Recommended Books by Evangelical Scholars

The following are books written by evangelical scholars that I, as a religious skeptic, highly recommend to evangelical Christians. Obviously I will not agree with everything written but these authors demonstrate the many problems with evangelical views of the Bible and the natural world.

• Peter Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament.

• Kenton Sparks, God's Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship.

• Vincent Bacote, Laura Miguelez, Dennis Okholm, eds., Evangelicals & Scripture: Tradition, Authority and Hermeneutics.

• John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible.

• Paul Seely, Inerrant Wisdom: Science and Inerrancy in Biblical Perspective.

• John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate.

• Craig Bartholomew, C. Stephen Evans, Mary Healy, Murray Rae, eds., "Behind" the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation.

• Darrel R. Falk, Coming to Peace With Science.

• Stephen J. Godfrey and Christopher R. Smith, Paradigms on Pilgrimage: Creationism, Paleontology and Biblical Interpretation.

• Davis A. Young and Ralph F. Stearley, The Bible, Rocks and Time: Geological Evidence for the Age of the Earth.

• Mark Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind.

• Alan G. Padgett & Patrick Keifert, eds., But is It All True? The Bible and the Question of Truth.

• Ruth A. Tucker, Walking Away from Faith: Unraveling the Mystery of Belief and Unbelief.

• Scot McKnight and Hauna Ondrey, Finding Faith, Losing Faith: Stories of Conversion and Apostasy.

The Changing Face of Apologetics: I Agree with Lee Strobel

Well, it looks like I agree with Christian apologist Lee Strobel. If he's right then I got it right in my book. In an interview for the evangelical magazine Christianity Today, he was asked this question: How have evangelism and apologetics changed? Here is his answer:

They have become more relational, more story-driven. Josh McDowell would go on college campuses and describe why to trust the Bible. And people would come to faith in droves. Then they stopped coming to faith in so many numbers, and he didn't know why. And now he takes a story approach. "You know," he says, "I was the son of the town drunk. This is how it affected my life and my relationship with [my dad]. This is what prompted me to seek spiritually. This is the evidence I found. This is how my life was changed. This is how I reconciled with my father." So it becomes a story.

That's what my ministry is about. I tell my story: I was an atheist. I scoffed. My wife became a Christian. It prompted me to investigate. Here's the evidence I found, how I received Christ, the difference it's made. It's a story. And I found that in postmodern America, people often are willing to engage on the level of story.

Link.

If he's right then deconversion (deprogramming) stories are useful in counter-apologetics too. In my book I tell my story. I tell how I came to faith, what experiences I had in the church, what experiences led me away from that faith, and why I personally decided there was no God. It's a complete story about my past Christian life, some parts of which are ugly. I also produce what some people describe as a massive refutation of Christianity in it, but it contains a story, my story.

Well-Researched, Judicious, and Enlightening: A Review of Robert Wright's "The Evolution of God."

I just wrote a review of this book to be found at Amazon.com. See what you think. If it's a helpful review, please let them know.

Making the inference to the supernatural

The apologist needs to show that if Jesus rose from the dead, he probably rose supernaturally (i.e. there was divine involvement). But how can he do this? He can only do this by showing that Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally. In other words,

P1. Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally. [I'm granting - for purposes of argument - that Jesus really did rise from the dead].
C. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.

When we ask the apologist how he will attempt to establish (1), his defense will be to appeal to current science and our knowledge about the possibility of people coming back from the dead. In other words,

P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.

This route seems more promising, and if we grant (P1), as most do, then only one question remains: Is the inference from (P1) to (C1) valid? It would be if the apologist can demonstrate the following:

Assumption ~A: there probably could not have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.

Why is (~A) needed in order for the inference from (P1) to (C1) to be valid? To see that (~A) is needed, consider:

Assumption A: there probably could have existed relevant differences (i.e. physiological, technological, etc) between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, might have been able to rise naturally from the dead.

If (A) were true, then clearly the inference from (P1) to (C1) would fail, and if there were no good reason to believe that (~A) were true, the inference would also fail. Hence the apologist is forced to argue that (~A) is true, which I do not think he can do. Thus we finally come to:

P1. The rest of humanity can't rise naturally, and ~A.
C1. Therefore, Jesus probably couldn't have risen naturally.
C2. Therefore, Jesus probably rose supernaturally.

Now we see the problem: there's no good reason to accept (P1) because there's no good reason to believe (~A).

My First "Flea"

Richard Dawkins labels any book written against his book as a "flea." I now have one too! Fred DeRuvo's book, The Anti-Supernatural Bias Of Ex-Christians: And Other Important Topics, deals with mine in the 5th-7th chapters. Check out the back cover. Fred sent me a copy and I've read it. There is nothing there that seriously engages my arguments even though he tried to be fair with them. Of my book he says: "It is a fairly well written and certainly a thoughtful and insightful treatise..." (p. 60). He also admits: "John does not seem to be purposefully unfair in his assessment of Christianity, or of the Bible and or of God." (p. 84) Fred has a Masters in Biblical Studies from Tyndale Theological Seminary.

I know of at least one more flea coming.

“Birds of a Feather, Flock Together!”

Asheville Priest Charged With Obstruction In Child Sex Case - Resigned Tuesday

A Western North Carolina Catholic priest has been charged with Obstruction Of Justice.
The Rev. John Schneider was arrested Monday and has since bailed out of jail.
This, after police say he deleted pornographic images off the home computer of his church’s music minister.
That man, Paul Lawrence Berrell, was under investigation and later arrested, last month, on multiple counts of sexual exploitation of a minor—statutory rape—and indecent liberties with a child.
He is currently being held at the Buncombe County Detention Center under a $1.5 million bond.
Rev. Schneider was pastor of St. Eugene Catholic Church since 2005. His bond was set at 10-thousand dollars.
The Diocese of Charlotte tells us he has resigned his position. A replacement will soon be assigned.
Video Here

Christian Belief Through the Lens of Cognitive Science: Part 3 of 6

I Know Because I Know

On a warm afternoon in June, two men have appointments with a psychiatrist. The first has been dragged to the office by his wife, much to his irritation. He is a biologist who suffers from schizophrenia, and the wife insists that his meds are not working. “No,” says the biologist, “I’m actually fine. It’s just that because of what I’m working on right now the CIA has been bugging my calls and reading my email.” Despite his wife’s skepticism and his understanding of his own illness, he insists calmly that he is sure, and he lines up evidence to support his claim. The other man has come on his own because he is feeling exhausted and desperate. He shows the psychiatrist his hands, which are raw to the point of bleeding. No matter how many times he washes them (up to a hundred in a day) or what he uses (soap, alcohol, bleach or scouring pads) he never feels confident that they are clean.

In both of these cases, after brain biochemistry is rebalanced, the patient’s sense of certainty falls back in line with the evidence. The first man becomes less sure about the CIA thing and gradually loses interest in the idea. The second man begins feeling confident that his hands are clean after a normal round of soap and water, and the cracks begin healing.

How do we know what is real? How do we know what we know? We don’t, entirely. Research on psychiatric disorders and brain injuries shows that humans have a feeling or sense of knowing that can get activated by reason and evidence but can get activated in other ways as well. Conversely, when certain brain malfunctions occur, it may be impossible to experience a sense of knowing no matter how much evidence piles up. V. S. Ramachandran describes a brain injured patient who sees his mother and says, “This looks like my mother in every way, but she is an imposter.” The connection between his visual cortex and his limbic system has been severed, and even though he sees his mother perfectly well, he has no sense of rightness or knowing so he offers the only explanation he can find (Capgras Delusion).

