoping that by bringing these things to the light it might help him to take a serious look at what I'm actually saying and respond as the budding respectful scholar he's supposed to be. But until he does, I can no longer take him seriously.