Neurologist Robert Burton explains it this way: “Despite how certainty feels, it is neither a conscious choice nor even a thought process. Certainty and similar states of knowing what we know arise out of involuntary brain mechanisms that, like love or anger, function independently of reason.” (On Being Certain, xi) This “knowing what we know” mechanism is good enough for getting around in the world, but not perfect. For the most part, it lets us explain, predict, and influence people or objects or events, and we use that knowledge to advantage. But as the above scenarios show, our ability to tell what is real also can get thrown off.

Burton says that the “feeling of knowing” (rightness, correctness, certainty, conviction) should be thought of as one of our primary emotions, like anger, pleasure, or fear. Like these other feelings, it can be triggered by a seizure or a drug or direct electrical stimulation of the brain. Research after the Korean War (e.g. R Lifton) suggested that the feeling of knowing or not knowing also can be produced by what are called brainwashing techniques: repetition, sleep deprivation, and social/emotional manipulation. Once triggered for any reason, the feeling that something is right or real can be incredibly powerful--so powerful that when it goes head to head with logic or evidence the feeling wins. Our brains make up reasons to justify our feeling of knowing, rather than following logic to its logical conclusion.

For many reasons, religious beliefs are usually undergirded by a strong “feeling of knowing.” Set aside for the moment the question of whether those beliefs tap underlying realities. Conversion experiences can be intense, hypnotic, and transformative. Worship practices, music and religious architecture have been optimized over time to evoke right brain sensations of transcendence and euphoria. Social insularity protects a community consensus. Repetition of ideas reinforces a sense of conviction or certainty. Religious systems like Christianity that emphasize right belief have built in safeguards against contrary evidence, doubt, and the assertions of other religions. Many a freethinker has sparred a smart, educated fundamentalist into a corner only to have the believer utter some form of “I just know.”

Does this mean that rational argumentation about religion is useless? The answer may be disappointing. Religious belief is not bound to regular standards of evidence and logic. It is not about logic and it is not obliged to follow logic. Arguments with believers start from a false premise—that the believer is bound by the rules of debate rather than being bound by the belief itself. The freethinker assumes that the believer is free to concede; but this is rarely true. At best the bits of logic or evidence put forth in an argument go into the hopper with a whole host of other factors. And yet each of us who is a former believer (we number in the millions) reached some point in our lives when we simply couldn’t sustain our old certainties. Our sense of knowing either eroded over time or abruptly disappeared. So sometimes those hoppers do fill up.

Given what I’ve said about knowing, how can anybody claim to know anything?
We can’t, with certainty. Those of us who are not religious could do with a little more humility on this point. We all see “through a glass darkly” and there is a realm in which all any of us can do is to make our own best guesses about what is real and important. This doesn’t imply that all ideas are created equal, or that our traditional understanding of “knowledge” is useless. As I said before, our sense of knowing allows us to navigate this world pretty well—to detect regularities, anticipate events and make things happen. In the concrete domain of everyday life, acting on what we think we know works pretty well for us. Nonetheless, it is a healthy mistrust for our sense of knowing that has allowed scientists to detect, predict, and produce desired outcomes with ever greater precision.

The scientific method has been called “institutionalized doubt” because it forces us to question our assumptions. Scientists stake their hopes not on a specific set of answers but on a specific way of asking questions. Core to this process is “falsification” – narrowing down what might be true by ruling out what can’t be true. And to date, that approach has had enormous pay-offs. It is what has made the difference between the nature of human life in the Middle Ages and the 21st Century. But knowledge in science is provisional; at any given point in time, the sum of scientific knowledge is really just a progress report.

When we overstate our ability to know, we play into the fundamentalist fallacy that certainty is possible. Burton calls this “the all-knowing rational mind myth.” As scientists learn more about how our brains work, certitude is coming to be seen as a vice rather than a virtue. Certainty is a confession of ignorance about our ability to be passionately mistaken. Humans will always argue passionately about things that we do not know and cannot know, but with a little more self-knowledge and humility we may get to the point that those arguments are less often lethal.

Essentials: Robert A. Burton, On Being Certain
V. S. Ramachandran (TED talk), A Journey to the Center of Your Mind

If you don’t want to miss any of this series, subscribe to Valerie Tarico at this blog or send email to valerietarico at hotmail.com and request to be added to her mailing list for weekly articles.

MSBH vs. DBH

1. If H1 and H2 can potentially explain all the observed physical events they are intended to explain, and H1 is not initially less probable than H2, then, if H1 makes far less causal assumptions than H2, H1 is preferable to H2.
2. MSBH and DBH can potentially explain all the observed physical events they are intended to explain (e.g. resurrection, postmortem appearances, etc), and MSBH is not initially less probable than DBH.
3. MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the observed physical events.
4. Therefore, MSBH is preferable to DBH.

MSBH = Jesus was a merely superpowerful being who rose from the dead.
DBH = Jesus was a divine being who rose from the dead.

In this post I will only attempt to defend (3). Why do I say MSBH makes far less causal assumptions than DBH to explain the physical events intended to be explained? Consider what William Lane Craig says about the resurrection event:

"Resurrection is not resuscitation. The mere restoration of life to a corpse is not a resurrection. A person who has resuscitated returns only to this early life and will die again."

In contrast,

"Jesus rose to eternal life in a radically transformed body that can be described as immortal, glorious, powerful, and supernatural. In this new mode of existence he was not bound by the physical limitations of this existence, but possessed superhuman powers." (Knowing the Truth About the Resurrection, p 15)

Clearly, then, DBH ascribes far more - infinitely more - causal powers to Jesus than MSBH, and therefore MSBH is the simpler of the two.


*Edit*

DBH makes far more causal assumptions primarily because of the following: according to this theory, after Jesus rose from the dead, he was: (a) no longer able to die; (b) no longer able to get injured; (c) no longer able to get sick; (d) no longer able to age; and (e) able to teleport without regard to spatial distances. These assumptions are unnecessary in order to account for the physical facts; and therefore, since MSBH does not ascribe these (infinite) properties to Jesus, it is far simpler.

Resurrection Debate: A New Approach

John W. Loftus has generously extended his invitation to me to become a member of this blog, and for that I am grateful. In the upcoming months I hope to contribute regularly on topics related to Christianity and its weaknesses, as well as the continuing debate between its prominent defenders and their critics. For those curious about my religious background, here is a little info:

I was not raised in a Christian home or religious environment, but nevertheless found my way into a Christian church, through a friend, prior to entering high school. It was in that church my friend attended that I became a Christian, and remained so until the end of my high school career, right before I left for college. Like many others, the doctrine of hell did not sit comfortably with me -- both on an intuitive and intellectual level -- and was thus the main reason for my departure from the Christian faith. Since then, after completing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy (I stopped at the MA level), I found many other compelling reasons which justified my abandonment of Christianity, which I hope to share and elaborate here.

In this entry, I will outline a new approach skeptics can and should take in the resurrection debate. As almost everyone agrees, skeptics and apologists alike, the ability for the apologist to establish a good case for the resurrection is vital to a successful defense of the Christian faith, and so, unsurprisingly, an enormous amount of time and effort has been spent devoted to this one area. A testament to the latter is the fact that anyone new (or old) to the scene will often observe the following: the debate can get really really complicated, especially among scholars. Why? A natural reason one might draw from this is that the case for the resurrection is not as terrible as one might think -- after all, if even the scholarly critics have to present elaborate and sophisticated arguments to answer their opponents, then the apologist's case can't be that bad. In actuality, the case for the resurrection can be very weak, despite the sophisticated nature of the debate, but it sure doesn't seem that way to those lost in the minutia of the historical details. I admit to being among the perplexed.

Hence I advocate a new approach to the debate, one that will cut through all the smoke and thus expose how weak the case for the resurrection truly is. To begin, one should pay close attention to the claim that the apologist wants -- needs -- to establish when he argues for the resurrection: it is the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead. And thus from this we can observe what the claim is not: it is not, merely, that Jesus was raised from the dead, which is obviously insufficient if the causal agent responsible for the resuscitation were not supernatural, but natural. The apologist undoubtedly needs to first establish the latter assertion in order to establish the former, but the two are clearly not equivalent -- in fact, the two are worlds apart. Here we come to my new approach: we should challenge the apologist to see if he can demonstrate (with probability, of course) that, if Jesus was really raised from the dead, it was God who did it. For, even if it were a historical fact that Jesus was raised from the dead, if it cannot be shown that God was the cause of the event, then what is the worth of historical apologetics to the rational defense of Christianity? None.

Below are arguments detailing why the inference from "Jesus was raised from the dead" to "it was probably God who raised Jesus from the dead" cannot be made nonfallaciously.

Argument 1

1. It is fallacious to infer that X probably can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all Zs can't y, when either: (a) we know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y; or (b) when X does not fall within the category of Z, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [assumption]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities), who was either human or not human, either a natural entity or supernatural entity. [assumption]
4. Jesus does not fall within the category of non-supernormal human being, and we know of no good reason to suppose there are no relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally. [premise, supported by C1 and c2 below]
5. We know of a plausible reason to suppose there might be relevant differences between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings that could enable Jesus, but not non-supernormal human beings, to rise naturally.
[premise, supported by the claim that Jesus may not have been not fully biologically human if we assume the virgin birth story]
6. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus probably could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. (from 5, 1, and 4, 1).


Edit: I realize premise (1) needs some explaining.

Consider Mike, a body-builder builder who works out 15 hours a day, and suppose one claims: Mike probably can't bench press 500 lbs, and this is thought to follow from the premise that all body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench press 500 lbs. This inference is clearly fallacious, but why? According to condition (b) of premise (1), the inference is fallacious not only because Mike and the other body-builders don't belong in the same category, but also because we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to 500 lbs, Mike is just like everyone else. If we had good reason for assuming that Mike was just like all the other body-builders (say, for instance, he has a muscular disorder which makes his 15 hours equivalent to a normal 2 hour work-out), then the inference would be nonfallacious. Hence: if X does not fall within the category of Z, the burden falls on the one making the inference to supply good reason for why we should assume the absence of any relevant difference between X and Z that could enable X, but not Z, to y.

To illustrate with another example, consider Dejohn the daily steroid-taker who works out less than 2 hours a day. Claim: Dejohn *probably* can't bench 500 lbs. Premise (data): All body-builders who work out less than 2 hours a day can't bench 500 lbs. Is this inference fallacious? Suppose we know that all the body-builders in our data don't take steroids, and Dejohn has been taking them for the past 8 years on a daily basis (let's assume they don't cause him any harm). Hence, even though Dejohn and everyone else works out the same amount of hours, there is a clear (possibly relevant) difference between the two that justifies an initial category distinction: we can separate Dejohn and the other body-builders -- since none of them take the drug -- into two classes (steroid taker vs. non-steroid takers). If we have no good reason to assume that with respect to being able to bench 500 lbs, Dejohn and everyone else are the same, then we must conclude that the inference is fallacious. Stated another way, given the justified category distinction, the inference is fallacious unless the one making the inference can supply good reason to suppose the distinction to be irrelevant -- like if we knew, for instance, that the steroids Dejohn takes only affects his lower legs and not his chest or upper body.

Condition (a) of premise (1) can be shown with the following illustration. Suppose one claims: Jane probably can't put her bare hand over a hot flame for 10 minutes without it be severely burned. Premise (data): over 100 million people can't put their bare hands over a hot flame for 10 minutes without their hands being severely burned. Is the inference fallacious? Not at all, until we find out the following fact: for over 10 years of her life, Jane has been a subject in numerous super-secret government experiments involving resistance to pyrogenic substances. Does this mean there are in fact relevant differences between Jane and everyone else (assuming those in the latter group were never involved in such experiments)? Not at all, because for all we know, those experiments might have been utter failures, or their scope very limited, and so forth. Nevertheless, because we are in the dark, and because there is some plausible reason to suppose there *might* indeed be relevant differences between Jane and everyone else, as a result of those experiments, the original inference would therefore be fallacious given this new information.




Argument 2: defense of premise (4)


P1. If biological entity X has capabilities that biological entity O do not have, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should not assume it is implausible that these capability differences cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in the physiology of X and O. [premise]

P2. Jesus had various supernormal capabilities that no non-supernormal human beings have. [assumption]

P3. There are no very good reasons to suppose we should assume it is implausible that these capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. [premise]

C1. Therefore, we should not assume it is implausible that capability differences, between Jesus and non-supernormal human beings, cannot be explained, at least in part, in terms of relevant differences in their physiology. (from P3, P1)


Argument 3: defense of premise (4)


p1. If A can't p, while B can p, then, barring very good reasons to suppose otherwise, we should assume there exist relevant differences between A and B which could explain how B, but not A, can p, even when A and B appear to be very similar.

p2. Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. [let's suppose]

p3. There are no very good reasons to assume there exist no relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead.

c1. Therefore, we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which would explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead. (from p3, p2, and p1)

p4. If we should assume there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise from the dead, then either: (a) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead, or (b) there exist relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise supernaturally from the dead.

p5. Either (a) or (b). (from p4, c1)

p6. If there are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false, then we should not suppose that (a) is false.

p7. There are no good reasons to suppose that (a) is false.

c2. Therefore, we should not suppose that (a) is false: that is, we should not suppose there exist NO relevant differences between Jesus and the rest of humanity which could explain why Jesus, but not the rest of humanity, was able to rise naturally from the dead. (from p7, p6)

My Comment on the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology

As of this posting it has received 0 out of 11 votes, my worst record ever. What do you think?

Welcome To the New Face of Christianity

Philip Jenkins, professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University, has argued that the Christianity of the future will be the one found in the Southern Hemisphere and Asia, since it's growing phenomenally in these places. In his newest book The New Faces of Christianity: Believing the Bible in the Global South, he shows us that Christianity is largely defined by that which it opposes. In the Northern Hemisphere Christianity opposes secularism and has developed responses to it by adopting liberalism. But in the Southern Hemisphere it opposes shamans, witch doctors, and animists--those who already believe in demonic forces. This video series below shows us how some evangelical Christians act on their beliefs. Welcome to the new face of Christianity folks! We're returning to the witch trials of the late Middle Ages, this time by evangelicals who believe the Bible, not Catholics. Doesn't it just warm your hearts?

There are seven parts to this video series all found by following the links in the sidebar at You Tube. Enjoy the first part below:



Related posts can be found by clicking here.

Hell: 20,000 Degrees Fahrenheit And Not A Drop of Water!

Back in 1974,while I was a licensed Southern Baptist Preacher and College Bible Major, the movie The Burning Hell was then being shown at many Bible Believing Churches throughout the Southeast. I was able to attend one such showing at a Pentecostal church in Seneca, SC.

While this video looks cheaply made by today’s high tech cinematography standareds, its affects were on par with such horror flicks of the era as The Night of the Living Dead and The Texas Chain Saw Massacre.

Many Christians who saw it were said to have had nightmares of Hell.

This film looks dumb today, but it’s horrors of the mid-seventies was claimed to have saved many over the reality of an eternal torment in Satan’s Hell.

If you can stomach it, all 8 section are here on Youtube.

Sleep well sinner!

On Cultural Relativism and Rape

Christian philosopher Victor Reppert offered up an argument against condemning rape if cultural relativism is the case. He wrote:

I had a teacher at Arizona State who told me that in one culture rape is considered perfectly OK, so long as you do it at the right time. In the morning, it's forbidden. In the afternoon, it is frowned upon. At night, it is perfectly OK, since a woman who is away from the protection of her husband is asking for it. (He never said which campus fraternity he was referring to).

If cultural relativism is true, the rules of that culture, with respect to rape, are justified. There is no "court of appeal" that is over and above that culture and out culture that would permit us to say that their views on rape are wrong and ours are right. For us to suggest that they are "really" wrong in permitting rape is to elevate the rules of our culture to a kind of cosmic status they cannot have. It is to be intolerant.

This is my brief response:

Let's say morals evolve in the same way as species do. Grant me that, okay?

Then I don't see a problem. The caveman who clubbed a woman and drug her into his cave did nothing wrong just as a chimpanzee who exhibits homosexual activity, or a dominant lion who demands sex with all of the females, or a cat who shows no mercy to a mouse.

We humans adopt codes of conduct in order to have the benefits that our higher species need, like friendship, family ties, and so on. That best explains why our moral codes are similar around the world on the major, basic issues, and why they are diverse on the moderate, lesser issues.

So, in a caveman culture rape is considered right. But in ours it is not. Our culture is different. Is it better? I would argue so, at least from our evolutionary standpoint. It's because we have continued to evolve. Because we do our morals have evolved in tandum.

Besides, it's not relativists who argue for rape, anyway, it's religious people, like what we find in Muslim and Old Testament texts.

Jephthah (Judges 11)

I Highly Recommend The New Book by Christian Scholar Kenton Sparks.

Christians do not trust the scholarship of atheists. They think we have an agenda and that we misrepresent the facts because we’re God haters. Okay, I guess. But Christian scholars are saying many of the same things we're saying while trying to maintain their faith. If you doubt what we say then try your hand at what your own scholars are saying.


Dr. Richard Knopp (pictured left) is using my book in his Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion classes at Lincoln Christian College and Seminary. He’s also attempting to answer my criticisms by requiring his students to read and evaluate Kenton L. Sparks book, God's Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship. I’m reading Sparks’s book right now and it’s excellent. Sparks is a Christian scholar who affirms inerrancy. If someone is concerned about his commitment to Christianity or whether he has some God hating agenda, Sparks has no such agenda.

I like how his argument progresses. He begins with Galileo in which Christians learned to re-read the Bible in light of the heliocentric universe. He argued that it wouldn’t do any good to ignore what was learned through science so Christian scholars began looking at the Bible differently. Sparks wrote: “Just as Galileo invited us to turn a critical eye toward the cosmos, so modern biblical scholars bid us to reflect critically upon our assumptions about the nature of Scripture and about how it should be read.” (p. 18) If Christians ignored the findings of Galileo it would discredit their faith. From this Sparks says there is a parallel tragic paradox, in that “the church’s wholesale rejection of historical criticism has begotten the irreverent use of Scripture by skeptics, thus destroying the faith of some believers while keeping unbelievers away from the faith.” (p. 21). His purpose in this book is to render the results of higher biblical criticism “theologically safe” just as Christian scholars did by admitting the results of modern science beginning with Galileo. (p. 23).

Sparks shows how that with the rise of philology we can date ancient writings because language changes throughout time and place. There is, after all, an Old- Middle- and Modern English, as well as British, Australian, South African and American dialects. This discipline began with the discovery that the “Donation of Constantine was a Christian forgery,” which was purportedly written in the 4th century whereby Constantine donated all of the Western Roman Empire to the authority of the Pope.

Sparks then takes us through three periods of hermeneutics, pre-modern, modern and post-modern, and shows us that people have not always treated texts in the same manner. He shows us how difficult it is for people who think they can understand a given text to do so, especially one in the ancient past. But since we must try anyway he proceeds.

The next part of his argument is where it gets good. He shows how historical criticism works with regard to the Assyrian Annals, which contains a lot of propaganda, and Babylonian Chronicles which are more accurate records, and why we know this. He shows how there are many texts in the ancient world which were psuedoprophetic, purportedly to be prophetic about the future but which were not, like the Uruk Prophecy. He also argues that “narrative stories that have the appearance of history may be fictional,” that these texts "can be the product of a very long literary process,” “sometimes written by different authors, and written in different historical periods, than the texts claim or imply.” (p. 71). From these parallels found in the literature of the ancient near eastern world he argues that “the evidence adduced above challenges the common evangelical charge that critical scholars approach the biblical texts with more skepticism than other ancient texts.” (p. 72). Right that.

Then in chapters three and four he shows why the Biblical critics are correct about the Bible, “in many instances,” especially with the Pentateuch, also called the Torah, or the first five books of the Bible. The Bible itself, if taken seriously, leads these scholars to think they were written by the same standards of other ancient near eastern literature in many places. It’s clear that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, if we take what it says seriously. There are problems of chronology, diverse narratives, legal diversity, and religious institutional progression, all reflecting a lengthy written process complete with anachronisms. Then there is the problem of Deuteronomy and the Exodus story itself. The normal evangelical “traditional” answers to these problems do not solve these issues, he argues.

This book is like a good novel. The reader wants to know how he solves these problems for his Christian faith and how he can maintain an inerrant Bible, so I won’t spoil his conclusions. I really like the fact that he’s being honest about what we can know about the Bible. I do not agree with his conclusions at all. In the end I think he undermines the basis for believing. See for yourselves. See if you can maintain your faith once you get done reading this book. I doubt you can.

I WANT IT TO BE TRUE DAMMIT IT! I DO!

I received an email from a Christian well-wisher who sent me the video below. The video produced a tear in my eye (just one). Maybe it's because my dad is dead and then maybe because in these hard economic times I'm hurting financially and might need some heavenly help. There's a huge emotional pull to the Christian message (on one level) that draws me back to that story. But I just can't believe. It's not true at all.

Another Argument by Spencer Lo for Input

See what you thinks about this:

1. If person P is fully human in the biological sense, then P possesses human DNA from both a human female and a human male.

2. If P did not acquire human DNA from a human male, then P does not possess human DNA from a human male.

3. Jesus had no biological human father. [Christian assumption]

4. Therefore, Jesus did not acquire human DNA from a human male. (from 3)

5. Therefore, Jesus does not possess human DNA from a human male. (from 4, 2)

6. Therefore, Jesus was not fully human in the biological sense. (from 5, 1).

A New Book Just Released That Will Redefine the Debate

The Evolution of God by Robert Wright is being released this week. Newsweek's religion editor Lisa Miller claims that it "redefines the faith debate." The description on Amazon reads:

In this sweeping narrative that takes us from the Stone Age to the Information Age, Robert Wright unveils an astonishing discovery: there is a hidden pattern that the great monotheistic faiths have followed as they have evolved. Through the prisms of archaeology, theology, and evolutionary psychology, Wright's findings overturn basic assumptions about Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and are sure to cause controversy. He explains why spirituality has a role today, and why science, contrary to conventional wisdom, affirms the validity of the religious quest. And this previously unrecognized evolutionary logic points not toward continued religious extremism, but future harmony.

Nearly a decade in the making, The Evolution of God is a breathtaking re-examination of the past, and a visionary look forward.

This sounds very interesting. Take a look for yourselves, click here: The Evolution of God

Feedback on Two Arguments Requested

Spencer Lo is looking to get some feedback on the following two arguments, and was wondering if I would post them so people can comment. Yes I will:

Argument 1

1. It is fallacious to infer that x can't y on the basis of data suggesting that all zs can't y, when x does not fall within the scope or category of z.
2. There is data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead. [Let's suppose]
3. Jesus was a supernormal being (i.e. a being with supernormal capabilities). [Let's suppose]
4. Therefore, it is fallacious to infer that Jesus could not have risen naturally from the dead on the basis of data suggesting that all non-supernormal human beings can't rise naturally from the dead

Argument 2

1. Whenever we encounter a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon has a supernatural cause.
2. The phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead is a scientifically unexplained phenomenon, which we have not adequately studied scientifically, and which appears to contradict our current scientific theories. [Let's assume for argument's sake that Jesus was raised from the dead.]
3. Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that the phenomenon of Jesus rising from the dead has a supernatural cause.

Pascal's Wager and the Annihilation View of Hell

Any attempted defense of Pascal's Wager has shown a complete and utter lack of knowledge about anthropological studies of the religious cultures around the world. There are literally a myriad number of gods and supernatural forces believed by the peoples of the world. This is called the "many gods" objection. But there are other things to consider.

When it comes to Pascal's Wager the evidence is simply below the threshold for it to be worth considering. The threat is more like someone crying out that the sky is failing. We've heard too many people make this claim too many times to take any of them seriously.

But in recent decades the "conditional immortality" annihilation view of hell seems to be the wave of future Christianity (ala, Clark Pinnock and Jonathan Kvanvig). With it the eternal threat has been significantly reduced and even completely neutralized. What would Pascal's Wager look like now, calculated with the annihilation view of hell in mind? Christians themselves are taking the bite out of the wager.

The Problem of Miscommunication

I'm writing a chapter for a new book to be published by Prometheus Books. In this chapter I'm describing what I consider to be a very serious problem for Christianity that needs to be highlighted and emphasized around the internet. I call it the Problem of Miscommunication.

Christians argue how that Christianity helped abolish slavery. Big deal, even if this is true. Who are you trying to kid here? If God had condemned slavery from the very beginning there would be nothing to reform, no beatings, no killings, no institutional slavery justified from the Bible. If God had repeatedly said, "Thou shalt not buy beat or own slaves," and never sent any vibes the other way, then Christians could never justify it as an institution.

There are so many other examples. Did you know that 8 million Christians killed each other during the French Wars of Religion and during the Thirty Years War over the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and who was the legitimate authority to administer it? Again, 8 million Christians. All Jesus had to do was to say he was speaking "metaphorically" about his body and blood, if that's what he meant. And all Jesus had to do was to clear up whether Peter was the rock or his confession was the rock in Matt 16.

To say these Christians (both Catholics and Protestants) should've known better is sheer ignorance, for they still disagree about this today. Whenever there is miscommunication both parties are to blame, especially if there is an omniscient God who could've known in advance how his followers would misinterpret what he said. Do you understand this? All attempts at answering this particular problem utterly fail to take it seriously.

For Christians to claim atheism was the cause of many deaths in modern wars misses the point for three reasons: 1) Atheism per se was not the cause of the killings; 2) It's a red herring, since whether or not this was the case with atheism does nothing to solve the Christian Problem of Miscommunication; 3) If the Christians in that era had modern weapons of war, including nuclear weapons, then we would've seen many more deaths, possibly genocide.

Oh, The Compassion of Conservative Christians

Saturday night (May 30) I headed to Lowes at 8:45 pm to pick up some electrical parts to complete a wiring job I had started on my motorcycle.


On the way back at 9:30 pm, I passed two SUV’s stopped in the right hand side of a 4 lane highway directly across from a large Southern Baptist Church which had apparently just let out as there was about 20 cars in the parking lot with about 30 or more people milling around and talking with about half staring at the stopped cars.

As I passed the SUV’s, I noticed an animal of some kind in front of the first SUV which then drove off. As I turned my motorcycle around, the second SUV also drove off over the animal (in between its tires).

I pulled up below the animal, I noticed it was a large house cat which was still breathing, but had blood coming out of its nose and right ear. Its right eye was crushed in as if the cat had been centered under the first SUV and its head had hit some part of the car’s frame.

I put my bikes emergency flashers on and carefully moved the cat to the sidewalk. There I left my motorcycle head lights on and I noticed the cat trying to get up and falling back down.

Being on a motorcycle, I had few options to help this gravely injured cat. I called my wife and told her to bring the Jeep and a blanket so we could carry it to the 24 hour Emergency Animal Hospital.

Although the church and its parking lot were filled with a good size crowd, other than staring and talking to each other, NO ONE offered to help, much less walk over to offer advice.

As I waited on my wife to arrive, about 5 cars left the church’s parking lot and drove passed me, the injured car and my motorcycle with only one even slowing down to “Rubber neck” the scene.
The cat finally got up and staggered into the woods ten feet and fell over.

An ambulance going the other way pulled up with strobe lights on and asked; “What was going on?”. I told them about the cat, and they offered to try an load it into my Jeep which had just pulled up followed by a county sheriff officer who also turned on his blue lights.

As they were catching the cat, two old women (in their early to mid 70’s) from the neighboring apartment complex came out. One identified the cat as “Mr. Smokes” and began crying in a panic. The second lady told her to stay back and told us the owner of the cat had had several heart attacks. Her friend said that if she saw Mr. Smokes in this condition, she might have another or even die.

So, now we have an EMS ambulance and county sheriff patrol car with red, white and blue strobes filling the night sky; and old lady yelling and crying about her pet cat of 12 years and a church parking lot full of Christians.

After the medics got the cat load into my Jeep, the two elderly women begged me to take Mr. Smokes to be euthanized as they had no car.

At the Emergency Animal Clinic, I told the nurses about the tow elderly women and that, if the cat could be treated, I would pay up to $500.00 to help the woman who love the cat.

However, once the doctor examined Mr. Smokes, he said it had severe head injures and its brain was starting to swell. With the owners permission, I signed the papers to have the cat euthanized.

So, just what did these Jesus loving and lost soul caring Southern Baptist church members do….NOTHING! (It was kind of like the time when Jesus was on the Cross; they watch form afar!)

The next day, I told my brother about the situation and the useless church members standing there 500 feet away who never once offered to help.

He said that’s pare for the course. That they were typical church members patting themselves on the back and congratulating one another for being saved.

Anyway for them: It was just a damn cat and the two old ladies (Hell, they probably weren’t even saved!). So why should Jesus care (WWJD)!!

Anyway, as an atheist, I DID AND STILL DO!

The Anchor Bible Dictionary on the Authorship and Date of 2nd Thessalonians

As I've said before, Christian scholarship debunks itself fine without atheists having to do it. Bible thumpers need to look at the case they make. Here is one example from Christian scholarship on the authorship and dating of II Thessalonians:

3. Theories Assuming Pseudonymous Authorship. Scholars in growing numbers argue against Pauline authorship in favor of authorship by an unknown Paulinist who used 1 Thessalonians as a model to meet a new situation in Macedonia.

a. History of Scholarship. J. E. C. Schmidt first proposed pseudonymous authorship in 1798 (Trilling 1972: 13, with reprint of the key pages of Schmidt’s work, 1972: 159–61). He challenged the authenticity of 2 Thess 2:1–12 on the basis of its eschatology. In 1892 Holtzmann (pp. 213–16) summed up the arguments against authenticity after 90 years of scholarship: no anti-Jewish polemic as in the authentic Pauline letters; non-Pauline form of the language; basically an expansive repetition of parallels from the first letter; no OT citations. Wrede (1903) introduced a new stage into the research by providing evidence for the literary dependence of 2 Thessalonians on 1 Thessalonians in language, order of motifs, and structure. He formulated the questions that dominated scholarship down to 1972 (see Jewett 1986: 35ff.; Collins 1988: 212–13), even though the majority of scholars still held to Pauline authorship. Trilling’s Untersuchungen (1972) ushered in the third stage of discussion, in which more and more scholars incline to pseudonymous authorship, e.g., Bailey (1978), Krodel (1978), Lindemann (1977), Collins (1988), Holland (1988), and Hughes (1989). Trilling supported his historical reconstruction in his 1980 commentary. Krodel and Collins provide convenient summaries of the cumulated argumentation.

b. Linguistic-Literary Evidence.

(1) Vocabulary. Vocabulary statistics are deceptive. Of the ten hapax legomena in 2 Thessalonians five occur in the LXX; the other five are not unusual (Milligan 1908: liii). Bornemann (1894: 471) suggests that the vocabulary of 2 Thessalonians is close to that of Luke–Acts, a suggestion supported by an examination of the eleven words that are Pauline hapax legomena in 2 Thessalonians but occur elsewhere in the NT, and the five that occur only in the Deutero-Pauline Ephesians and Pastoral Epistles. There are also a series of Pauline terms that are completely absent from 2 Thessalonians: agapētos, aiōn, hamartia, an, anēr, apothnēskō, apostolos, ginōskō, gnō rizō, egeirō, egō, ethnos, zēteō, kalos, keryssō, laleō, mallon, men, nekros, polys, syn, sōma, teknon, tis. The particles and prepositions are especially important. Thessalonikeus (1 Thess 1:1; 2 Thess 1:1) and euthynō (1 Thess 3:11; 2 Thess 3:5) are the only terms that occur in both Thessalonian letters, but nowhere else in Paul. The former is striking, because it is the only time Paul uses the term for the inhabitants of a city rather than the city name. Such word statistics allow no firm conclusions.

2 Thessalonians uses a number of terms in a sense unusual for Paul. Gk thlipsis (“suffering”) is viewed as the basis for the retribution of the persecutors in 2 Thess 1:4–6, but as confirmation of the Thessalonians’ election in 1 Thess 1:6–10. Paul regards the basileia tou theou as present in Rom 17:17, 1 Cor 4:20 and 1 Thess 2:12, but future in 2 Thess 1:5. (Paul does regard it as future in the phrase “inherit the kingdom,” 1 Cor 6:9, 10; 15:50; Gal 5:21.) 2 Thess 1:7 uses apokalypsis of Jesus’ Parousia (cf. 1 Cor 1:7), while elsewhere Paul uses it of the wrath of God (Rom 2:5), of some specific item of information (1 Cor 14:6, 20; Gal 1:12; 2:2), or of mystical experience (2 Cor 12:1, 7). Gk klēsis has a future orientation in 2 Thess 1:11 (without any tie to baptism), while 1 Thess 4:7 uses it of Christian life in the world. Paul usually relates “calling” to baptism (Gal 1:6, 15; 5:13; 1 Cor 1:26; 7:20).

Unusual turns of phrase are more significant. Frame (1912: 32–34) presents an extensive list of such phrases and turns of thought in 2 Thessalonians, which Trilling (1972: 49–50; cf. Rigaux 1956: 85–87) presents in a convenient format. While Frame claims that the apocalyptic subject matter accounts for many of them, Trilling more persuasively claims that recurring features of style in 2 Thessalonians better account for them: figures of speech, recurrent parallelism (see Trilling 1972: 52–53), and frequent plerophory.

(2) Literary Style. 2 Thessalonians has a distinctive style for such a short letter. On the one hand, it betrays few of the characteristic stylistic features of the authentic Pauline letters described by Weiss (1897: 5): individual, short sentences, rarely formed into periods, even when clauses are introduced by hoti, hina, hopōs, hōste, etc.; asyndetic clauses or clauses joined by the copula or antithetical or comparative particles; frequent appositions; infrequent genitive absolutes. In short, this is the style of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Such style uses much figurative language drawn from daily life, with frequent address to the readers.

2 Thessalonians is different. Some things characteristic of Paul’s style are missing. There are no parenthetic expressions, no play on prepositions (cf. Gal 1:11, 12; Rom 11:36), and no initial or end rhyme (except for the one possibility in 2 Thess 2:17). Rigaux (1956: 90) gives an extensive list of pictorial language drawn from daily life in 1 Thessalonians, but finds only two examples of pictorial language in 2 Thessalonians: “rest” in 1:6 and the Word of the Lord “running” in 3:2, a sure indication of nonauthenticity for Trilling (1972: 56). The sentence structure is different. 2 Thessalonians has long sentences (1:3–12; 2:5–12; 3:7–9), formed of elements joined like links in a chain (“kettenartige Verknüpfung,” von Dobschütz 1909: 42). 2 Thessalonians frequently repeats terms or expressions in identical form or a slight variant, a mark of the letter’s “poverty of expression.” Trilling (1972: 62–63) gives a long list that demonstrates this as a distinctive mark of style of 2 Thessalonians. This pleonastic style also led to the frequent use of parallelism, in 2 Thessalonians most frequently synonymous, more rarely synthetic, almost never antithetical. Trilling (1972: 52–53) gives a long list of such passages. Krodel (1978: 82–83) translates part of the list into English and comments that these parallelisms are “all the more important when we recognize their sparsity in 1 Thessalonians.” Weiss (1897: 12–13) points out that Paul himself most frequently used antithetical parallelism, a basic element of his theological thought.

Rigaux (1956: 89) called attention to Paul’s development of thought by triadic groupings in 1 Thessalonians. He identified sixteen such triads. But 2 Thessalonians has only one such triad (2 Thess 2:9). This is striking in view of 2 Thessalonians’ tendency to pleonasm, fullness of expression, seen in compound verbs when the simplex would do (2 Thess 1:3, 4, 5, 10), in the frequent use of pas, pantes, en panti tropō, the use of substantive chains, and the use of hendiadys (2 Thess 2:4, 17; 3:8, 12; Trilling 1972: 58–60). A comparison of the paraenetic sections of the Thessalonians letters makes this clear. 1 Thess 4:4–10; 5:1–11 are formed of short sentences, while 5:14–22 is a series of short, asyndetic imperatives. 2 Thessalonians is different: there are only two short sentences in its paraenesis (2 Thess 3:2b, 17) and four paraenetic imperatives (2 Thess 2:15; 3:13, 14).

(3) Verbal Similarity. Bornemann (1894: 473) already pointed out that the similarity of 1 and 2 Thessalonians went far beyond structure to include “sequence of thought, clauses, turns of phrase and expressions.” Wrede (1903: 3–36) provided massive documentation by presenting the parallels in tabular form, by showing that every paragraph in 2 Thessalonians has a conceptually related section in 2 Thessalonians. He demonstrates that these significant parallels occur in the same order in both letters. (Many of the linguistic similarities are listed in the paragraphs above.) They are not dependent on a specific historical situation in the congregation addressed. Wrede finally concludes in an impassioned paragraph (pp. 29–30) that the coincidence of memory or historical situation is not adequate to explain the similarity.

(4) Lack of Personal Warmth. Commentators point to the striking difference in tone between 1 and 2 Thessalonians. 1 Thessalonians is written with warmth. Paul’s affection for his readers is clear. He recalls their reception of the gospel in a time of great pressure (1 Thess 1:6) and their open announcement of the gospel to others (1 Thess 1:8) so that their faith was known throughout Achaia as well as Macedonia. When separated from them, he felt the loss, repeatedly striving (in vain) to visit them (1 Thess 2:17–18). His affection for them led him to send Timothy N from Athens so that he was bereft of companionship there (1 Thess 3:1–2). And when Timothy returned with the good news of their fidelity in faith and their enduring affection for him, Paul becomes lyrical in his joy (1 Thess 3:7–10). The tone of 2 Thessalonians is quite different. Bornemann (1894: 468; cf. Trilling 1972: 63) spoke of the letter’s consistent impersonal, official tone, closer to prophetic speech than to a true letter. For example, in both thanksgivings 2 Thessalonians uses opheilomen with eucharistein (“we ought to give thanks,” 2 Thess 1:3; 2:13). The opening thanksgiving is impersonal in tone. While adelphoi (“brothers”) is found eighteen times in 1 Thessalonians, it occurs in 2 Thessalonians “only when it is part of a structural formula or when it is taken over from 1 Thessalonians” (2 Thess 1:3; 2:1, 13, 15; 3:1, 6, 13; Collins 1988: 222). 2 Thess 3:6 introduces the paraenesis with the verb “we order” (paraggelomen, cf. 3:4, 10, 12), not “we beseech” (parakaloumen), as in 1 Thess 4:1 (cf. 4:10; 5:11, 14). The relationship between writer and readers differs from that in 1 Thessalonians.

In short, while the structure and language of 2 Thessalonians are in many respects close to 1 Thessalonians, there are significant differences in vocabulary, rhetoric, and tone. Such differences call for explanation.

c. Theological Arguments. 2 Thessalonians introduces no new themes into the Thessalonian correspondence. But there are many differences in theological emphasis or nuance that suggest the writer differs from Paul in theological outlook and probably comes from a later age.

(1) Eschatology. 2 Thessalonians is the only Pauline letter in which eschatology is the major topic. Its eschatology, strongly apocalyptic in language and outlook (Giblin 1967), is a response to the persecution undergone by the readers (2 Thess 1:4). 2 Thessalonians exhorts the readers to fidelity and endurance by pointing out that God’s justice (2 Thess 1:5) leads inevitably to the condemnation of the oppressors and the vindication of the faithful at the revelation of the Lord Jesus. Jesus will “execute vengeance on those who do not know God” (2 Thess 1:8–9), a point reinforced in 2 Thess 2:11–12. 2 Thess 2:1–12 reinforces the need to remain faithful by pointing out that a series of events must take place before the Parousia of Jesus can happen. The persecution will grow worse as the opposition develops in intensity. The “Man of Lawlessness, the son of destruction” (2 Thess 2:3) must appear first. He will be a parody of the Lord, whose Parousia, accompanied by false signs and acts of power and miracle, will deceive and lead to destruction all those who “do not receive the love of the truth in order that they might be saved” (2 Thess 2:9–10).

Paul elsewhere makes use of apocalyptic motifs and language, but without such a consistent apocalyptic schema of events. He speaks of the present age and the coming age (Gal 1:4) and sets out in 1 Cor 15:21–28 a periodization of events that lead to the resurrection of believers. In 1 Thessalonians he speaks of the Parousia of Jesus (1 Thess 2:19; 3:13; 4:15; 5:23) in a context strongly influenced by the ruler cult (apantēsis, kyrios), not apocalyptic. The “day of the Lord” in 1 Thess 5:2 is borrowed from prophetic, not apocalyptic, imagery. Krodel (1978: 84) points out that nowhere does Paul “use the idea of divine retribution to comfort believers in distress.”

2 Thess 2:1–2 suggests that some of the readers expected the Parousia very soon. But Christians must be clear about the Lord’s Parousia and their future gathering before him (2 Thess 2:1–2). Paul stressed the nearness of the Lord’s Parousia in 1 Thess 4:15, 17; 5:1–5, while his later letters continued to say “The Lord is at hand” (1 Cor 7:29, 31; Rom 13:11–12; Phil 4:5). 2 Thessalonians stresses the opposite to reinforce the urgency of the need to stand fast and remain faithful (2 Thess 2:15) to the God who called the readers through the gospel (2 Thess 2:14; cf. Krodel 1978: 74–77). And both letters appeal to earlier teaching (1 Thess 5:1–2, explicitly rejecting time speculation; 2 Thess 2:5 affirms a sequence of events).

(2) Christology. 2 Thessalonians never mentions the death or resurrection of Jesus. Jesus is primarily the Lord (kyrios) in 2 Thessalonians (cf. 1:1, 7, 8, 12; 2:1, 8 [13?], 14, 16; 3:3, [5?], 6, 12, 16, 18), but the letter nowhere tells how he became the Lord. It does not cite earlier creedal formulas (1 Thess 1:9–10; 4:14; 5:10 does), does not talk of Jesus’ death as sacrifice (as 1 Thess 5:10 does), or relate his lordship over the Thessalonians to baptism. There is nothing like “the word of the cross” (cf. 1 Cor 1:18) in this letter. In 2 Thessalonians Jesus, the Lord, does not have a past, but only a future, significance. At the Parousia he will punish the oppressors (2 Thess 1:8; cf. “righteous judgment,” 1:5), while the faithful will be gathered before him (2 Thess 2:1). His Parousia will also be his revelation as Lord, i.e., as benefactor and vindicator. His major characteristic is power exercised in the destruction of the “Man of Lawlessness” (2 Thess 2:8). This contrasts strongly with other letters in the Pauline corpus, where the confession “Jesus is Lord” is tied to his resurrection and to baptism (1 Cor 12:3; Rom 10:9; Phil 2:11).

2 Thessalonians also diverges from Paul by using language about Jesus that Paul reserves for God. The term “Lord,” referring to Jesus, occurs where Paul speaks of God. Thus 2 Thess 2:13 speaks of the “beloved of the Lord,” while 1 Thess 1:4 speaks of the “beloved of God.” 2 Thess 2:14 speaks of the “glory of our Lord Jesus Christ” (cf. 2 Thess 1:10, 12). Paul ascribes glory only to God (Rom 1:23; 3:7, 23; 4:20; 5:2; 6:4; 1 Cor 10:31, etc.); Jesus only reflects God’s glory (2 Cor 3:18; 4:4, 6). Where 1 Thess 5:23 invokes the “God of peace,” 2 Thess 3:12 calls on the “Lord of peace.” The language of 1 Thessalonians is the normal Pauline expression (Rom 15:33, 16:20; 1 Cor 14:33; 2 Cor 13:11; Phil 4:9). 2 Thessalonians reveals a christological development that gives greater prominence to Jesus.

(3) Theology. God’s acts in the past are the basis of the Christians’ hope. He chose the Thessalonians as the “firstfruits” toward salvation (2 Thess 2:13), an election that is the basis for their conviction that they are “beloved by the Lord” and destined “for the sure possession of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Because God called them, they are his assembly (ekklēsia, 1:4) that suffers for the royal rule of God (basileia tou theou). Suffering leads to the demonstration of the “just judgment of God” (2 Thess 1:5) because it leads to the public demonstration that God is just. Twice God is addressed as “our Father” (1:1; 2:16), but never as “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (cf. 2 Cor 1:3) or as the one who “raised Jesus from the dead” (Rom 4:24; 8:11; 10:9, etc.).

God’s election and justice determine the content of the gospel in 2 Thessalonians. God will carry out his apocalyptic plans for them. “The gospel of our Lord Jesus” (2 Thess 1:8) describes how Jesus’ Parousia executes judgment and gathers the faithful. God is responsible for all that happens: their election (2 Thess 2:13), their growing faith and love (2 Thess 1:3), his past love for them (2 Thess 2:16), the sanctification of the spirit (2 Thess 2:13), their past comfort and hope (2 Thess 2:16). It is not surprising that grace (charis) plays so small a role in this book. It occurs twice in stock formulas (2 Thess 1:2; 3:18). 2 Thess 1:12 relates grace to the Parousia of the Lord, while 2:16 ties it to God’s love and the gift of comfort and hope in the past to pray that God exhort and establish them in the present. The familiar Pauline contour is absent.

(4) Tradition and Life. 1 Thess 3:8 urges the Thessalonians to “stand fast in the Lord.” 2 Thessalonians urges its readers to “stand fast and hold on to the traditions” (paradoseis, 2 Thess 2:15; the singular is used in 3:6). By tradition 2 Thessalonians means the content of the letter itself, that is, the apocalyptic teaching that God will vindicate those faithful under persecution. Tradition is thus a criterion for action. Paul’s work in order not to accept any money from the Thessalonians (2 Thess 3:8–9) is described in language reminiscent of 1 Thess 2:9. The imitation of Paul is a part of the tradition they must (dei, 2 Thess 3:7) keep.

Prayers in 1 Thessalonians pray for the survival of the readers in the Parousia (1 Thess 5:23), since the coming of Christ is the basis for comfort and encouragement (1 Thess 4:18; 5:11). 2 Thessalonians prays for a right action in word and deed (2:16–17), for “love of God and the endurance of Christ” (3:5), for a life lived in peace (3:16). The eschatology determines the content of the prayer. Thus it is not surprising that 2 Thessalonians urges the readers to proper action against those “who live [walk] without order” (2 Thess 3:6, 11), because of the imminent Parousia of the Lord Jesus (2 Thess 2:8). The Thessalonians themselves should not grow tired of doing what is good (2 Thess 3:13).

4. Reconstruction of Historical Origin. Apocalyptic eschatology flowered at the end of the 1st century, as Revelation and Matthew suggest. The last two decades (80–100 c.e.) was a time of persecution for the Church. The stress on authoritative tradition also suggests a later age in which Paul has become a revered figure. This dating also provides a good historical context for interpreting the reference to spurious Pauline revelation, theological argument (logos), or correspondence mentioned in 2 Thess 2:2. People were invoking Paul’s name as authority for their teaching—and 2 Thessalonians does the same. The reference to Paul’s handwriting in 2 Thess 3:17 is based on the earlier references in 1 Cor 16:21, Gal 6:11, and Philemon 19. Nowhere does Paul suggest it as a mark of authenticity; in Galatians it is a mark of his personal feelings for the addressees. 2 Thess 3:17 is the only place the handwriting is used as a mark of authenticity. (The word semeion elsewhere in Paul always refers to miraculous events or to evidence of the Spirit’s activity.) Bailey (1978: 138) comments that 3:17 “makes more sense as the product of the pseudonymous author who wished by it to allay any suspicions of inauthenticity which his letter might arouse.” Krodel’s proposal (1978: 85), supporting the suggestion of Lindemann (1977: 35–47) that 2 Thess 2:2 might refer to 1 Thessalonians, now misinterpreted at this later date, is attractive, but not compelling. In short, 2 Thessalonians is the work of a late Paulinist who rethinks Paul in terms of apocalyptic eschatology and the Pauline tradition to reinforce the fidelity of persecuted Christians.

By Edgar M. Krentz, Professor of NT, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, Chicago, IL.

Freedman, D. N. (1996, c1992). The Anchor Bible Dictionary (6:519). New York: Doubleday.

What is the Evidential Value of Personal Testimonies?

Many Christian people think that by sharing their personal religious experiences with us that this is some kind of evidence to those of us who don't believe. They claim to know God in a personal way. They claim to feel him, experience him, and so forth and so on. But of what import is that to people who don't believe? Nothing I can see at all.

I would like for these Christians to learn something from Professor Dan Lambert, who is using my book in his class at John Brown University. In his class he makes his students think through my arguments. You see, if I have not had these personal experiences then what value does telling me about them do for me? All I can say is that if I had these experiences then I would believe too. The problem is why God doesn't give me those kinds of experiences. God surely knows what it would take to convince me, okay? If he wanted to convince me he could easily do this and doing so would not depend upon me at all. That I have a stubborn or hard heart does not matter, for if God appeared to me like the Bible says he did to Moses, Gideon, or Paul, then I would believe even if I was not receptive to him.

So when dealing with our arguments do what Prof. Dan Lambert said:

"You cannot use the Bible to try to refute his points or to support your own. You must use logic and critical thinking primarily."

I'm sure Dan would also say you cannot refute our arguments by referring to personal experiences which we have not had.

Cheers.

Answering Albert Camus: "Why Not Just Commit Suicide?"

Jeff said it this way:

I've heard a quote at various times that goes something like this: "Do you dance while the music is playing, or sit down and cry because you know it will end?" I think the analogy is apt. So what if the song will end? Why not enjoy it while it lasts? In fact, because our life ends, it gives us all the more reason to squeeze every ounce out of it that we can. It doesn't matter to the universe whether we do, but it matters to us.